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This   thesis   studies   the   wartime   experiences   of   the   Empire’s   urban   civilians   in   the  
sixth-century  Persian  wars.  While  many  researches  have  been  conducted  to  examine  
Romano-Persian   relations,   civilians’   fates   in   the   armed   conflicts   between   these   two  
great   powers   were   generally   neglected.   This   dimension   deserves   more   attention   to  
shed  new  light  on  the  relationship  between  Rome  and  Persia  and  the  nature  of  warfare  
in  classical  antiquity. 
This   thesis   is   divided   into   three   parts.   In   chapter   1,   both   a   sketch   of   major  
political  and  military  events  of  the  Roman  Near  East  and  a  brief  review  of  late  antique  
intellectual  backgrounds  are  provided.  Chapter  2  aims  to  investigate  how  late  antique  
and   medieval   writers   presented   and   described   civilians’   wartime   experiences.   The  
results   show   that   they   not   only   shared   the   same   language   stock   with   their  
predecessors,   but   also   adopted   certain   allusions   and   motifs   in   their   works.   Roman  
civilians’  fates  are  examined  thematically  from  chapter  3  onwards.  Whereas  many  of  
them   were   killed,   the   blockade   of   a   city   could   lead   to   famine   and   cannibalism.  
Meanwhile,  cases  of  sexual  violence  were  reported  by  authors  from  different  literary  
milieux.   Also,   the   inhabitants’   possessions   and   buildings   were   either   destroyed   or  
removed.   Different   types   of   population   movements   in   wartime   are   investigated   in  
chapters   4   and   5.   Some  Romans   took   refuge   outside   their   hometown  or   escaped   to  
other  places,  while  certain  notables  were  detained  as  hostages.  The  victorious  Persians  
captured  many  survivors  and  transported  them  to  different  places. 
In   the   end,   chapter   6   includes   both   a   synthesis   of   Roman   civilians’   wartime  
experiences   and   an   explanation   for   these   phenomena.   Whereas   many   cities   were  
either   besieged   or   threatened,   it   is   shown   that   the  Romans’   fates   in   these   conflicts  
were  variable  and  affected  by  the  interaction  of  various  factors  such  as  the  Sasanids’  
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Notes  on  transliteration  and  terminology 
1.   Most   Greek   personal   names   will   be   transcribed,   so   Prokopios   rather   than  
Procopius,   and   Theophylaktos,   not   Theophylact.   Other   standardised,   anglicised  
personal  names  such  as  Justinian,  George,  and  Paul,  will  still  be  used. 
 
2.  There  is  no  standard  system  of  transliteration  for  middle  Persian  or  Arabic  names.  
In   these   cases   the   conventions   in   the   Encyclopædia Iranica 
http://www.iranicaonline.org (accessed 12 April 2015) and the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam (Leiden 1960-2009) will be followed. For those coming from other languages, I 
use the commonly latinised forms of the names. 
 
3. I use the term ‘Mesopotamia’ either to designate two frontier provinces of the 
Empire, Mesopotamia and Osrhoene, or the alluvial plain lying between the Tigris 
and the Euphrates. The term ‘Roman Syria’, on the other hand, refers to the region 
which includes both Syria Prima and Syria Secunda. 
 
4. Throughout my thesis I use the most well-known Greek names for the place-names 
in the Roman Near East unless the names in other (usually oriental) languages were 
used by our authors in their texts. Thus Edessa and not Urfa or Urhay, Beroea, not 
Halab and so on. The case of Kallinikos needs to be addressed briefly. While this city 
bore names from both Greek and Latin in Late Antiquity, many Greek-speaking 
authors like Prokopios called it Καλλινίκος in their texts. In my thesis a transliterated 
name Kallinikos is thus preferred to its latinised form Callinicum and Leontopolis. 
 
5. Throughout my thesis I follow the translation and texts of standard editions for both 




Armed conflicts between peoples and states can have a terrible impact upon civilian 
populations such as the victims in the Gaza-Israel Conflict and the Syrian Civil War, 
the Yazidi refugees in the Jebel Sinjar, and the hostages executed by the ‘Islamic 
State’. Meanwhile, we are exposed to information regarding these events, with 
different purposes and standpoints for these calamities and misfortunes being made 
known across the world; sometimes, the details are even revealed by the perpetrators 
themselves. The focus of my thesis is both to study civilian populations’ experiences 
in the long conflicts between the Eastern Roman Empire and the Sasanian Empire 
between the beginning of the Anastasian War (502) and the peace treaty signed in 
Maurice (582-602)’s reign (591)1 and to examine which experiences were reported 
and presented and by what means. However, it  is  not  my  aim  to  compare  the  situation  
of   the   sixth-century   Near   East   to   what   we   can   learn   from   news   coverage   of  
contemporary  media;;  the  huge  social  and  cultural  differences  between  people  living  in  
Late  Antiquity   and   those  of   contemporary   societies  would  make   such  a   comparison  
impossible.  Rather,   through the close reading of available literary sources from the 
sides of both the Romans and the Sasanids in my thesis, the information we have is 
clearly subjected to the perspective and contexts of these texts. It is hoped that this 
observation—in which the importance of relevant political, social, and intellectual 
background from which our knowledge was produced and presented is highlighted—
can contribute methodologically to the study of civilians’ wartime fates nowadays.  
        Perceived by themselves as the ‘two eyes of the world’, 2  the relationship 
between Rome and Persia—the two ‘great powers’ of the eastern Mediterranean 
                                            
1  Ḵosrow II (r. 590-628) promised to give Martyropolis and Dara back to the Romans 
in 590, Th. Sim. 4.13.24. However, Dara was actually returned in 591, Th. Sim. 
5.3.10-1, and the Great King fulfilled his promise by making a peace agreement in the 
same year, Th. Sim. 5.15.2, Sebeos 12. Therefore, in my thesis, that year is preferred 
as the end of the Romano-Persian wars in the sixth century. 
2  Th.  Sim.  4.11.2,  possibly  quoting  from  Ḵosrow II’s letter to Maurice (r. 582-602). 
This term, however, appears to have originated earlier: see, for example, Petr. Patr. 
13, in which this term was used by Peter the Patrician to refer to the negotiation under 
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world at the end of antiquity—has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Whereas 
most research has concentrated on political, economic, and even cultural issues, the 
topic of civilians’ wartime experiences has been largely neglected. 3  This 
underexplored dimension deserves more attention in itself as a way not only to shed 
new light on the relationship between Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity but also to 
study warfare and society in the postclassical period. 
This   is   the   first   study   to  examine   the   social  aspects  of  besieged  and  captured  
cities  in  the  Persian  wars  systematically  and  critically.  Based on a thorough analysis 
of various sources, details surrounding the sacking of cities in the Roman Near East 
(Amida in the reign of Anastasios I [r. 491-518, hereafter Anastasios], Sura, Antioch, 
and Kallinikos in the 540s, and finally Apamea and Dara in the reign of Justin II [r. 
565-74]) will be examined at factual, textual, and contextual levels. Several important 
questions will be addressed. First, what might have been the civilians’ experiences in 
urban communities, from provincial metropoleis to frontier citadels, both during and 
after armed conflict? Second, how did classical and oriental historians depict Roman 
civilians’ wartime and postwar experiences and sufferings? Finally, what are the 
significance and particularities of these sixth-century civilians’ misfortunes in the 
conflicts between Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity? 
Both  the  Romans  and  the  Persians  became  victims  in  the  Romano-Persian  wars,  
and   indeed certain aspects of Sasanid experience, such as the massacre and 
deportation of the Persians 4  and the maltreatment of Persian Christians 5  in the 
                                                                                                                           
Diocletian. On the Romano-Persian treaty of 299, see Blockley 1984: 28-34, 1992: 5-
7. 
3  The  literature  on  these  issues  is  vast.  See  Rubin  1995:  225-97,  Wiesehöfer  1996:  
151-221,  Vesta  and  Stewart  2008,  Daryaee  2009,  Payne  2014a  for  the  basic  
introduction  of  Sasanian  Persia’s  history  and  relevant  discussions.  On  Romano-
Persian  relations,  see  Blockley  1992,  Wiesehöfer  and  Huyse  2006,  Drijvers  2009:  
441-54,  Bowersock  2012.  Also  see  Wiesehöfer  2005a,  Canepa  2009  for  studies  on  
cultural  and  ideological  themes.    For  the  collection  of  translated  texts,  see  Dodgeon  
and  Lieu  1991,  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002,  Dignas  and  Winter  2007. 
4  Ps.  Dion.  II.  6  for  the  fruits  of  the  Romans’  counteroffensive  in  Beth  Arabaye,  where  
they  ‘killed  every  male  (of  the  Persians)  from  twelve  years  upward…  and  deported  
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Romans’ successful military activities, were noted. However, in most cases the 
defeated Persians’ treatment was not the main concern of contemporary authors, and 
the information  regarding  the  situation  of  the  frontier  regions  of  the  Sasanian  Empire  
is   generally   lacking.   In contrast, the   Romans’   wartime   experiences   can   be  
reconstructed  from  detailed  accounts   in  Greek,  Syriac,  and  other  oriental   languages.  
Therefore  this thesis will focus on the Romans’ wartime experiences rather than those 
of all non-military personnel of both Rome and Persia. 
Admittedly, those living in the Empire’s urban settlements and rural areas would 
have become the victims in wartime, and sometimes we can glimpse the lives of those 
living in villages from local chronicles and hagiographies. For example, precious 
information regarding the local countryside of northern Mesopotamia was preserved 
in the Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua,6 and the Life of Saint Symeon the Younger also 
gave insights into the situation of Antioch’s territorium during Ḵosrow I (r. 531-79)’s 
invasion.7 In addition, from the account of the Live of Eutychios, the patriarch of 
Constantinople, we know that many villagers became refugees, and some suffered 
famine when Ḵhosrow I’s soldiers arrived and raided their land in the second half of 
the sixth century.8 Moreover, extant epigraphical and archaeological evidence such as 
fortifications prove to be helpful for analyzing both the   features   of   the   Empire’s  
countryside   in  Late  Antiquity  and,  more   importantly,   the  possible   repercussions  and  
impacts  of  war  upon  local  society.9  For  example,  in Clive Foss’ research, the results 
of archaeological excavations were examined in detail to reconstruct the political, 
                                                                                                                           
the  others’.  Th.  Sim.  3.4.3,  3.15.15  and  Menander  fr.  23.8  for  the  presence  of  Persian  
captives  in  the  second  half  of  the  sixth  century,  see  also  Oleson  1976:  161-4,  cf.  
Charanis  1961:  140-54. 
5  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.10. 
6  Josh.  Styl.  51-2. 
7  V.  Sym.  Styl.  Iun.  57ff.  On  the  importance  of  this  text,  see  Trombley  1994:  182-94. 
8  Eustratios  V.  Eutychii  1719ff.  On  the  role  of  local  monasteries,  see  Trombley  1985:  
53. 
9  See,  for  example,  Trombley  2004a:  87-9,  cf.  Kennedy  and  Liebeschuetz  1988:  65-
90.  On  the  fortifications  in  the  Roman  Near  East,  see  Kennedy  and  Riley  1990,  
Howard-Johnston  2013:  853-92,  Sarantis  2013:  317-70. 
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social, and economic life in Roman Syria,10 while Frank Trombley argued that what 
happened in 540 in the surrounding areas of Antioch could provide a model for 
examining similar cases in sixth-century Syria and Mesopotamia.11 
Nevertheless, although the invasion of the Sasanids may well have resulted in 
depopulation and shortage of labour, Trombley’s approach neglected the 
distinctiveness of every case in the sixth century. In fact, in many cases information 
about the situation of rural areas12 during wartime is scanty: some villages might have 
been either destroyed or in decline because of the Sasanids’ invasions, but the day-to-
day reality of inhabitants’ experiences cannot be reconstructed with certainty because 
of the lack of further details. Neither Prokopios nor other classicising historians ever 
produced detailed treatments of the situation in rural areas in the Persian wars, and 
few details can be gleaned from the accounts of John of Ephesos. In short, the dearth 
of literary and material data pertaining to the Empire’s rural areas in the Persian wars 
makes it difficult both to probe the villagers’ experiences and to establish firm 
connections between the shahs’ military activities and such situations. 
Compared to the Empire’s villages, much more information about the cities of 
the Roman Near East can be mined. Of course, the size and population of these urban 
settlements varied greatly in Late Antiquity; while some of them, such as Antioch and 
Apamea, were metropoleis with large populations, others were merely tiny frontier 
citadels that were founded for military purposes. As Nigel Pollard   previously  
observed,   such   a   fortress   city   ‘played   a   military   role   as   a   place   of   defence   and   a  
civilian  role  as  a  place  of  residence  and  administration’.13  Therefore,  as the Empire’s 
political, military and economic centres, these settlements seem to have become the 
targets of the Sasanids and, more importantly, the focus of most literary texts. The 
scope of my thesis, therefore, will be limited to the Empire’s cities in the Persian 
wars. 
                                            
10  Foss  1997:  189-269. 
11  Trombley  1997:  156-9. 
12  On  the  detailed  survey  of  Roman  Syria,  see  Tchalenko  1953-8,  Tate  1992.  For  
recent  works,  see,  for  example,  the  excavations  at  Androna  (modern  al-Andarin,  
Syria),  Mango  2002:  307-15,  2003:  293-7,  2008:  73-81. 
13  Pollard  2000:  79. 
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This, however, does not imply that it is always impossible to probe Roman 
villagers’ wartime experiences in the Persian wars. While the situation of the 
Empire’s villages during wartime will be excluded in my thesis because of the lack of 
detailed accounts, the calamities of villagers in the siege of the Empire’s cities can be 
deduced from a close reading of literary sources. As some contemporary authors 
noted, many villagers took refuge in the fortified cities during wartime,14 and from 
then on they became the de facto inhabitants of these urban communities. Since the 
Sasanids made no distinction between the cities’ original inhabitants and those who 
sojourned there temporarily in terms of their treatment of the defeated Romans, these 
refugees must have shared similar fates with other Romans. 
Apart  from  the  short-term,  immediate  consequences,  scholars  have  stressed  that  
the  Great  King’s  military  activities  sometimes  had  long-term  effects  on  the  Empire’s  
society   and   economy   in   the   sixth   and   seventh   centuries.15  For   example,   the   sack   of  
Antioch  (modern Antakya, Turkey) in  540  was  a  great  shock  for  Justinian I (r. 527-
65, hereafter Justinian),   his   empire,   and   his   subjects.   The   emperor’s   postwar  
rebuilding  scheme  made  this  metropolis  survive  into  the  Islamic  period,16  but  it  never  
flourished   again   as   in   the   times   of   Julian   the   Apostate   (r.   361-3)   and   Libanios.17  
However, my thesis does not intend to uncover all the long-term or existing structures 
and phenomena, and providing an exhaustive study of all the Persian wars’ possible 
consequences for and impact upon those living in the Near East is beyond the scope 
of this work. Instead, this thesis aims mainly to study the   short-term   effects   of   the  
Sasanids’  invasions on the Empire’s population. Meanwhile, certain important longer-
term consequences will be studied as well. A   well-known   case   is   the   mass   panic  
experienced   by   the   inhabitants   of   Martyropolis   (modern   Silva,   Turkey),   Edessa  
                                            
14  See,  for  example,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6  for  the  case  of  Dara. 
15  Numerous  studies  exist  on  this  aspect,  some  of  which  cover  longer  periods  than  
others;;  see,  for  example,  Kennedy  1985a:  141-83,  Kennedy  and  Liebeschuetz  1988:  
65-90,  Foss  1997:  189-269,  cf.  Liebeschuetz  2001,  Whittow  1990:  3-29,  2003:  404-23  
(esp.  406-8)  for  an  overview  of  the  changes  in  the  Roman  East. 
16  Kennedy  1985b:  5-6. 
17  Kennedy  1985a:  155,  1992:  195-6,  cf.  Liebeschuetz  1972:  99-100. 
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(modern   Urfa,   Turkey),   Carrhae   and   Amida   (modern Diyarbakir, Turkey)18  in   the  
middle  of  the  sixth  century.  Having  heard  the  rumour  about  the  Persians’  invasion  and  
massacre   of   citizens,   the   inhabitants   of   Amida   were   terrified,   and   their   resulting  
abnormal   reactions   were   preserved   in   contemporary   texts. 19   Therefore,   even   after  
several   decades,   the   experience   of   being   sacked   by   Kawād   I (r. 488-96, 498-531, 
hereafter Kawād)   still   cast   a   shadow  over   local  people’s  minds.  On   the  other  hand,  
despite  of  being  captured  by  the  Great  King,  some  Romans  eventually  returned  to  the  
Empire  via  a  variety  of  means.  These  details  deserve  to  be  examined  not  only  to  probe  
local   populations’   understanding   and  memory   of   the   Sasanids’   invasion   but   also   to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of the Romans’ deportation during the sixth century. 
It   should  be  noted   that   sometimes   the  Romans’  misfortunes  during   the  Persian  
wars  resulted  from  the  behaviour  or  activities  of  their  compatriots.  In  the  Chronicle  of  
Pseudo-Joshua,   local   citizens   of   the   Empire’s   eastern   provinces   suffered   from   the  
soldiers’   billets,20  and   the   Jewish   people   at   Konstantia   were   slaughtered   by   other  
Romans   after   their   plot   was   revealed.21   In   addition,   the   escaped   Roman   soldiers  
trampled   and   killed   many   Antiochenes   in   540. 22   Although   in   these   episodes   the  
Romans  did  not  suffer  at   the  hands  of   the  Great  King’s  soldiers,   their  calamities,  as  
the   results   of   the   Sasanids’   military   invasions,   will   be   included   into   my   thesis   to  
establish  a  more  thorough  picture  of  civilians’  wartime  experiences. 
 
Chronological and geographical scope 
The chronological frame adopted for my thesis will now be discussed in order to 
explain the reasons for focussing on sieges in the sixth-century Persian wars as the 
subject of my thesis.   As   Michael   Whitby   rightly   observed,   ‘since   the   defeat   of  
Hannibal…opponents   such   as   Mithridates   who   challenged   the   Romans   to   a  
                                            
18  Spurious  Life  of  Jacob  Baradaeus  PO  19.259-60. 
19  Ps.  Dion.  II.  105,  cf.  Spurious  Life  of  Jacob  Baradaeus  PO  19.259-62.  For  the  
study  of  these  phenomena,  see  Harvey  1980:  1-11. 
20  Josh.  Styl.  86,  92-6,  cf.  Fear  2007:  437-41.   
21  Ibid.,  58. 
22  Prok.  Wars  2.8.18-9. 
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confrontation   were   rare’.23  However,   things   changed   in   the   third   century,   and   the  
Empire   began   to   face   threats   from   the   north   and  east.  Among   these   enemies   in   the  
postclassical  period,  only  the  shahs  of  the  Persian  Empire  were  able  to  project  armed  
forces  to  the  Empire  and  even  mount  a  lengthy  siege  against  the  Romans;;  moreover,  
rich  information  about  their  military  activities  makes  it  possible  to  examine  relevant  
political,  military,  and  social  issues. 
Whereas the Sasanids fought with the Romans from the middle of the third 
century onwards, the conflict between these two great powers in the sixth-century 
Near East was particularly significant for the following reasons. On the one hand, in 
this period, both Rome and Persia attacked each other more frequently than during 
previous centuries.24 At the beginning of the sixth century, Kawād’s first Roman 
campaign lasted for five years, and the Sasanids again crossed into Roman territory 
during the reign of Justinian. From the 540s onwards, his son Ḵosrow I undertook 
expeditions to the Empire’s eastern provinces (540, 542, 543, 573), Lazica (541), and 
Armenia Interior (576). The Sasanids’ frequent military activities offer an opportunity 
to compare and contrast their treatment of the Romans inside various frontier citadels, 
cities, and even inland metropoleis. On the other hand, the available contemporary 
sources, written in both Greek and Syriac, prove to be helpful in analyzing relevant 
issues.      
The situation was different in previous centuries. As a newly risen power that 
replaced the Parthians’ existing hegemony in the first quarter of the third century,25 
the Sasanids soon adopted a belligerent attitude towards the Romans. Several decades 
later, a lengthy conflict between Shapur I (r.  240-70)  and successive Roman emperors 
broke out: throughout this period, in most cases, the Persians clearly had the upper 
hand, and numerous cities of Roman Syria, Cappadocia, and Kilikia were captured 
                                            
23  Whitby  2007a:  310. 
24  Lee  1993b:  143-4  for  a  catalogue  of  their  invasions  throughout  Late  Antiquity. 
25  Much  less  research  has  been  done  on  the  history  and  culture  of  the  Parthians,  see  
Bivar  1983:  21-101,  Kurz  1983:  559-67,  Schippmann  1986:  525-36,  cf.  Griffin  2000a:  
39-41,  2000b:  123-8,  Birley  2000:  158-65  for  the  situation  of  the  first  and  second  
centuries. 
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and sacked. However, the lack of any substantial contemporary accounts makes it 
difficult to study the Roman citizens’ wartime experiences in the third century.26 
It   is  difficult   to  know  whether   the  Sasanids   considered   the  conquest  of  Roman  
Syria  and  other   important  cities  such  as  Antioch   in   the  fourth  century,27  but  villages 
and cities in the Empire’s frontier regions clearly became the invaders’ main targets in 
this period. Certain places, including Amida, Singara and Bezabde, were attacked and 
even sacked by Shapur II (r. 309-79) during the reign of Constantius II (r. 337-61).28 
Contemporary or near-contemporary authors documented these events well, but less 
information can be extracted from the Perso-Arabic literary tradition.29 Hence, it is 
not easy to access the voices of different sides, nor to obtain a thorough picture of 
what might have happened in these frontier cities. Compared to the previous two 
centuries, those living in the Near East enjoyed quite a long period of peace in the 
fifth century, and both Constantinople and Ctesiphon at that time faced different 
rivalries and enemies both inside and outside their realms.30 Thus, little concrete 
evidence about the sack of Roman cities can be found in this period. 
                                            
26  On  Shapur I’s invasion, see Henning  1939:  823-49,  Downey  1961:  252-9,  
Kettenhofen  1982,  Millar  1993:  159-67,  Edwell  2008:  169-81,  184-98,  Mosig-
Walburg  2009,  cf.  Peeters  1924:  288-314. 
27  See  Lee  1993b:  23-4  for  the  Romans’  perception  of  the  Sasanids’  military  
aggressiveness  in  Late  Antiquity. 
28  See  the  sources  assembled  in  Dodgeon  and  Lieu  1991:  211-30.  On  Shapur II’s  
military  activities  and  relevant  issues,  see  Blockley  1989:  465-89,  Lightfoot  1988:  
105-25,  Hunt  1998:  11-4,  39-43,  Lenssen  1999:  40-50. 
29  For  example,  apart  from  Ammianus,  the  sufferings  of  the  Roman  captives  were  
recorded  in  the  Acta  martyrum  et  sanctorum  as  well.  For  the  translation,  see  Dodgeon  
and  Lieu  1991:  215-9  for  the  (partial)  translation  of  this  text.   
30  On  the  side  of  the  Romans,  see  Heather  1991  1995,  2006:  145-250,  Halsall  2007:  
165-219  for  the  threats  caused  by  the  Goths,  cf.  Heather  2014:  212-29.  See  Thompson  
1996:  69-176,  Heather  2006:  300-84  for  the  invasions  of  the  Huns.  On  the  
Hephthalites,  who  became  one  of  the  most  menacing  enemies  for  the  Sasanids  at  their  
northeastern  frontier,  see  Frye  1996:  174-8,  Litvinsky  1996:  135-62,  Bivar  2003:  198-
201,  Kurbanov  2010,  La Vaissière 2007: 119-32, cf.  La Vaissière 2012: 142-69, 2014: 
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As I have shown above, the sixth century represents a fitting choice for a close 
look at my topic because of the rich information pertaining to the Sasanids’ frequent 
military activities against the Empire. Finally, in the seventh century, after the period 
under examination in this thesis, hostilities between these two empires resumed. In 
the long conflict against the Romans, which was dubbed by James Howard-Johnston 
in his study of al-Ṭabari as the ‘last great war of antiquity’,31 Ḵosrow II’s generals 
and soldiers penetrated into the Empire’s heartland, and the reigning shah became the 
ruler—albeit temporarily—of a substantial Roman territory. While some events of 
this period, such as the sack of Jerusalem in 614, were recorded by authors in classical 
and oriental languages extensively,32 we know much less about the situation in other 
places of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Egypt.33   
The geographical scope of this thesis also requires some explanation. Of course, 
the theatre of armed conflicts between Rome, Persia, and their allies was not restricted 
to the regions stretching from the Empire’s frontier to the shore of the Mediterranean 
Sea: in the middle of the sixth century, Ḵosrow I competed with Justinian over the 
control over Lazica, a region situated on the eastern coast of the Black Sea,34 and 
nearby areas for many years; moreover, the Sasanids’ allies sometimes attacked the 
Empire. Because the focus of my research is to investigate the treatment of Romans 
                                                                                                                           
182-5, Maas 2014: 6-18 for a broader context. On  the  strategic  dilemma  faced  by  both  
the  Romans  and  the  Persians  in  the  fifth  century,  see  Howard-Johnston  2010b:  38-9,  
43-4. 
31  Howard-Johnston 2006: 1-2. 
32  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  190-3  and  Stoyanov  2011:  11-4  for  the  collection  and  
discussion  of  some  existing  literary  accounts.  On  the  sack  of  Jerusalem  and  the  
situation  of  its  surrounding  areas,  see  Flusin  1992.2:  129-81. 
33  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  195.  On  the  Sasanids’  conquest  and  occupation  of  Egypt,  
see  Altheim-Stiehl  1992:  87-96,  1998:  252-54,  Morony  1987:  87-95,  Sänger  2011:  
653-65.  For  other  regions,  see  Foss  1975:  721-47,  2003:  149-70,  Palme  2007:  265,  
Haldon  2010:  2-6,  cf.  Kaegi  2003:  65-99. 
34  Greatrex  1998:  46.  It  could  actually  have  been  the  Sasanids’  target,  Howard-
Johnston  2008:  80,  cf.  Bonner  2014:  279. 
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by the Sasanids, discussion of Transcaucasian affairs will be limited, 35  and the 
conflicts in the Arab peninsula will also be excluded.36 Instead, the conflicts that took 
place in the eastern frontier regions that stretch from the region of Chorzane to the 
area south of Euphrates River—including Armenia Interior, the Armenian satrapies, 
Mesopotamia, Osrhoene, Euphratesia, Syria Prima, and finally Syria Secunda (Map 
1)—will be studied in great detail. Whereas the Sasanids chose different routes to 
cross the border to raid the Empire, and sometimes even aimed to attack sites outside 
these areas,37 in most cases, the Romans living in these regions would have been the 
main targets and victims of the conflicts.38 
 
Civilians: terminology, description, and composition 
The   term   ‘civilian’   rather   than   ‘non-combatant’   will   be   preferred   in   my   thesis.  
Admittedly,  in  classical  antiquity,  certain  groups  of  people  were  both  regarded  as  non-
combatants  and  excluded  from  the  proper  defending  force  of  a  city  in  some  military  
manuals.   In   the   Strategikos   of   Onasander,   a   first-century   CE   Greek   philosopher,   a  
general   should   send   ‘women…children…feeble  men   and   old   people’   captured   from  
the  surrounding  territory  into  a  besieged  city,  for  they  ‘will  consume  more  quickly  the  
supplies  of  the  besieged’.39  In  his  Epitome  of  Military  Science,  an  important  military  
                                            
35  Toumanoff  1963,  Braund  1994  for  a  synthesis  of  these  events.  See  Greatrex  and  
Lieu  2002:  115-22  for  some  important  sources. 
36  On  the  relationship  between  Rome,  Persia,  and  the  Arabs,  see  Shahîd  1988,  1989,  
1995-2009,  Fisher  2011. 
37  For  example,  see  Prok.  Wars  2.20.18  for  the  claim  made  by  Ḵosrow  I, who intended 
to raid Roman Palestine and Jerusalem  in  the  540s. 
38  In  502,  Kawād’s  forces  crossed  the  border  and  invaded  Armenia  Interior;;  in  540,  
the  Persians  took  another  route  and  sacked  Sura,  a  frontier  city  located  near  the  river  
course  of  the  Euphrates,  and  later  sacked  Antioch,  the  metropolis  of  Syria  Prima.  In  
the  following  years,  the  shah’s  army  reached  Edessa  and  Kallinikos,  both  of  which  
were  in  Osrhoene,  several  times.  Finally,  during  the  reign  of  Justin  II,  the  shah  
oversaw  the  siege  of  Dara  in  person,  while  the  forces  led  by  Adarmahan  penetrated  
into  Syria  Secuda  and  sacked  its  metropolis  Apamea. 
39  Onasander  42.23. 
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manual   that   was   probably   composed   in   the   late   fourth   or   the   early   fifth   century,40  
Vegetius  pointed  out  that  those  groups  of  people  should  either  be  ‘shut  out  of  the  gates  
because  of  the  need  to  conserve  food’,41  or,  as  indicated  in  the  Strategikon,  one  of  the  
most  important  military  manuals42  composed  either  in  the  late  sixth  century  or  in  the  
early  seventh  century,43  evacuated  from  their  hometown  before  the  enemy’s  arrival.44   
However,  as  other  cases   from  classical  antiquity  show,45  both  soldiers  and  non-
fighting  individuals,  such  as  civil  officers,  women,  and  even  churchmen,  engaged  in  
warding   off   the   besiegers.   The   presence   of   civilians   as   combatants   in   the   period  
covered   by   this   thesis   can   be   illustrated  by   the   following   examples.   In   the   siege  of  
Amida,  members  of  the  city  council  led  the  citizens  to  defend  their  city  for  more  than  
90   days. 46   In   540,   young   people   rushed   to   fight   against   Ḵosrow   I’s   forces   in  
Antioch.47  Finally,   in   Edessa,   according   to   Prokopios,   ‘the   whole   population,   even  
                                            
40  Goffart  1977:  65-100,  Barnes  1979:  254-7,  Milner  1993:  XL-XLI, Zuckerman 
1994: 67-74. 
41  Vegetius  Epitome  of  Military  Science  4.7. 
42  The  treatise  on  military  affairs  addressed  to  Anastasios by Urbicios preserved 
nothing related to civilians, Burgess et al. 2005: 35-74. Another  military  manual  by  
Syrianos Magistros, formerly ‘The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy’, was 
assigned to the middle ages rather than Late Antiquity.  On  the  dating  of  this  text,  see  
Baldwin  1988:  290-3,  Zuckerman  1990:  209-24,  Lee  and  Shepard  1991:  15-39,  
Cosentino  2000:  262-75,  Rance  2007:  701-37.  For  the  text  and  translation,  see  Dennis  
1985:  10-135. 
43  On  the  date  and  authorship  of  this  text,  see  Dennis  1984:  XVI- XVII. 
44  Strategikon  10.3. 
45  Apart  from  the  Romano-Persian  wars,  the  role  played  by  the  civilians  in  armed  
conflicts  can  still  be  illustrated  by  many  contemporary  examples,  see,  for  example,  
Agath.  3.25.4,  5.19.4,  Menander  fr.  12.5.  Also,  see  Vegetius  Epitome  of  Military  
Science  4.25,  28,  in  which  ‘people  of  all  ages  and  both  sexes  overwhelm  the  invaders’  
and  the  citizens  could  both  kill  the  invaders  and  destroy  the  siege  engines  when  the  
enemies  become  negligent. 
46  See,  for  example,  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
47  Prok.  Wars  2.8.17,  28-9. 
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women  and   little   children,  were  going  up  on   to   the  wall…the  women  and  children,  
and   the  aged  also,  were  gathering  stones  for   the  fighters  and  assisting   them  in  other  
ways’;; 48   some   citizens,   together   with   soldiers,   were   led   by   Peranios,   the   Roman  
commander,  to  defeat  the  Persians.49  The  difference  between  a  combatant  and  a  non-
combatant   can   therefore   be   blurred;;   thus,   ‘civilian’   is   a   preferable   term   because   it  
evokes  an  urban-dwelling  non-soldier  who  may  nonetheless  have  resisted  invasion. 
As the core of my thesis, it is necessary to establish whether and to what extent 
we can apply the term ‘civilian’  accurately in the sixth-century Romano-Persian wars 
to describe such a category of people, together with a certain identity, in the Roman 
Empire.   In   classical   antiquity,   Latin-speaking   authors   sometimes   used   paganus   to  
describe   a   civilian   as   opposed   to   a   soldier   in   their   works.   Tacitus   reported   that  
‘soldiers   were   demoralised   by   mixing   with   civilian   inhabitants’   (inter   paganos  
corruptior   miles)   in   his  Histories.50  In   Vegetius’   Epitome   of   Military   Science,   this  
word  stood  for  a  civilian  as  opposed  to  a  soldier:  ‘if  training  in  arms  ceases,  there  is  
no  difference  between  a  soldier  and  a  civilian’  (nam si doctrina cesset armorum, nihil 
paganus distat a milite).51  As  suggested  in  the  Oxford  Latin  Dictionary,  originally  the  
word   referred   to   an   inhabitant   of   a   pagus,   a   country   district, 52   a   peasant   and   a  
countryman  regardless  of  whether  he  was  involved  in  fighting  or  not.53   
The   terminologies   in   some  Greek  military   treatises   that   are   linguistically  more  
relevant   to  my   research   subject   require   further   examination.   In   the  Strategikon,   the  
author   stated   that   ‘if   anyone   presumes   to   stay   beyond   the   time   of   his   furlough,   he  
shall  be  dismissed  from  the  army  and  as  a  civilian  handed  over  to  the  civil  authorities’  
(Εἴ  τις  τολμήσει  βαγεῦσαι  ὑπὲρ  τὸν  χρόνον  τοῦ  κομεάτου,  καὶ  τῆς  στρατείας  ἐκβληθῇ  
καὶ  ὡς  παγανὸς  τοῖς  πολιτικοῖς  ἄρχουσι  παραδοθείη).54  According  to  E.  A.  Sophocles’  
Greek  Lexicon   of   the  Roman   and  Byzantine  Periods   (from  B.C.   146   to  A.D.   1100),  
                                            
48  Ibid.,  2.27.33,  35. 
49  Ibid.,  2.27.42. 
50  Tac.  Hist.  1.53. 
51  Vegetius  Epitome  of  Military  Science  2.23. 
52  OLD  s.v.  pagus. 
53  OLD  s.v.  paganus. 
54  Strategikon  1.6. 
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παγανός   could   be   used   to   designate   a   common   citizen  who  was   not   a   soldier   or   a  
pagan.55  Thus,   again,   the   use   of   παγανός   was   not   limited   to   the   military   domain  
exclusively. 
More  importantly,  while  the  use  of  paganus  and  παγανός  to  designate  a  civilian  
(or  a  soldier  who,  having  gone  AWOL,  was  to  be  treated  as  a  civilian)  can  be  noted  in  
late  antique  military  manuals,  neither  was  a  technical  term  used  commonly  by  sixth-
century   authors   in   other   literary   genres:   searches   in   the   TLG   database   reveal   that  
neither  Prokopios  nor  other  major  Greek-speaking  authors  in  the  sixth-century  Empire  
used   παγανός   in   their   works.   Instead,   several   terminologies,   often   in   plural   forms,  
were  used  in  contemporary  accounts  of  non-soldier  populations  inside  a  Roman  city.  
Clearly,  the  bulk  of  the  besieged  Romans  would  have  been  citizens  of  urban  centres  
under  attack.  In  540,  Ḵosrow  I plundered  the  property  of  the  citizens  (τῶν  πολιτῶν)  in  
Beroea.56  More   than  30  years   later,  people   in   the  city  of   (τῶν  τῆς πόλεως),57  that   is,  
Apamea,  went   out   and   negotiated  with   the   Sasanids;;   and   in   the   last   quarter   of   the  
sixth   century,   Melitene,   an   undefended   city   that   was   deserted   by   its   citizens  
(ἀφυλάκτῳ καὶ ἐρήμῃ πολιτῶν καθεστώσῃ),58  was  attacked  by  the  Sasanids.  In  other  
cases,   our   authors   chose   to   emphasise   either   the  Romans’   unfavourable   situation  or  
the   military   contexts   of   the   Persian   wars.   During   the   sieges,   ‘the   besieged’   (οἱ   δὲ 
πολιορκούμενοι) was   used   by   Prokopios, 59  while in negotiations ‘pitiful   people’  
(ἀνθρώπων  οἰκτρῶν)  were  mentioned  several  times  in  Ḵosrow I’s  campaign  in  540.60  
His   description   of   civilians’   deportations   mentioned   both   ‘those   who   have   been  
captured’  (ἡλωκότας)61  and  ‘captives’  (αἰχμαλώτους).62 
                                            
55  GLRBP  s.v.  παγανός. 
56  Prok.  Wars  2.7.19,  21. 
57  Th.  Sim.  3.10.9. 
58  Euagr.  HE  5.14. 
59  Prok.  Wars  1.7.14,  17,  1.9.1,  2.7.12,  2.13.28. 
60  Ibid.,  2.5.13  (the  citizens  of  Sura),  2.6.18  (the  Antiochenes),  2.7.23  (the  Beroeans)  
Cf.  2.13.14  (τοὺς  οἰκήτορας  μόνους)  when  Bar-Hadad  negotiated  with  Kawād  on  
behalf  of  Konstantia’s  citizens. 
61  Ibid.,  1.7.33. 
62  Ibid.,  2.13.2,  cf.  Ducrey  1968:  19-20,  49  for  the  connotation  of  this  word. 
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Other   collective   nouns   can   be   gleaned   from   our   sources.   In   the   Wars,   ‘the  
Romans’   (Ρωμαίοι)   was   the   general   term   used   when   Prokopios   mentioned   the  
Persians’   sieges  of  Roman  cities.63  Although   these  Romans  might  have  consisted  of  
soldiers  in  the  case  of  Sura,  Antioch,  and  Dara,  in  other  cases,  this  term  seems  to  have  
referred   to   a   city’s   inhabitants.   The   most   common   convention,   however,   seems   to  
have  been  to  simply  call  them  either  ‘the  citizens  of  so-and-so’  or  ‘the  citizens  of  the  
(above-mentioned)  city’.  That   is,   the   inhabitants  of  a  city  were   identified  with   it.  In  
502,  Prokopios  reported  that  the  citizens  of  Amida  (’Αμιδηνοὶ)  resisted  the  Persians.64  
From   the   middle   of   the   sixth   century   onwards,   similar   examples   can   be   observed  
when   he  mentioned   cities   that   were   either   threatened   or   conquered   by   Ḵosrow I’s  
soldiers   such   as   Sura   (Σουρηνοὺς),65  Antioch   (Αντιοχέαι),66  Beroea   (Βεροιαίους),67  
Apamea   (τοῖς   ’Απαμεῦσιν), 68   Kallinikos   (Καλλινικηνσίους), 69   Chalkis  
(Χαλκιδεῦσι), 70   Edessa   (’Εδεσσηνοὺς), 71   Carrhae   (Καρρηνοὶ), 72   Konstantia  
(Κωνσταντινιέων),73  and  Sergiopolis  (Σεργιουπολῖται).74  Euagrios  used  ‘the  son  of  the  
Apameans’   (τῶν   ’Απαμέων   οί   παῖδες) 75   and   ‘the   city   of   the   Theopolitans’   (τῇ  
Θεουπολιτῶν) 76   in   Ḵosrow I’s   campaigns   in   540   and   573,   respectively,   and  
                                            
63  Amida:  Prok.  Wars  1.9.22;;  Sura:  ibid.,  2.5.12,  cf.  2.5.15;;  Antoch:  ibid.,  2.8.9,  11,  
15-6;;  Dara:  ibid.,  2.13.16,  22,  24,  26-7;;  Kallinikos:  ibid.,  2.21.30;;  Edessa:  ibid.,  
2.26.11,  28,  39,  42,  44,  2.27.1,  7-8,  10,  13,  16,  19,  21,  23-4,26-7,  32,  40,  42-4. 
64  Ibid.,  1.7.4,  12,  19,  26,  30,  33. 
65  Ibid.,  2.5.13-6,  21,  25,  32,  2.20.3. 
66  Ibid.,  2.6.16,  2.7.25,  2.14.5. 
67  Ibid.,  2.7.5,  13,  19,  32,  34,  36 
68  Ibid.,  2.11.21,  36. 
69  Ibid.,  2.11.28. 
70  Ibid.,  2.12.1-2. 
71  Ibid.,  2.12.33,  2.13.3,  2.21.27,  2.26.4,  13,  20,  2.27.42,  46,  Euagr.  HE  4.27. 
72  Prok.  Wars  2.13.7. 
73  Ibid.,  2.13.8. 
74  Euagr.  HE  4.28,  Prok.  Wars  2.20.7,  13. 
75  Euagr.  HE  4.26. 
76  Ibid.,  5.9. 
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Theophylaktos  wrote  of  the  deportation  and  revolt  of  the  ‘people  of  Dara’/  ‘the  men  
of  Dara’   (∆αρηνοὶ/οἱ  ∆αρηνοὶ)77  at   the   castle   of  Oblivion.  Also,   alternative   phrases  
such  as  ‘all  the  inhabitants  of  the  East’  (τῶν  ἑῴων  ἁπάντων),78  ‘the  whole  population  
of   Apamea’   (ὁ   τῶν   ’Απαμέων   λεώς), 79   ‘those   who   inhabited   in   Antioch’   (τοῖς  
ᾠκημένοις)80  and  people  (δῆμος)81  of  so-and-so  were  introduced,  but  the  rule  remains  
the  same,  and  the  inhabitants  were  called  by  the  area  in  which  they  lived.   
In  short,  while  sometimes  the  circumstances  and  contexts  of  a  city’s  inhabitants  
in  wartime  were  either  revealed  or  stressed,  so  far  no  technical  word  or  phrase  whose  
use   was   limited   to   the   military   domain   can   be   found   in   contemporary   texts   to  
designate  civilians   in  war;;   in  most  cases,  our  authors  merely  called  them  ‘people  of  
so-and-so  city’,  and  such  phrases  cannot  provide  readers  with  details  regarding  these  
Romans’   identities.  Below   the   composition   of   these   non-military   urban   populations  
will be examined   to   establish   who   could   possibly   have   stayed   inside   a   besieged  
Roman  city  in  the  Persian  wars. 
In  wartime,   a   city’s   non-soldier   population   consisted   of   two   groups:   the   city’s  
inhabitants   and   the   citizens   who   originally   inhabited   extramural   communities   but  
moved   to   stay   in   the   city   temporarily.   For   example,   in   the   Anastasian   War,   some  
villagers  stayed   in  Edessa  and  attacked   the  Sasanids  with  slings.82  In  543,   ‘many  of  
the  rustics’  (τῶν ἀγροίκων πολλοὶ)83  fended  off  the  Persians  courageously  in  Edessa.  
In  addition,  descriptions  of  the  situation  in  a  besieged  or  sacked  city  sometimes  reveal  
valuable  details  about  the  genders,  religious  beliefs,  social  statuses,  and  professions  of  
urban-dwelling  civilians.   In   the   following  paragraphs,   available  data   extracted   from  
literary   texts   will   be   categorised   to   illustrate   the   complexity   of   a   Roman   city’s  
population  components  under  the  attacks  of  the  Sasanids. 
                                            
77  Th.  Sim.  3.5.4,7. 
78  Prok.  Wars  2.6.25. 
79  Ibid.,  2.11.16 
80  Ibid.,  2.10.1. 
81  Ibid.,  2.11.19,  31,  38  (the  Apameans),  2.8.6,  26,  2.14.3  (the  Antiochens),  2.26.7  (the  
Edessenes). 
82  Josh.  Styl.  62. 
83  Prok.  Wars  2.27.34,  see  also  ibid.,  2.27.20. 
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We  may  assume  that  both  male  and  female   inhabitants  in  all  age  groups  would  
have  suffered  from  the  atrocities  in  the  Persian  wars.  For  example,  the  men  were  said  
in  Edessa  to  consist  of  ‘those  who  were  in  the  prime  of  life;;  men  of  age  fit  for  service’  
(οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ),84  and  in  Antioch  and  others  to  be  ‘the  most  courageous  youths  
of  the  populace’  (τοῦ  δήμου  εὐτολμότατοι  νεανίαι  πολλοί).85  The  presence  of  women  
was  noted  by  writers  in  various  cultural  traditions;;  whereas  some  of  them  participated  
in  defending  a  besieged  city,86  the  fates  of  others,  such  as  the  captured  maiden  in  573,  
were   recorded   in   great   detail. 87   In   addition,   many   Romans   living   in   Sergiopolis  
escaped  to  other  places,  and  only  ‘the  superannuated  and  untimely  citizens’  (ἐξώρους  
τε   καὶ   ἀώρους) 88   stayed   when   the   Persians   arrived.   Menander   the   Guardsman  
articulated   the   results   of   the   fierce   conflicts   between   Rome   and   Persia:   ‘…the  
survivors  demanding  of  us  the  dead—perhaps  a  father,  or  a  son,  or  perhaps  a  dearest  
friend,  or  just  a  human  being…the  homes  bereft  of  their  menfolk,  the  new-born  child  
an  orphan,  and  the  grief  which  everywhere  spreads  amongst  all  the  kin’.89 
People   from   both   upper   and   lower   echelons   of   society   would   possibly   have  
shared  similar  or  the  same  calamities  when  a  Roman  city  was  besieged,  captured,  and  
even   sacked   by   the   Sasanids.   For   example,   two   distinguished   women   became  
concubines  in  the  sack  of  Amida,  while  others  were  raped  by  the  Persians  in  Antioch  
and  Apamea.90  The  presence  of  male  elites  can  be  spotted   in  both  Greek  and  Syriac  
texts.   Having   learned   what   happened   in   Sura,   Bouzes,   who was in charge of 
commanding all troops of the Oriens,91  met   ‘the   first   men   of   the   Hierapolitans’92  
(τοὺς  ῾Ιεραπολιτῶν  πρώτους)  and  told  them  his  strategy  in  coping  with  the  Sasanids’  
invasion.   As   well   as   ordinary   citizens   of   the   Empire,   many   elites   became   victims.  
                                            
84  Ibid. 
85  Prok.  Wars  2.8.11.  cf.  2.8.17,  28-9. 
86  Ibid.,  2.27.33-4. 
87  See  below,  pp.  120-3. 
88  Euagr.  HE  4.28. 
89  Menander  fr.  6.1. 
90  See  below,  pp.  114-20. 
91  Prok.  Wars  2.6.1. 
92  Ibid.,  2.6.2. 
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Some   were   taken   as   hostages,   while   others   were   humiliated,   slaughtered,   or  
deported.93  Whereas   their   fates   sometimes   receive   more   attention   in   our   texts,   the  
patchy  data  does  not  permit  us  to   trace   the  experience  of  any  particular   family—for  
example,  during  wartime—nor  is  it  possible  to  provide  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  
fates  of  those  who  came  from  the  higher  echelons  of  society. 
Because both Kawād and Ḵosrow I captured survivors from the conquered cities 
indiscriminately, one may assume that certain non-Christians living in the Empire 
could have been taken to Persia. For example, the Jewish community in Antioch 
seems to have been prosperous in Late Antiquity,94 and some of them must have been 
captured along with the Christians from this metropolis in 540. Sadly, no further 
details are known regarding the situation of the Jews under Ḵosrow I’s rule,95 and it is 
impossible to know their social or spiritual life in the Persian Empire. It must be 
stressed, however, that sometimes the wartime experiences of both the Jewish people 
and the polytheists could have been different from the Christian communities. As 
noted above, 96  many Jews were killed in Konstantia by the furious inhabitants 
because they intended to surrender their city to the Persians. While Ḵosrow I extorted 
money from the cities the Persians passed by in 540, at Cahrrae, he refused to do so 
and left, saying that ‘most of them are not Christians, but are of the old faith’.97 These 
cases will be studied in my thesis to discuss the possible consequences of the 
Sasanids’ military activities among the Empire’s different religious groups. 
Finally,   details   regarding   the   civilians’   professions   inside   a  Roman   city   can   be  
unveiled,   but   the   data  we   have   is,   of   course,   patchy.   In   the   first   years   of   the   sixth  
century,   some   courtesans   ‘drew   up   their   clothing   and   displayed   themselves’   to  
                                            
93  See  below,  chapters  3-4  for  the  treatment  of  elites. 
94  Brooten  2000:  29-36. 
95  Neusner  1970:  107,  Wiesehöfer  1996:  216,  cf.  Kalmin  2006:  138  for  further  
relevant  information.  Others  argued  that  Ḵosrow  I’s  attitude  to  them  must  have  been  a  
rather  tolerant  one,  Widengren  1961:  147. 
96  See  above,  p.11. 
97  Prok.  Wars  2.13.7.  On  the  polytheistic  traditions  of  Carrhae  and  its  nearby  areas,  
see  Segal  1953:  97-119,  Green  1992:  54-9,  cf.  Drijvers  1982:  35-43. 
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Kawād,98  who,  together  with  his  soldiers,  encountered  a  stalemate  in  besieging  Amida  
at  that  time.  When  this  city  was  later  sacked  by  the  Sasanids,  a  priest  approached  the  
shah,  saying   that   it  was  unkingly   to  kill  prisoners  of  war.99  If  what  John  of  Ephesos  
and   other   sixth-century   Syriac   authors   reported   is   right,   then   Christian  monks   and  
priests   were   killed   both   during   and   after   the   siege   of   this   frontier   city.100  In   540,  
Germanos,  the  Emperor’s  nephew,  decided  to  strengthen  Antioch’s  defence  either  by  
cutting  off  the  rock  that  ‘rises  to  a  height  only  a  little  less  than  the  fortifications’  at  the  
highest   point   of   the   surrounding   hills   or   by   building   a   new   tower   at   that   point.  
However,   his   proposal   was   rejected   by   ‘the   architects   of   public   buildings’   (τῶν  
οἰκοδομιῶν  ἀρχιτέκτοσι),  saying  that  it  was  too  hazardous  to  conduct  such  works.101  
In  the  sack  of  Antioch,  one  monk  was  decapitated,  and  another  was  captured;;102  in  the  
end,  charioteers  and  musicians  were  deported   to  Persia.103  Several  years   later,  many  
farmers   (γεωργῶν   πάμπολύ) 104   stayed   in   Kallinikos   when   Ḵosrow I’s   forces  
conquered  this  city. 
What   we   can   extract   from   contemporary   texts   regarding   a   Roman   city’s  
inhabitants   in   the  Persian  wars  can  be  summarised  now.  The  results  of   the  previous  
discussion   suggest   that   whereas   the   details   of   their   genders,   social   classes,   and  
professions  as  distinct  from  the  able-bodied  male  citizens  were  sometimes  signalled,  
there  is  no  specific  technical  term  used  exclusively  to  refer  to  these  people  in  wartime.  
The   words   paganus   and   paganos   were   used   several   times,   but   clearly   they   had  
different  meanings  in  different  contexts,  and  their  use  was  limited  to  military  manuals.  
Instead,   classicising   historians   in   Late   Antiquity   often   used   descriptive   phrases   or  
words  when  mentioning  these  groups  of  people;;  all  we  know  is  that  it  was  the  Empire,  
or  certain  cities’  citizens,  who  were  the  victims  of  the  turmoil  and  calamities  caused  
by   the  Sasanids’   invasions.  Nonetheless,  while   the  majority  of   these  contemporaries  
                                            
98  Prok.  Wars  1.7.18. 
99  Ibid.,  1.7.30. 
100  See  below,  pp.  88-89,  93. 
101  Prok.  Wars  2.6.13. 
102  V.  Sym.  Styl.  Iun.  57. 
103  See  below,  p.  148. 
104  Prok.  Wars  2.21.32. 
 24 
never   used   a   term   that   corresponded   exactly   to   ‘civilians’,   the   Romans   who   were  
mentioned   in   their   accounts   clearly   belonged   to   a   social   group   that   the   Geneva 
Convention defines as ‘any   person   not   belonging   to   the   armed   forces’   in   armed  
conflicts.105  The  term  ‘civilian’,  therefore,  will  be  used  throughout  this  thesis. 
 
Existing  scholarship  on  civilians  in  siege  warfare 
The   last  decades  of   the   twentieth  century  witnessed  a  burgeoning  of   scholarship  on  
various   aspects   of   ancient   siege   warfare   and   the   Romano-Persian   relationship.106  
Because  my  thesis  mainly  concerns  the  literary  and  social  issues  of  the  sixth-century  
Persian   wars,   particular   attention   will   be   given   to   relevant   studies,   and   their  
methodologies   and   results  will   be   evaluated   further   to  provide  a   framework   for  my  
methodological  approaches. 
Civilians’   experiences   in   the   conflicts   between   Rome   and   Persia   have   not  
received   the   attention   they   deserve;;   as  Doug   Lee   noted,   ‘the   experience   of  war   by  
non-combatants   during   late   antiquity   has   not   been   the   subject   of   any   overall  
synthesis’. 107   Nevertheless,   certain   aspects   of   civilians’   wartime   experiences   have  
been   investigated,108  and   such  work  has  paved   the  way   for   further  discussion   in   the  
second  part  of  this  thesis.  Surely  certain  common  features  in  these  events,  such  as  the  
                                            
105  Geneva  Convention  IV of 12 August 1949. 
106  A  comprehensive  bibliography  on  all  relevant  issues,  however,  is  out  of  the  scope  
of  this  section;;  see,  for  example,  Whitby  2013:  433-57  for  a  short  review  on  the  sieges  
in  Late  Antiquity,  cf.  Lavan  2006:  16-25  for  bibliography  on  relevant  aspects.  On  the  
collection  of  cases  of  sieges  from  Late  Antiquity  to  the  early  middle  ages,  see  
Petersen  2013:    457-764. 
107  Lee  2007a:  146,  cf.  Rich  and  Shipley  1993a,  1993b,  Hanson  2007:  12  for  some  
relevant  studies  on  the  cases  of  classical  antiquity. 
108  On  deportation,  see  Lieu  1986:  475-505,  Kettenhofen  1996,  Morony  2004a.  On  
sexual  violence,  see  Turtledove  1977:  218-9,  Lee  2007a:  144-6.  A  thorough  
discussion  of  sexual  violence  in  ancient  warfare,  however,  is  still  lacking,  Gaca  2011:  
75-6,  let  alone  the  cases  in  Late  Antiquity.  Cf.  Lenski  2008:  80-109,  2011:  185-98,  
2014:  230-5,  238-46  for  the  cases  of  deportation  between  the  Empire  and  the  
Germanic  peoples. 
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loss   of   life,   the   destruction   and   removal  of   personal   or   communal   property   and   the  
transportation  of  survivors  can  be  noted.  Here,  a  study  that  I  found  particularly  helpful  
in   a   methodological   sense   was   the   work   of   Adam   Ziolkowski   on   Roman   siege  
warfare.   The   author   examined   the   nature   of   the   urbs   direpta109  and   identified   two  
basic  rules  regarding  Roman  treatment  of  these  cities.  While  the  practice  of  sacking  a  
captured   city   varied,   it   would   have   been   conducted   in   a   somewhat   consistent  
framework;;   in   a   real   sack,   the   control   from   above   would   be   suspended,   and   the  
soldiers  would  treat  the  conquered  inhabitants  arbitrarily. 
This,  however,  was  not  always  the  case.  In  fact,  the  Sasanids  did  not  always  treat  
the  defeated  Romans  in  the  same  manner  throughout  the  sixth  century.  For  instance,  
sometimes  the  Empire’s  inhabitants  were  slaughtered  indiscriminately,  while  in  other  
cases  they  were  spared.  Also,  certain  cities  like  Antioch  and  Apamea  were  reported  to  
have  been  destroyed  by  contemporaries,  while  most  of  the  buildings  of  other  places  
seem   to   have   been  maintained.  Having   collected  and   analyzed   relevant   information  
from  both  literary  and  material  sources,  I  will  use  these  results  to  establish  a  paradigm  
of   civilians’   fate   during   the   Persian   wars   to   include   both   the   shared   features   and  
particularities. 
Whereas  information  related  to  the  Romano-Persian  wars  from  the  narratives  of  
both  classicising  Greek-speaking  historians  and  contemporary  Syriac  authors  has  been  
extracted  and  studied,  the  allusions  and  literary  topoi  in  these  texts  have  not  received  
the  attention  they  deserve.  Therefore,  I  aim  to  offer  fresh  insights  into  contemporary  
and   later  authors’  perceptions  and  understanding  of  people’s  wartime  experiences   in  
armed  conflicts.  As  I  will  demonstrate  in  subsequent  discussions,  sometimes  the  use  
of   literary   commonplaces   by   Greek   and  Syriac   authors   could   have   undermined   the  
credibility  of  their  narratives.110  The  use  of  topoi  in  descriptions  of  sieges,  especially  
civilians’  wartime  experiences,  however,  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  distortion  of  
historical   facts.   In   fact,   in   many   cases   what   they   reported   in   their   texts   can   be  
validated  by  the  accounts  of  other  literary  traditions. 
                                            
109  Ziolkowski  1993:  90. 
110  For  example,  see  below,  pp.  71-6  for  the  suicide  of  the  captured  maidens  and  pp.  
128-38  for  the  discussion  of  Roman  cities’  destruction. 
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I  adapted  and  modified  the  methodology  of  some  existing  works   in   the   literary  
study  of  this  thesis’  core  texts.  The  key  features  of  the  urbs  capta  motif  and  its  use  in  
Greco-Roman  literature  from  Homer  to  the  fifth  century  CE  have  been  identified  by  
George  Paul   in   a   seminal   article,   and   the   significance   of   classical   education   in   this  
motif’s  transmission  and  preservation  has  been  highlighted.111  Recently,  scholars  have  
not   only   established   the   connection   between   late   antique/Byzantine   texts   and   other  
classical   works   but   also   demonstrated   the   importance   of   rhetorical   treatises   in   the  
study   of   late   antique   historiography.   Conor  Whately   identified   different   strands   of  
literary   traditions   in   framing   these   narratives   in   Prokopios’   works 112   through   the  
analysis  of  the  descriptions  of  sieges  and  battles  in  Justinian’s  campaign,  while  Kyle  
Sinclair   stressed   the   indebtedness   of  Byzantine   historians   to   their   classical   and   late  
antique   predecessors   and   the   role   played   by   rhetorical   education.113  Turning   to   the  
Christian  Syriac  evidence,  Michael  Morony  and  Amir  Harrak  examined   the  biblical  
terms   and   phrases   used   by   Syriac   authors   on   the   rise   of   Islam. 114   Based   on   the  
approaches   of   these   abovementioned  works,  my   thesis  will   investigate  whether   and  
how   these   motifs   were   preserved   and   used   by   various   authors   to   relate   civilians’  
calamities  in  the  postclassical  world. 
I  have  noted   the  Sasanids’  different  strategies  and  manners   in   treating  both   the  
defeated   Romans   and   the   conquered   cities,   and   these   differences   deserve   further  
discussion  to  study  how  different  factors  would  shape  Roman  civilians’  experiences.  
In  the  third  part  of  my  thesis,  I  will  present  these  results  and  discuss  them  in  a  broader  
political  and  military  context.  I  will  argue  that  what  happened  in  a  city’s  sack  could  
actually   have   been   a   complicated   process   affected   by   different   factors.   In   order   to  
investigate  such  phenomena,  an  examination  of  the  roles  played  by  both  sides,  that  is,  
the  Sasanids  and  the  Romans  during  these  sieges  is  needed.  More  importantly,  since  
these  conflicts  were  parts  of  the  confrontation  between  Ctesiphon  and  Constantinople  
                                            
111  Paul  1982:  144-55.  Relevant  surveys  have  been  conducted  on  works  of  Latin  
literature;;  see,  for  example,  Rossi  2004:  10,  17-53.  On  the  work  of  Livy,  see  
McDonald  1957:  163-4;;  on  Lucan,  see  Torgerson  2011. 
112  Whately  2007:  339-43. 
113  Sinclair  2013:  8-17. 
114  Morony  2005:  8ff,  Harrak  2005:  45-65. 
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in  Late  Antiquity,  some  perennial,  structural  features  of  the  Romano-Persian  relations,  
such   as   the   monarchs’   propagandistic   needs   and   considerations,   will   be   noted   and  
discussed  as  well. 
Several  scholarly  works  should  be  highlighted  here  in  terms  of  their  approaches  
and  scopes.  Two  recent  studies  have  addressed  the  issue  of  battlefield  psychology   in  
classical   antiquity.   Josh   Levithan   argued   that   in   the  Roman   era,   both   the   defenders  
and  the  besiegers  would  have  understood  that  violence  and  tension  would  accelerate  
as  long  as  the  assault  of  a  city  progressed,  and  such  progress  could  ultimately  only  be  
ended   by   the   sack   of   a   conquered   target.115   This   model,   however,   is   not   always  
applicable  to  the  sieges  in  the  Persian  wars  because,  as  shown  in  the  cases  of  Sura  and  
Dara   in  540  and  573,   respectively,   the  Great  King  began  a  siege  promptly  upon   the  
Persians’  arrival,  and  nothing  similar  to  such  an  increasing  tension  and  violence  can  
be  noted. 
Although   it is not always possible to probe the Persians’ understanding and 
perception of things that happened during sieges, as Noel Lenski suggested, to launch 
a successful siege against a Roman city could have been a difficult and dangerous 
task for the Great King’s soldiers, and their military activities would certainly have 
been either facilitated or checked not only by the environmental situation of the Near 
East but also by the Romans’ resistance.116 The analysis of these human- and nature- 
induced factors during the sieges of Roman cities could be helpful in explaining 
certain atrocities conducted by the Sasanids and their brutal treatment of the Romans. 
A successful war against a regime’s archenemy would have been an effective 
propaganda weapon not only to consolidate the authority of the ruling class but also to 
display their victory against their rivals. In Late Antiquity, both the Romans and the 
Sasanids seem to have become the main target audience for the Great King’s 
propaganda, and modern scholars have raised relevant issues. Henning Börm not only 
examined the ideological and political importance of the sack of Antioch in 540 but 
also placed the Persians’ military activities in a broader international and diplomatic 
context in the Mediterranean world.117 Matthew Canepa suggested that for both Rome 
                                            
115  Levithan  2013:  48. 
116  Lenski  2007:  230-4. 
117  Börm 2006: 299-326. 
 28 
and Persia, the hippodrome was a great venue for the performance of power.118 In this 
section, I will examine how the Sasanids displayed their victory against the Romans 
at different occasions and venues and whether and how Roman civilians’ fates were 
affected by their propagandistic considerations. 
What   the  Sasanids  did  during  and  after   the   sieges,  however,   is  merely  half   the  
story.  The  Empire’s  elites,  on  the  other  hand,  sought  to  address  the  difficulties  of  the  
Empire’s   war-torn   areas   by   adopting   various   strategies   and   policies,   and   these  
measures  could  have  profound  repercussions  upon   the   lives  of   local  society  as  well.  
John  Haldon  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  reconstruction  of  fortifications  and  
tax   remission   in   the   Empire’s   eastern   provinces   in   his   study   of   late   antique   and  
medieval   society   and   warfare. 119   In   the   sixth   century,   emperors   adopted   similar  
policies   in   coping   with   the   situation   of   the   Empire’s   frontier   region.   Indeed,   it   is  
difficult   to   examine   the  possible  psychological   effects  of   these  measures  upon   local  
society  for  most  of  them  could  have  been  too  nuanced  to  be  recorded  in  literary  texts,  
and   sometimes  we  will   probably   never   know   local   inhabitants’   perception   of   these  
events   and   decisions.  However,   under   certain   circumstances,   the  Empire’s   political,  
military  and  ecclesiastical  elites  could  have  played  decisive  roles  in  Roman  civilians’  
fates  and  treatment  during  the  Persian  wars.  For  instance,  as  a  newly  arisen  authority  
in  the  postclassical  world,  the  role  of  bishops  in  ransoming  prisoners  of  war  has  long  
been   recognised.   For   instance,  William  Klingshirn   has   discussed   the   ransoming   of  
captives  by  Caesarius  of  Arles  in  the  sixth-century  Gaul  and  other  relevant  issues.120  
These   issues   warrant   further   study   to   investigate   the   exertion   and   presence   of   the  
Empire’s  different  power  and  authorities  upon  local  society  during  the  time  of  armed  
conflicts.121     
 
Sources and methods 
                                            
118  Canepa  2009:  167-74. 
119  Haldon  1999:  239-42. 
120  Klingshirn  1985:  186-7.  For  other  cases,  see  Osiek  1981:  365-86,  Rapp  2005:  228-
32,  Weisweiler  2009:  389-91. 
121  See  below,  pp.  245-56. 
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The argument of my thesis is based on the meticulous study of a wide range of both 
literary sources and material culture. Political, diplomatic, and military events in the 
Empire and its neighbouring regimes and peoples were always the main concern of 
classicising historians in the sixth and seventh centuries. Prokopios’ (ca. 500-ca. 565) 
accounts are the best source we have regarding the reigns of both Anastasios and 
Justinian. What he recorded will be indispensable in investigating not only the first 
two cases of my research—that is, the siege of Amida and the sack of Antioch—but 
also other minor events in the first half of the sixth century, including the fates of 
those living in Sura, Kallinikos, and other places. The availability of sources for the 
second half of the sixth century is different. The History of John of Epiphania and 
Euagrios’ Church History are by far the most detailed narratives regarding the sack of 
Apamea and Dara after Justin II’s Syrian campaign. Unfortunately, only the first parts 
of John of Epiphania’s History are preserved intact. The works of Agathias (ca. 530-
ca. 582), Menander the Guardsman, and Theophylaktos also shed light on some 
aspects of these conflicts. Menander the Guardsman’s History, albeit in fragmentary 
form today, is the major source for the reign of Justin II, especially the information 
about the diplomatic activities among Rome, Persia, and other groups of people. 
However, the fortunes of those defeated in conquered cities or villages were not his 
main concern, and the most extensive treatment of a city’s siege is the Romans’ siege 
of Chlomaron—a fortress in Arzanene—during the reign of Tiberios II (r. 578-82).122 
Finally, in his History, Theophylaktos also provided a rather detailed account of both 
the situations of the Mesopotamian frontiers and the internal affairs of Persia, and 
sometimes the postwar experiences of the Romans were recounted. 
More information can be collected from both the Western Syrian (Miaphysite) 
and East Syrian (Dyophysite)123 historiographical traditions. At the beginning of the 
sixth century, an Edessene citizen124 wrote a chronicle which, together with Pseudo-
Zachariah’s Church History, preserved details concerning not only the siege and sack 
of Amida but also the situation of many other cities of Upper Mesopotamia. Another 
                                            
122  Menander  fr.  23.7.  On  the  forts  of  this  area,  see  Whitby  1983a:  207-12. 
123  See  Brock  1996:  23-35  for  the  discussion  of  the  Nestorians  and  the  Dyophysites. 
124  Regarding  the  discussion  of  the  author’s  identity,  see  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  
XXVI-XXIX. 
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important source for our research is the Church History of John of Ephesos, written at 
the end of the sixth century. The third part of this work, in which the reign of Justin II 
was covered, preserves the most detailed account of the sack of Apamea and Dara we 
have today. 
This, however, does not mean that literary sources of later periods are of no use 
in the study of civilians’ fates in the Persian wars. Whereas the first two parts of John 
of Ephesos’ Church History are lost today, they can be reconstituted by examining the 
texts of later Syriac historians who copied it in their works.125 For example, the details 
about the sack of Antioch were preserved in the chronicle by Pseudo-Dionysios of 
Tel-Mahre, which was probably written in the second half of the eighth century. From 
the twelfth to the thirteenth centuries, the Syriac-speaking world produced some 
important historical works,126 and three enormous chronicles will be discussed and 
cited frequently. The first is the Chronicle of Michael the Syrian, a katholikos of the 
Syrian Orthodox Church in the twelfth century (?-1199). In the thirteenth century, an 
anonymous writer finished the so-called Chronicle of 1234. Finally, in the second half 
of the same century, the polymath Bar Hebraeus (1226-86), a katholikos, finished the 
Syriac version of his Chronography, ‘the last work of Syriac classical 
historiography’.127 Along with these texts, the Chronicle of Seert was probably the 
most important work in the historiographical tradition of the Dyophysites. The main 
body of this work consists of the deeds of the katholikoi,128 the Persian shahs, and 
sometimes even the patriarchs and emperors of the Empire. It thus preserves valuable 
information regarding both Persia’s internal affairs and Romano-Persian relations. 
What we can glean from the above-mentioned texts does not necessarily reflect 
the viewpoints of the Romans; however, several types of sources will be examined in 
order to probe into both the invaders’—that is, the Persians’—perspectives on and 
perceptions of the sixth-century wars, and some passages   from   these  works   can   be  
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53-9. 
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used   to   supplement   the   evidence   of  Greek   and   Syriac   texts. The knowledge of the 
shah’s regime in the sixth and seventh centuries can be gleaned from some 
postclassical sources. From the last decades of the twentieth century, the study of 
Sasanian sigillography129 has yielded precious data regarding the political, social, and 
religious life of the Sasanids. Several   contemporary   texts,   such   as   an anonymous 
work,  the  Life  of  Anasharwan—in  which  details  about  the  Sasanids’  relationships  with  
both  the  Empire  and  the  Turks  were  preserved,130  will  also  be  consulted.131 
Nonetheless,  few  details  regarding  Kawād’s  and  Ḵosrow  I’s  Roman  campaigns  
can   be   securely   concluded   from   contemporary   Sasanian   political   treatises   and  
sigillographic  evidence,  and neither the details of the Sasanids’ viewpoints nor their 
treatment of the defeated Romans can be gleaned from them. Therefore, we must use 
another batch of works, including the texts of medieval Arab and Persian authors 
from the ninth century onwards, to extract more information. Whether they all used 
the   Khwadaynamag   (‘Book   of   Lords’)—a   single,   lost   national   history   of   ancient  
Persia   compiled   in   the   late   Sasanian   era—in   writing   the   Sasanids’   history   and  
culture 132   remains   a   controversial   issue   among   scholars, 133   and   Michael   Bonner  
suggested  that  at  least  in  the  case  of  the  sack  of  Antioch,  the  texts  of  the  Persian  Royal  
Annals’  tradition  ‘raise…more  questions  than  they  answer’.134  However,  the  accounts  
of   these  medieval   texts   reflect,   to  some  extent,   the  viewpoints  of   the  ruling  class  of  
the   Sasanian   Empire.   A   discussion   of   all   these   works   is   beyond   the   scope   of   my  
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130  Grignaschi  1966:  16-45. 
131  For  another  important  text,  the  Letter  of  Tansar,  in which the Sasanids’ political 
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134  Bonner  2011:  57. 
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thesis;;135  however,   some chief works,136 including that of Dīnavarī (828-896), the 
History of al-Ṭabari (839-923), and the Šāh-nāma of Ferdowsī (ca. 940- ca. 1020) 
will be used in the following discussion.137 
Apart from this evidence, many later writers also preserved details concerning 
not only the Sasanids’ military activities but also the Romans’ calamities. Although 
sometimes these accounts preserve parts certain lost texts, the information they 
provide should be treated with caution. For instance, Theophanes the Confessor 
reported that the Sasanids ‘plundered and destroyed all’ in Amida,138 and Michael the 
Syrian mentioned the destruction of Dara in 573. Finally, Agapios, the bishop of 
Hierapolis, stated that the invading Persians seized the wood of the True Cross from 
Apamea and carried it back to their land.139 
I will argue that while, in most cases, the sources used by these authors remain 
unidentified, the credibility of these accounts should be doubted on the grounds that 
they are contradicted by what contemporary writers described in their works. Whereas 
Theophanes’ account of the sack of Amida was probably based on Eustathios of 
Epiphania, a common source which was used by other authors like Malalas, nothing 
related to the destruction of this frontier city is mentioned in these texts,140 and neither 
Pseudo-Joshua nor Pseudo-Zachariah reported anything similar. Also, as one of the 
major military disasters during Justin II’s reign, the capture and sack of Dara was 
recorded by both contemporary and later historians, but none of them has ever 
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Pellat  1995: 417, Pourshariati 2010: 201-8, Bonner 2014 (Dīnavarī);;  Khaleghi-
Motlagh 1999: 514-23 (Ferdowsī). 
138  Theoph.  A.M.  5996. 
139  Agap.  PO  8.436. 
140  The  collection  of  data  regarding  the  siege  of  Amida  and  subsequent  events,  
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Anastasian  war,  Mal.  16.9.  See  Treadgold  2007:  725ff  for  Malalas,  and  Trombley  and  
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mentioned the destruction of this frontier city.141 Since Michael the Syrian used John 
of Ephesos, who was silent on the destruction of Dara, as a primary source in his 
work, 142  he must have incorporated other texts in which this frontier citadel’s 
destruction was mentioned. Where he obtained such information, however, remains 
unclear. Finally, Agapios’ statement should be rejected, for all the contemporary 
sources are silent about the removal of this relic. Recently, Andy Hilkens argued that 
both Agapios and Michael the Syrian used a common yet unidentified Syriac 
chronicle.143 However, since Michael the Syrian never mentioned the capture of the 
True Cross in 573, Agapios must have incorporated this information from another 
text. The silence of Euagrios, who often vehemently criticised Justin II’s personality 
and incompetence in military affairs, 144 is even more significant. If this relic had ever 
been looted by the Persians, it is hard to imagine that he would omit recording it in his 
work. In addition, if it had been removed by the Persians, then the Romans would 
have managed to ransom or recapture it, but the issue was never raised by the Roman 
diplomats on any occasion. Had such a precious relic been removed by the Persians in 
the reign of a Chalcedonian emperor, other non-Chalcedonian contemporaries like 
John of Ephesos would surely have recorded this and even seized the opportunity to 
criticise the emperor. The silence of both the Miaphysites and the Dyophysites about 
this event is thus significant. It is safe to say that this relic was still kept in the 
Empire. 
Source  criticism  will  be  used  to  examine  authors’  reports  regarding  this  subject  
and  why   they   described   them   in   particular  ways   in   these   texts.   I  will   examine   ‘the  
relations  not  only  of  words  to  words  within  a  literary  text  but  of  words  in  one  genre  
and   one   social   group   to   the   words   of   quite   different   genres   and   social   groups—
and…of   words   to   specific   social   relations   within   the   ebb   and   flow   of   a   particular  
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of  Euagrios’  Kaiserkritik,  see  Cameron  1977:  9-10. 
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culture’.145  Their limitations are various. The first difficulty concerns the narratives’ 
style and pattern. As Brent Shaw has observed,   in   Greco-Roman   historiography,  
certain  narratives  regarding  violence  might  have  been  based  on  ‘typecast  descriptions  
derived   from   literary   prototypes’;;146  for   example,   the   scenes   of   a   besieged   city,   the  
urbs  capta,  were  a  notable  theme  in  classical  literature  from  Homer  to  the  very  end  of  
antiquity.147  Also,   some   hagiographers   and   church   historians   clothed   the   Sasanids’  
military  activities  and  the  Romans’  calamities  with  Judeo-Christian  literary  motifs.  An  
analysis  on  these  writers’  languages  is  thus  needed.   
Second, whereas many writers preserved relevant information about the sack of 
these Roman cities, it is impossible to draw a comprehensive picture of every aspect, 
and we  are  bound  to  recognise  the  uncertainties,  ambiguities,  and  unevenness  of  our  
material   about   civilians’   experiences   in  different   cases;;   the   dearth   of   further   details  
makes  it  difficult  to  provide  a  complete  explanation  of  all  aspects  of  their  experiences.  
Whereas  many writers focused on certain dimensions, they usually chose to leave 
other issues unmentioned.   For   example,   thanks   to   both   Pseudo-Joshua’s  Chronicle  
and   Pseudo-Zachariah’s  Church   History,   we   are   relatively   well   informed   about   the  
sack  of  Amida.  Prokopios’  accounts  in  the  Wars,  together  with  other  works  in  oriental  
languages,  make   it  possible   to   reconstruct   the  lives  of  captured  Romans  deported  to  
the  Persian  Empire,  but  much  less  information  can  be  collected  from  the  sacks  of  Sura  
and   Kallinikos   in   Ḵosrow   I’s   campaigns   in   540   and   542,   respectively.   Another  
example   is   the fate of the conquered Roman women. Among   the   classicising  
historians,  only  Prokopios  provided  his  readers  with  several,  if  not  extensive,  cases  of  
misfortunes  that  befell  women  from  Sura,  Antioch,  and  Apamea,  and  neither  Agathias  
nor   Theophylaktos   related   the   misfortunes   of   women   in   any   detail.   In   Syriac  
historiography,   from   the   Chronicle   of   Pseudo-Joshua,   we   can   glimpse   the   fate   of  
women   inside   Amida   when   this   city   was   occupied   by   the   Persians,   but   the   most  
important  case  remains  the  suicide  of  2,000  Roman  virgins  in  captivity,  an  event  that  
was  first  recorded  by  John  of  Ephesos  in  the  second  half  of  the  sixth  century  and  then  
                                            
145  Smith-Rosenberg  1986:  32. 
146  Shaw  1999:  132. 
147  Relevant  issues  will  receive  further  discussion  in  chapter  2,  pp.  61-8. 
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preserved   in   many   oriental   Christian   texts   in   the   middle   ages.   Apart   from   these  
accounts,  few  additional  details  can  be  found  in  their  works. 
Moreover,   the   imbalanced   treatment   of   frontier   and   inland   sites   in   the  Syriac  
literary   tradition   must   be   addressed.  The suffering of those who lived in northern 
Mesopotamia, at least in the cases of the sixth century, seems to have played a 
dominant role in their narratives. The sack of Antioch can be taken as an example. As 
one of the most disastrous events in Justinian’s reign, this event was mentioned in 
nearly all of these chronicles from the sixth to the thirteenth century,148 but neither 
Pseudo-Dionysios of Tel-Mahre nor the authors of the chronicles in the thirteenth 
century preserve detailed accounts. 
Similar patterns can be found in John of Ephesos and other Syriac historians’ 
narratives of Apamea and Dara: whereas these two cases were treated meticulously by 
John of Ephesos in his Church History, the narratives related to Dara were apparently 
much longer than those of Apamea, 149  and the situation remains the same in 
subsequent historical works.150 It is possible that because all of these writers came 
from northern Mesopotamia, it was natural for them to concentrate on the affairs 
around their hometowns or nearby areas.151 For instance, John of Ephesos was born at 
Amida, a city located not far from both the frontier of the Empire and Dara, and it is 
possible that the anonymous writer of the Chronicle of 1234 came from Edessa.152 Jan 
Jacob van Ginkel states that in most cases, this church historian used oral reports and 
letters from local Miaphysite leaders as the main sources of his narratives of the 
Persian war.153 Therefore, what he could obtain from his social networks, such as 
friends and clerics, must have played a decisive role in the description of these 
postwar scenes and details. 
                                            
148  Chr.  724  a.871/112,  Ps.  Dion.  II.  64,  Mich.  Syr.  9.24,  Chr.  1234  56,  Bar  Hebraeus  
Chronography  8.79. 
149  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5-6. 
150  Mich.  Syr.  10.9,  Chr.  1234  66-8,  Bar  Hebraeus  Chronography  8.84. 
151  Cf.  the  work  of  Euagrios  the  church  historian,  who  was  much  less  familiar  with  the  
frontier  areas,  Whitby  2000:  XVIII-XIX. 
152  Weltecke  2010:  102-3. 
153  van  Ginkel  1995:  77. 
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Because the narratives by John of Ephesos provided the most important primary 
source of these chroniclers’ works in the following centuries, such imbalanced 
narratives were thus repeated. The reading of the main Syriac chronicles from the 
middle of the eighth century onwards suggests that the sack of Antioch, probably one 
of the greatest military disasters for Justinian’s Empire, was recorded only succinctly. 
Indeed, subsequent Syriac authors often truncated John’s narratives to fit in their 
narratives and structures. However, the loss of the second part of his Church History 
makes it impossible to compare John of Ephesos’ treatments of Antioch, Apamea, and 
Dara with those of other Syriac historians, and it is not possible to know whether he 
had recorded these events as painstakingly as the case of Dara. Therefore, no firm 
conclusion can be made at this moment because all we have now are the abridged 
versions, from which we simply have no idea what was removed and what was 
preserved by these subsequent authors in most cases. 
Third,  in  most  cases,  we  are  examining  civilians’  fates  through  the  distorting  lens  
of   the  works  of   social  elites.  Of   course,  both   social  and  ecclesiastical   elites   such  as  
members  of  city  councils  and  bishops  were  victims  in  wartime,154  but  it  was  the  less  
privileged   groups   who   formed   the   bulk   of   the   urban   civilians   in   the   sixth-century  
Empire.  Unfortunately,  they  left  no  direct  testimony  of  their  experiences:  rather,  it  was  
the   well-educated,   upper-class   male   authors   whose   accounts   were   preserved.   As  
Robert  Knapp  pointed  out  in  Invisible  Romans,  ‘the  experience  of  ordinary  people  has  
no  direct  voice  in  the  histories  the  Romans  have  left  us’.155  Therefore  it  is  not  always  
easy  to  garner  insights  into  the  civilians’  wartime  lives,  and  a  presupposed  perspective  
and  readership  will  sometimes  result  in  the  limitation  of  available  information. 
Finally, many surviving   accounts   of   conquered   cities   came   from   ‘outsiders’—
that  is,  those  who  never  experienced  or  witnessed  a  city’s  siege  personally.156 John of 
Ephesos resided in Constantinople while writing his Church History, and as the legal 
advisers of Gregory, the patriarch of Antioch, Euagrios and John of Epiphania would 
                                            
154  See  below,  chapters  3-4. 
155  Knapp  2011:  2-3. 
156  On  the  issue  of  Ammianus’  accounts  of  the  Persian  invasion  and  the  siege  of  
Amida  in  359,  see  Thompson  1947:  47-55,  Austin  1973:  331-5,  Blockley  1988:  245-
6,  cf.  Matthews  1989a:  549-62. 
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have possibly worked within the Patriarchate.157 However, many, if not all, writers 
seem to have not only tried to access documentary or oral reports of the events they 
recorded, but also preserved the information based on the oral reports of either the 
witnesses or the sufferers themselves   or,   at   least,   someone   who   was   familiar   with  
local  affairs.  The author of the Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua was living in Edessa when 
the Anastasian War broke out. In the seventh book of his Church History, Pseudo-
Zachariah drew on a local source 158  written by someone who personally knew 
Gadana, who set a trap for Glones, the Persian commander who presided in Amida at 
that time, and his soldiers.159  The returned Amidenes told of their life in the Caucasus 
in the middle of the sixth century, and some captives in 573 seem to have reported the 
torment of the deported Roman virgins. 160  The information from these different 
perspectives can thus be teased out and examined together. 
Material   evidence  proves   to  be  helpful   in  historical   and  military   studies.161  For  
example,  the  excavation  of  Dura-Europos’  walls  yielded  valuable  evidence  about  both  
the   sequence   of   the   city’s   siege   and   the   use   of   chemical   weapons   in   the   third  
century. 162   Approximately   40   years   ago,   Clive   Foss   demonstrated   the   use   of  
archaeological   and   numismatic   data   in   the   study   of   Sardis’   history   in   the   seventh  
century,163  but  the  results—together  with  the  limited  quantity  of  evidence—have  since  
been   questioned.164  From   the   end   of   the   nineteenth   century,   a   series   of   excavations  
have  been  conducted  at  certain  Roman  and  Persian  cities,165 and  the  development  and  
                                            
157  Whitby  2000:  XIV. 
158  Greatrex  2006b:  41,  43. 
159  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
160  Ibid.,  12.7,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.7. 
161  For  an  updated  overview  on  this  topic,  see  Whately  2013:  139-42. 
162  See,  for  example,  James  2011:  69-101. 
163  Foss  1975:  14-5. 
164  Charanis  1973:  175-80.  Cf.  Russell  1986:  137-54,  2001:  41-71  for  more  
discussion. 
165  On  the  excavation  of  Antioch,  see  Elderkin  1934,  Stillwell  1938,  1941,  Lassus  
1972.  On  Apamea,  see  Balty  1969,  1981,  1984,  1989,  C.  Balty  and  J.  Balty  1972,  
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history   of   Dara,   Sura,   and   other   frontier   citadels   were   studied166  with   the   help   of  
available  material  data.  Whereas the results of these campaigns are useful in tracing 
these cities’ development and history, scholars have noted the methodological 
problems of using non-literary data in historical research. Hugh Kennedy argued that 
‘archaeologists have tended to look to catastrophes…to explain changes in the urban 
patterns’,167 and according to Josh  Levithan,  they  ‘cannot  fill  in  the  essential  details  of  
context  and  chronology’.168 Additionally, most cities such as Antioch, Ctesiphon, and 
Dara have been only partially excavated. Therefore, such information should be 
examined with caution.  
The   information  we   can   learn   from   available   literary   and  material   sources   is  
thus   deemed   to   be   partial   and   imbalanced.   Indeed,   the   studies   of   people’s  wartime  
experiences   in  other  periods  and  societies  are   fruitful:   in  Warfare  and  Society  in   the  
Early  Medieval  West,  Guy  Halsall  stated  that  sometimes  an  analogical  approach—in  
which   data   from   other   periods   or   spaces   is   introduced   to   fill   the   lacuna   of  
information—may   be   used   to   reconstruct   the   details   of   a   conflict.   However,   it   is  
highly  risky  to  employ  this  approach  on  the  ground  of  the  particularities  of  every  case  
and  event   across  different  periods,  geographical   areas,  and  contexts.169  Hence,   these  
limitations  will  be  both  singled  out  in  my  thesis  and  presented  rather  than  bridged  by  
tentative  or  conjectural  attempts. 
 
Structure  of  the  thesis 
                                                                                                                           
Napoleone-Lemaire,  J.  et  al.  1969.  On  Ctesiphon,  see  Reuther  1929:  434-51,  1930,  
Gullini  1966:  7-38,  Fiey  1967a:  3-38. 
166  On  Amida  and  Dara,  see  van  Bercham  and  Strzygowski  1910,  Gabriel  1940:  85-
205,  Sinclair  1987-90:  164-95,  219-24  and  Preusser  1911:  44-9,  Croke  and  Crow  
1983:  143-59,  Whitby  1986b:  737-83,  Furlan  1988:  105-27,  1995:  51-64,  Ahunbay  
1990:  391-7,  1991:  197-203  respectively.  On  Sura,  see  Konrad  1999:  398-400,  2001,  
2008:  433-54;;  on  other  fortifications,  see  Whitby  1986a:  717-35. 
167  Kennedy  1985a:  150. 
168  Levithan  2013:  10. 
169  Halsall  2003:  6-10,  Whitby  2007a:  80. 
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What follows will be divided into three main parts. In the first part, both a sketch of 
the historical events of the sixth century and a short review of late antique literary and 
intellectual backgrounds will be provided in chapter 1. Chapter 2 will study the key 
texts’ narratives, agenda, and possible literary topoi to enhance our understanding of 
their authors’ intellectual milieux and cultural backgrounds. In addition, the narratives 
of earlier works, such as Herodotus’ Histories, Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars, and 
Josephus’ Jewish War, will be studied in order to establish the extent of dependence 
in later works on them, and the key motifs of both Greek and Syriac texts will be 
discussed. 
The second part consists of three thematic chapters that analyze and compare 
data from four major case studies: Kawād’s sack of Amida and the Romans’ 
counteroffensive from 502-4, the sack of Antioch by Ḵosrow I in 540, and that of 
Apamea and Dara in 573. Other ‘minor cases’—for example, the Persian attack on 
and capture of local cities in some Roman provinces, such as Sura, Kallinikos, and 
Theodosiopolis (modern Erzurum, Turkey)—have also been studied insofar as they 
can shed light on my main case studies. In chapter 3, the first thematic chapter of part 
two, the wartime experiences of civilians inside the cities will be presented and 
discussed. The theme of the fourth chapter is the movement of Roman citizens in 
wartime out of their cities, whether as refugees, hostages, or deported captives. In the 
fifth chapter, the experiences of these prisoners of war once outside the Roman 
Empire will be examined, whether transported to newly established cities or imperial 
prisons or sold to nomads. 
The last part is the analysis and investigation of factors that influenced the 
experiences of urban citizens. Apart from the Persians’ presence in the Empire, their 
perspectives in the conflicts, including strategic considerations, economic interests, 
and the wartime experiences of the besiegers, will be analyzed. On the other hand, the 
possible impacts of the decisions made by the Empire’s elites upon civilians’ wartime 
fates will be assessed. In the end, the experience of Roman citizens of both conflicts 
and coexistence between Rome and Persia will be placed within the context of the 




Chapter 1. Historical and intellectual background  
The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, a sketch of the Romano-Persian 
wars in the sixth-century Mediterrenean world, as the historical setting of the 
Sasanids’ sieges of the Empire’s cities, will be provided. On the other hand, as details 
pertain to these events were recorded by both contemporary and later historians, the 
intellectual and social contexts from within these accounts were written down and 
preserved deserve to be studied briefly. 
 
Historical setting 
Different types of armed conflicts, such as pitched battles, raids and sieges were 
conducted by both Rome and Persia from the reign of Anastasios to Maurice. 
However, the focus of this thesis will be limited to the Sasanids’ sieges and sacks of 
the Empire’s cities, and, more importantly, the treatment of the Romans in these 
events, rather than providing a comprehensive review of the relationship between 
these two great powers in the sixth century, nor does it aim to investigate the 
diplomatic relations between Constantinople and Ctesiphon in depth. At the end of 
this chapter a chronological table of the Persians’ incursion into and the sackings of 
Roman cities will be provided. 
        For those living in Roman frontier provinces the second half of the fourth 
century and and the subsequent century were marked by a period of relative peace. 
The bellicose Shapur II, the longest reigning monarch of the Sasanian dynasty who 
invaded the territory of the Empire several times and sacked Amida (Map 1, zone E5) 
in 359, turned his attention to Armenia.1 From the fifth century onwards the Sasanids 
were occupied with the threats of the Kidarite and the Hephthalite Huns. The war of 
421-22 turned into a stalemate,3 while the invasion of Yazdgerd II in 440 ended with 
little success.4 
                                            
1  Both Rome and Persia, however, engaged in war in Armenia for decades from the 
360s, see Blockley 1987: 222-34, Greatrex and Lieu 2002: 21-30. 
2  Sokr.  HE  7.18.7-25,  Mal.  14.23.  For  scholarly  studies  on  relevant  issues,  see  Holum  
1977:  153-  72,  Croke  1984a:  68-72,  Blockley  1992:  56-8,  Schrier  1992:  75-86,  
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Things changed at the very beginning of the sixth century. A depleted treasury5 
seems to have triggered Kawād to break the peace and launch a sudden attack against 
the Empire.6 In the summer of 502, the shah invaded Armenia Interior and conquered 
Theodosiopolis7 and Martyropolis (Map 1, zone E5).8 Later he went southwards, and 
arrived at Amida in October.9 The siege of this city, however, did not go as smoothly 
as the Sasanids might have expected. While different techniques, including mound 
and battering-ram, were deployed by the Great King to surmount Amida’s 
fortifications,10  the inhabitants of this frontier city, under the leadership of civic 
authorities, defended their city courageously, and the weather conditions tormented 
the besiegers. The siege lasted for more than three months11 and Amida fell in January 
503.12 All contemporary texts agreed that a massacre took place inside Amida, and 
                                                                                                                           
Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  36-43.  See  Payne  2014b:  296-8  for  a  summary  of  the  
Romano-Persian  relations  in  the  fifth  century. 
3  Greatrex  1993:  2,  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  42.   
4  Thdrt.  HE  5.37.5-6,  Marc.  com.  a.441,  Blockley  1992:  61.  See  Greatrex  1993:  1-14,  
1998:  287-91  and  Rubin 1986: 677-95 for  the  Romano-Persian  relations  in  the  fifth  
century,  cf.  Millar  2006:  66-76  for  the  eastern  frontier  in  the  reign  of  Theodosios  II (r. 
408-50). 
5  See  below,  pp.  212-4. 
6  On  the  Anastasian  War  and  the  sack  of  Amida,  see  Trombley  1997:  159-68,  Greatrex  
1998:  73-119,  esp.  83-94,  108-115,  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  62-74,  Haarer  2006:  53-
65,  Meier  2009:  174-222. 
7  Josh.  Styl.  48.  Zach.  HE  7.3. 
8  Prok.  Aed.  3.2.4-7.  Whitby  1984:  177-8. 
9  Josh.  Styl.  50,  Zach.  HE  7.3. 
10  Cf.  Rance  2007a:  359-62  for  late  antique  siegecraft. 
11  Josh.  Styl.  53,  Chr.  Ede.  80. 
12  The  siege  and  sack  of  Amida  was  recored  by  many  late  antique  and  medieval  texts.  
Both  Pseudo-Joshua’s  Chronicle  and  Pseudo-Zachariah’s  Church  History  preserved  
the  most  detailed  accounts,  Josh.  Styl.  50,  53,  Zach.  HE  7.3-4.  For  other  important  
sources,  see  Prok.  Wars  1.7.3-4,  12-35,  Marc.  com.  a.502,  Ps.  Dion.  II,  5,  Theoph.  
A.M.  5996. 
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many Romans were deported either to Persia or to the Caucasus. Besides, Kawād’s 
soldiers removed goods from the city and sent them back to their territory. In the end 
a Persian garrison was established to rule this city, possibly together with remaining 
social elites. 
Although Kawād attacked other cities such as Edessa, Carrhae and Konstantia 
(Map 1, zone D4)13 in the following years, he was unable to capture any of them, and 
later his attention was distracted by the Huns’ invasion of the Caucasus.14 The so-
called Anastasian war was concluded in 506,15 and no further major armed conflicts 
between Rome and Persia took place on the Mesopotamian frontier during 
Anastasios’ reign. It was not until the first years of Justinian that a full-scale war was 
resumed in Mesopotamia.16 The siege of Roman cities, however, did not feature at 
this stage: the Persians led by Azarethes captured Gabboulon in the spring of 531,17 
but other places were spared.18 In winter, the Persians were dispatched to besiege 
Martyropolis,19 but retreated without gaining anything.  
Ḵosrow I’s reign, which lasted for more than 40 years, saw the most frequent 
attacks against Roman cities by the Sasanids. In the spring of 540 the Great King 
broke the Eternal Peace, crossed the border with his soldiers, possibly in May,20 and 
launched his attack on Roman territory. Prokopios reported that the shah returned to 
Persia before the end of summer,21 therefore, his army would possibly have stayed in 
                                            
13  Josh.  Styl.  58-63. 
14  Prok.  Wars  1.8.19. 
15  Ibid.,  Josh.  Styl.  98-9,  Greatrex  1998:  115-8. 
16  Greatrex  1998:  163,  cf.  Howard-Johnston  1989:  218. 
17  Mal.  18.60. 
18  See  Greatrex  1998:  168-212  for  the  battles  of  Dara,  Kallinikos  and  other  conflicts.  
For  the  battle  of  Dara,  see  Prok.  Wars  1.13.9-1.1.14.55,  Mal.  18.50,  Zach.  HE  9.3,  
Theoph.  A.M.  6022.  For  the  battle  of  Kallinikos,  see  Prok.  Wars  1.18.7-56,  Mal.  60-1. 
19  Mal.  18.66,  Prok.  Wars  1.21.4-8,  Zach.  HE  9.6,  Greatrex  1998:  209-11. 
20  Chr.  Ede.  105. 
21  Prok.  Wars  2.13.29. 
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the Empire for nearly half a year.22 While the inhabitants of other places chose to 
ransom their cities,23 in this year two Roman cities were captured and sacked. The 
inhabitants of Sura (Map 1, zone D2), together with the soldiers defended their city 
bravely under the command of their general Arsaces but sought to sue for peace later. 
Having been irritated by the Romans’ resistance, the Great King feigned to negotiate 
with the Romans first, but not long afterwards seized this city and sacked it.24 The 
Sasanids encountered fierce opposition again at Antioch (Map 1, zone A3). The siege 
of this metropolis took place after its inhabitants refused to pay a sum of money to the 
Persians. While neither the Persians nor the Romans could overcome each other at the 
beginning, the sudden collapse of the timber platform which the Romans used to 
attack their enemies created great confusion among the defenders, and both the 
reinforcements and many civilians began to escape. While many young citizens kept 
resisting, hope of victory was crushed by the arrival of the Great King’s elite forces. 
Antioch was captured and sacked in June 540.25 The treatment of those living in Sura 
and Antioch shared some common features, including slaughter, plundering and 
deportation. In the end both of them were reported have been destroyed. 
In spite of the fact that the Great King and his soldiers invaded Roman 
Mesopotamia several times in the following years, only a few cities like Edessa and 
Sergiopolis (Map 1, zone D2)26 were besieged and only Kallinikos (Map 1, zone D3) 
                                            
22  On  Ḵosrow I’s  campaign  and  the  sack  of  Antioch,  see  Bury  1923.2:  96-8,  Downey  
1953:  340-8,  1961:  542-6,  Stein  1949.2:  485-92,  Evans  1996:  155-8,  Treadgold  1997:  
192-5,  Meier  2003:  313-20,  Tate  2004:  750-6,  Börm  2006:  299-328.  On  the  possible  
repercussions,  both  mentally  and  physically,  see  Trombley  1997:  158,  168,  
Liebeschuetz  2001:  71,  295,  392,  410,  Morony  2004b:  183.  The  examination  of  
epigraphical  data  was  provided  in  Trombley  2004b:  342-50. 
23  Apamea:  Prok.  Wars  2.11.21-4,  Chalkis:  ibid.,  2.12.1-2,  Edessa:  ibid.,  2.12.33-4,  
Konstantia:  ibid.,  2.13.8,  Dara:  ibid.,  2.13.28. 
24  On  the  siege  and  sack  of  Sura,  see  Prok.  Wars  2.5.8-33,  2.9.9-10.  Cf.  Ferdowsī  Šāh-
nāma  7.254. 
25  Mal.  18.87.   
26  For  Sergiopolis,  see  Prok.  Wars  2.20.1-16,  Euagr.  HE  4.28,  6.21,  cf.  Th.  Sim.  
5.13.2,  for  Edessa,  see  Prok.  Wars  2.26.5-2.27.46. 
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was captured in 542.27 In 545, a five-year truce was signed with the Persians.28 A 
comprehensive peace treaty was concluded in the last years of Justinian.29 The second 
half of the reign of Justinian was a relatively peaceful period, and the Romans living 
in the eastern provinces enjoyed peace for about 30 years. 
Some more Roman cities were conquered and sacked in the last years of Ḵosrow 
I’s reign. In 572, it was Justin II who took the initiative in waging war against the 
Sasanids. 30  The Romans, under the leadership of Marcian, the newly-promoted 
magister militum per Orientem, began to attack some Persian frontier citadels and 
Nisibis (Map 1, zone F4). Although their military activities seemed successful at first, 
they failed to capture Nisibis and began to retreat.31 The Sasanids,32 on the other hand, 
launched counterattacks on two fronts. Ḵosrow I, who was now in his seventies, led 
his army in person across the river Tigris and went towards Nisibis.33 
The shah not only tried to expel the besiegers, but also struck Dara (Map 1, zone 
F4), the most important fortified site of the Empire. Ḵosrow I made every effort, 
using various methods such as mounds, ramparts and siege towers to subdue this 
place’s fortifications. The Romans defended this city for more than sixth months, and 
their resistance certainly perplexed the Great King. The wintry weather and the 
                                            
27  Prok.  Wars  2.21.32. 
28  Ibid.,  2.28.11.  For  the  information  regarding  the  diplomatic  activities  in  the  
subsequent  years,  see  ibid.,  8.15.1-7,  Agath  2.18.3,  Stein  1949.2:  510,  Greatrex  and  
Lieu  2002:  123-4,  275. 
29  See  Menander  fr.  6.1  for  the  most  extensive  account. 
30  For  the  accounts  on  Justin II’s  unsuccessful  campaigns  and  the  Sasanids’  
counteroffensive,  see  Stein  1919:  40-8,  Goubert  1951:  68-70,  Downey  1961:  561-2,  
Turtledove  1977:  191-220,  Allen  1981:  220-4,  Whitby  1988:  250-8,  Greatrex  and  
Lieu  2002:  135-50,  cf.  Trombley  2007:  321-56. 
31  For  Marcian’s  campaign,  see  Euagr.  HE  5.8-9,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.2,  Chr.  1234:  65.  
Joh.  Epiph.  2-3,  Th.  Sim.  3.10.1-4. 
32  Euagrios  stated  that  the  Sasanids  had  made  sufficient  preparation,  Euagr.  HE  5.9.  
Such  a  detail,  however,  could  be  mentioned  to  illustrate  Justin II’s negligence of 
military affairs. 
33  Euagr.  HE  5.9,  Th.  Sim.  3.10.6,  Chr.  1234  66. 
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defenders’ negligence, however, eventually led to the fall of this citadel,34 which was 
conquered in November of 573.35 The treatment of the remaining defenders was 
harsh: many of them were slaughtered, while survivors were captured and sent back 
to Persia. Ḵosrow I did not want Dara to be occupied by the Romans again, and a 
garrison was established to keep a firm grip on this frontier citadel. 
Another force of the Sasanids, led by Adarmahan, a marzbān (a governor of a 
province of the Sasanian Empire)36, crossed into Roman territory.37 In this case much 
less information regarding the siege and sack of the Empire’s cities can be securely 
noted. In the Chronicle of 724, the compiler indicated that the Sasanids conquered 
Seleukia (Map 1, zone A3); 38  Michael the Syrian enumerated what territory 
Adarmahan’ forces ravaged, including Barbalissus (Map 1, zone C3), Qasrin, Beth 
Dama, Gabboulon, 39 and the territory surrounding other important cities, such as 
Chalkis (Map 1, zone B2), Gazara40 and Antioch.41 However, it remains unclear how 
                                            
34  Contemporary  authors  mentioned  Dara’s  siege  and  fall,  and  some  of  them  provided  
detailed  accounts  on  this  event,  Euagr.  HE  5.10,  Joh.  Epiph.  5,  Th.  Sim.  3.11.2,  Joh.  
Eph.  HE  6.5,  cf.  Chr.  1234  66. 
35  Agapios  PO  8.436,  Mich.  Syr.  10.9.  Theophanes  the  Confessor  mistakenly  
attributed  the  fall  of  Dara  to  Adarmahan’s  siege,  Theoph.  A.M.  6066. 
36  Christensen  1944:  136-7,  Gignoux  1984:  1-27. 
37  Euagr.  HE  5.9,  Joh.  Epiph.  4,  Th.  Sim.  3.10.7-8.  John.  Eph.  HE  6.6.  Chr.  1234  68.  
The  sequence  of  events  given  by  Agapios  is  different.  Having  found  it  was  difficult  to  
surmount  the  fortifications  of  Dara,  Ḵosrow  I  decided  to  send  another  force  to  invade  
Roman  Syria,   possibly   considering  Antioch   as   his   primary   target,   Agap.  PO   8.436.  
This  statement  is  contradicted  by  what  we  know  from  other  sources. 
38  Chr.  724  a.884/112.  This  information  cannot  be  found  in  other  sources,  but  it  may  
be   correlated   with   what   we   can   learn   from   the   Šāh-nāma,   in   which   the   Persians  
captured   Beroea   and   Sakila,   Ferdowsī   Šāh-nāma   8.46-7,   see   also   the   comments   in  
Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  150. 
39  As  a  city  not  far  away  from  Antioch,  this  place  has  been  attacked  by  the  Sasanids  in  
the  reign  of  Justinian  as  well,  Mal.  18.60. 
40  Barbalissus  is  Beth  Balash,  and  Qasrin  was  probably  the  city  of  Neocaesarea.  Beth  
Dama   was   near   Hierapolis,   and   Gazara   was   probably   Gephyra   in   Greek,   see  
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the Sasanids captured these places and, if so, how the Romans were treated in the 
post-conquest period. Both Greek and Syriac authors agreed that Adarmahan came 
into Koele Syria and seized Apamea (Map 1, zone A2) by trickery. Having made an 
agreement with this city’s representatives, the Persians asked the inhabitants to open 
the gates and controlled the whole city. Apart from plundering this city’s wealth and 
destroying its buildings, Adarmahan’s soldiers enslaved the Apameans and returned 
back to join Ḵosrow I’s forces.42 
The capture of Dara, the Empire’s frontier citadel, and Apamea, the metropolis 
of Syria Secunda, marked the Sasanids’ last greatest military success in the Empire’s 
eastern provinces in the sixth century. In 576, Ḵosrow I again conquered and 
destroyed some Roman cities such as Sebasteia and Melitene,43  but little further 
information regarding the treatment of these places’ civilians can be mined from late 
antique and medieval texts. The Persians ceased to conduct serious sieges against the 
Empire’s cities in the last decades of the sixth century. In 578, a year before Ḵosrow 
I’s death, they merely laid waste to the region around Theodosiopolis, Konstantia and 
Martyropolis and Amida.44 The situation in Hormozd IV (r. 579-90)’s reign was 
similar: we know that his commander Adarmahan again despoiled the country around 
Konstantia and Edessa and even went against Kallinikos,45 but none of them was 
besieged and sacked. Several years later, the nearby areas of Martyropolis were 
raided, but again the city was left intact.46 
                                                                                                                           
Honigmann   1923:   20,   48,   15,   40   respectively   for   the   identification   of   these   sites.   I  
owe  this  information  to  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  283. 
41  Mich.  Syr.  10.9. 
42  On  Adarmahan’s  invasion  and  the  fall  of  Apamea,  see  Euagr.  HE  5.9-10,  Joh.  
Epiph.  4,  Th.  Sim.  3.10.8-9,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6. 
43  The  most  reliable  account  should  be  John  of  Ephesos’  report,  see  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.8-
9,  Whitby  2000:  275.  For  other  works,  see  Euagr.  HE  5.14,  Th.  Sim.  3.12.11-14.11. 
44  Menander  fr.  23.1,  23.6,  Th.  Sim.  3.15.11-2.  See  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.14,  27  for  more  
details. 
45  Th.  Sim.  3.17.8-11,  Joh,  Eph.  HE  6.17,  Chr.  1234  74. 
46  This  raid  took  place  after  the  Sasanids’  failure  to  take  Monocarton,  a  Roman  
fortress  near  Konstantia,  Th.  Sim.  1.14.7,  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  245. 
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Therefore in terms of the Sasanids’ sieges and sackings of Roman cities the 
Romano-Persian wars in the sixth century can be divided into three stages. The first 
stage stretches from the beginning of Kawād’s Roman campaign to the Eternal Peace; 
the second consists of Ḵosrow I’s invasions in the 540s and his counterattacks in 573, 
and the last stage begins with the Sasanids’ campaign of Melitene in 576 and ends 
with the truce between Maurice and Ḵosrow II. In the first stage Kawād besieged 
Theodosiopolis and Amida successfully and sacked the latter. The situation in the 
second period was different. In the middle of the sixth century Zenobia was captured 
but its inhabitants were spared, while Sura, Antioch and Kallinikos were sacked. The 
Sasanids also tried to attack other Roman cities like Beroea (Map 1, zone B3), Dara, 
Sergiopolis and Edessa, but failed, or, in some cases, were persuaded not to take 
them. Three decades later, two more cities, Dara and Apamea, were captured and 
sacked. In short, in the heyday of the Sasanian Empire, that is, Ḵosrow I’s reign, both 
the Empire’s two metropoleis and two frontier citadels were successfully captured. 
The frequency of the Persians’ sieges of Roman cities decreased significantly in the 
third stage: they never captured any Roman city except those seized in Ḵosrow I’s last 
expedition in 576. The reign of Hormozd IV was less-documented by contemporary 
authors, and information about the situation inside the Sasanian Empire proves to be 
sketchy. Therefore, we do not know to what extent the internal unrest of Persia47 
curtailed the Sasanids’ military capabilities. The differences between these three 
stages of the Persian wars may be explained, albeit tentatively, by Ḵosrow I’s 
decision after his fiasco in the battle of Melitene in 576. The Great King ordered that 
from then on it was prohibited for a shah to engage in foreign expeditions unless he 
fought another king.48 Therefore, while in the first and second stages, both Kawād 
and Ḵosrow I frequently led their armies in person against the Romans, in the third 
stage, the Great King’s generals went against the Empire. Scholars have argued the 
crucial role played by the Great King, who often threatened his soldiers to surmount 
the Romans’ defences during sieges,49 and the Persians’ morale could possibly have 
                                            
47  Th.  Sim.  3.16.9-13,  al-Ṭabari  1.988. 
48  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.9,  see  also  Euagr.  HE  5.14,  Th.  Sim.  3.14.11. 
49  See,  for  example,  Whitby  1994:  227-63. 
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been raised by the presence of their shah. Therefore, in the third stage, the Sasanids 
could possibly have lost their impetus to launch a serious siege against the Romans 
due to the absence of the Great King in military expeditions. 
It, however, should be pointed out that while the Sasanids seem to have been 
more aggressive in the second period, their treatment of Roman civilians did not 
experience drastic change. Instead, certain common features, such as massacre, 
deportation, plundering and destruction, can be observed in almost every Roman city 
they sacked. In the subsequent chapters, these aspects will be studied in depth, first to 
investigate how these details were presented in literary texts and second to establish 
why and how these atrocities were conducted during wartime. 
 
Intellectual and social contexts of key texts 
The information regarding the Sasanids’ military activities or relevant issues can be 
extracted from different late antique and medieval texts, but a comprehensive 
discussion of all available sources’ authors and their intellectual background is 
certainly beyond the scope of my thesis.50 Instead, this section will focus on two main 
groups of authors. The Persians’ military activities were recorded extensively by 
classicising Greek historians. Meanwhile, Greek- or Syriac-speaking monks, bishops 
and patriarchs also wrote some important historical works in which civilians’ wartime 
experiences were preserved. I will discuss these writers’ cultural and social 
background to establish to what extent these factors could have influenced their 
accounts. 
The late antique Greek authors’ cultural background must be established in order 
to understand the possible use of literary techniques in their works, an important issue 
which will receive more discussion in chapter 2. All of them may well have have 
either practised as lawyers or studied law, a subject which was ‘over and above the 
                                            
50  For example, it is not possible to identify the compiler (s) of some medieval texts 
like the Chronicle of Seert and the Chronicle of 1234. See  Wood  2013a  and  Hilkens  
2014  for  the  most  up  to  date  research  on  these  two  texts. 
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normal course of grammar and rhetoric’.51 Prokopios was referred to as a rhetor,52 a 
term usually applied to people who practised law.53 While information about his 
family and social background is meagre,54 he was clearly a well-educated official.55 
Agathias and John of Epiphania received legal training56 and later on worked as legal 
counsellors. Also, Menander the Guardsman was trained at the capital’s law school,57 
and Theophylaktos, who could possibly have come from the upper class,58 must have 
finished education at both Alexandria59  and Constantinople.60  As the last Greek-
speaking church historian in Late Antiquity, 61  the education of Euagrios, as a 
scholastikos, was clearly rhetorical/ legal,62 and the use of atticising language and 
                                            
51  Jones  1964:  999.  On  the  benefits  of  studying  law,  see  Jones  1964:  511-3,  Kaster  
1988:  124,  Greatrex  2001:  155,  157. 
52  See  PLRE  III:  s.v.  Procopius  2  where  such  evidences  were  collected. 
53  Baldwin  1980:  21,  Blockley  1981:  48,  cf.  Cameron  and  Cameron  1966:  15-6.  On  
the  evidences  regarding  Prokopios’  knowledge  of  law,  see  Greatrex  2001:  150. 
54  See,  for  example,  the  attempts  made  by  James  Howard-Johnston,  Howard-Johnston  
2000:  19-21,  contra  Turquois  2015:  219-31,  see  also  Barnes  1998:  66,  Kelso  
2003:122-5. 
55  On  the  discussion  of  Prokopios’  life  and  education,  see  Cameron  1985:  5-8,  
Greatrex  1996:  125-45,  Howard-Johnston  2000:  24-30,  cf.  Kouroumali  2006:  102-3.  
On  Prokopios’  connection  with  Gaza,  see  Downey  1963,  Greatrex  1996:  125-45. 
56  On  Agathias’  education,  see  Agath.  2.15.7,  Cameron  and  Cameron  1966:  8.  On  
John  of  Epiphania,  see  PLRE  III:  s.v.  Ioannes  162,  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  XXI. 
57  Menander  fr.  1.  See  Baldwin  1978:  103  for  further  discussion. 
58  Th.  Sim.  8.13.12,  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  XIII. 
59  The  bibliography  on  the  vivid  intellectual  life  of  Alexandria  is  enormous,  see,  for  
example,  Watts  2006:  204-31,  2010:  53-88,  Majcherek  2010:  471-84. 
60  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  XIV. 
61  On  the  themes  and  features  of  Euagrios’  work,  see  Liebeschuetz  1993:  162,  Conrad  
1999:  96,  cf.  Allen  1989:  2-3. 
62  See  Whitby  2000:  XIV  for  Euagrios’  education,  cf.  Allen  1987:  377-81. 
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style draws him closer to other classicising authors.63 His accounts of the Romano-
Persian wars, therefore, should be examined together with Prokopios and other 
classicising historians. 
As  the  core  of  their  education,  key  features  of  late  antique  rhetorical  education  
should  be  investigated.  Although  we  will  probably  never  know  the  teaching  materials  
of   every   rhetorical   school,   for   many   teachers   and   rhetoricians  must   have   had   their  
own   textbooks,64  we   know   something   about   what   these   classicising   historians   had  
probably   read   and   which   works   were   regarded   as   exemplary   by   Greek-speaking  
literati.  The  examination  of  extant  ‘teaching  materials’  and  the  preliminary  exercises,  
the  Progymnasmata,65  by  distinguished  rhetoricians  will  be  helpful  for  understanding  
the  possible   literary   indebtedness  of  our  historians   to   their  predecessors. Although a 
wide range of texts was studied in schools,66 the dominance of Homer   is   evident,67  
and   Raffaella   Cribiore   argued   that   prose   works   by   orators   and   historians,   such   as  
Demosthenes,   Thucydides   and   Herodotus,   were   widely   read   ‘as   a   preparation   to  
rhetorical   school’. 68   Whether   students   could,   as   Averil   Cameron   argued,   have  
obtained   knowledge   of   certain   exemplary   passages   from  handbooks,69  is   difficult   to  
determine.70   
                                            
63  Allen  1981:  51,  cf.  Krueger  2010:  16-9  for  the  fifth-  and  sixth-  century  church  
historians’  practice  of  citing  biblical  passages. 
64  Kennedy  2003:  XII. 
65  Webb  2001:  289-92.  They  were  the  exercises  which  were  assigned  to  the  students  
of  the  ‘intermediate  level’,  that  is,  at  the  stage  between  elementary  the  rhetoric  school. 
66  Morgan  1998:  97.  For  the  citation  of  important  classical  texts  in  rhetorical  treatises,  
see  Morgan  1998:318-9. 
67  Wilson  1983:  19. 
68  Cribiore  2001:  144.  See,  for  example,  Iglesias-Zoido 2012: 401-17 for the 
collection of these exemplary passages. For the influence of Thucydidean passages 
from the postclassical era onwards, Reinsch  2006:  755-78,  also  see Canfora  2006:  
721-53  for  earlier  periods. 
69  Cameron  1964:  44,  52.  It  seems  that  only  parts  of  Thucydides  were  read,  Cameron  
1986:  39,  Carlos  Iglesias-Zoido  2012:  395. 
70  Reinsch  2006:  762. 
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Apart   from   classicising   authors’   texts,   the   works   written   by   late   antique   and  
medieval   monks,   bishops   and   even   patriarchs   also   preserved   much   invaluable  
information  pertaining  to  Roman  civilians’  wartime  experiences.  Extant  biographical  
information   on   many   Syriac-speaking   writers   is   meagre.   For   example,   many  
hypotheses   regarding   the   identity   of   the   author   of   Pseudo-Joshua’s  Chronicle   have  
been  proposed,71  but  a  firm  conclusion  cannot  be  reached.  Also,  our  knowledge  about  
the  continuator  of  Zachariah,  a  monk  of  Amida,  is  rather  limited.72  Nevertless,  nearly  
all   these authors, together with John of Ephesos, the towering figure in Syriac 
historiography, were all clerics from Edessa, Amida or other places of Upper 
Mesopotamia, and must thus have been taught either in the monasteries, ‘the centers 
of authority and intelligence’ 73  in the Syro-Mesopotamian world, or in village 
schools.74 
Admittedly the study of rhetoric and the education programme of classical 
antiquity, if in reduced circumstances, remained alive in Syriac in the monasteries of 
Upper Mesopotamia,75 and certain Greek texts, including those of classical writers76 
and the Homeric epics had certainly been translated into Syriac. 77  The situation, 
however, changed in the early middle ages. While many cities in Mesopotamia were 
bilingual in classical antiquity,78 the use of Greek seems to have been in decline from 
the second half of the eighth century onwards.79 Therefore the lack of Syriac versions 
of Herodotus, Thucydides and other great classical historians would have made it 
                                            
71  See  Palmer  1990b:  275-9  for  a  summary  of  relevant  discussions. 
72  Greatrex  et  al.  2011:  32. 
73  Debié  2010:  160. 
74  Debié  2010:  127-35.  See,  for  example,  van  Ginkel  2005:  37  for  the  early  life  of  
John  of  Ephesos. 
75  Watt  1993:  49,  67-8,  1994:  245-8,  1999a:  159,  166. 
76  Watt  1993:  62,  Brock  1982a:  27. 
77  On  the  reading  of  the  Homeric  epics,  see  Watt  1993:  58-60,  1994:  254-5.  See  Debié  
2010:  142-5  for  other  Greek  texts. 
78  Segal  1970:  30-1,  Brock  1982a:  17-34. 
79  Watt  1993:  49-50. 
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difficult for the intellectuals to imitate their style, content and methods.80 The reading 
and study of Demosthenes or other Greek orators’ classical portraits of postwar 
scenes was also much slighter in medieval Mesopotamia, and it is impossible to know 
whether Syriac historians had access to these texts. 
Therefore, while the classical rhetorical tradition of describing a city’s capture 
and fall inspired Christian homilists and hymn writers in the Greek-speaking world,81 
relevant motifs seem to have played less prominent roles in the majority of Syriac 
historical works. Instead,  the focus of their educational programme was a theological 
rather than a literary or rhetorical one. The reading of the Bible was the core part of 
their curriculum,82  and sometimes the works of great Christian theologians, like 
Gregory of Nazianzus, might have been read in translation.83 
Many   Syriac   writers   composed   their   works   mainly   for   didactic   purposes.  
Pseudo-Joshua  stated  that  the  aim  of  his  work  is  ‘[…]  to  leave  behind  memorials  of  
the  punishments  inflicted  in  our  times  on  account  of  our  sins,  so  that  when  they84  read  
and   see   what   happened   to   us,   they   may   guard   against   our   sins   and   escape   our  
punishments’.85  Right before his account of the Sasanids’ invasion, he stated that 
‘these things (i.e. the political and natural disasters in Mesopotamia at the beginning 
of the sixth century) … occurred to discipline us, because our sins had grown so 
great’.86 Similar accounts can be noted in Pseudo-Zachariah’s Church History, which 
was written ‘for the instruction of the brethren, the pleasure of lovers of learning, and 
the edification of the faithful’.87 
                                            
80  Watt  1993:  62,  1999b:  326. 
81  Maguire  1981:  94-6. 
82  Debié  2010:  127. 
83  Watt  1994:  245,  1995:  67. 
84  The  monks  under  the  leadership  of  Sergios,  an  abbot  on  whose  request  our  author  
composed  this  work,  Josh.  Styl.  1.   
85  Ibid.,  1. 
86  Ibid.,  49,  cf.  Watt  2006:  286-90,  Watts  2009:  79-83  for  our  author’s  explanation  of  
these  catastrophes. 
87  Zach.  HE  2.0. 
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Having such purposes in mind, the potential readers of these Syriac texts would 
have been limited to local, co-religionists’ communities.88 As Jan van Ginkel has 
observed, it is evident that the Greek-speaking ruling elites or intellectuals of the 
Empire could not have been John of Ephesos’ audience since he wrote his work in 
Syriac, a provincial language of the East. Rather, being a well-known leader of the 
Miaphysite community, John’s co-religionists must have been his intended readers.89 
The situation in the later period must have been similar. Having finished these 
historical works with strong edifying purposes in mind, the Miaphysite communities 
under Muslim rule,90 especially churchmen and the monks, must have been the main 
audience of these historical works.91 
This chapter argues that whereas both Greek and Syriac-speaking authors were 
Christians, and most of them would have come from the upper echelons of the 
Empire’s society, clearly their cultural and intellectual background would have been 
different. Therefore, they seem to have inherited different language stock from their 
predecessors, and they addressed different audiences with different purposes. As these 
two categories of sources are the most detailed accounts we currently have concerning 
the Persian wars, information from these texts will be extracted and studied together 
in the next chapter to investigate not only how these writers presented Roman 
civilians’ wartime experiences but also how they tried to establish the connection 
between what they had studied in schools and their reportage. 
 
                                            
88  Such  imbalanced  accounts  (see  above,  pp.35-6)  could  possibly  have  been  a  part  of  
the  literary  movement  through  which  the  identity  of  local  community  was  formed  in  
the  sixth  century,  cf.  Wood  2010:  175-183. 
89  van  Ginkel  1995:  97. 
90  Apart  from  the  ‘well-trained  clerics…  “the  insiders”’,  some  of  them,  like  Bar  
Hebraeus,  aimed  for  a  larger  audience,  Weltecke  1997:  21,  2009:  125. 
91  Morony  2005:  29. 
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A chronological table on the sixth-century Persian wars, with a 
special emphasis on the Sasanids’ sieges of Roman cities 
 
502 August   Kawād’s invasion in Armenia; the fall of Theodosiopolis and  
Martyropolis 
502 October   The siege of Amida began 
503 Winter    The sack of Amida 
503 Spring- Summer The Romans’ counteroffensive 
504     Persians’ retreat from Amida 
526/7    Ambassador Probos sent by Justinian to the Huns; meeting 
between the Amidenes and Probus 
540 Spring    Ḵosrow I’s invasion of the Empire 
540 Spring?   The sack of Sura 
540 June       The sack of Antioch 
540?    The foundation of the city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow 
540 Autumn   The return of Ḵosrow I’s forces back to Persia 
542     Ḵosrow I’s second invasion; the conquest of Kallinikos;   
    negotiation between Tribunos and Ḵosrow I; the release of  
distinguished captives 
543    The unsuccessful siege of Edessa  
552/3    The return of the Amidenes from Transcaucasus 
573 Spring?   The siege of Dara began 
573  The invasion of Adarmahan of the Empire’s provinces; the fall of 
Apamea 
573 November  The sack of Dara 
589?    The escape of Roman captives from the castle of Oblivion 
590     The dethronement of Ḵosrow II 






Chapter 2. Analysis of literary accounts 
The results of the survey in the previous chapter suggest that many—if not all—of our 
authors shared similar social and intellectual backgrounds. Many were among the 
elites of the Empire or, in medieval times, their local communities, and in their school 
years they must have read the works of towering figures such as Homer, Thucydides, 
or other normative texts including the Bible. Through an examination of the 
description and presentation of Roman civilians’ wartime experience in our core texts, 
this chapter aims to identify the possible influence and traits of both these ‘normative 
texts’ and these authors’ social backgrounds on their accounts and narratives. The 
discussion will be centred on three groups of texts that form the bulk of our 
knowledge about Roman civilians’ wartime experiences: first, contemporary 
classicising histories; second, church histories and hagiographies written in both 
Greek and Syriac; and finally, some late antique and medieval texts in which the 
Sasanids’ perspectives can—albeit tentatively—be established. 
Through a close reading of selected passages from our core texts, I will 
investigate not only the literary techniques, features, and themes in which these 
authors’ accounts were framed but also the preservation and transmission of certain 
viewpoints and perspectives in this chapter. I will study individual and dominant 
figures such as Prokopios and John of Ephesos in detail, and the similarities and 
differences between contemporary and later authors’ texts will be examined as well. 
Civilians’  wartime  experiences  in  the  armed  conflicts  between  Rome  and  Persia  will  
thus   act   as   a   test   by   which   various   literary   features   of   Greek   and   Syriac   texts   are  
examined  not  only  to  investigate  how  they  portray  these  scenes  but  also  to  establish  
the   possible   connections   among   these   accounts,   their   predecessors,   and   various  
literary  traditions. 
 
Words and phrases 
Scholars have demonstrated the influence of classical historians on those of Late 
Antiquity. Arnaldo Momigliano has already pointed out that the latter sometimes 
borrowed from or alluded to the works of their predecessors; 1  Brent Shaw also 
                                            
1  Momigliano  1978:  11. 
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suggested that ‘most of Procopius’ accounts of sieges and set battles [are] dependent 
on rhetorical devices and images adopted from earlier historians’. 2  Whereas the 
affinities between some late antique historians’ narratives of armed conflicts and 
those of classical writers have been attested by many scholars,3 a comparison between 
their accounts of civilians in a conquered city is lacking. This section does not aim to 
provide a comprehensive index of all possible terms used by both classical and 
postclassical Greek-speaking historians in portraying a captured/conquered city, nor 
will it discuss the details and accuracy of every event reported in their works.4 Some 
passages, such as the construction of the Better Antioch of Ḵosrow and the situation 
inside the Castle of Oblivion, were clearly based on contemporary accounts, but the 
majority of these authors seem to have followed certain patterns in describing the 
wartime fates of the Romans. What follows is a study centred on such key cases in the 
sixth-century Persian wars to investigate the  possible  affinity  and  similarities  of  these  
historians   to  their  predecessors. In the first stage, I will examine the texts related to 
our case studies to determine whether they share a common stock of phrases. I will 
then compare these results to key passages in Herodotus, Thucydides, and other 
important classical histories to establish possible connections among them.5 In the last 
part, I will present and discuss both these postclassical authors’ indebtedness to their 
predecessors and their portraits’ novelty pertaining to civilians in the Persian wars. 
        As   one   of   the   most   detailed   accounts   regarding   Kawād’s   and   Ḵosrow   I’s  
campaign,   Prokopios’   narratives   deserve to   be   examined   first.   In   Amida,   Kawād  
‘bade  the  Persians  plunder  the  property  and  make  slaves  of  the  survivors’  (ἀλλὰ τά  τε  
χρήματα   ληίζεσθαι Πέρσας   ἐκέλευε   καὶ τοὺς   περιόντας   ἐν   ἀνδραπόδων   ποιεῖσθαι 
λόγῳ).6 In the sack of Sura, a frontier fortress of the Empire, he reported that Ḵosrow 
                                            
2  Shaw  1999:  133. 
3  On  the  historical  works  of  the  previous  centuries,  see,  for  example,  Thompson  1945:  
92-4,  Blockley  1972:  18-27,  Baldwin  1981:  50-6.  On  Prokopios,  see  Braun  1885,  
1894,  Haury  1896;;  on  Agathias,  see  Cameron  1964:  33-52,  Adshead  1983:  82-7. 
4  For  the  discussion  of  these  events’  details,  see  below,  chapters  3-5. 
5  Cf.  Kaldellis  2012:  71-85. 
6  Prok.  Wars  1.7.32. 
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I   ‘plundered   the   houses   and   put   to   death   great   numbers   of   the   population;;   all   the  
remainder he reduced to slavery, and setting fire to the whole city razed it to the 
ground’   (τάς   τε   οἰκίας   ἐληίσατο καὶ τῶν   ἀνθρώπων   πολλοὺς   μὲν   κτείνας,   τοὺς   δὲ 
λοιποὺς   ἅπαντας   ἐν   ἀνδραπόδων   ποιησάμενος λὸγῳ πυρπολήσας τε   ξύμπασαν   τὴν  
πόλιν  ἐς  ἔδαφος  καθεῖλεν).7 Later, the survivors were captured, and their property was 
removed (Χοσρόης δὲ τὸ μὲν στράτευμα τῶν Ἀντιοχέων τοὺς περιόντας ζωγρεῖν καὶ 
ἀνδραποδίζειν ἐκέλευε καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα ληίζεσθαι).8 When he mentioned this 
catastrophe again in Book VIII of the Wars,  the  Persians  ‘razed  Antioch  to  the  ground’  
(καὶ Ἀντιόχειαν   γὰρ   τούτου   δὴ εἵνεκα   ἐς   ἔδαφος   καθελὼν). 9  In 541-2, the shah 
‘enslaved  and  razed  everything  to  the  ground’  at  Kallinikos,  another  Roman  fortress  
(οὓς  ὁ Χοσρόης  ἀνδραποδίσας ἅπαν  ἐς  ἔδαφος  καθεῖλεν).10 Finally,  whereas  Kawād  
did  little  to  harm  the  Empire’s  buildings,  Ḵosrow  I  ‘fired  every  structure and razed it 
to   the   ground’   (ἅπαντα   πυρπολήσας ἐς   ἔδαφος   καθεῖλε). 11 The accounts of John 
Lydus, Prokopios’   contemporary,   are   mainly   concerned   with   the   sack   of   Antioch.  
Having slaughtered the Romans, the Great King burned this metropolis, plundered its 
wealth, and then deported the inhabitants of Roman Syria back to Persia (εὐχείρωτον  
αὐτῷ   φανεῖσαν   ὡς   ἄφρακτον   λαβὼν   πολέμῳ   κατέφλεξεν,   φόνον   ἄπειρον  
ἐργασάμενος,   τοὺς   δὲ   ἀνδριάντας,   οἷς   ἐκοσμεῖτο   τὸ   ἄστυ,   σὺν   πλαξὶ   καὶ   λίθοις   καὶ  
πίναξιν  ἁπλῶς  ἀναρπάσας ὅλην  εἰς  Πέρσας  Συρίαν  ἀπήλασεν).12 
These accounts of the Persian wars terminated in the 550s, and I will resort to 
other texts in order to examine the details about the Romano-Persian conflicts in the 
second half of the sixth century. John of Epiphania wrote that the Persians plundered 
the properties, enslaved the inhabitants, and burned the city of Apamea (διαρπάζουσι 
μὲν οἱ Μῆδοι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας ἀνδραποδίσαντες, τήν τε πόλιν 
                                            
7  Ibid.,  2.5.26. 
8  Ibid.,  2.9.14. 
9  Ibid.,  8.7.11. 
10  Ibid.,  2.21.32. 
11  Prok.  Anecd.  23.7. 
12  Joh.  Lyd.  De  Mag.  3.54. 
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ἅπασαν πυρὶ παραδόντες) in 573,13 while Ḵosrow I plundered the entire city and 
enslaved the population after his capture of Dara (Πᾶσάν τε αῦτὴν ληισάμενος, καὶ 
τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνδραποδίσας).14 In Theophylaktos’ work, the Sasanids ‘enslaved the 
city…consigned it to the flames’ (καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνδραποδιζεται...δὲ καὶ τῷ πυρὶ 
παραδοὺς) at Apamea. 15  Euagrios related the Persians’ atrocities, saying that 
Adarmahan burnt Apamea completely, plundered everything, and enslaved the city 
(πᾶσαν ἐμπρήσας καὶ πάντα ληἴσάμενος...ἐξἀνδραποδίσας τὴν πόλιν).16 
The examination of these accounts suggests that while these classicising authors 
shared similar social and intellectual background,17 they did not always use exactly 
the same words and phrases in describing the results of armed conflicts. Certainly 
some words (ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον—to   enslave,   ληίζομαι—to plunder) 
frequently occur, but others (ἀναρπάζω—to   snatch   up,   ἀπελαύνω—to   expel,  
διαρπάζω—to   plunder,   ζωγρέω—to   capture) were employed as well. In addition, 
particular phrases and words (ἐς ἔδαφος καθαιρέω—to raze something to the ground) 
were used in describing the destruction of different Roman cities.  Clearly these words 
and phrases had classical precedents.18  Some of them like ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον  
or ζωγρέω  were used in the works of many classical writers,19 but others seem to have 
been less popular.20  Also, the phrase ‘to raze a city (or its fortifications) to the 
                                            
13  Joh.  Epiph.  4. 
14  Ibid.,  5. 
15  Th.  Sim.  3.10.9. 
16  Euagr.  HE  5.10. 
17  See  above,  chapter  1. 
18  Cf.  Cribiore  2001:  144. 
19  Hdt.  1.66,  1.76,  1.155-6,  1.161,  3.59,  3.137,  3.140,  3.147,  4.203-4,  5.27,  6.9,  6.17-
8,  6.94,  6.96,  6.101,  6.106,  6.108,  8.29,  8.126.  Thuc.  1.98.1-2,  1.113.1,  2.68.7,9,  
3.28.1,  3.36.2,  3.68.3,  4.48.4,  5.3.4,  5.9.9,  5.32.1,  5.116.4,  6.62.3.  ζωγρέω:  Hdt.  1.66,  
1.83,  1.86,  1.128,  1.211,  2.169,  3.52,  4.62,  4.110,  5.77,  6.20,  6.28,  6.30,  6.37,  6.91,  
7.210.  Thuc.  1.50.1,  2.5.4,  2.92.2,  3.66.2,  4.57.4,  7.23.4,  7.24.2,  7.41.4,  7.85.2,  8.95.7.   
20  For  example,  ἀναρπάζω:  Hdt:  8.28,  9.60,  διαρπάζω:  Hdt.  1.88-9,  9.42,  9.70,  Thuc.  
8.36.1,  ληίζω: Hdt.  4.111,  113.   
 59 
ground’, which was frequently used by Prokopios, 21 can be traced back to classical 
antiquity as well for both Thucydides and Polybios reported that some cities were 
razed to the ground by the invaders.22 
Averil Cameron observed that whereas some similarities can be observed 
between Prokopios’ and Thucydides’ accounts on the plagues, they are simply a 
‘superficial resemblance’,23 and the divergence between these two authors can be 
noted occasionally.24 In what follows, I will examine the extent to which the use of 
these similar or identical phrases would affect the classicising authors’ accounts of 
Roman civilians’ fates by comparing their works with not only the information from 
other non-Greek contemporary texts but also the material data from archaeological 
excavations. I will argue that the use of similar or identical words and phraseology 
does not necessarily entail the fabrication or invention of things that did not happen at 
all; rather, what these classicising authors reported would have been sober historical 
facts. 
Because Prokopios preserved more cases than any other historian (Amida, Sura, 
Antioch and Kallinikos), I will examine the data extracted from his work first and 
then compare it to other historians’ texts. His descriptions were mainly composed of 
four elements—massacre, plundering, destruction and deportation. What we can 
observe from other classicising authors’ texts is similar. Although certain details 
regarding what the Sasanids plundered from Antioch were provided, John Lydus, who 
probably wrote his works during the reign of Justinian,25 again limited his description 
to certain themes: the Romans’ massacre and deportation, the plundering of their 
goods and the destruction of this metropolis. John of Epiphania focused on the 
Persians’ plundering, destruction, and deportation at Apamea and Dara, and both 
                                            
21  Prok.  Wars  1.13.8,  2.7.20,  2.29.24,  3.5.22,  4.13.26,  6.21.39,  7.6.1,  7.8.10,  7.21.19,  
7.22.6,  7.23.3,  7.24.27,  8.4.6,  8.5.28,  8.7.11,  8.9.30,  8.12.28,  8.13.20,  8.13.22,  
8.14.47,  Prok.  Anecd.  23.7,  Prok.  Aed.  2.4.8,  3.7.7,  4.5.6,  4.5.13,  6.5.4,  6.6.2. 
22  Thuc.  3.68.3,  4.109.1,  Plb.  4.64.10,  4.65.4,  5.9.3,  5.10.6. 
23  Cameron  1985:  40,  cf.  Kouroumali  2006:  78. 
24  Cameron  1985:  40-3. 
25  Bandy  1983:  XXIV-XXVIII. 
 60 
Euagrios and Theophylaktos—who used John as a primary text26—added nothing 
new to John’s History. Thus these Greek-speaking authors could have possibly 
presented Roman civilians’ fates quite selectively at the expense of other aspects, and 
in many cases what they recorded, as  Ryszard  Kulesza  rightly  pointed  out  in  his  study  
on  the  deportation  of  the  Greeks  in  classical  antiquity,  was  merely  ‘of  a  very  general  
and  simplified  character’  as  well.27 
What Prokopios and other Greek-speaking writers reported, nevertheless, can be 
checked by contemporary Syriac texts, such as the Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua and 
John of Ephesos’ Church History. In fact, the massacre and deportation of the 
Romans and the destruction of the Empire’s cities would make up the common 
features of the Persian wars.28  Given that the conduct of sieges had not dramatically 
changed since classical antiquity, it is not surprising to note such parallel traits in 
these texts. In addition, as the following chapters will show, these accounts might 
actually imply not only the   classicising   authors’   shared   interests   in   recording   the 
topics that deserved to be mentioned in a city’s fall and sack but also, more 
importantly, the Sasanids’ consistent and coherent strategies in treating the defeated 
Romans throughout the sixth century.29 
The nature of these Greek-speaking classicising historians’ texts, particularly the 
descriptions of a captured city, however, could create obstacles for modern readers 
and even cast a shadow on the credibility of these accounts. For example, in many 
cases, such as Kallinikos (542), Dara and Apamea (573), these Greek-speaking 
literati seem to have refrained from providing further details and have presented 
information rather selectively. Furthermore, Prokopios preferred using ‘to raze 
something to the ground’ (ἐς ἔδαφος καθαιρέω), a more vivid and dramatic term, in 
Ḵosrow I’s campaign during the 540s in Sura, Antioch, Beroea (540) and Kallinikos 
(542). In this case, the   results  of  archaeological   campaigns  prove   to  be   the  basis  of  
reference  to  assess  Prokopios’   reliability.  As my discussion of these data below will 
                                            
26  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  XXI- XXII. 
27  Kulesza  1994:  231. 
28  See  the  discussion  of  chapters  3-5. 
29  See  the  discussion  of  chapter  6. 
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show,30 whereas there are discernible traces of destruction in these cities, the Sasanids 
do not seem to have totally destroyed all of them in the sixth century. The mention of 
total urban destruction, therefore, could have been a rhetorical exaggeration through 
which the Romans’ sufferings were emphasised.  
 
Women, children and the urbs capta 
Whereas  all   civilians  must  have  been  victims   in  wartime,  depicting   the   suffering  of  
women  and  children   in   the  capture   and   sack  of   a   city  was   sometimes  a  particularly  
effective   literary   device   for   engendering   sympathy   and   compassion   among   an  
audience.31  In  this  part,  I  will  first  present  what  we  can  notice  in  contemporary  works  
before  moving  on  to  examine  possible  literary  motifs  in  the  ensuing  sections.  Finally,  
I   will   discuss   the   significance   of   these   narratives   in   the   description   of   civilians’  
experiences.   
In his Wars, Prokopios reported that in Sura, ‘a comely woman and one not of 
lowly station’ (γυναῖκα κοσμίαν τε καὶ οὐκ ἀφανῆ ἁλισκομένης τῆς πόλεως), while 
running, was dragged by the Persians by her left hand violently, and thus her weaned 
baby fell to the ground.32 The Great King, having noticed such a horrible scene, 
‘uttered a pretend groan…making it appear to all who were present…that he was all 
in tears…[He] prayed God to exact vengeance from the man who was guilty of the 
troubles which had come to pass’. 33  Whereas the reading of the preceding and 
following clauses suggests that Prokopios might have intended, on the one hand, to 
stigmatise Ḵosrow I as ‘a master at feigning piety in his countenance…absolving 
himself in words from the responsibility of the act’,34 Prokopios’ account of this 
aristocratic woman and her child’s fate, on the other hand, could actually have 
belonged to a larger literary tradition in classical antiquity. 
                                            
30  See,  for  example,  below,  pp.  128-38  for  the  discussion  of  Roman  cities’  destruction  
in  the  Persian  wars. 
31  Cf.  Rossi  2004:  41. 
32  Prok.  Wars  2.9.9. 
33  Ibid.,  2.9.10. 
34  Ibid.,  2.9.8. 
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Before embarking on further discussions about relevant issues, a preliminary 
investigation on how a city’s capture and fall, the urbs capta, was portrayed in 
classical literature should be conducted. Because a city’s fall and its inhabitants’ fates 
were important themes across different literary genres in classical antiquity, it is 
impossible to draw a conclusion by examining all of these accounts in my thesis. 
Instead, I will focus on certain bundles of texts to establish first which passages were 
considered to be important and second which motifs were essential in describing a 
city’s capture in Greco-Roman literature. 
As preliminary exercises for students of rhetoric, the   importance   of   the cases 
introduced in the   Progymnasmata   in   the   study   of   rhetorical   education   has   been  
highlighted   in   the   previous   chapter,  where   it   was shown that some core texts were 
widely appropriated in classical education.35 Below, I will collect and analyze the 
passages quoted or cited in these treatises. In On   the  Method   of  Forceful   Speaking 
(Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος) of the Hermogenic corpus, the author stressed both the 
tragic style of Homer’s description of a city’s sack and Demosthenes’ imitation of it.36  
In  another  treatise,  On  Invention,  which  might  have  been  used  by  the  students  in  both  
composing  declamations  and  delivering  public  speeches,37  the  scenes  depicting  sacks  
of   cities   in  Demosthenes’  works  were   regarded   as   excellent   examples   of   a   ‘highly-
developed’  narrative.38  More evidence can be found in other rhetorical treatises.  When  
Aelius   Theon   of   Alexandria 39   introduced   the   technique   of   paraphrase   in   his  
Progymnasmata,  he  indicated  that  both  Demosthenes  and  his  contemporary  Aeschines  
rephrased   the   words   of   Homer’s   Iliad   and   developed   their   own   images   about   the  
capture  of  a  city.40 
                                            
35  See  above,  p.  50. 
36  Pseudo-Hermogenes  On  the  Method  of  Forceful  Speaking  33.  On  the  dubious  
authorship  of  this  treatise,  see  OCD  s.v.  Hermogenes  (2). 
37  Kennedy  2005:  XVI. 
38  Pseudo-Hermogenes  On  Invention  2.7. 
39  The  information  about  this  manual’s  date  of  composition  and  Aelius  Theon’s  life  is  
sparse;;  see  Kennedy  2003:  1. 
40  Theon  Progymnasmata  62-3,  see  also  Webb  2009:  114-5. 
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In short, with regard to a city’s sack, the descriptions by Homer, Demosthenes, 
and others seem to have become excellent examples in classical education. Hereafter, 
I will examine the passages cited or mentioned in these textbooks to establish how a 
city’s sack was portrayed in these texts. The most well-known example comes from 
Homer’s Iliad. On the side of the besieged, Phoenix said that Meleager’s wife 
Kleopatra recounts the sufferings after the fall of city: ‘the men are slain and the city 
is wasted by fire, and their children and low-belted women are led captive by 
strangers’ (ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει, τέκνα δέ τ᾽ ἄλλοι ἄγουσι 
βαθυζώνους τε γυναῖκας).41 Apsines   considered   the  misfortunes   of   the   Phokians   in  
Demosthenes’   On   the   False   of   Embassy   to   be   a   stereotypical   account   when   he  
addressed   the   issue   of  pathos,   ‘an   evil   happening   to   a   city   or   some   person   beyond  
what  is  deserved’.42  What  Demosthenes  portrayed  in  this  oration  thus  deserves  to  be  
quoted  in  length:  ‘cities stripped of their defensive walls, a countryside all emptied of 
its young men; only women, a few little children, and old men stricken with misery’.43    
In  Aeschines’  Against  Ctesiphon,  the  scenes  of  a  city’s  sack  were  portrayed  in  greater  
detail:  ‘…the razing of their walls, the burning of their homes; their [i.e., the victims’] 
women and children led into captivity; their old men, their aged matrons, late in life 
learning to forget what freedom means; weeping, supplicating you’.44 
To sum up, certain scenes, including the destruction of buildings, the killing of 
male inhabitants, and acts of violence meted out to women and children,45 seem to 
have been mentioned repetitively in these frequently cited passages. However, these 
                                            
41  Hom.  Il.  9.593-4.  Similar images were preserved in the dialogue between Hector 
and Priam: if Troy was conquered, then the aged Priam would be tortured and ‘my 
sons perishing and my daughters dragged off, and my treasure chambers laid waste, 
and little children hurled to the ground in the dread conflict, and my sons’ wives 
dragged off beneath the deadly hands of the Achaeans’, ibid., 22.61.5. On the eve of 
Troy’s conquest and sack, Agamemnon said that the Greeks would lead the Trojan 
women and children away, ibid., 4.238-9. 
42  Apsines  Art  of  Rhetoric  10.48. 
43  Demo.  19.65. 
44  Aeschin.  3.157. 
45  See  Rossi  2004:  24ff  for  an  extensive  discussion  of  these  features. 
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authors clearly did not use exactly the same words or phrases to portray civilians’ 
sufferings in their works, and the details varied. Therefore, instead of providing a 
sole, clear definition that includes every bit of detail regarding the urbs capta, a 
category in which several core motifs are included will be established. Whenever a 
classical writer portrayed a city’s fall and conquest, certain aspects—such as 
destruction, women and children’s capture/sufferings, and the massacre of the male 
population—would not only be highlighted but also be elaborated. For reasons of 
brevity, in subsequent discussions, I will use the term ‘urbs capta motif’ to designate 
these abovementioned motifs through which the sacking of a city was presented. 
Because  these  post-siege  scenes  were  preserved  in  these  handbooks  of  classical  
antiquity,  teachers  of  later  periods  would  have  introduced  them  in  rhetorical  schools,  
and   young   pupils   from   the   classical   period   onwards   must   thus   have   learnt   and  
memorised   these   scenes   and   passages.  The   purpose   of  mentioning   such   scenes   and  
details  in  their  description  of  a  city’s  capture  was  to  evoke  emotions  in  the  audience.  
When  Apsines,   a   sophist   of   the   third-century  Empire,46  analyzed   the   issue   of   pity47  
extensively  in  his  work  Art  of  Rhetoric,  what  Phoenix  told  Agamemnon  was  regarded  
as  a  moderate  example  of  portraying  people’s  sufferings  properly  in  a  way  that  could  
arouse   their   pity. 48   In   the   part   on   ekphrasis   (description)   of   Nikolaus’  
Progymnasmata,  a  sophist  who  taught  rhetoric  in  Constantinople  from  the  second  half  
of   the   fifth   century   onwards,49   Demosthenes’   narratives   were   regarded   as   a   good  
example  ‘to  frighten  or  amplify  feelings’.50 
The dissemination of the urbs capta motif can be noted across different genres. 
The experiences shared by women and children in Troy were preserved and further 
elaborated by the tragedians of the fifth century B.C.51 as well as in other literary 
                                            
46  Dilts  and  Kennedy  1997:  XVI. 
47  Cf.  Dilts  and  Kennedy  1997:  207n  for  more  ancient  texts  on  this  topic. 
48  Apsines  Art  of  Rhetoric  10.31. 
49  Kennedy  2003:  129. 
50  Nikolaus  the  sophist  Progymnasmata  71. 
51  Kern  1999:  154-62.  See  Anderson  1997:  105-76  for  a  study  of  these  tragedians’  
works.  See,  for  example,  Eur.  Andr.  9-11,  Tro.  484-6,  1173-8,  Aisch.  Seven  321-68. 
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genres. 52  In the Hellenistic period, the so-called tragic historians, 53  who usually 
depicted pathetic events dramatically, 54  introduced relevant themes. Phylarchos 
described events at Mantinea: ‘…the clinging women with their hair dishevelled and 
their breasts bare…crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents 
weeping and lamenting as they are led away [to] slavery’.55 While admitting that 
these Mantineans deserved to be punished for their faithlessness,56 Polybios thought 
that what Phylarchos employed here was ‘an ignoble and womanish strategy’ to 
‘arouse the pity and attention of his readers’ by ‘depicting certain crude scenes vividly 
in order to bring horrors to his audience’.57 Indeed, the fall of a city became ‘a theme 
common to tragedy and history’,58 but clearly not every classical historian used this 
motif in his works. For example, whereas Thucydides, as D. Lateiner rightly 
observed, was a historian interested in both the calamities of people and their literary 
representation,59 such pathetic and dramatic scenes were not used frequently in his 
descriptions of a city’s siege and sack;60 and the fates of women and children, though 
often mentioned, were not presented in detail. 61  More importantly, a   recent  
investigation   of   rhetorical   works,   including   the   Progymnasmata   and   its   use   in  
composing  declamations,62  demonstrates  that  not  all  parts  of  Thucydides  were  read  in  
Late   Antiquity,   and   in   most   cases   only   certain   passages   were   introduced   into   the  
curricula   of   imperial   teachers, 63   none   of   which   consisted   of   postwar   scenes   in  
conquered  cities  or  villages. 
                                            
52  Paul  1982:  148ff.  Rossi  2004:  20-4. 
53  Cf.  Ullman  1942:  33-44. 
54  Lateiner  1977:  43,  Momigliano  1978:  8. 
55  Plb.  2.56.7.  Cf.  Walbank  1957:  259-60,  1960:  216-7. 
56  Ibid.,  2.58.4-5,  8. 
57  Ibid.,  2.56.7.   
58  Rutherford  2010:  510. 
59  Lateiner  1977:  51,  cf.  Thuc.  1.23.2-3. 
60  See,  for  example,  Thuc.  7.29.4  for  the  atrocities  in  Boiotia. 
61  On  Thucydides’  descriptions  of  women,  see  Wiedemann  1983:  163-5. 
62  Carlos  Iglesias-Zoido  2012:  394-5. 
63  Carlos  Iglesias-Zoido  2012:  417-8. 
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Apart from his accounts concerning the Sasanids’ atrocities at Sura in 540, 
Prokopios provided another example, though not in a conquered city, when 
recounting the Vandals’ defeat by Belisarios’ forces. After Gelimer, the king of the 
Vandals, ran away, ‘the men (of the Vandals) began to shout and the children cried 
out and the women wailed’,64 and the victorious Romans ‘captured the camp, money 
and all…pursued the fugitives…killing all the men upon whom they happened, and 
making slaves of the women and children’.65 The reading of classicising historians’ 
texts, however, suggests that the use of the urbs capta motif almost disappeared in the 
sixth and seventh centuries, and neither Menander nor Theophylaktos ever used it 
when describing the enemies’ seizure of Roman cities. In addition, although both 
Prokopios and Agathias occasionally elaborated on calamities that befell women and 
children in wartime, not every case can be seen as belonging to the urbs capta motif. 
In the second half of the sixth century, Agathias depicted gruesome scenes regarding 
the defeated Misimians, a people who lived in the Caucasus, stating that many women 
‘came streaming out of the houses crying and sobbing’, and many children ‘were 
seized sobbing and crying out for their mothers’, and the victorious Romans ‘hurled 
some of them down and mangled brutally against the rocks…tossed others in the air, 
as though they were playing some sort of game, and caught them on the points of their 
spears’.66 While the first part of this account echoed the feebleness of women and 
children of the urbs capta, the later part diverted from this motif’s ordinary features, 
and what Agathias intended to stress here would be the Roman soldiers’ atrocities, 
possibly performed in retaliation for the killing of general Soterichos and their 
insolence towards the Empire’s dignity: ‘the inhuman wretches (i.e. the Misimians) 
despoiled the dead men, taking away…everything else that the place 
contained…appropriating the Emperor’s money’.67  
We  can  now  return   to  Prokopios’  use  or  adaptation  of   this  motif   in   the  sack  of  
Sura.  Although  he  might  have  been  inspired  by  the  characters  of  the  urbs  capta  motif,  
it  should  be  noted  that  it  was  an  aristocratic—rather  than  ordinary—woman  who  was  
                                            
64  Prok.  Wars  4.3.23. 
65  Ibid.,  4.3.24. 
66  Agath.  4.19.3-5. 
67  Ibid.,  3.16.9.  Later  on  the  Misimians supported the Persian cause, ibid., 3.17.2. 
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the   focus   in   his   account.68  Since   the   nobles  were   usually   the   ‘spotlights’   of   ancient  
society,  it   is  not  surprising  that  their  experiences  would  have  been  signalled  in  these  
texts  more  than  those  of  others.  As  a  historian  who  came  from  a  high  social  class,69  
Prokopios  would  have  been  more  inclined  to  depict  the  sufferings  of  his  ‘peers’  than  
those  of  others.  Moreover,  he  would  have  considered  those  who  had  similar  social  and  
intellectual  backgrounds  to  be  his  potential  readers  and  thus  might  have  chosen  topics  
or  scenes  that  would  have  particularly  resonated  with  them.  Some  who  had  personally  
experienced  these  events  would  surely  ‘respond  with  enthusiasm’,70  and  his  work  was  
popular   in   the  Empire.71  Both  aristocratic  and  more  humble  women  must  have  been  
violated   by   the   Persians,   but   Prokopios   may   have   decided   to   concentrate   on   the  
dreadful   fate   faced  by   these  noble  women   to   attract   the  attention  of  his   readers  and  
evoke  more  sympathy  among  them. 
The traits of the urbs capta should now be placed in a broader context in order to 
deduce Prokopios’ intention of using this motif in the Wars. Unlike the succinct 
accounts of other conquered Roman cities including Amida and Kallinikos, civilians’ 
calamities in Sura, a tiny frontier city, were treated in much greater detail by 
Prokopios. In fact, this account was actually second in length only to that of 
Antioch.72 As the first important Roman citadel conquered by the Persians in 540, 
such atrocities could have been conducted on purpose in Sura, possibly to frighten the 
Romans living in other cities.73 Considering the lack of knowledge regarding his 
primary sources, it is difficult to know whether Prokopios provided such a lengthy 
narrative on the sufferings of Sura’s inhabitants simply because he had access to more 
sources regarding this city. Nonetheless, the detailed accounts concerning the 
inhabitants in such a small city could have been Prokopios’ strategy to emphasise the 
cruelties of the Persian wars. This event was inserted abruptly in his narrative of 
                                            
68  See  also  Prok.  Wars  2.8.35  for  another  example  in  which  distinguished  women’s  
calamities  were  illustrated. 
69  See  above,  p.  49. 
70  Kaldellis  2004:  1. 
71  Prok.  Wars  8.1.1. 
72  Ibid.,  2.8.34-5,  2.9.14-8. 
73  Cf.  below,  pp.  223-6  for  the  Sasanids’  possible  intentions. 
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Antioch’s sack, and the looming traces of the urbs capta could have been used by 
Prokopios to imply that much such atrocities against children and women could 
possibly have been committed by the victorious Sasanids in this metropolis. More 
importantly, because the Sasanids’ invasions from 540 to 545 were the main concern 
of Book II, his detailed accounts about the calamities caused by Ḵosrow I’s forces in 
Sura—the first Roman city sacked by the Persians since 503—at the beginning of this 
book could have acted as a signpost to alert his readers to the Sasanids’ policies in 
treating Roman civilians in the following chapters. 
 
Motifs from Judeo-Christian Literature 
Apart from the works of classicising historians, other contemporaries preserved 
details regarding Roman civilians’ wartime experiences in their works as well. 
Further research will be conducted to examine whether, and, if possible, how these 
authors alluded to the texts of their predecessors or other literary traditions in order to 
awaken the shared memories of their addressees.  
Being mostly clerics in the monasteries of northern Mesopotamia,74 late antique 
and medieval Syriac-speaking writers would have been very familiar with the siege 
scenes in the Old Testament, for instance, the sack of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, 
the king of the Neo-Babylonian Empire in the sixth century B.C.75 While this motif 
was never used in the description of the calamities in the Empire’s major cities such 
as Amida, Antioch, and Dara,76 other biblical allusions, together with the texts of 
renowned Christian or Jewish writers such as Flavius Josephus and Eusebios of 
Caesarea, were important components in framing their narratives. 
Many biblical passages were invoked simply to describe either the Sasanids’ 
invasions or the conflicts between Rome and Persia. The term ‘Assyrians’, as God’s 
                                            
74  See  above,  p.  51. 
75  The  relevant  passages  in  the  Old  Testament  are  particularly  numerous,  see  for  
example,  2  Kings  25:  1-11,  2  Chronicles  36:  6-7,  18-9,  Jeremiah  34:  1-3,  39:  1-9,  52:  
4-11. 
76  It  does  not  mean  that  this  motif  disappeared  in  Late  Antiquity.  Rather,  in  Eustratios’  
Life  of  Eutychios,  the  patriarch  of  Constantinople,  Ḵosrow  I was  portrayed  as  the  new  
Nebuchadnezzar  who  led  the  godless  Persians,  Eustratios,  V.  Eutychii,  1720-1. 
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punishment, designated the Persians by many Greek- and Syriac-speaking church 
historians and hagiographers. At the very beginning of the sixth century, the author of 
Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle stated that God ‘struck us by means of “the Assyrian” 
designated “the rod of anger” ’.77 In the Life of Saint Simeon Stylites the Younger, in 
a divine vision God handed ‘the senseless people’78 to the ‘Assyrians’ in the sack of 
Antioch, that is, the Persians,79 and John of Ephesos cast Ḵosrow I’s forces in 573 as 
the Assyrians as well.80 In the middle ages, Michael the Syrian again reported that the 
invading Persians in the sixth century were the Assyrians, ‘the rod of God’s anger’,81 
who were sent by God to punish the ungodly people.82 While John of Ephesos’ 
Church History was used by many medieval Syriac authors, nothing similar can be 
observed in other works such as the Chronicle of Pseudo-Dionysios or the Chronicle 
of 1234. Therefore, such details could have been added by Michael the Syrian rather 
than John’s original accounts. As one of the most furious enemies of Israel, the 
Assyrians were of course presented in numerous negative ways in the Bible. In the 
Old Testament, they were usually identified with the misfortunes resulting from war 
and invasion, including plundering/extortion, 83  deportation, 84  and other types of 
disasters and misfortunes.85 For example, in the book of Isaiah, the Israelites’ enemy 
was ‘the rod of mine [i.e., God’s] anger, and the staff in their hand is mine 
indignation’ and ‘I will send him…against the people of my wrath will I give him a 
                                            
77  Josh.  Styl.  5.  Cf.  Harrak  2005:  6,  Debié  2009b:  106. 
78  Deute.  32.21. 
79  V.  Sym.  Styl.  Iun.  57. 
80  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5.  See  Harrak  2005:  45-65  for  more  examples  in  the  following  
centuries.  For  its  use  in  the  process  of  the  ethnicisation  of  the  Syriac  Orthodox  Church  
and  the  formation  of  their  new  identities,  see  Becker  2008:  398-9. 
81  Cf.  Isaiah  10:5-6. 
82  Mich.  Syr.  9.24. 
83  2  Kings  15:19-20,  16:8. 
84  Ibid.,  15:29,  16:9,  17:6,  17:23-4,  18:11,  Isaiah  36:1. 
85  2  Kings  16:18,  17:26,  18:16,  19:11,  19:17,  Isaiah  20:6,  37:11,  37:18,  Jeremiah  
50.17. 
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charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of 
the streets’.86 
Other biblical allusions were used mainly to describe the military operations of 
both Rome and Persia. When Edessa was besieged by Kawād’s soldiers in 503, the 
author of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle reported that the Persians’ attacks were in vain, 
using a story in the book of Judges: ‘like the Philistine who went up against Samson 
and who although numerous and armed could not kill him, while he, unarmed as he 
was, killed a thousand of them with the jaw-bone of an ass’.87 In the reign of Tiberios 
II, John of Ephesos described Curs, the Roman general, launching a sudden attack 
against the Persians ‘like fire that is left in the wood, and as the flame which burned 
the mountains’.88 The passages from the Psalms in which aid from God in crushing 
Israel’s enemies was requested were here quoted to describe the Persians’ defeat.89 
Therefore, some church historians or chroniclers might have viewed the 
Romano-Persian wars as the conflicts between the Israelites, the chosen people, and 
their enemies/conquerors. The clearest example regarding the use of the Judeo-
Christian literary allusions in portraying civilians’ fates, however, comes from 
Pseudo-Zachariah in the middle of the sixth century. He stated that the scale of 
Amida’s famine surpassed those which occurred during the siege of Samaria and the 
sack of Jerusalem in the first century.90 What he was alluding to here belonged to two 
different traditions. First, there is the infamous case of a mother in famine-stricken 
Samaria as preserved in the Old Testament who approached the king of Israel and 
said, ‘Give thy son, (so) that we may eat him today, and we will eat my son 
tomorrow…we boiled my son, and did eat him’.91 In Josephus’ account, a horrible 
scene was described: ‘Among the residents of the region beyond Jordan was a woman 
called Mary…she proceeded to an act of outrage upon nature…Seizing her child, an 
                                            
86  Isaiah  10:5-6. 
87  Josh.  Styl.  62.  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  81.  For  the  parallel  passages  in  the  Bible,  
see  Judges  15:  9-15. 
88  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.28. 
89  Psalms  83.14. 
90  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
91  2  Kings  6:  28-9. 
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infant at the breast…she killed her son, roasted the body, swallowed half of it, and 
covered up and stored the remainder’.92 Although nothing like the aforementioned 
‘mother-child cannibalism’ can be found in other contemporary texts such as the 
Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua and the Wars of Prokopios, such well-known and 
dramatic scenes might have served as a literary trope through which the readers would 
be reminded of the possible but hidden sufferings in times of dire famine.93 Also, 
because Pseudo-Zachariah already mentioned the cannibalism committed by women 
in the same chapter,94 the allusion to Josephus could thus have been used to stress the 
connection between women and predators inside Amida.95 
In John of Ephesos’ lengthy narrative about the 2,000 Roman virgins’ suicide,96 
various motifs taken from biblical and martyrological texts can be noted. In 573, the 
Great King’s force led by Adarmahan took numerous prisoners of war back to Persia. 
Ḵosrow I then selected a number of girls in puberty from these captives, and sent 
them to the Turks as gifts. While apart from Apamea, nothing pertaining to sieges of 
the Empire’s eastern cities at the time has been preserved, certain places were taken 
by force by the Sasanids. 97  Therefore some of these deportees must have been 
captured from these places, and the suicide of the 2,000 virgins should be discussed in 
the context of the Romano-Persian wars. A brief outline of this event’s important 
features should be provided before further discussion. Various types of calamities 
were then mentioned—for example, the pollution resulting from the consumption of 
‘impure meats…horseflesh, and things that have died or been strangled’. 98 
Meanwhile, the antagonism against the pagan Persians and Turks was stressed not 
only by John of Ephesos but also by other Syriac historians in the middle ages. John 
stated that these virgins ‘were to be delivered into the savage hands of barbarians and 
enemies’, and clearly they understood that they would eventually be ‘defiled and 
                                            
92  Joseph.  BJ  6.201-9. 
93  Cf.  Stathakopoulos  2011:  45. 
94  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
95  See  below,  p.  109. 
96  See  below,  pp.  120-3  for  further  discussion. 
97  See  above,  pp.  45-6. 
98  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.7. 
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polluted by the barbarians and heathenism’.99 In Michael the Syrian’s Chronicle, 
these Roman virgins did not want to lose ‘both the faith of their souls and the purity 
of their bodies by mixing with godless people’,100 and their torments mainly came 
from the loss of Christianity and the impurity of the barbarians—i.e., the Turks101—
and it was their Christian belief that at the end strengthened their soul and body.102 In 
the end, these maidens decided to commit suicide. In John of Ephesos’ earliest 
version, a rather long, enthusiastic and zealous ‘speech’ was preserved;103 however, 
the language used in the Armenian version of Michael’s Chronicle was even more 
dramatic: because these girls ‘would become prey to the ferocious beasts’,104 they 
eventually chose to commit suicide, and regarded it as martyrdom, exclaiming that 
‘Christ…Thou art the crown and the salvation of Christians, the husband of celestial 
pure virgins, come to us, contemplating our martyrdom, receive us in your womb’.105 
John of Ephesos and other medieval chroniclers seem to have intertwined 
various strands of literary motifs in the suicide of the 2,000 Roman virgins. Regarding 
this episode’s layout and subject, he seems to have been inspired by Eusebian 
accounts of the martyrs in the Great Persecution. The comparison of this event with 
Eusebios’ Church History suggests some striking parallels with almost the same 
descriptions: two virgin sisters from Antioch, according to Eusebios, ‘…illustrious in 
family and distinguished in life, young and blooming, serious in mind, pious in 
deportment, and admirable for zeal….the worshippers of demons commanded to cast 
them into the sea’ (ἐπιδόξων μὲν ὸ γένος, λαμπρῶν δὲ τὸν βίον, νέων τοὺς χρόνους, 
                                            
99  Ibid. 
100  Mich.  Syr.  10.10. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.7,  see  Mich.  Syr.  10.10,  in  which  these  virgins  exclaimed  the  name  
of  God  before  jumping  into  the  currents. 
103  Ibid.  Medieval  Syriac  historians  tended  to  omit  it;;  see  Mich.  Syr.  10.10,  Chr.  1234  
69. 
104  Langlois  1868:  207. 
105  Langlois  1868:  207. 
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ὡραίων τὸ σῶμα, σεμνῶν τὴν ψυχήν, εὐσεβῶν τὸν τρόπον, θαυμαστῶν τὴν 
σπουδήν…θαλάττῃ ῥίπτειν ἐκέλευον οἱ τῶν δαιμόνων θεραπευταί).106  
Similar episodes can be found—with some variation—in the works of late 
antique Christian hagiography and historiography107 and became an important literary 
topos. In the martyrdom of Pelagia, an Antiochene virgin possibly in the reign of 
Diocletian, 108  her female relatives committed suicide by drowning themselves in 
water.109 In the fourth century, a mother (Domnina) and her daughters (Bernike and 
Prosdoke) were martyred in the Great Persecution by drowning near Hierapolis (Map 
1, zone C3) in order to escape being ravished by the Roman soldiers.110 As suggested 
by John Chrysostom, the river ‘became everything—both altar and wood and knife 
and fire and offering and baptism, a baptism far clearer than this baptism’.111 The 
suicide, therefore, can be understood as these virgins’ second and final baptism. 
Therefore, these virgins’ suicide through drowning in water, as a ‘highly public and 
spectacular method’, 112  could have reminded these texts’ audience of similar 
scenarios from other works they had read or heard.  
The accounts about what these virgins suffered or would suffer at the hands of 
the Sasanids and the Turks were clothed by certain literary allusions and topoi. Their 
complaint about consuming impure foods, though at first glance seeming to have 
resulted from the changing dietary habits and customs, is a good example. In fact, 
                                            
106  Eus.  HE  8.12.5,  see  Clark  1992:  256-60  for  the  synthesis  of  Eusebios’  accounts. 
107  Ambrose  On  Virgins  3.7.33-7,  Joh.  Chrys.  On  Saints  Bernike,  Prosdoke  and  
Domnina  19-21. 
108  Leemans  et  al.  2003:  149. 
109   Ambrose   On   Virgins   3.7.33-7.   The   identity   of   Pelagia   in   the   homily   of   John  
Chrysostom  was  different  from  Ambrose’s  On  Virgins;;  cf.  Hunter  2000:  281-303.  See  
also  Joh.  Chrys.  A  Homily  on  Pelagia,  Virgin  and  Martyr  2. 
110  Joh.   Chrys.  On   Saints   Bernike,   Prosdoke   and  Domnina   19-21,   trans.   by  Wendy  
Mayer  and  Bronwen  Neil  2006:  171-4.  Regarding   the  possible  connections  between  
these  two  acts,  see  Mayer  and  Neil  2006:  156. 
111  Joh.  Chrys.  On  Saints  Bernike,  Prosdoke  and  Domnina  20. 
112  Gaddis   2005:   113,   see  Castelli   1994:   1-20   for   the   study   of   the   interrelationship  
between  ‘seeing’  and  ‘being  seen’  in  early  Christianity. 
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those who were familiar with the Bible might have understood the allusions to Acts in 
which Christians were commanded to ‘abstain from pollutions of idols, and from 
fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood’.113 
The image of the virgin martyrs in late antique hagiographical tradition should 
be analyzed before embarking on the analysis of John and other authors’ texts. The 
purpose of hagiography was to exhort Christians to imitate the deeds of Christ, and its 
subjects were thus presented as a model or an example of virtues which deserved to 
be imitated by fellow Christians.114 From the fourth century onwards, certain new 
types of heroes, including virgins, monks and bishops were introduced and formed 
another important branch of hagiographical literature; in most cases, a virgin was a 
young, pretty girl.115 John of Ephesos’ lengthy account makes it possible to examine 
his use of such motifs in this episode, and the virgins’ appearance was recounted in 
detail. Having selected 2,000 Roman virgins from his captives, the shah commanded 
that these selected women, ‘full-grown, and of perfect beauty’, should be ‘adorned in 
everything like brides, in splendid and costly garments, and gold and silver, and 
jewels and pearls’.116 Several further martyrological topoi can be noted. John stressed 
these virgins’ fear of being violated by the heathen Turks. As Elizabeth Castelli has 
written, what the audience expected from the martyrological texts were ‘the triumph 
of virginal virtue over scurrilous and scandalous male desire’.117 Finally, a lengthy 
speech was delivered by these virgins before their suicide. As Claudia Rapp has 
rightly observed, the martyrs ‘displayed great boldness of speech in their loud and 
fearless confession of faith…during their execution’.118 Daniel Boyarin has further 
                                            
113  Acts  15:  20,  29. 
114  Harvey  1990:  37-8,  Leemans  et  al.  2003:  23. 
115  Winstead   1997:   8-9,   Leemans   et   al.   2003:   24,   cf.   van  Henten   1995:   305-6   for   a  
discussion   of   the   literary   motifs   in   Judeo-Christian   tradition.   For   the   image   of  
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116  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.7. 
117  Castelli  1994:  10. 
118  Rapp  2005:  268. 
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suggested that ‘a ritualised and performative speech act associated with a statement of 
pure essence’ was a focal part of martyrology.119  
In short, John of Ephesos and other Syriac authors’ narratives of these virgins in 
the Persian wars were clothed with different literary allusions. As monks and bishops 
in late antique Mesopotamia, the study of the Bible was an indispensable part of these 
authors’ education. Their knowledge of biblical passages in their texts must thus have 
come from what they had learnt in schools or monasteries. The images of famine 
mentioned in Flavius Josephus’ Jewish War by Pseudo-Zachariah here deserves 
further study. The Jewish War was used in Eusebios’ Church History,120 and this 
work had been translated into Syriac in the fifth century. 121 The Syriac-speaking 
writers could therefore have obtained this knowledge of the sack of Jerusalem in the 
first century, and John of Ephesos could have consulted this work and adapted its 
narratives as well. The second possibility is that the translation of Josephus’ works 
themselves would have made it possible for them to read these narratives first-hand. 
The Jewish War was probably translated into Syriac before the middle of the fifth 
century and was even included in the Syriac Vulgate.122 Hence, our author might have 
                                            
119  Boyarin  1999:  95. 
120  See  Schreckenberg  1972  for  the  use  of  Josephus’  text  by  late  antique  writers,  cf.  
Allen  1988:  1-11. 
121  The  earliest  extant  Syriac  manuscript  of  Eusebios’  Church  History  was  dated  to  the  
fifth  century;;  see  Wright  2001:  61,  van  Rompay  1994:  73-4.  See  Brock  2006:  21-4,  
Debié  2009a:  24-9  for  a  broader  context  of  Greek  and  Syriac  historiography  in  Late  
Antiquity. 
122  Schreckenberg  and  Schubert  1991:  74-5.  The  reception  of  Josephus’  works  in  
Syriac  Christianity  has  not  received  much  attention.  David  Taylor  has  presented  his  
paper  The  reception  of  Josephus  in  Syriac  Christianity  in  the  workshop  on the 
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had a chance to consult the manuscript deposited in the library of Amida,123 but no 
firm conclusion can be reached owing to the lack of further information.124 
These  stories,  as  Susan  Ashbrook  Harvey  has  suggested,   ‘had   to  be   true   to   the  
thought   world   of   their   time’;; 125   for   what   these writers, though not necessarily 
hagiographers, were really concerned about was spiritual rather than literal or 
historical truth to ‘celebrate the patterns of holiness that gave shape to history’.126 The  
possible  sufferings  of  these  virgins  were  preserved  and  then  transformed  into  shared  
memories   among   the   Syriac   Christian   (literate)   communities, both the Miaphysites 
and the Dyophysites, through the use, revision, and adaption of his work.127 For both 
the writers and their audiences, what they could learn from the experience of these 
2,000 Roman virgins was its moral lesson rather than its sober historical record. 
The above study shows that many late antique and medieval Greek and Syriac 
writers resorted to existing literary motifs, phrases, or passages in portraying the 
Romans’ wartime experiences in the Persian wars; however, certain differences can 
still be noted. First, their accounts were clearly derived from different literary 
traditions: whereas the classicising historians inherited words or topoi from their 
classical predecessors, the scenes or motifs from the Bible and other Judeo-Christian 
literary works played important roles occasionally in the texts of Greek and Syriac 
hagiographers, monks, and church historians. In addition, whereas the classicising 
writers used the phrases from their predecessors to portray civilians’ fates, the 
majority of the late antique and medieval church historians and hagiographers used 
biblical passages merely to embed their description of the conflicts between Rome 
and Persia; but with the exception of Pseudo-Zachariah’s accounts of famine in 
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Amida, none of these references was explicitly connected to their portraits of 
civilians’ calamities.128 
 
The Great King’s kindliness presented in literary sources and the Khwadaynamag 
tradition 
So   far,   we   have   seen   that   Greek-   and   Syriac-speaking   authors   would   have   either  
alluded   to   normative   passages   or   been   inspired   by   the  motifs   from   various   literary  
traditions  to  construct  their  narratives  in  which  the  Romans’  calamities  were  stressed.  
Nevertheless,   this   does   not   mean   that   the   Sasanids   were   always   portrayed   in   a  
negative   light   in   our   literary   sources;;   sometimes,   the   Great   King’s   generosity   and  
kindliness   were   stressed   by two groups of authors, first, some late antique and 
medieval Christian writers, including Prokopios, Pseudo-Zachariah, and the compiler 
of the Chronicle of Seert; second, the medieval  Islamic  authors  from  the  ninth  century  
onwards.   I  will   offer   further   analysis   in   order   to   examine  which   of,   how,   and  why  
these   images   were   presented   in   our   literary   texts.   I   will   divide   the   following  
discussion   into   several   parts.   First,   I   will   present   information   extracted   from   both  
groups  of   texts   and  analyze   these  accounts’   similarities   and  differences.  The   results  
will   pave   the  way   for   further   analysis   in   the   subsequent   part.   I  will   investigate   the  
literary   contexts   of   these  works,   and  which   primary   sources   these  Christian  writers  
might   possibly   have   used   and   whether   medieval   Islamic   authors   used   the  
Khwadaynamag,   a   lost   volume   of   Persian   royal   annals,   in   their   works   will   be  
discussed.   In   the   end,   I   will   assess   the   significance   of   the   Great   King’s   positive  
images  in  these  Christian  and  Islamic  sources  by  examining  whether,  what,  and  how  
similar  information  was  possibly  preserved  and  transmitted  across  different  linguistic  
traditions  from  Late  Antiquity  to  the  middle  ages.   
As one of the most important texts we have regarding the Romano-Persian wars 
in the sixth century, Prokopios’ record deserves to be examined first. Whereas 
Prokopios wrote that Kawād treated the deportees from Amida ‘with a generosity 
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befitting a king’ and released all of them later,129 such an account is contradicted by 
contemporary Syriac texts, in which details about deportation, including the 
destination of these Amidenes, were provided. In the case of Antioch, the generosity 
of the Iranian king was stressed again.130 If we take all of these accounts at face value, 
the Persian king Ḵosrow I emerges as one who treated his Roman captives rather 
kindly or, at least, not cruelly.131 More information can be found from other sources. 
In the second half of the sixth century, the shah’s compassion for the captured 
Romans—, including the building of a hospital, —was mentioned at the very end of 
Pseudo-Zachariah’s Church History. 132  Finally, in the Chronicle of Seert, the 
inhabitants of the Better Antioch even paid homage to Ḵosrow I after his death.133 
While the shah’s benevolent treatment was highlighted by these three Christian 
writers, the results of recent studies suggest that they seem to have obtained such 
information from different primary sources. Philip Wood demonstrated elsewhere that 
the author of the Chronicle of Seert sometimes used material from official Sasanian 
historiography as his source,134 and such a fascinating story could have come from the 
propaganda of the Sasanids. Sometimes, we can glimpse the primary texts used by 
Prokopios in his Wars. For example, he obtained the knowledge pertaining to the 
castle of Oblivion from a certain ‘History of the Armenians’ (ἡ τῶν ’Αρμενίων 
ἱστορία);;135 but in other cases, Prokopios seldom mentioned the sources he used in 
writing his work.136 After the analysis of his reports on civilians’ deportation in the 
                                            
129  Prok.  Wars  1.7.34. 
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sixth century, particularly the mild policies adopted by the Sasanids, Erich 
Kettenhofen stressed Prokopios’ use of pro-Sasanian or Sasanian-friendly sources.137 
As a military officer who accompanied Belisarios in Dara, Prokopios possibly 
had access to first-hand reports from the Sasanids. Berthold Rubin pointed out that he 
could have had some knowledge of middle Persian,138 but Prokopios never implied 
the use of Persian sources in his works. In any case, judging from the detailed 
narrative regarding the city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow,139 it may be safe to say that he 
had access to such information from the Sasanids, from someone who developed 
familiarity with Persian affairs or even from the returned captives themselves.140 
Nevertheless, while Prokopios described Ḵosrow I’s policies in treating the captured 
Antiochenes in a positive light, it remains an open question whether he ever had a 
chance to read the official history of the Sasanids. 
As Averil Cameron has previously argued, in the middle of the sixth century, 
Agathias, through an intermediate translation, could have had access to the material of 
the Khwadaynamag   text  or  the  text  itself.141  The  Sasanids  agreed  to  give  Sergios  the  
interpreter  the  records  of  the  Persian  Royal  Annals,  and  Sergios  ‘took  the  names  and  
dates  and  principal  events’  and  translated  them  into  Greek.142  The  accounts  available  
to  him  clearly  ended  with  the  reign  of  Kawād. It is possible, therefore, that the parts 
depicting Ḵosrow I’s reign had not been finished at that time. Second, while Ḵosrow 
I’s deeds and reign were also described by Agathias in great detail, nothing pertaining 
to the Great King’s military campaign in 540 and the construction of a Persian 
Antioch was mentioned by him. 
Agathias’  account,  however,  may  raise  more  questions  than  it  can  answer.  We do 
not know the exact text that was consulted by Sergios, Agathias’ intermediate, in the 
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sixth century, nor can we ascertain whether what he had read was the full text of the 
Sasanids’ official history. However, if Agathias, who finished his work later than 
Prokopios, was able to consult the Royal Annals covering the rule of Kawād, then it is 
difficult to imagine that Prokopios would have had access to the Sasanids’ official 
accounts of the Great King’s construction of the Persian Antioch, an event which 
would happened and was expectedly recorded much later. 
The editors of Pseudo-Zachariah’s work suggested that he based his account on 
oral reports from the part dealing with the conversion of those living in the Caucasus 
onwards.143 Such information, however, probably did not come from the escaped 
Amidenes, who would have passed through the Persian Empire in least two periods: 
first, in the beginning of the sixth century when they were sold to the Sabir Huns, and 
second, in the middle of the sixth century. The Christianisation of the Northern 
Caucasus and the activities of the missionaries from neighbouring countries might 
have been remembered by these Amidenes, but it would have been difficult for these 
captives who lived outside the Persian Empire for more than 50 years to know the 
situation of the Sasanids’ capital in southern Mesopotamia, not to mention the shah’s 
treatment of other captives in his realm. Instead, this author might have either used 
pro-Sasanian sources or adopted the oral reports of someone who was either 
influenced by Sasanian propaganda or was familiar with Ḵosrow I’s court. We have 
no information regarding this informant’s identity, but he could possibly have been a 
Persian or a Roman who came from the political nucleus of the Sasanids, and most 
possibly a Christian, because the last parts included not only an allusion to the 
apocalypse but also Ḵosrow I’s conversion. He could possibly have been a diplomat, 
or at least someone who was a member of the Roman diplomats’ retinue. According 
to Pseudo-Zachariah, Peter the Patrician visited Amida in 553/4 and ‘restrained the 
dux from again expelling the monks’ after learning the reports from the monks.144 
Peter was sent by Justinian to negotiate with the Sasanids, and the settlement was 
confirmed in 551.145 These Roman diplomats would thus have been familiar with the 
situation of the Sasanid Empire. As a local monk, Pseudo-Zachariah could possibly 
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144  Zach.  HE  12.6. 
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have had the chance to talk with Peter’s retinue at Amida and to obtain knowledge 
about the Persian court and the Great King. 
The intertextual relationships between these three Christian sources should be 
examined as well. As noted above, information in Prokopios and the Chronicle of 
Seert seem to stem from accounts about the Great King’s treatment of the 
Antiochenes, and these accounts would have come from different literary traditions. 
Below I will further argue that the relationship between these two texts proves to be 
weak. Whereas both of them called the city where the captured Antiochenes were 
resettled ‘the Antioch of Ḵosrow’, in the Chronicle of Seert this city was also known 
as ‘al-Rumiya’, the city of the Romans, a piece of information Prokopios never 
mentioned. This city, according to Prokopios, was established near Ctesiphon, but the 
author of the Chronicle of Seert merely suggested that it was founded in Seleukia. In 
the Chronicle of Seert nothing pertaining to this city’s planning was mentioned, 
whereas Prokopios described the shah’s building schemes in detail. The most striking 
difference, however, lies in the last part of the Chronicle of Seert’s accounts of the 
sack of Antioch, in which the author concluded that the enslavement of the 
Antiochenes was a terrible punishment for Justinian.146  Hence clearly the whole 
passage must have come from the community of non-Chalcedonian Christians. The 
accounts from Prokopios and the Chronicle of Seert thus differ in terms of details and 
focus. 
Although the details pertaining to the benevolent relations between the Great 
King and the captured Romans/Antiochenes differ in Pseudo-Zachariah’s Church 
History and the Chronicle of Seert, both texts highlighted the Christian beliefs of 
these Roman captives: the Great King built a hospital for the Christian captives in his 
realm, while the captured Antiochenes paid homage to the Great King according to 
Christian customs.147 More stories with similar themes can be noted in other sixth-
century texts. For example, in John of Ephesos’ Church History, the Christians of the 
Persian Empire worshipped and prayed for the Great King after Ḵosrow I promised 
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that they would never be persecuted again. 148  Therefore the accounts from both 
Pseudo-Zachariah and the Chronicle of Seert could have belonged to a larger literary 
tradition in which the survival and even expansion of Christianity within Persia was 
stressed.149  
In the next subsection, I will discuss the well-known Khwadaynamag  argument  
through  a  close  reading  and  analysis  of  some  medieval   Islamic   texts.  In his ground-
breaking work Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden,  Theodor 
Nöldeke   argued   that   many   Islamic   and   Persian   historians   relied   on   a   single,   lost  
volume  of  Persian  royal  annals  as  a  common  source  when   they  wrote   the  history  of  
pre-Islamic   Iran.   This   work,   which   was   centred   on   the   Great   King’s   deeds,   was  
possibly  composed  under  the  patronage  of  Ḵosrow   I  or  Yazdegerd  III (r. 633-51),150 
the last monarch of the Sasanian Empire. The   original   text   was   reported   to   be  
translated   by   Ibn al-Muqaffa', an eighth-century Persian thinker who had access to 
Sasanian archives. Recently, however, this argument was challenged by Michael 
Bonner, who suggested that instead of a  single,  lost  Persian  official  history,  what  these  
medieval  Arab  and  Persian  writers  used  might  have  been  a  Khwadaynamag  tradition  
in  which  pro-Sasanian  perspectives  were  embodied.151 
The   details   regarding   the   Great   King’s   treatment   of   the   defeated   Romans   in  
medieval   Islamic   texts   and   Eutychios’   Annals,   as   one   of   the   core   parts   of   these  
writers’  narratives  of  the  Romano-Persian  wars,  should  be  presented  first  to  assess  the  
possible  affinities  between  these  texts.  Both  Dīnavarī  and  al-Thālibī  reported  that  the  
Romans   were   captured   in   Amida   and  Martyropolis   during   the   reign   of   Kawād.152  
Later,   they,   together  with  al-Ṭabari,   enumerated  almost   exactly   the  cities   conquered  
by   the   Persians   in   Ḵosrow I’s   campaign. 153   Also,   both   al-Thālibī   and   Eutychios  
reported  that  the  Great  King  asked  his  prefect  to  build  a  Persian  Antioch  according  to  
                                            
148  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.20,  see  also  Euagr.  HE  4.28,  Joh,  Nik.  95.23-5. 
149 Greatrex  et  al.  2011:  454.  Recently Alexander Schilling has studied the story of 
Ḵosrow I’s conversion to Christianity, Schilling 2008: 37-41. 
150  Nöldeke  1879a:  XV-XVI. 
151  See  the  discussion  in  Bonner  2014:  82-4,  293,  295. 
152  Dīnavarī  68,  al-Thālibī  Histoire des rois des Perses  594-5. 
153  Dīnavarī  70,  al-Ṭabari  1.959.  al-Thālibī  Histoire des rois des Perses  612-3. 
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the  plan  of  Roman  Antioch,  and  the  presence  of  a  Christian  prefect  of  this  newly  built  
city  was  mentioned  by  Dīnavarī  and  al-Ṭabari.154  Finally,   these  medieval  authors  all  
emphasised   the   similarities   between   the   original   Antioch   and   that   built   by   the  
Sasanids.155 
In   addition,   Ḵosrow   I’s   expeditions   against   the   Romans   in   the   540s   became  
unanimously  the  spotlight  of  these  medieval  writers’  narratives,  and  his  greatness  and  
military   successes   were   emphasised   at   the   expense   of   other   sixth-century   Persian  
rulers.  All  of  these  medieval  authors  treated  Kawād’s  campaign  rather  succinctly  and  
kept   silent   about   the   Sasanids’   successful   counteroffensive   in   573—an   event   that  
received   much   attention   in   Greek   and   Syriac   texts—let   alone   the   fiasco156  in   the  
campaign   of   Melitene   three   years   later.   The   reign   of   Hormozd   IV was generally 
presented negatively, because  he  returned the cities conquered by his father, including 
Amida, Martyropolis and Dara.157 
Two  more  features  of   these  medieval   texts’  descriptions  of  Ḵosrow   I’s  military  
activities  can  be  noted.  Compared  to  what  we  can  observe  from  Prokopios158—by  far  
the  most   detailed   account   of   the  Romano-Persian  wars   in   the   first   half   of   the   sixth  
century—it   is   indicated   that   ‘it   did   not   matter   to   the   Persians   which   cities   were  
involved,   so   long   as   their   forced   submission   was   emphasised’.159  Ferdowsī’s   Šāh-
nāma,  a  Persian  epic  poem,  is  an  excellent  example.  He  not  only  stressed  the  Romans’  
aggressiveness   and   subsequent  defeat,160  possibly  as   a  way   to   aggrandise   the   shah’s  
military  prowess,  but  also  articulated  the  brutal  treatment  of  the  defeated  Romans.  For  
example,   after   the  end   of   the  Romans’  massacre   at   Shurab   (Sura?),   ‘the   stronghold  
                                            
154  Dīnavarī  71,  al-Ṭabari  1.959-60. 
155  Dīnavarī  70,  al-Ṭabari  1.898,  959,  al-Thālibī  Histoire des rois des Perses  612-3,  
Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  7.259-60,  Eutychios  92. 
156  Cf.  Bonner  2014:  281. 
157  Dīnavarī  81. 
158  Prok.  Wars  2.5-14. 
159  Bonner  2011:  52,  see,  for  example,  al-Ṭabari  1.959. 
160  Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  7.255-8.  Whether  this  general  can  be  equated  with  Germanos,  
Justinian’s  nephew  who  was  sent  to  Antioch  in  540,  cannot  be  confirmed. 
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was   all   trunkless   heads   and   feet,   elsewhere  were   headless   trunks’.161  Later,   another  
Roman   city,   Arayish-i-Rum (Hierapolis), became ‘a sea of blood’ 162  and 
‘unnumbered Romans perished beneath the arrows’. The veracity of these 
descriptions, however, should be questioned on the grounds that nothing similar was 
mentioned in other contemporary Greek and Syriac accounts. What we can note from 
it, however, was Ferdowsī’s (or the authors’ of his primary sources) efforts to 
emphasise the Romans’ defeat. 
Meanwhile,   the ‘fundamental principles of government’ of Sasanian Persia,163 
particularly Ḵosrow   I’s generosity and kindness,  were illustrated.   In the city Better 
Antioch of Ḵosrow, the Great King had the workers plant more green trees for a 
Roman captive after hearing this man’s complaint.164 Ferdowsī uses hyperbole to 
demonstrate the similarities between the original Antioch and the Persian Antioch; it 
is difficult to believe that a newly captured Roman would have dared to make 
complaints about such a trivial matter. 
Despite   of   such   similar   features   and   descriptions,   certain   differences   among  
these  texts’  accounts  are  discernible.  Many  of  them  mentioned  the  deportation  of  the  
Amidenes,  but  only  al-Ṭabari  related  that  it  was  women  and  children  who  became  the  
prisoners  of  war.165  In  al-Thālibī’,  both  the  seizure  of  these  two  cities  and  the  Romans’  
deportation  were  recorded,  but  nothing  pertaining  to  the  construction  of  a  new  city  in  
which   these   captives   were   resettled, 166 which   was   reported   by   Dīnavarī, 167 was  
mentioned.  In  Eutychios  of  Alexandria’s  Annals,  the  fierce  battle  between  Rome  and  
Persia   at   Alexandria,   an   event   that   cannot   be   found   in   Dīnavarī,   al-Ṭabari,   and  
                                            
161  Ibid.,  7.254.  Whether  it  implied  the  mutilation  of  corpses,  however,  remains  
unclear  because  nothing  similar  was  preserved  in  other  texts. 
162  Ibid.,  8.47. 
163  Howard-Johnston  1995:  171,  2010a:  350. 
164  Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  7.260,  cf.  al-Thālibī  Histoire des rois des Perses 613. 
165  al-Ṭabari  1.887. 
166  al-Thālibī  Histoire des rois des Perses  594-5. 
167  Dīnavarī  68. 
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Ferdowsī,  was  inserted  abruptly  after  Amida’s  destruction.168  The  difference  between  
these  texts  regarding  Ḵosrow I’s  first  invasion  in  540  is  clear:  both  Dīnavarī  and  al-
Ṭabari   stated   that   the   Sasanids   conquered   many   Roman   cities,   whereas   Ferdowsī  
merely  mentioned   the   sack   of   Sura,  Kallinikos,   and  Antioch;;   in  Eutychios’  Annals,  
only  Antioch  was  seized.169  Moreover,  neither  the  toponym  of  the  Persian  Antioch  nor  
the   name   of   this   city’s   prefect   in   other   texts   can   be   identified   with   Dīnavarī’s  
reports.170  Therefore,  these  medieval  authors  focused  particularly  on  both  Ḵosrow I’s  
military   prowess   and   the   construction   of   the   Persian  Antioch,   and   a   comparison   of  
their  texts  demonstrates  striking  affinities;;  however,  in  many  cases,  the  details  gleaned  
from  them  varied.  Michael  Bonner’s  argument—in  which  the  Khwadaynamag  should  
be   regarded   as   a   literary   tradition   with   various   versions   rather   than   a   single   lost  
historical  text171—can  thus  be  accepted. 
The  results  of  a  close  study  of  these  Christian  and  Islamic  texts—especially  the  
positive  image  of  the  Great  King  in  the  Persian  wars—can  be  compared.  Whereas  the  
resettlement  of  the  captured  Antiochenes  received  particular  attention  in  these  Islamic  
texts,  and  the  Great  King’s  endeavours  to  build  a  replica  of  the  original  Antioch  and  
his   generosity   in   treating   these   Romans   were   stressed   as   well, 172   none   of   them  
mentioned   the   events   preserved   in   Pseudo-Zachariah’s   Church   History   and   the  
Chronicle  of  Seert,   nor  do   they  emphasise  Ḵosrow I’s  Christian-friendly  policies   in  
treating   the   captives   inside   his   realm.  On   the   other   hand,  whereas   late   antique   and  
medieval  Christian  writers  portrayed  Ḵosrow  I in  a  positive  light,  what  they  presented  
sometimes  concerned  the  Great  King’s   friendliness   towards   the  Christians,  and  such  
details  received  much  less  attention  in  medieval  Islamic  texts.  The  difference  between  
the  Khwadaynamag  tradition-based  texts  and  the  Christian  sources  in  which  the  Great  
King’s  kindliness  towards  the  captives  was  recorded  is  thus  clear. 
                                            
168  Eutychios  82,  see  also  al-Ṭabari  1.898.  The  Sasanids  never  fought  against  the  
Romans  at  Alexandria  in  the  sixth  century. 
169  Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  7.254-9,  Eutychios  92. 
170  Dīnavarī  70. 
171  Bonner  2014:  82-3,  293. 
172  al-Thālibī  Histoire des rois des Perses  612-3. 
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The above investigation suggests that it is difficult to employ the dichotomy of 
Christian/non-Christian or Greek/oriental texts to explain the different images of the 
Sasanids provided in these narratives. Rather, what we see in these texts is a 
multifaceted picture: Pseudo-Zachariah and Prokopios depicted the Sasanids’ 
atrocities in Amida and Antioch, respectively, but both of them also preserved the 
positive image of Ḵosrow I in their works. More significantly, such details were 
written in Greek, Arabic (Christian), and Perso-Arabic (Islamic) works. Therefore the 
differences between these religious and literary traditions were blurred. 
The contrast between the information provided by these texts and those by John 
of Ephesos, in which the sufferings of those in the city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow 
were stressed, is clear. John’s accounts may reflect the viewpoints of the Romans,173 
or, at least, could be based on the observation of local communities where their daily 
lives were harassed by the invading enemies. These two standpoints do not 
necessarily contradict each other, and both of them might have just been one part of 
the whole puzzle. The Persians might have treated the captured Romans well, 
especially those from Antioch, for they would have been considered as ‘show pieces’ 
to be settled in the ‘Persian Antioch’, a space designed to glorify the Sasanids’ 
victories, while at the same time certain countermeasures were adopted in order to 
prevent the captured Romans from escaping this place. 
In this chapter, I have examined a number of core texts to establish how 
contemporary and later historians constructed their narratives to describe Roman 
civilians’   calamities.   Many Greek-speaking classicising writers used the same or 
similar clauses and words to describe certain aspects  of  the  Romans’  experiences.  The  
credibility of the majority of these accounts, however, can be established by 
comparing their reportage with contemporary Syriac texts and material data. Motifs 
from the Bible and other Judeo-Christian literary works were used by Greek- and 
Syriac-speaking hagiographers and church historians in Late Antiquity and in the 
middle  ages,  such  as  the  Assyrians’  invasions,  the  turmoil  in  the  siege  of  Jerusalem,  
and the martyrs. Finally, the reading of the Khwadaynamag tradition-based texts 
suggests that whereas many parallels in their accounts can be observed, the details 
were actually at variance with each other. A single Khwadaynamag text, therefore, 
                                            
173  Kettenhofen  1996:  305. 
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might never have existed. Positive images of the Great Kings were mentioned in some 
Christian texts, but the connection between the Khwadaynamag tradition and these 
accounts proves to be weak; nothing identical can be observed in these two groups of 
texts. The investigation of this chapter, therefore, suggests contemporary and 
medieval  sources’  literary  and  historical  complexity.  In  the  following  chapters,  I  will  
further   examine   these   complexities   to   unveil   Roman   civilians’   experiences   in   the  
conflicts between Rome and Persia. 
In  most   cases,   authors   from   a   common   linguistic   and   cultural   group   shared   a  
similar  standpoint.  Although  it  is  too  crude  to  say  that  most  Greek  and  Syriac  authors  
from   the   sixth   century   onwards   shared   common   attitudes,   they   clearly   focused   on  
civilians’  misfortunes  in  a  conquered  city.  By  contrast,  the  Persians’  military  victories  
were   the   main   concern   in   some   Islamic   texts,   whereas   few   details   regarding   the  
atrocities  against  urban  civilians  were  preserved.  Of  course,   the  homogeneity  of   the  
works  in  the  Perso-Arabic  literary  tradition  is  significant,  but  a  closer  reading  of  these  
texts   reveals   that  many   differences   can   still   be   observed.   Hence,   the  material   used  
would   have   come   from   a   variety   of   texts  within   a   common   literary   tradition   rather  
than   a   lost   single   volume   of   royal   annals.   More   significantly,   the   shah’s   positive  
image   can   also   be   noted   occasionally   in   some   late   antique   and  medieval   Christian  
texts,   which   stressed   the   compassion   and   respect   between   the   Great   King   and   the  
captured  Christians  rather   than   the  Persians’  greatness  and  generosity.  Although   the  
details   of   these   sources were at variance with each other and seemed to have had 
different access to such information, what they recorded and presented could possibly 
have originated from the same literary and cultural context.  
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Chapter 3. The experience of civilians in Roman cities 
The calamities of those living in urban communities in wartime can be observed both 
during and after a city’s siege. The Sasanids’ sieges and attacks would have led to a 
high death toll among civilians. Having overcome the resistance of defenders, the 
victorious Sasanids would have seized control of the conquered Romans. In this 
chapter I will examine the citizens’ wartime experiences thematically inside or near 
the cities, including loss of life, sexual violence, plundering and destruction. 
 
Loss of life 
The loss of life was one of the most prevelant experiences of a besieged city’s civilian 
population. In most cases, the Romans were killed by the Persians either during or 
after the siege; while the enemy would have inflicted numerous casualties on a city’s 
inhabitants, many would be slaughtered in the post-siege massacre. Other Romans 
perished in wartime from lack of food. 
 
Hand-to-hand combat and street battles 
Although many citizens would surely have been killed when the Sasanids attacked a 
city’s fortifications and inhabitants, relevant evidence is scarce even in contemporary 
sources. What we have, instead, is information concerning hand-to-hand combats 
between the defenders and the Sasanids. 
Hand-to-hand combats would have happened when the Persians strove to break 
the Romans’ resistance and enter the cities. The most detailed description comes from 
contemporary accounts regarding the situation on the eve of Amida’s fall. Despite 
different details provided in Greek and Syriac texts, most reports agreed that those 
who were in charge of defending this frontier city were killed when the Persians were 
struggling to enter the city. The author of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle reported that the 
guards of the fortifications had drank too much and fell asleep, and some of them 
even deserted their posts.1 The continuator of Zachariah’s Church History, who would 
have used a local text in his work, suggested that when the monks who were in charge 
of defending the fortifications of Amida were drunkenly sleeping, the Persians 
                                            
1  Josh.  Styl.  53. 
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approached the fortification with ladders and slaughtered them in the Tripyrgion, the 
‘three towers’.2 
Such precious information makes it possible to glimpse the situation inside 
Amida. Since this city was taken in January 503, 3  what contemporary writers 
described above must date to the very beginning of that year. From Prokopios’ Wars, 
we are further informed that at that time the Romans were ‘keeping some annual 
religious festival to God’.4 Although they did not celebrate the Epiphany,5 the defence 
of Amida at that point could possibly have become more lax. Having noticed that his 
soldiers were discomfited by the weather and the Romans’ resistance, the Great King 
asked the Amidenes to ransom their city6 rather than continuing the siege. Therefore, 
the civic leaders of Amida might have relaxed their vigilance against the Persians. 
The defenders’ negligence soon led to the fall of Amida. Even though many 
Amidenes rushed to assist the monks and managed to repel the Persians, it was too 
late, and many of them were shot by arrows and perished. After the Persians 
consolidated their grip on this tower, the Great King began the final attack in the 
morning; more towers were seized and the inhabitants killed, and eventually the 
whole fortification fell into the hands of the enemies, who ‘killed and thrust back the 
guards over one night, one day, and another night’.7 
In both Antioch (540) and Dara (573) heavy street battles raged. After  observing  
the  departure  of  Roman  forces,  the  Persians  entered  Antioch,  but  some  young  citizens  
resisted   the   invaders.   While   some   of   them   wore   heavy   armour,   others   remained  
                                            
2  Zach.  HE  7.4,  cf.  Prok.  Wars  1.7.23-8.  See  also  Marc.  com.  a.502  and  Theoph.  A.M.  
5996,  both  of  whom  ascribed  the  fall  of  Amida  to  the  defenders’  treachery.  Other  
similar  cases  can  be  noted  in  Shapur II’s  invasion  and  the  siege  of  Amida  in  359,  see  
Ammianus  18.8.3,  19.5.4-5. 
3  See  above,  p.  41. 
4  Prok.  Wars  1.7.22. 
5  Greatrex  1998:  91. 
6  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
7  Ibid. 
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unarmed  and  used  stones  to  attack  the  approaching  Sasanids.8  They  were  even  able  to  
push   the   enemies   back,   albeit   temporarily,   and   ‘raised   the   paean…proclaimed   the  
Emperor   Justinian   triumphant’.9  Later   on   it   was   only   after   the   arrival   of   the   elite  
forces  sent  by  Ḵosrow I,  who  ‘forced  back  the  citizens  by  their  numbers  and  turned  
them  to  flight’,  that  the  resistance  of  these  Romans  was  crushed.10 
In 573, Euagrios wrote that the shah slew some Romans in Dara, presumably 
after their capture (Απαντας τοίνυν ἐξαγαγών, πλῆθος ἀστάθμητον, καὶ τοὺς μεν 
αὐτοῦ δειλαίως κατασφάξας, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους καὶ ζωγρίας ἑλών),11 but we do not 
know how it happened. Here we should consult contemporary and later Syriac 
sources. After this city was captured by the Sasanids, numerous Romans ran to the 
gates in order to escape,12 but they soon realised that the enemy had begun to flow 
into Dara and they could not find the keys to open the gates. Such a frustrating 
situation ultimately ignited their will to defend their city, and a street battle took place 
inside this frontier fortress. These Romans, as John of Ephesos recorded, began to 
resist desperately: they rushed towards the enemies and ‘mowed and smote one 
another down like ears of corn’13 for seven days. Dara was now full of corpses of both 
Persians and Romans, and the inhabitants were forced to throw them into the adjacent 
river and the cisterns. 14  In order to take control of the havoc and turmoil, the 
victorious Persians decided to persuade the remaining Romans to surrender, and 
                                            
8  On  their  subversive  and  military  role  in  Late  Antiquity,  see  Al.  Cameron  1976:  105-
25,  Roueché  1993:  152-3,  Whitby  1999:  229-53.  In  the  late  Empire,  imperial  
legislation  usually  prohibited  private  persons  from  possessing  weapons,  presumably  
for  deterring  local  violence  and  turbulence,  Kaegi  1992:  51,  Haldon  1999:  257.   
9  Prok.  Wars  2.8.29. 
10  Ibid.,  2.8.34. 
11  Euagr.  HE  5.10. 
12  Cf.  Chr.  1234  66,  in  which  the  author  implied  that  they  tried  to  flee  into  the  citadel  
but   were   rejected.   On   the   credibility   of   John   and   the   anonymous   author,   see   van  
Ginkel  1995:  78,  cf.  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  283. 
13  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5. 
14  Ibid. 
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promised to make peace with them. It was not until the mutual agreement between the 
attackers and the citizens was finalised that the bloody conflict finally ended.15 
While  many   Romans   were   killed   by   the   Sasanids   in   the   hand-to-hand   battles,  
massacres   and   executions,   others   perished   during   the   Persian  wars   for   a   variety   of  
reasons.   The   presence   of   Roman   army   contingents   sometimes   caused   troubles   to   a  
city’s  inhabitants.  In  the  reign  of  Anastasios  some  civilians were insulted and attacked 
by the soldiers for trivial matters when the Roman army billeted the Empire’s cities, 
such as Edessa, and a citizen was killed because he managed to prevent soldiers from 
stealing produce from a garden. 16  However, no further detail regarding the 
lawlessness of Roman soldiers can be noted in other contemporary sources. Also, we  
have   a   piece   of   information   regarding   the   fates   of   local   Jews   at   the   hands   of   their  
compatriots,  presumably  the  Empire’s  Christians  at  the  beginning  of  the  sixth  century.  
Pseudo-Joshua’s   Chronicle,   our   chief   source   of   this   episode,   reported   it   in   great  
detail.17  When  the  Great  King  assaulted  Konstantia,  the  Jewish  inhabitants  decided  to  
side  with  the  Sasanids;;  they  dug  a  tunnel  in  the  tower  of  their  synagogue  to  inform  the  
Persians  about  what  had  been  done  so  that  they  could  dig  another  tunnel  from  outside  
the   fortifications  and  sneak  into   the  city.  However,   their  plot  was  disclosed,  and   the  
defenders   were   eventually   informed   by   Peter   the   comes,   who   was   at   that   time  
detained   as   a   hostage   by   the  Persians.  Having   observed  what   the   Jews   had   done,   a  
massacre   ensued,   and   ‘all   the   Jews   they   (i.e.   the   Romans)   could   find,   men   and  
women,  old  and  young’  were  slaughtered.18   
Finally, in some cases, Romans sometimes perished, though  accidentally,  in  the  
havoc  and   turmoil   inside   the  besieged  cities.  When   the  defenders  of  Antioch   found  
they   were   not   able   to   resist   the   Sasanids   anymore,   the   soldiers   of   Theoktistos   and  
                                            
15  Ibid. 
16  Josh.  Styl.  96. 
17  Prokopios  did  not  mention  it  in  his  account  of  Kawād’s campaign. 
18  Josh.  Styl.  58,  see  also  Petersen  2013:  333.  The  massacre  was  stopped  by  the  
bishop  Bar-Hadad  and  the  comes  Leontios,  who  took  charge  of  he  defence  of  
Konstantia. 
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Molatzes   ‘leaped   upon   the   horses…rode   away   to   the   gates’ 19   to   desert   the   city.  
Meanwhile,   they   tried   to   coax   the   remaining   citizens,   possibly   to   facilitate   their  
escape,  by  saying  that  since  the  reinforcement  by  Bouzes  would  come  soon,  they  had  
to  go  out  of  Antioch  to  receive  them.  The  sudden  retreat  of  these  soldiers  resulted  in  
chaos  among  the  remaining  Antiochenes.  They,  possibly  fearing  their  subsequent  fate  
after  the  retreat  of  Roman  soldiers,  together  with  ‘all  the  women  with  their  children’  
started  to  rush  to  the  gates  (ἐνταῦθα  τῶν  Ἀντιοχέων  πολλοὶ  μὲν  ἄνδρες,  γυναῖκες  δὲ  
πᾶσαι   ξὺν   τοῖς  παιδίοις   ἐπὶ   τὰς  πύλας  δρόμῳ  πολλῷ  ᾔεσαν).20  The  overcrowding  of  
people  and  horses  soon  resulted   in  a  disaster:   in  order   to  escape  Antioch  as  soon  as  
they   could,   the   soldiers   ‘sparing   absolutely   no   one   of   those   before   them,   all   kept  
riding   over   the   fallen   still   more   fiercely   than   before’. 21   Many   people   were   thus  
trampled  by  their  compatriots  and  perished  even  before  this  metropolis  was  conquered  
by  Ḵosrow  I’  s  forces. 
 
Massacres  and  executions 
Having   crushed   the   defenders’   resistance   and   rushed   into   the   city,   the   victorious  
Persians  began  to  slaughter  the  remaining  Romans.  While mass graves in places like 
Jerusalem have been recently excavated and studied,22 the results of archaeological 
excavations in Antioch, Dara 23  and other eastern cities are much less helpful. 
Therefore we are reliant on information from written sources preserved in different 
                                            
19  Prok.  Wars  2.8.17.  Theoktistos  survived  this  turmoil,  see  ibid.,  2.16.17,  2.19.33-4,  
2.24.13  for  his  participation  of  later  operations  against  the  Persians. 
20  Ibid.,  2.8.18. 
21  Ibid.,  2.8.19. 
22  On  the  assessment  of  both  literary  and  archaeological  data  related  to  the  sack  of  
Jerusalem,  see  Avni  2014:  307,  Stoyanov  2011:  11-23,  Kaegi  2003:  77-8,  Schick  
1995:  20-6.  On  the  material  traits,  especially  the  well-known  Mamila  burial  cave,  see  
Breydy  1981:  62-86,  Maeir  1994:  299-306,  Reich  1994:  111-8,  1996:  26-35,  Naggar  
2002:  141-8.  For  other  similar  cases  in  the  Balkans,  see  Poulter  2007:  86. 
23  For  example,  see  Mango  1975:  209-27  and  Gabriel  1940  on  the  Necropolis  of  Dara  
and  Amida  respectively,  but  nothing  related  to  the  slaughter  of  the  Romans  has  been  
noted. 
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linguistic milieux. I will investigate these texts both to provide a synthetic account of 
what happened and to establish our understanding of certain important features, 
including these executions’ locations, victims and means in the post-siege period. 
In 503, apparently it was Kawād who commanded the massacre of the remaining 
citizens once the Persians rushed into Amida. They ‘destroyed men and women of 
every class and age for three days and three nights’,24 while Michael the Syrian wrote 
that they were ordered to kill all the adults.25 The Latin chronicler Marcellinus Comes 
noted that even the monastic traitors 26  were executed. 27  Such indiscriminate 
massacres, however, proved to be uncommon in Ḵosrow   I’s  campaigns   in   the  540s.  
Even  in  Beroea,  where  the  citizens  refused  to  pay  more  money  and  took  refuge  in  the  
citadel,   Ḵosrow I,   possibly  moved   by   the   words   of  Megas,   their   bishop,   refrained  
from  slaughtering  them. 
Pseudo-Joshua claimed that in the sack of Amida the Persians killed many 
Romans on the top of the mound.28 Several observations regarding the timing and 
location of these executions can be made. Kawād’s soldiers constructed at least two 
mounds outside Amida’s fortifications during this city’s siege. In his Lives of the 
Eastern Saints, John of Ephesos reported that having destroyed the monastery in the 
vicinity of Amida, the Persians exploited its building materials and ‘piled its wood 
and its stones and its clay on to the “mule” (i.e. the mound) against the Romans’.29 
While this mound was destroyed by the Amidenes,30 Kawād’s soldiers managed to 
                                            
24  Zach.  HE  7.4,  cf.  Josh.  Styl.  53,  Prok.  Wars  1.7.30,  the  former  emphasised  the  
manner  of  the  Romans’  execution,  while  the  latter  simply  mentioned  that  the  Romans  
were  slaughtered. 
25  Mich.  Syr.  9.7. 
26  Cf.  above,  pp.  88-9. 
27  Marc.  com.  a.502. 
28  Josh.  Styl.  53. 
29  Joh.  Eph.  Lives,  PO  19.217.  See  also  Josh.  Styl.  50,  Prok.  Wars  1.7.14.  It  might  
have  been  a  wooden  structure.  Greatrex  et  al.  2011:  235. 
30Josh.  Styl.  50,  cf.  Prok.  Wars  1.7.14-5,  in  which  the  mound  collapsed,  possibly  
because  too  many  Persians  stood  on  it.  See  Zach.  HE  7.3  for  the  most  detailed  
account  of  the  Persians’  use  of  mounds  and  their  destruction. 
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restore it, presumably in the later phase of siege. Therefore, the corpses of the 
Romans must have lain on the second mound.31  
In order to reconstruct the circumstance of these civilians’ deaths, a brief review 
of what could have happened during the siege of Amida is needed. In the sixth 
century the Romans seldom launched sorties against the Persians during sieges, and in 
many cases the defenders would simply keep the enemy away from attacking and 
surmounting the fortifications. One exceptional episode, however, can be noted in 
Kawād’s unsuccessful siege of Edessa in 503. At that time, a few defenders went out 
from the city and killed many Persian soldiers, and some local women even carried 
water for these Edessenes. The author of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle attributed the 
Sasanids’ incapability of assaulting the fortifications to the blessings of Christ. 32 
However, since the Sasanids arrived at Edessa in the middle of September, which is 
the end of the campaign season,33 they could have purposed to merely surround the 
walls of Edessa, both to intimidate the citizens and, more possibly, to distract the 
attention of the Empire’s forces that had been mustered at Samosata.34 
The situation of Amida in 502-3, however, could have been different. While at 
some point during the siege Kawād considered the possibility of receiving payment 
from the Romans and retreating,35 the Sasanids’ assaults on the fortifications must 
have been fierce.36 Therefore, while Pseudo-Zachariah noted that a criminal dared to 
snatch provisions from the Sasanids when the siege was still in progress,37 it would 
have been much riskier for the Romans to constitute any counteroffensive, and no 
sally was made against Kawād.38 
Therefore, given the lack of sally at Amida in 502-3, none of the Romans would 
have stayed and been killed outside the fortification before the fall of their city, and 
                                            
31  Ibid.,  53.  Other  contemporary  historians  failed  to  mention  this  detail. 
32  Ibid.,  60.  Cf.  Lenski  2007:  225-34  for  the  anatomy  of  the  Pesians’  sieges  of  Amida. 
33  Greatrex  1998:  105. 
34  Josh.  Styl.  60. 
35  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
36  Josh.  Styl.  53,  Zach.  HE  7.3. 
37  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
38  Cf.  Ammianus  19.6.7-11. 
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what Pseudo-Joshua referred to must have been the events that took place after the 
siege concluded. In the sack of Amida in 359, while the Roman soldiers were 
occupied in fighting off Shapur II’s  soldiers,  Ammianus  hid  with  two  other  Romans  
and   escaped   through   an   unguarded   gate  during   a   dark   night.39  Just as in 503, those 
who were killed at these mounds might thus have been the Romans who managed to 
escape from the city when the enemies rushed into their hometown in January 503.  
More relevant information can be extracted from contemporary Syriac works. 
While many Romans were killed outside the city, others seem to have been 
slaughtered inside the fortifications. Some of them were killed in public spaces, like 
the squares, and others were discarded in the private spaces, like inns and houses.40 
However, it is impossible to tell whether the Sasanids rushed into the houses of 
individual citizens to slaughter them or simply to cast some corpses into different 
places. The most vivid account was the testimony of an old survivor who came from 
the brotherhood of the monastery Mar John and took refuge inside Amida at that time. 
In the sack of Amida, the refugees seemed to have been at a loss about what they 
should do: ‘we (i.e. the priests) all stood up sorrowing and weeping for the Service of 
our death and of our lives’ end, slaughter being now set before our eyes’. Later, when 
the Persian soldiers or, if Pseudo-Dionysios’ narrative is to be believed, two Persian 
scouts41 arrived and saw the Romans, they began to slaughter them: ‘(they) beheaded 
ninety of us in one massacre while our eyes beheld it’.42 
Prokopios’   reports  provide   the  backbone  of  our  knowledge  of   the  massacres   in  
both   Sura   and   Antioch   in   540.   Having   accepted   the   entreaty   of   Sura’s   bishop  
deceitfully,43  the   Sasanids   got   a   chance   to   hold   the   gates   open.   It  was   at   that   point  
Ḵosrow I’s   soldiers   rushed   into   this   city   and   slaughtered   the   inhabitants   (καὶ   τῶν  
ἀνθρώπων   πολλοὺς   μὲν   κτείνας).44  In   June,   an   ‘unlimited   massive   killing’   (φόνον  
                                            
39  Ammianus  19.8.5. 
40  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
41  Ps.  Dion.  II,  5. 
42  Joh.  Eph.  Lives,  PO  19.219. 
43  Prok.  Wars  2.5.16. 
44  Ibid.,  2.5.25-6. 
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ἄπειρον  κατεργασάμενος)45  took  place  inside  Antioch  after  the  best  Persian  forces  had  
been   sent   to   crush   the   resistance   of   the   young   Antiochenes.46  The Persians killed 
many people, did not ‘spare persons of any age’, and slew ‘all whom they met, old 
and young alike’ (οὐδεμιᾶς ἡλικίας φειδόμενοι τοὺς ἐν ποσὶν ἅπαντας…ἔκτεινον).47  
Prokopios’ accounts regarding the massacre in this metropolis above were not 
unparalleled. For example, Belisarios’ victorious soldiers were ‘killing all whom they 
encountered, sparing neither old nor young’ (…τὸν ἐν ποσὶν ἀεί, οὐδεμιᾶς ἡλικίας 
φειδόμενοι, ἔκτεινον)48 at Naples in 536. Instead of resorting to the urbs capta motifs, 
such phraseology in the Wars echoes Thucydides’ description of what happened when 
the victorious Thracian mercenaries ransacked Mykalessos in Boiotia: they dashed 
into the city and slaughtered its people, ‘spared neither old nor young, but cut down, 
one after another’ (τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐφόνευον φειδόμενοι οὔτε πρεσβυτέρας οὔτε 
νεωτέρας ἡλικίας, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἑξῆς, ὅτῳ ἐντύχοιεν).49 These Thracians’ brutality at 
Mykalessos is unusual, and it is in fact one of the most detailed accounts on a sacked 
city in Thucydides. Therefore, the use of similar phrases by Prokopios in the Wars 
could have served to highlight the Antiochenes’ extraordinary sufferings in Ḵosrow 
I’s campaign. Although other contemporary writers did not use such vivid phrases to 
describe the msaacre of the Antiochenes, what Prokopios said may be compared with 
the situation at Amida in 503, where the Sasanids killed ‘men and women of every 
class and age’.50 The credibility of Prokopios’ accounts may thus be established.  
In 573, a massacre took place when a substantial body of Persian forces entered 
Dara and encountered the Roman inhabitants. At the beginning they mingled with 
each other peacefully, but, as described by John of Ephesos, not long afterwards the 
victors began to ‘seize the Romans…and put most of them to the sword’.51 After 
finishing the first wave of massacre, the Persians further chained the rest of the 
                                            
45  Joh.  Lyd.  De  Mag.  3.54. 
46  Prok.  Wars  2.8.28-9,  33. 
47  Ibid.,  2.8.34. 
48  Ibid.,  5.10.29,  cf.  7.29.1. 
49  Thuc.  7.29.4. 
50  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
51  Joh.Eph.  HE  6.5. 
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survivors, along with ‘their nobles…women of rank, and their princes’, and took them 
to Ḵosrow I. The Shahanshah then ordered that all of them should be drowned in the 
nearby river.52 John of Ephesos’ narrative is contradicted by what we learn from the 
Chronicle of 1234, in which the shah ‘forbade a slaughter of the leaders of 
city…(and) carefully bound their hands’.53 Since it is evident that apart from the 
common sources like John of Ephesos’ Church History the anonymous author also 
used other unknown sources,54 he might have chosen to rely on the accounts in which 
another version of the sack of Dara was provided. While we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the Sasanids, as suggested by preceding cases, might treat social elites 
magnanimously,55 in this case no clear answer regarding the reliability of these two 
sources can be found. 
Although both Apamea and Dara were conquered and sacked by the Sasanids in 
573, it seems that a post-conquest massacre only took place in Dara. However, it 
should be noted that in the Chronicle of 1234, the compiler stated that in Apamea the 
Persians killed men but spared women and children whom they chained and put into 
captivity.56 This account sounds reminiscent of classicising authors’ reports of a city’s 
sack, in which male citizens were slaughtered, while women and children were 
enslaved. Scholars have suggested the close connection between the anonymous 
writer of the Chronicle of 1234 and Edessa and its surrounding areas, and he could 
have been a lower-ranking cleric.57 Andy Hilkens further noted his great interest in 
the sieges of cities, and his account of the Trojan War was impressive.58 However, 
since the author seems to have had no access to the original Homer epics and other 
                                            
52  Ibid. 
53  Chr.  1234  66. 
54  Neither  John  of  Ephesos  nor  other  Syriac  historians  mentioned  that  Ḵosrow  I  
treated  the  leaders  of  Dara  kindly. 
55  See  below,  p.  100  for  the  cases  of  Amida  in  503. 
56  Chr.  1234  68. 
57  Hilkens  2014:  19-23. 
58  Hilkens  2014:  24. 
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important texts of Greek historiography,59 it seems less likely that he consciously 
reverted to classical literary commonplaces to portray the calamities of the Apameans. 
In addition, while the Persians could have killed the male citizens in order to 
curtail any possibility of a later uprising, neither the Greek historians, including 
Euagrios, John of Epiphania and Theophylaktos, nor other Syriac chroniclers 
mentioned that a comprehensive slaughter had been conducted by the Sasanids. 
Indeed such an argumentum ex silentio is certainly not conclusive, but the silence of 
Greek authors is exceptionally significant. Being an important metropolis in Roman 
Syria, what happened in Apamea must have been important for the Greek-speaking 
world. Take Euagrios, who came from Epiphania in Syria Secunda for example. 
Judging from his detailed knowledge of sixth-century Apamea,60 he would surely not 
have failed to talk about a mass killing of the Romans if such a slaughter had ever 
happened in this important city. 
While many Romans were killed in the above-mentioned ad hoc massacre, the 
Persians captured and executed other survivors. The soldiers of the Great King did not 
choose distant places to kill the Romans, and the post-siege executions would have 
taken place either inside the conquered cities or in their vicinities. Sometimes the 
survivors were thrown into nearby water. In 503, some Amidenes were thrown into 
the Tigris,61 and 70 years later, many defeated Roman elites from Dara were cast into  
the  river  of  Cordes  which  runs  through  this  frontier  citadel.62  While in doing so there 
was no need for the Sasanids to cover or remove the corpses from the conquered 
cities, it would have been a difficult process because they had to first collect the 
Romans then transport them to the location of execution. 
Certain details regarding the methods of the Romans’ executions can be noted by 
looking at contemporary Syriac texts. In the first years of the sixth century, the author 
                                            
59  On  the  translation  and  reading  of  Greek  texts  by  medieval  Syriac-speaking  
communities,  see  above,  pp.  51-2. 
60  See,  for  example,  Euagr.  HE  4.25-6  for  the  situation  inside  this  city  on  the  eve  of  
the  Sasanids’  arrival  in  540. 
61  Josh.  Styl.  53,  cf.  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
62  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5. 
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of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle stated that some of the Amidenes were stoned,63 and 
according to Pseudo-Zachariah, certain citizens were crucified.64 No report about such 
methods can be found from other cases in the Romano-Persian wars in the sixth 
century, 65 and these accounts deserve to be studied in depth. While we cannot rule 
out the possibility that these accounts may serve didactic purposes,66 Syriac writers 
merely noted such details in passing. Another possible explanation, therefore, seems 
to be more plausible. In classical antiquity, to crucify someone was a method of 
execution practised by either the barbarians, 67  or the Romans, ‘against slaves, 
foreigners, and citizens of low social standing’, and, more importantly, against those 
who committed serious crimes. 68  This method of execution, together with its 
excruciating death,69 must have shocked beholders. In addition, for the Christians of 
the Empire to stone someone to death was also regarded as a savage and barbarous 
way of killing people. 70  Both the author of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, a 
contemporary Edessene writer and Pseudo-Zachariah, who came from Amida and 
might have used an Amidene source in the seventh book,71 may have demonstrated 
the cruelty of Kawād ‘s soldiers by providing these details.  
                                            
63  Josh.  Styl.  53. 
64  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
65  See  Anthony  2014:  15-26  for  the  collection  of  crucifixion  cases  conducted  by  the  
Sasanids  in  Late  Antiquity.  Most  of  them  were  Christian  martyrs  or  political  
opponents  of  the  regime. 
66  See,  for  example,  the  cases  in  the  sack  of  Jerusalem  in  J.  BJ  5.449ff.  For  the  
crucifixion  of  Christian  martyrs,  see  Eus.  HE  8.8.2,  8.14.13.  For  the  discussion  of  
Pseudo-Joshua  and  Pseudo-Zachariah’s  didactic  purposes,  see  above,  pp.  52-3. 
67  Hengel  1977:  22-4.  For  some  late  antique  cases,  see  Cook  2014:  304-10. 
68  Cook  2014:  358-9,  423. 
69  Cook  2014:  418-23. 
70  Matthews  2010:  77-8.  For  other  cases  in  classical  antiquity,  see  Pease  1907:  5-18,  
Rosivach  1987:  232-48. 
71  On  their  identity,  see  above,  p.  51,  on  the  possible  primary  text  used  by  Pseudo-
Zachariah,  see  Greatrex  et  al.  2011:  54-5. 
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In most cases, such as the sack of Amida, Antioch and Dara, indiscriminate 
slaughter of the Roman elites is not reported in either Syriac or Greek texts. The case 
of John, son of Timostratos is a good example. Being a local commander of Dara72 
who ‘surpassed all the others in power and rank’73 and took charge of both the 
administration and defence work of this city,74 he was praised by John of Ephesos as 
‘a man of great warlike ability’.75 He was deported to the Persian Empire after the 
siege was concluded rather than being killed instantly.76 The fate of Paul, the son of 
Zaynab, the steward, needs to be discussed further. In 503, he was killed after the fall 
of Amida by the soldiers of Kawād, and actually this was the only case we have 
regarding a member of the elite’s execution in this frontier city. His death might have 
resulted from the Persian soldiers’ dreadful experience during the siege and, possibly, 
the humiliation when they tried to negotiate with these Roman elites. Having been 
frustrated by the prolonged siege, Kawād was eager to seek a compromise with the 
Romans by asking for small amounts of gold from them. Instead of paying the 
ransom, the Persian envoy was sent back by the leaders inside the city to demand 
from the enemies ‘the price of cultivated vegetables that his army had consumed as 
well as of the grain and wine that they had gathered and brought from the villages’.77 
In other words, the invaders were asked to compensate the inhabitants for their 
economic loss in war. While some social elites would have either owned or managed 
estates in the territorium of Amida, and it is needless to say that their crops must have 
been destroyed by the Sasanids, such a reckless reply was rejected immediately. Paul 
was surely a member of the group of civic leaders, but it is difficult to know whether 
he was regarded as a scapegoat by the victorious Persian soldiers or not. 
                                            
72  PLRE  III:  s.v.   Ioannes  87.  Cf.  the  more  negative  image  of  Euagrios,  in  which  this  
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The massacres eventually ended in different ways.78 In Ferdowsī’ Šāh-nāma, it 
was the entreaty of old and young inhabitants from Arayish-i-Rum (Hierapolis) which 
terminated the atrocity, and the defeated Romans were eventually treated by the 
Sasanids benevolently.79 In the sack of Amida, it was terminated possibly by Kawād 
himself. In the continuator of Zachariah’s work, the king ceased the slaughter after 
three days and nights,80 while Pseudo-Joshua did not provide any relevant detail at all. 
Prokopios wrote that a certain old priest (τῶν τις Ἀμιδηνῶν γέρων τε καὶ ἱερεὺς)81 
approached Kawād and entreated him to stop killing more captives.82 At first glance it 
seems that it was the bishop of Amida who called a halt to the massacre on behalf of 
the Romans, but in fact John of Saoro, the bishop of Amida, had passed away ‘a few 
days earlier (before the arrival of the Persians),’ and no new bishop could have been 
ordained during the siege of Amida.83 In other cases like Sura, Antioch and Dara and 
other conquered cities in the sixth century, all we know is that the slaughter was 
ended, but no further detail was given. 
It is not easy to reconstruct the timing of the removal of corpses and how they 
were treated either by the surviving Romans or by the Sasanids. After the main forces 
of Kawād left Amida, the remaining Persians, presumably the garrison left behind, 
began to clear the city, 84  possibly ordered by Glones, while Pseudo-Zachariah 
recorded that the city was cleaned before the arrival of Kawād.85 Such a decision must 
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have resulted from both hygienic86 and strategic reasons. While the cold temperature 
must have slowed the rate of decomposition as this city was captured in January 503, 
the smell of the corpses must have been unendurable for the garrison soldiers.87  
Strategic considerations would also have been a crucial factor. Since Kawād 
seems to have intended to attack the Romans continuously in the following period, the 
consolidation of what the Persians had conquered up to that point must have been 
important. The survivors, possibly along with the Persians, must have removed the 
bodies lying in public areas. Pseudo-Zachariah wrote that the corpses were counted 
‘not including those who had been put in the inns…in the streams and those left in the 
houses’.88 Some corpses of the dead Romans were removed by the Sasanids from the 
city and piled them up outside the North Gate89 (today’s Kharput Gate),90 while other 
dead bodies were carried through other gates.91 In the Chronicle of Pseudo-Dionysios 
of Tel-Mahre, the author noted that ‘they (i.e. the corpses) were cast into pits and 
ditches, and buried there’.92 Since Zoroastrians were forbidden from burying dead 
bodies and rather exposed them,93 it is difficult to believe that the Persians buried 
them themselves. It would thus have probably been the Romans who buried the dead, 
either inside, or, more possibly, outside the city. 
Despite the atrocities perpetrated by the Persians, many Romans seem to have 
survived, and some of them hid or took refuge at certain places. Pseudo-Zachariah 
wrote that a Christian prince from Arran, i.e. Caucasian Albania, pleaded with Kawād 
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not to kill the refugees in the Great Church of the Forty Martyrs,94 which was built by 
the bishop of Amida.95 In addition, as suggested by contemporary Greek and Syriac 
texts, many Romans remained in this frontier city in the time of famine.96 While very 
little is known of similar events in other places, the  Persians  did  not  always  try  to  kill  
all   the   survivors,   and   such  bloodthirsty   activity  was  clearly  not   the  victors’  primary  
goal.  After  the  conquest  of  Antioch  Ḵosrow  I  did  not  slaughter  all  the  soldiers  and  the  
civilians  inside  this  metropolis:  having  considered  that  the  remaining  soldiers  would  
likely   obstruct   his   forces’   subsequent   activities,   the   shah   decided   to   allow   them   to  
escape  to  other  places  freely,  and  the  Persians  even  ‘made  signs  to  the  fugitives  with  
their  hands,  urging  them  to  flee  as  quickly  as  possible’.97  If  Prokopios  is  right,  then  all  
the   remaining   Roman   soldiers,   along   with   their   generals   and   some   citizens,   left  
Antioch  through  the  gate  which  led  to  Daphne.98 In the Life of Saint Simeon Stylites 
the Younger, the Antiochenes rushed out of the city and fled southwards once the 
gates were opened.99 Later, in the Buildings he further pointed out that ‘it became 
impossible for the people of Antioch to recognise the site of each person's house’.100 
Therefore, some inhabitants of this metropolis must have survived the postwar 
carnage. In 573, when the line of defence at Dara was broken by the Sasanids, at the 
beginning they did not obstruct the Romans from fleeing either, and simply ‘held 
back…gave the Romans room to flee, least they should turn and defend 
themsleves’. 101  The annihilation of the remaining Romans was clearly not the 
Sasanids’ target at all. 
 
Lack of subsistence 
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Apart from being killed during or after a city’s siege, in Late Antiquity sometimes 
urban-dwelling Romans perished because of famine.102 Nevertheless, although the 
Persians invaded the Empire and besieged the cities many times in the sixth century, 
only the Amidenes seem to have suffered from severe famine. Below I will present 
the background to this event and the details of the Amidenes’ experiences. 
        Both   the situation in northern Mesopotamia from the very end of the fifth 
century to the beginning of the sixth century and the  background  of  the  siege  and  sack  
of   Amida   from   502-3   needs to be addressed first. Those living in Amida and its 
vicinity had suffered from the arrival of locusts which ‘devoured and ravaged these 
regions, consuming everything in them’,103 from Edessa, Konstantia to the border of 
the Sasanian Empire. 104  Before the coming of the Sasanids, their bishop John 
admonished the wealthy citizens, saying that ‘they should not hoard grain in [such] a 
time of distress but sell [it] and give [it] to the needy’.105 Therefore at that time while 
some Amidenes could sustain their lives, other inhabitants faced famine caused by 
pestilence, invasion and other factors. 
To what extent Amida and its surrounding areas recovered from these 
catastrophes is impossible to determine, but clearly when Kawād and his soldiers 
arrived in October of 502 the Romans were not suffering from a shortage of food. 
Indeed, the Sasanids besieged this city for more than 90 days, and historians reported 
no information regarding the lack of provisions. However, such   a   prolonged   siege 
could possibly have drained resources in the vicinity of this city. As noted above, 
Kawād’s military operations would have halted the production of crops in Amida’s 
neighbouring areas. Similar cases can be found elsewhere. In 503, Kawād again led 
his forces and invaded Konstantia, a city which was fortified by Constantius II in the 
middle of the fourth century and was the seat of the dux Mesopotamiae at that time.106 
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The Sasanids were not able to capture this city.107 Later, the shah decided to retreat 
because of the boldness of the Romans and the scarcity of provisions; ‘it could not 
find supplies in an area that had been devastated’108 because the invading Persians had 
plundered the surrounding areas of this city in the winter of 502.109 At that time, the 
bishop of Konstantia Bar-Hadad approached Kawād, bringing with him wine, dried 
figs, honey and loaves. Having been persuaded by the bishop’s entreaty, and possibly 
thinking that it was fruitless to attack such a poor city, the shah decided to retreat and 
went westwards to Edessa.110 
Of course, the situations in the hinterlands of both Konstantia and Amida were 
different. While Ammianus noted the barrenness of the area around the former city by 
stating ‘everything is parched by constant drought except for a little water to be found 
in wells’,111 the territorium of Amida was fertile.112 Nonetheless, such an example 
still suggests that the devastation of armed forces in the Anastasian war’s area of 
operation could have considerably diminished the agricultural yields. Therefore, it 
would have been difficult for both the Sasanids and, possibly, the remaining Romans 
to obtain provisions from nearby areas after the Persians’ occupation of Amida at the 
beginning of 503. Furthermore, as an inland city, those living in Amida must have 
relied on the crop production of its hinterland, and the supply of provisions would be 
affected by the displaced people from the neighbouring areas who took refuge in 
Amida during wartime.113 Although we have no idea how many people flooded into 
                                            
107  Josh.  Styl.  58. 
108  Ibid. 
109  Ibid.,  51. 
110  Prok.  Wars  2.13.13-5.  However,  it  is  unthinkable  for  Kawād  to  present  the  
provisions  of  his  soldiers  to  the  bishop.  See  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  74,  in  which  
such  a  statement  was  regarded  as  a  historical  invention  made  by  Ḵosrow  I to  justify  
his  extortions  from  Roman  cities  in  his  540  campaign. 
111  Ammianus  18.7.9. 
112  Ibid.,  18.9.1-2. 
113  Stathakopoulos  2004:  46-7,  2007:  213,  cf.  Millman  and  Kates  1990:  9-11. 
 106 
this city during the campaign season, their presence could have resulted in the 
shortage of foodstuffs.114 
From 503 onwards, the Empire’s forces were dispatched not only to attack the 
Persian Empire but also to re-capture Amida. While it remains unclear how long the 
Romans’ siege of the Persian-occupied Amida lasted, several remarks can be made. 
The forces led by Patrikios and Hypatios failed to capture this city and retreated in the 
summer of 503.115 Several months later they, together with other forces retreated to 
their winter quarters at Melitene.116 The second tide of the attack against Amida was 
launched possibly in May 504, 117  but soon the Roman commanders decided to 
blockade the city in order to force the enemies to surrender.118 Therefore, the Romans, 
unlike what the Sasanids had done nearly two years earlier, did not incessantly attack 
Amida’s fortifications. Even though many Roman soldiers began to disperse in 
wintertime,119 the blockade of this frontier city could have lasted several months until 
the Sasanids’ surrender. As I will demonstrate below,120 such a prolonged blockade 
could have led to the famine inside Amida. 
While details of famine121 were preserved in both Greek and Syriac texts, it 
remains unclear when exactly the outbreak of starvation took place inside Amida. The 
clearest passage regarding the lack of provisions among the Sasanids comes from 
Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, that in A.G. 816.122 Some clues, however, can still be 
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noted.  In July 503, while the soldiers of Patrikios and Hypatios failed to attack 
Amida by using siege towers, some Persians, together with a marzbān, were killed in 
a trap set by Farzman, another Roman general.123 If it can be identified with the death 
of Glones,124 an event which eventually resulted in the closure of local market, then 
after the middle of 503 the Persian garrison and the Romans inside Amida could have 
faced the shortage of commodities.125 In May 504, the Sasanids inside Amida clearly 
faced the problem of the lack of meat. When a young boy grazed his camels and 
donkeys around the city, one of the asses approached the fortifications. Having 
noticed it, a Persian ‘came down from the wall by rope, intending to cut it up and take 
it up for food’.126 
Later, the Amidenes’ sufferings were manifold. The shortage of provisions led 
the Persians to adopt certain strategies to sustain their lives. The first victims were the 
male citizens and the remaining local elites, who were tied up by the soldiers127 and 
detained in the amphitheatre.128 We do not know how long these Amidenes were 
detained, but many of them perished in custody because of hunger or imprisonment, 
while others survived by eating their sandals and excrement and drinking their own 
urine to survive.129 The situation was so desperate that the prisoners attacked each 
other, possibly wrestling for the limited provisions. Finally they were released ‘like 
dead men from their graves’.130 
In the second stage, when food became even scarcer, things changed again, and 
no more food was provided to either women or men. If none of the Persian soldiers, 
as Pseudo-Joshua’s work suggested, ‘had anything except a daily handful of 
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barley…had absolutely no meat, wine, or any other item of provision’,131 the situation 
among of the remaining Romans must have been even more difficult. Prokopios 
pointed out that the Persians, not knowing the possible disastrous consequences, 
‘continued to conceal scrupulously their lack of the necessities of life, and made it 
appear that they had an abundance of all provisions’.132 Such accounts chime with the 
Persians’ characteristics as described in the Strategikon, in which they are presented 
as ‘extremely skilful in concealing their injuries and coping bravely with adverse 
circumstances’.133 Later Prokopios mentioned that actually the Sasanids ‘doled out 
provisions…more sparingly than they were needed’,134 and they left the provisions for 
around seven days inside Amida. Thus the Romans’ incompetence in prosecuting a 
successful siege against the Sasanids was highlightened by Prokopios.135 Had they 
done so, the Romans could have recaptured Amida through defeating the enemy 
rather than paying money to the Great King.  
The situation among the Amidenes must have been worse, and our historians 
recorded certain horrible events which testify to their desperation. At the beginning, 
people might have resorted to certain ‘unaccustomed foods’ and even ‘every 
forbidden thing’ (οἳ δὴ ἐς βρώσεις ἀήθεις τὰ πρῶτα ἐλθόντες τῶν τε οὐ θεμιτῶν 
ἁψάμενοι πάντων),136 such as ‘shoes, old soles, and other horrible things from the 
streets and squares’.137 Later on in order to survive such an ordeal, the Romans ‘tasted 
each other’s blood’ (τελευτῶντες καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγεύσαντο),138 implying cannibalism 
among both men and women. Unlike his detailed accounts regarding the cannibalism 
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practised by two women, who  killed  and  ate  seventeen  male  strangers  who  lodged  in  
their   house in the nearby areas of Ariminum, 139  Prokopios preserved no further 
information about the situation among the Amidenes. In Syriac texts the devouring of 
human flesh seems to have been practised only by women. The surviving women 
began to form groups and hunted for their possible prey in Amida at the time of 
sunset or daybreak, ‘seized some of the men by seduction, by deceit, and by 
craftiness’,140 and more than 500 men were eaten by them. In addition, ‘…anyone 
they came across whom they could overpower, whether woman, child…old man, they 
would pull indoors, kill and eat, either boiled or roasted’.141 While both Pseudo-
Joshua and Zachariah may allude to Flavius Josephus’ renowned passage about the 
cannibalism in the siege of Jerusalem,142 the hunting and devouring of men by women 
as predators can also be seen to symbolise the subversion of the traditional values and 
social order among the desperate Amidenes, as cannibalism, because of its disgusting 
and monstrous connotation, has often been ‘used to “other” particular 
groups…(including) working classes, women, homosexuals’.143 
Having learned of this gruesome activity, the Persian governors executed some 
of those responsible and prohibited these women from doing such things again, 
possibly in order to control the situation as far as they could. However, they still 
permitted them to devour dead bodies. Things seem to have become worse because of 
the coming of winter ‘with a great deal of snow and ice’:144 even the Roman soldiers 
outside Amida, who seem to have enjoyed plenty of supplies,145 became too weak to 
stand it,146 and began to either desert their camps or retreat to winter quarters. The 
situation of those inside Amida must have been even less favourable, and many must 
have died. 
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Meanwhile, those staying outside Amida, including both the besieging Romans 
and the Persian reinforcements, noticed the shortage of food experienced by both the 
Amidenes and the Persians. According to Pseudo-Joshua, the Persian astabed (the 
general or the chief of an army of the Sasanian Empire)147 outside Amida, knowing 
that his fellow Persians under siege were distressed by hunger, tried to provide them 
with food.148 His endeavour proved to be in vain because the supply group which 
consisted of 300 camels was destroyed by the Romans. 149  The hunger of the 
Amidenes was relieved possibly after the Romans re-occupied Amida, when a supply 
column, possibly dispatched by Anastasios, was sent from Edessa in order to 
replenish the granaries there.150 The remaining citizens must have been tormented by 
the lack of provisions for a considerable period of time. 
While no statistical data on rates of mortality in the famine of Amida can be 
computed, the scale of such a great disaster can be gauged from contemporary 
accounts. It seems that some corpses were disposed inside the city for a certain period 
of time, and it was not until the re-establishment of Roman imperial rule at this city 
that they were removed: having re-occupied Amida at the end of 504, the citizens 
from surrounding areas were recruited to remove the corpses out of this place and 
received their due salaries.151 Although the employment of these people might have 
resulted from Anastasios’ eagerness to restore the damaged social and daily life in 
Amida as effectively as possible, the employment of outsiders suggests the shortage 
of manpower in Amida: the casualties of famine might have been so great that most 
inhabitants perished before the arrival of the Romans, and the emperor had to renew 
the city by introducing other non-Amidenes. 
Apart from the calamities of the Amidenes at the very beginning of the sixth 
century, no famine is related of any other city besieged by the Persians in the sixth 
century. When  the  forces  led  by  Kawād’s  generals  besieged  Martyropolis  in  531,  the  
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inhabitants  were  faced  with  a  lack  of  provisions,152 but the Sasanids retreated without 
achieving their objective,153 and no further information regarding the famine among 
the defenders can be noted. In 573 Ḵosrow I laid siege to Dara for six months, and in 
the end the Romans agreed to let the Persians occupy their city due to the lack of 
necessities.154 However, neither John of Ephesos nor any other contemporary authors 
stated that those who stayed in Dara suffered from famine. 
More  discussion  regarding  the  nature  of  the  Persian  wars  and  the  situation  of  the  
Empire  in  the  sixth  century  should  be  provided  to  investigate  why  the  Romans  did  not  
experience  a  similar   fate  as   the  Amidenes  during   the  reign  of  Anastasios. Here, one 
possible explanatory factor is the length of sieges. Dionysios Stathakopoulos 
suggested that in cases of famine, the average duration of larger cities’ sieges would 
have been more or less one year, while the smaller sites would have capitulated within 
six months.155 While  the  shah  besieged  the  frontier  cities  and  citadels  like  Amida  and  
Dara  for  several  months,  it  was  less  possible  for  his  expeditionary  troops  to  launch  a  
prolonged  siege  against  the  Romans  at  cities  like  Antioch,  Apamea  and  Beroea,  and  
sometimes  the  Sasanids  themselves  encountered  problems  with  provisions.156  In  fact,  
in  most  cases  the Great King’s soldiers subdued the Roman resistance promptly and 
swiftly, and neither   Greek   nor   Syriac   authors   ever   reported   that   they   intended   to  
blockade  a  city  and  starve  the  Romans.     
While  the  length  of  a  Roman  city’s  siege  could  have  been  a  decisive  factor  that  
led to famine among the defenders, a proper supply of necessities would have surely 
reduced the risk for provision shortages.   At   the   local   level,   some   epigraphical  
evidence  of  the  construction  of  granaries  at  individual  cities  can  be  noted.  At  the  end  
of  the  fifth  century  the  bishop  Andreas  supervised  the  construction  of  a  public  granary  
                                            
152  Prok.  Wars  1.21.8. 
153  Ibid.,  1.21.27,  Zach.  HE  9.6,  Mal.  18.66. 
154  Only  John  of  Ephesos  mentioned  this  piece  of  information,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5,  cf.  
Prok.  Wars  6.27.25,  in  which  the  Goths,  having  been  tormented  by  famine  during  the  
siege  of  Fisula,  decided  to  surrender  and  ibid.,  7.16.3,  where  the  Romans  at  Placentia  
accepted  the  Goths’  terms  after  being  tormented  by  famine  and  cannibalism  in  545. 
155  Stathakopoulos  2004:  47. 
156  See,  for  example,  Prok.  Wars  2.21.16,  cf.  ibid.,  2.6.6. 
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at  Arethusa   (modern  Al-Rastan,  Syria).157  In May  543,   a  granary  was  established  at  
Konstantia  under  the  supervision  of  bishop  Thomas.158 
It   was   not   until   the   news   of   the   Amidenes’   sufferings   became   known   to  
Anastasios  that  the  emperor  ordered  that  a  store  should  be  established  in  every  city  of  
the  Empire,  presumably  in  order  to  stockpile  provisions  for  the  citizens.159  Moreover,  
clearly   the   emperor   was   aware   of   the   importance   for   adequate   supplies   during  
wartime.  In  531,  Justinian  dispatched  the  former  praetorian  prefect  Demosthenes  with  
money   to   ensure   that   enough   food   was   provided   in   the   cities,   such   as   Antioch,  
Edessa160  and  those  of  Osrhoene,  to  cope  with  possible  attacks  and  sieges  launched  by  
the  Persians  in  the  coming  future. 
With  Dara  being  one  of   the  most   important  citadels   in  north  Mesopotamia,   the  
emperors   must   have   always   ensured   its   supply   of   provisions   in   the   sixth   century.  
According   to   Prokopios,   ‘there   is   always   an   abundant   supply   of   all   manner   of  
provisions…stored   away   against   a   siege’   during   the   reign   of   Justinian.161  He   also  
related  that  the  inhabitants  of  both  Dara  and  Nisibis  ‘put  away  the  annual  food-supply  
in  public  store-houses’,  for  these  two  cities  would  surely  have  become  the  targets  of  
invading  enemies.162  In  the  second  half  of  the  sixth  century,  Menander  the  Guardsman  
reported  that  Justin  II  dispatched  John,  the  son  of  Domnentiolos,  to  this  frontier  city  
to   restore   the  water   supply   and   to   ‘deal  with   other   needs   of   the   inhabitants’.163  We  
have   no   idea   what   the   needs   of   Dara’s   citizens   would   have   been,   but   replenishing  
necessities  must  have  been  important.  The  Romans  could,  therefore,  have  withstood  
the  Great  King’s  siege  for  sixth  months  in  573  without  experiencing  famine. 
 
                                            
157  IGLS  2081.   
158  Humann  and  Puchstein  1890:  405.  For  the  translation,  see  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  
243.  I  owe  this  information  to  Geoffrey  Greatrex. 
159  Josh.  Styl.  81.  See,  for  example,  Bell  and  Mango  1982:  103  for  the  case  of  Dara. 
160  Mal.  18.63,  Chr.  Ede.  100  on  the  arrival  of  Demosthenes  at  Edessa. 
161  Prok.  Wars  8.7.6-7. 
162  Ibid.,  2.19.20. 
163  Menander  fr.  9.1.  See  Prok.  Aed.  2.2.1-3,  26  for  Justinian’s  endeavors  to  control  
the  river  Cordes.   
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Sexual violence 
In   classical   antiquity   both   male   and   female   populations   could   have   become   the  
victims   of   sexual   violence   during   wartime. 164   In   the   sixth-century   Persian   wars,  
however,  only  cases  concerning  women  were  reported.  Although  neither  the  Romans’  
attitudes  to  these  events  nor  women’s  understanding  and  perception  of  their  fate  were  
recorded  in  detail,  both  their  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  Sasanids  and  their  response  
in  wartime  can  still  be  recovered. 
 
Concubinage  and  sexual  relations  with  the  conquerors 
Both distinguished and ordinary women could have been treated as either concubines 
or sex slaves in wartime. After their city was conquered by Kawād in 503, Prokopios 
noted that a few remaining Amidenes ‘were destined to minister as servants to the 
daily wants’ (οἳ δὴ ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ὑπηρετήσειν Πέρσαις ἔμελλον)165 of the Sasanids. 
While in this passage Prokopios’ language is rather ambiguous, what he wrote can be 
viewed together with Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle. When the Persians encountered the 
lack of provisions later, they still distributed food among the female citizens for they 
were ‘useful’: ‘they (i.e. the Sasanids) committed adultery with them and needed 
them to grind and bake for them’.166 Hence some of the remaining Roman women 
could have become domestic servants/slaves to satisfy the victors’ daily needs, while 
others could have been forced into sexual service. 
The sexual violence against Roman women during the Persian wars is not 
confined to the cities conquered or occupied by the Sasanids, and the presence of 
Roman soldiers could sometimes have been a threat for the local female population as 
well. In the first years of the sixth century, the Empire’s billeting soldiers ‘had their 
way over the women in the streets and houses’.167 In addition, events in Martyropolis, 
                                            
164  See,  for  example,  the  cases  collected  in  Williams  1999:  104-7. 
165  Prok.  Wars  1.7.33. 
166  Josh.  Styl.  76. 
167  Ibid.,  86.  In  the  well-known  Euphemia  and  the  Goth,  a  billeting  soldier  even  had  
children  with  a  widow’s  daughter  at  the  end  of  the  fourth  century,  Euphemia  and  the  
Goth,  11-2,  trans.  by  Francis  Crawford  Burkitt  1913:  133-4. 
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an important Roman frontier city seized by the Persians, though not through siege, in 
589, 168  should also be examined. Having controlled this city, Sittas, the Roman 
deserter, 169  ‘kept inside the majority of women in the prime of life…expelled 
everyone else except for a few slaves’,170 presumably with the help of a contingent of 
Persian soldiers. The information we have regarding the situation inside Martyropolis 
during the Persians’ occupation is rather meagre: all we know is that while the 
Romans failed to win it back,171 this city was eventually handed back by Ḵosrow II 
around two years later in return for Maurice’s aid, and Sittas was executed. 172 
Although further investigation on these women’s fates cannot be made, Euagrios’ 
language implies that they were treated as concubines, and in any case they must have 
been at the mercy of Sittas and the Persian soldiers. 
In other cases some distinguished women in conquered places were regarded as a 
kind of reward to be bestowed on Roman deserters. The experience of Constantine, a 
senator,173 and probably the comes Armeniae at that time,174  is a good example. 
Having been defeated at Theodosiopolis, he surrendered the city to the Persians in the 
summer of 502.175  Later on Kawād rewarded him with ‘two eminent women of 
Amida’,176 presumably after the fall of Amida. Constantine, however, was forgiven by 
the emperor in the end: when he went back to the Empire with these concubines after 
finding out that it was profitless to join the cause of the Sasanids, Anastasios simply 
ordered a bishop to ordain him priest. Nothing, however, about the eventual fate of 
                                            
168  Euagr.  HE  6.14,  Th.  Sim.  3.5.11-6. 
169  On  the  possible  status  of  Sittas,  see  Whitby  2000:  305. 
170  Euagr.  HE  6.14. 
171  Ibid.,  6.14-5,  cf.  Th.  Sim.  4.2.1. 
172  Ibid.,  6.19,  Th.  Sim.  4.15.6-12. 
173  Theoph.  A.M.  5996. 
174  See  Prok.  Aed  3.1.27  for  the  limited  armed  forces  at  the  disposal  in  coping  with  
possible  threats. 
175  Josh.  Styl.  48. 
176  Ibid.,  74.  Malalas’  account,  in  which  Constantine,  who  defended  Theodosiopolis  
bravely,  died  later  in  the  territory  of  the  Persians,  Mal.  16.9,  should  be  objected,  
Greatrex  1998:  75,  PLRE  II:  s.v.  Constantinus  14. 
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these two women is recorded. Another example comes from Ḵosrow I’ s campaign in 
the spring of 540. Having sacked Sura, the shah, ‘either through motives of humanity 
or of avarice, or as granting a favour to a woman whom he had taken as a captive 
from the city’, decided to release the captured Romans from this city.177 This beautiful 
woman, Euphemia, could have been deported to Persia because she, having been 
favoured by the Great King, became his concubine,178 but neither Prokopios nor other 
contemporary text preserved any further information related to her ultimate fate.  
In short, the fate of these distinguished Roman women in a captured city seems 
to have been somewhat different from that reserved towards the Empire’s ordinary 
women. While those who came from the higher strata of the Empire’s society were 
treated as concubines of either high ranking Roman deserters or the Great King 
himself, the majority of the Empire’s ordinary women could have served as the 
Persians’ slaves/servants after the enemy occupied their city. Recently, Leif Petersen 
argued that defenders’ concerns for their own families would play a crucial role in 
their decisions during sieges.179 It can be equally be assumed that the Sasanids might 
possibly have managed to demonstrate their lenience towards the defeated Roman 
social elites. If this were the case, then the different treatment of Roman women from 
varying social strata in a captured city would have had political and propagandistic 
appeal. In the middle of the fourth century, Shapur II treated the wife of Craugasius of 
Nisibis, ‘a man distinguished among the officials of his town for family, reputation 
and influence’,180 benevolently, hoping that her husband would turn to the cause of 
the Persians and surrender Nisibis to him.181  The scarcity of further information 
during the sixth century, however, prevents us from reaching a solid conclusion. 
 
Rape 
                                            
177  Prok.  Wars  2.5.28. 
178  Ibid. 
179  Petersen  2013:  320. 
180  Ammianus  18.10.1. 
181  Ibid.,  18.10.3. 
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The  female  population   inside  a  conquered  Roman  city  could  have  either  been  raped  
by  the  victorious  Sasanids  or  suffered  from  the  threat  of  being  violated  sexually.182  In  
540,   one   Roman   citizen   of   Apamea   approached   Ḵosrow   I   and   accused   a   certain  
Persian  of  ‘entering  his  house  and  violating  his  maiden  daughter’  (ἐς  τὴν  οἰκίαν  τὴν  
αὐτοῦ  ἀναβάντα  τὴν  παῖδα  οὖσαν  παρθένον  βιάζεσθαι).183  The  Romans,  as  Prokopios  
noted,  had  surrendered  this  metropolis  to  Ḵosrow  I.184  Thus,  it  may  be  safe  to  say  that  
even  in  such  a  relatively  peaceful  case,  the  presence  of  the  shah’s  soldiers  could  have  
been  a  threat  for  local  women.  The  role  played  by  the  Great  King  and  the  Apameans  
in  this  event  needs  to  be  discussed  further.  If  Prokopios  is  right,  Ḵosrow I’s  attitude  
changed   several   times.   At   the   beginning,   he   ordered   that   this   rapist   should   be  
executed,  but  he   later  promised   that   the  culprit  would  be   released   to   the  Apameans  
because  of  the  entreaty  of  other  Romans.  However,  in  the  end,  the  shah  impaled  this  
Persian,  perhaps  at  his  camp  outside  the  city.185  Upon  discovering  that  the  shah  would  
execute  the  rapist,  the  people  (ὁ  δῆμος)  of  Apamea  ‘raised  a  mighty  shout  as  loud  as  
they   could,   demanding   that   the   man   be   saved   from   the   king’s   anger’   (γνοὺς  
δὲ  …παντὶ  σθένει  ἀνέκραγον  ἐξαίσιον  οἷον,  πρὸς  τῆς  τοῦ  βασιλέως  ὀργῆς  ὀργῆς  τὸν  
ἄνθρωπον  ἐξαιτούμενοι.).186   
While   the   Apameans   seem   to   have   protested   against   the   shah’s   will,   an   act  
through   which,   according   to   Henning   Börm,   the   Romans’   moral   superiority   was  
stressed, 187   a   brief   review   of   the   context   of   Ḵosrow   I’s   arrival   and   stay   in   this  
metropolis   is   needed   both   to   check   the   credibility   of   Prokopios’   report   and   to   see  
whether   the   surrendered   Romans   dared   to   argue   with   a   shah   who   had   just   sacked  
another  metropolis  several  days  earlier.  The  arrival  of  the  Sasanids  resulted  in  horror  
                                            
182  For  other  cases  of  classical  antiquity,  see  Harris  1979:  52-3,  Schaps  1982:  193-
213,  Pritchett  1991:  238-42,  C.  R.  Whittaker  2004:  129-32,  T.  Whittaker  2009:  234-
42.  Recently  see  Gaca  2010-1:  85-109,  2014:  305-11,  324-57  for  philological  studies. 
183  Prok.  Wars  2.11.36. 
184  Ibid.,  2.11.21-3. 
185  Ibid.,  2.11.37-8. 
186  Ibid.,  2.11.38. 
187  Börm  2007:  99. 
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among   the   Apameans, 188   and   they   ‘implored   their   bishop   to   bring   forth   and  
display…the  saving  and  life-giving  Wood  of  the  Cross,  so  that  for  the  last  time  they  
might  see  and  kiss   the  sole  salvation  of  mankind  and  receive  a  passage   to   the  other  
life’.189  Later,  Ḵosrow   I   selected   ‘two   hundred   of   the   best   of   the  Persians’   (ἄνδρας  
τῶν  ἐν  Πέραις  ἀρίστων  διακοσίους),190  and  entered  this  metropolis  with  them.  Since  
the  Romans   had  already   surrendered   their   city   before   the  Persians   reached   it,191  the  
decision   to   elect   these   ‘best  men   among   all   of   them’   to   accompany   the   shah  might  
thus   have   been   considered   a   ‘spectacle’   to   glorify   the   strength   and   might   of   the  
Persians.192  In  addition,  later   the  shah  ordered   that  a  chariot  contest  be  conducted   in  
the   hippodrome. 193   When   he   learned   that   Justinian   supported   the   Blue   faction,  
Ḵosrow   I  hoped  that  the  Greens  would  win.194  At  the  beginning  things  did  not  go  to  
plan,   and   the   Blue   faction   had   the   upper   hand. 195   The   Great   King’s   reaction   is  
interesting:   ‘thinking   that   this   had   been  done   purposely…he   cried   out  with  a   threat  
that   the   Caesar   had   wrongfully   surpassed   the   others…commanded   that   the   horses  
which   were   running   in   front   should   be   held   up’.196   This   time   the   Roman   circus,  
according  to  Alan  Cameron,  as  ‘a  backdrop  against  which  the  emperor  could  act  out  
in   due   pomp   his   role   as   divine   ruler,   victor   in   war,   and   provider   of   peace’,197  was  
introduced   by   Ḵosrow   I   as   a  means   both   to   celebrate   his   victory,   and,   possibly,   to  
stress   the   opposition   between   himself/the   Persians   and   Justinian/the   Romans  
deliberately.198 
                                            
188  Prok.  Wars  2.11.16. 
189  Euagr.  HE  4.26. 
190  Prok.  Wars  2.11.24. 
191  Ibid.,  2.11.22-3,  Euagr.  HE  4.26. 
192  See  Menander  fr.  18.6,  and  Th.  Sim.  1.15.2  for  similar  strategies  used  by  the  
Persians  and  the  Romans  respectively. 
193  Prok.  Wars  2.11.31. 
194  Ibid.,  2.11.32. 
195  Ibid.,  2.11.33-4. 
196  Ibid.,  2.11.35. 
197  Al.  Cameron  1976:  182. 
198  See  Dagron  2011:  245  for  other  sixth-century  examples. 
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                Therefore  the  shah’s  authority  and  prowess  were  established,  albeit  temporarily,  
at   different   occasions   in   this  metropolis,   and   at   the   same   time   the  Apameans  must  
have  been  intimidated.  Since   the  accuser  may  have  come  before  the  shah  soon  after  
(ἐνταυθα)  the  end  of  the  chariot  race,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  people  of  Apamea  
were   gathered   either   at   the   hippodrome   or   at   another   public   place.   Indeed,  
acclamation  was  a  common  way  through  which  public  opinion  could  be  conveyed  in  
Late  Antiquity,199  but  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  inhabitants  would  have  felt  able  
to  demand  Ḵosrow  I’s  mercy  under  such  circumstances. 
The  Apameans’  supplication,  therefore,  could  have  been  made  up  by  Prokopios.  
This  episode  can  be  compared  with  the  situation  inside  Naples  while  occupied  by  the  
Goths  to  explain  Prokopios’  possible  purpose  for  inserting  this  event.  At  that  time,  a  
certain  Roman  came  before  Totila,  and  charged  one  of  the  bodyguards  with  raping  his  
maiden   daughter   (τὴν παῖδα παρθένον οὖσαν οὔτι ἑκουσίαν βιάσασθαι).200  Unlike  
what   happened   in  Apamea,   this   time   it  was   the  Gothic   aristocrats  who   approached  
their  leader  and  asked  for  the  rapist’s  release.201  Totila,  however,  refused  to  do  so  and  
executed   this   soldier,   giving   the   Roman   girl   all   of   the   culprit’s   belongings.202  It   is  
shown   that   while   sexual   violence   against   Roman   women   may   not   have   been  
uncommon   in   enemy-occupied   cities,   contemporary   authors   could   have   employed  
these  events  for  their  own  purposes.  Whereas  Totila  acted  as  the  guardian  of  justice,  in  
the  case  of  Apamea,  as  Henning  Börm  rightly  argued,  the  Great  King  was  a  ruler  who  
‘was  ready  to  agree  to  everything  and  to  pledge  the  agreement  with  an  oath,  and  much  
more  ready   to   forget  completely   the   things   lately  agreed   to  and  sworn   to  by  him’203  
for  breaking  his  previous  promise.204 
Even  though  the  women  themselves  were  not  raped  by  the  invading  enemies,  the  
prospect   of   sexual   violence   was   horrifying.   In   540,   two   ‘illustrious   women   of  
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203  Ibid.,  2.9.8,  see  also  ibid.,  2.11.24,  cf.  2.12.34. 
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Antioch’   (γυναῖκας   τῶν   <ἐν>   Ἀντιοχεῦσιν   ἐπιφανῶν   δύο)   ‘got   outside   the  
fortifications’  (ἔξω  τοῦ  περιβόλου)  after  this  metropolis  was  captured  by  the  Persians.  
While   the   calamities   and   chaos   inside  Antioch   could   possibly   have   instigated   their  
flight,   clearly  being  violated  by   the  Persians  must  have  been  a  much  more  dreadful  
threat.   Instead  of  escaping   to   the  neighboring  areas  of  Antioch  and   taking   refuge  at  
safer  places,  they,  according  to  Prokopios,  ‘…perceiving  that  they  would  fall  into  the  
hands   of   the   enemy   (for   they   were   already   plainly   seen   going   about   everywhere)  
(αἰσθομένας   δὲ   ὡς   ὑπὸ   τοῖς   πολεμίοις   γενήσονται   πανταχόσε   γἁρ   ἢδη   περιιόντες  
καθεωρῶντο),  went  running  to  the  River  Orontes.  In  other  words  these  women  might  
have  understood  that  in  any  case  they  would  be  doomed  to  be  violated.  Later,  having  
been   horrified   by   the   prospect   of   being   raped   by   the   enemy   in   the   coming   future  
(φοβουμένας  δέ  μή  τι  σφᾶς  ἐς  τὸ  σῶμα  ὑβρίσωσι  Πέρσαι),  they  ‘covered  their  faces  
with  their  veils  and  threw  themselves  into  the  river’s  current’.205 
Since  the  clothing  style  of  Roman  women  always  played  a  predominant  role  in  
the  construction  of  their  status,  identity  and  gender  in  society,   the  wearing  of  veils  in  
Prokopios’   vignette   above   may   have   had   special   meanings   and   connotations.   It   is  
possible  that  the  veils  were  used  to  hide  their  faces,  making  it  difficult  for  the  Persians  
to  know  their  identity  and  gender  after  their  death,  and  their  clothing  style  might  have  
been  influenced  by  the  customs  of  those  living  in  inland  areas  of  Roman  Syria,  where  
women  usually  kept  their  heads  covered  with  veils  and  decorated  bands.206  Two  more  
observations  can  be  made.  Since  it  was  difficult  for  those  who  wore  veils  to  perform  
manual   labour,   this   clothing   style  must   have   been   a   ‘privilege’   for   noblewomen.207  
Also,   the   display   of   Roman   women’s   bodies   was   seen   as   the   neglect   of   modesty  
which   might   have   been   associated   with   sexual   immorality,   and   a   married   woman  
                                            
205  Prok.  Wars  2.8.35,  cf.  Prok.  Anecd.  7.37-8  in  which  an  aristocratic  woman  
committed  suicide  by  jumping  into  the  Bosporus  after  being  seized  by  circus  
partisans.  The  threat  of  sexual  violence  was  implied:  ‘many unwilling boys were 
compelled to enter into unholy intercourse with the Factionists… women, too, while 
living with husbands, had to submit to this same treatment’,  ibid.,  7.36-7.  I  owe  this  
point  to  Geoffrey  Greatrex. 
206  Croom  2010:  129-30. 
207  Olson  2008b:  45-6. 
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should  wear  a  veil,208  as  a  mark  of  her  virtues,209  to  cover  her  head  in  public  life.  In  
this  context,  this  clothing  style  was  a  symbol  of  these  Antiochene  women’s  purity  and  
chastity,  both  physical  and  spiritual. 
 
The suicide of 2,000 virgins210 
John of Ephesos’ Church History includes arguably the most significant, and possibly 
the most detailed narrative regarding the potential threats of sexual violence suffered 
by Roman women in the Persian wars. John gave quite a lengthy account of the mass 
suicide of Roman virgins who were captured by the Sasanids in 573. This story could 
have become well-known among the Christians in the Near East. While it circulated 
independently,211 different versions of this story were preserved by many important 
Syriac historical works as well.212 When the  Armenian   version   of   the  Chronicle   of  
Michael  the  Syrian  was  translated  in  the  thirteenth  century,  the  mass  suicide  of  these  
Roman   virgins   was   preserved,   albeit   in   abridged   form.213 More significantly, Bar 
Hebraeus removed this event from the Arabic version of his Chronography.214 These 
Roman virgins’ deeds and suicide were thus deemed unimportant for the Arabic 
                                            
208  Clark  1993:  108:  ‘veiling  connoted  modesty  as  well  as  marriage’.  On  the  wearing  
of  veils  by  Roman  women,  see  Treggiari  1991:  163,  Croom  2010:  112,  Edmondson  
2008:  27,  Olson  2008b  93-5,  cf.  MacMullen  1980:  208-18,  cf.  Beard  1980:  13.   
209  Croom  2010:  89,  Olson  2008a:  147,  2008b:  34-5,  89. 
210  See  above,  pp.  71-6. 
211  See,  for  example,  cod.  Vat.  Syr.  145,  in  which  the  scribe  mentioned  this  event  after  
the  brief  account  of  Dara  and  Apamea’s  fall  in  573,  Greatrex  2006a:  52.  For  the  
manuscript  of  this  text,  see  Assemanus  1759:  263.  I  owe  this  information  to  Geoffrey  
Greatrex. 
212  Chr.  Seert  1.3,  Mich.  Syr.  10.10,  14.2,  Chr.  1234  69,  Bar  Hebraeus  Chronography  
8.84. 
213  In   the  nineteenth  century   two  versions  of   this  work  were  published  at  Jerusalem,  
but   none   of   them  were   translated.   Victor   Langlois’   translation   was   based   on   other  
recent  manuscripts,  Schmidt  2013:  98-101. 
214  See  Hambye  1990:  406,  Conrad  1994:  319-78,  Aigle  2005:  92,  94-5,  106-7  for  the  
possible  audience  of  this  work. 
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readers. Such a difference makes it clear that the story might have been a shared 
cultural heritage which was transmitted only among the Syriac-speaking community 
in the medieval near east. 
The historical background of this event in John of Ephesos’ text fits into the 
relations between the Sasanids and the nomads in the second half of the sixth century. 
These virgins were regarded as the Persians’ gifts to those who inhabited ‘the heart of 
his territories’, i.e. the Turks, in order to please and then hire them. What he said can 
actually be   compared   with   the   account   of   an   Arabic   text,   the   so-called   Sirat  
Anusharwan,  ‘Life  of  Ḵosrow  Anushawan’,  in  which  the  details  about  the  recruitment  
of   the   Turks   in   the   reign   of   Ḵosrow   I   were   preserved. 215  Nevertheless, the 
anachronism  of  other  medieval  texts  is  clear,  and  the  use  of  the  same  story  in  different  
periods  suggests  that  it  can  fit  into  different  contexts  by  different  authors.  The  author  
of   the   Chronicle   of   Seert   considered   the   transportation   of   these   virgins   to   be   the  
results  of  the  conflicts  between  Rome  and  Persia  in  the  mid-third  century,  and  it  was  
Shapur   I  who  decided   to  send   them  in  order   to  please  the  Hephthalites.216  Since   the  
Hephthalites   had   not   been   a   menace   at   the   north-eastern   frontier   of   the   Sasanian  
Empire   in   the   third   century,217  this   dating   should   be   rejected.   Similar   problems   are  
discernible  in  the  Armenian  version  of  Michael  the  Syrian’s  work,  in  which  the  scribe  
confused  the  Turks  with  the  Hephthalites,  stating  that  the  shah  sent  these  ‘gifts’  to  the  
Thedaliens   (the  Hephthalites)  because   the  Sasanids  wanted   to  wage  war   against   the  
Romans,   the  Armenians  and   the  Dadjiks  (the  Tajik  people?).218  The  claim  regarding  
the   possible   recruitment   by   the   Sasanids   should   be   rejected   on   the   ground   that  
apparently   the   Hephthalites   had   been   vanquished,   if   not   totally,   by   the   Turks   well  
                                            
215  Cf.  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.22.  In  568,  four  Turkish  tribes  submitted  to  Persia,  and  the  
warriors,  along  with  their  wives,  children  and  servants  were  permitted  to  inhabit  the  
territory  of  the  Persians,  Sirat  Anusharwan  9.  Grignaschi  1966:  23-4,  Bonner  2011:  
85-7.  On  the  history  of  the  Turks  in  the  sixth  century,  see  von  Gabain  1983:  613-7,  
Sinor  and  Klyashtorny  1996:  327-34. 
216  Chr.  Seert  1.3. 
217  They  had  been  a  menacing  threat  for  the  Sasanids  from  the  reign  of  Yazdegerd  II  
(r.  438-57),  Litvinsky  1996:  138-41. 
218  Langlois  1868:  207. 
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before   the   Syrian   campaign   of   Justin.219  Interestingly   enough,   Michael   the   Syrian  
inserted  this  story  for  the  second  time  when  he  talked  about  the  Turks,220  suggesting  
that  it  took  place  when  Shapur  I  destroyed  Dara.221  Since  Dara  had  not  been  founded  
in  the  third  century,  once  again  the  anachronism  of  this  passage  is  clear. 
The suicide of these 2,000 Roman virgins, therefore, cannot be taken at face 
value. In fact, the literary study of this event in chapter 2 suggests a variety of literary 
traditions were introduced by these Christian authors and then interwined. 222  In 
addition, some scholars regard the suicide of 2,000 virgins as a fabricated episode. 
Erich Kettenhofen argued that this story should be read as hagiography rather than 
history,223 while Jan van Ginkel pointed out that the focus of these historians were 
thus the integrity, chastity and faithfulness of these Roman virgins—‘martyrs for the 
Christian faith’.224 
Sometimes the enemy’s rape of the Empire’s female ascetics was recorded in 
great detail in Late Antiquity. For example, when the Kutrigurs ransacked the Empire 
in the second half of the sixth century, according to Agathias, ‘many ladies of noble 
birth who had chose a life of chastity were cruelly dragged away…being forced to 
serve as the instruments of unbridled lust’.225 Some of them, who lived ascetic lives 
for they ‘from their youth renounced marriage together with the love of material 
things…hidden themselves in the contemplative solitude of the cloister…withdrawing 
themselves entirely from active life’, were raped as well.226 
                                            
219  Widengren  1952:  69-94,  Grignaschi  1980:  219-48. 
220  Mich.  Syr.  14.1.  Michael  the  Syrian  clearly  mingled  this  event  with  other  sources  
which  may  come  from  Muslim  or  Georgian  sources  in  this  passage,  Rapp  2003:  257,  
267,  Witakowski  2007:  259.  I  owe  this  information  to  Dickens  2006:  439. 
221  Ibid.,  14.2. 
222  See  above,  pp.  71-6. 
223  Kettenhofen  1996:  301.  Some  scholars  chose  to  consider  the  capture  and  suicide  of  
them  as  historical  information  and  even  tried  to  identify  the  place  where  these  virgins  
committed  suicide.  Suermann  1992:  45,  Turtledove  1977:  218. 
224  van  Ginkel  1995:  156. 
225  Agath.  5.13.2. 
226  Ibid.,  5.13.2-3. 
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 However, it is not the case in the suicide of the 2,000 Roman virgins. Neither 
John of Ephesos nor other oriental Christian historians provided any further 
information regarding these virgins’ identity in their texts. John of Ephesos 
designated them as maidens (laimta).227 We will probably never know whether John’s 
original version was based on some Romans’ actual calamities in the Persian wars. 
Nevertheless, since some female populations of other Roman cities, as shown 
above,228 were treated as concubines in the sixth century, it is not implausible to say 
that some maidens were actually deported together with other prisoners of war and 
even faced the threat of sexual violence. 
 
Loss and destruction of property 
The removal and destruction of property or buildings is another important dimension 
of citizens’ wartime experiences in the conquered cities. Although nothing related to 
what the Sasanids captured from the Empire can be found today, the results of 
archaeological excavations sometimes prove to be helpful in estimating the scale of 
destruction at certain places. In this section I will analyze both literary and material 
data to study the Persians’ plundering and destruction in the conquered cities. 
 
Plundering 
In exercising control over the conquered cities, the victorious Sasanids were regularly 
said to seize valuable goods from the Romans. While the possessions of those living 
in Roman cities such as Sura was plundered,229 the most detailed accounts come from 
those related to Antioch, Apamea and certain frontier cities. In the sack of Amida the 
removal of citizens’ property possibly took place after the massacre. 230  In 540, 
Ḵosrow I ordered that all possessions should be plundered from Antioch after 
                                            
227  If  these  virgins  had  been  ascetics,  surely  John  would  have  the  appropriate  term  
such  as  b’tula,  TS  1.624,  J.  Smith  1903:  57.  I  owe  this  information  to  Shahîd 1995: 
732. 
228  See  above,  pp.  113-5. 
229  Prok.  Wars  2.5.26. 
230  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
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resistance was suppressed.231 After the conquest of Dara, the shah seized wealth from 
the inhabitants and then pillaged the whole city,232 ordering that ‘who had gold should 
bring it to him’, and all bullion found in this border city, including those from 
churches and other places, should be gathered to his tent.233 In the same year, having 
seized Apamea by trickery, the Persians, on the third day after the agreement,234 made 
the inhabitants into prisoners of war, perhaps in order to facilitate their looting and 
plundering, and then began to pillage the city.235 
The treasures of the church were one of the most important targets of the 
invaders. 236  Sometimes the victorious shah himself visited places, especially 
churches, in the conquered cities, possibly in order to inspect the possible wealth 
accumulated inside these buildings. When Kawād entered the treasury of the church 
and took the sacred gold and silver vessels, his soldiers ‘trampled on the consecrated 
elements…(and) stripped its churches’.237 In 540, the possessions of the church of 
Antioch became the target of Ḵosrow I: he went to the church of Antioch together 
with the Roman ambassadors (αὐτὸς δὲ ξὺν τοῖς πρέσβεσιν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας 
κατέβαινεν, ὅπερ ἐκκλησίαν καλοῦσιν).238 The Great King was said to have been 
‘seated on the tower which is on the height’ (Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Χοσρόης ἐν πύργῳ τῷ κατὰ 
τὴν ἄκραν) when the Sasanids were rushing into Antioch;239 perhaps this means that 
he was staying at a safer place just outside the city until his soldiers took control. Its 
wealth must have been significant: the shah plundered it as his own booty, and  
                                            
231  Prok.  Wars  2.9.14-5. 
232  Joh.  Epiph.  5,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5,  Chr.  1234  66. 
233  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5. 
234  Th.  Sim.  3.10.9. 
235  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6. 
236  For  the  examples  of  other  parts  of  the  Mediterranean  world,  see  Agath.  2.1.7-8  for  
the  destruction  and  plundering  by  the  Alamanni  and  Th.  Sim.  7.14.11-2  for  the  Avars’  
pillage  of  the  martyr’s  grave  at  Drizipera. 
237  Josh.  Styl.  53,  cf.  Villagomez  and  Morony  1999:  311-2. 
238  Prok.  Wars  2.9.14. 
239  Ibid.,  2.8.30. 
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according to Prokopios, ‘departed possessed of enormous wealth’.240 Two years later, 
a cross decorated with gold and precious stones which was dedicated by Theodora, 
was seized by Ḵosrow I from Sergiopolis.241 Since at that time the Sergiopolitans 
agreed to ransom their city with sacred treasures, 242  in this case the cross was 
regarded as a part of ransom rather than booty. When Ḵosrow II  occupied  the  throne  
with   the   help   of   Maurice,   he   sent   this   relic   back   to   Gregory,   the   patriarch   of  
Antioch.243  Finally, the churches of Dara were plundered by the Persians in the winter 
of 573. We are informed that the shah plundered more than one or two hundred 
kentenaria244 of gold from this city,245 but no further detail regarding the scale and 
detail of the church’s wealth can be found.  
The removal of relics must have been noteworthy for Roman Christians, because 
while they did not always elaborate the quantity and quality of what the invading 
Persians had carried away from the Empire, many of them recorded the seizure of 
such items in their works. Being   one   of   the  most  well-known   relics   in   the   Empire  
which  was  honoured  by  Christians  ‘on  the  days  appointed  for  adorations’,246  the  fate  
of  the  fragment  of  the  True  Cross  from  Apamea  is  worth  more  analysis.247  In the reign 
of Justin   II, the fragment of the True Cross at Apamea had been divided into two 
                                            
240  Ibid.,  2.9.15. 
241  Th.  Sim.  5.13.2,  Euagr.  HE  6.21.  Theophylaktos’s  account,  in  which  Sergiopolis  
was  subdued  by  Ḵosrow  I’s  soldiers,  was  at  variance  with  both  Prokopios  and  
Euagrios. 
242  Euagr.  HE  4.28. 
243  Ibid.,  6.21,  Th.  Sim.  5.13.1-2,  see  also  Higgins  1955:  89-102,  Allen  1981:  259-61,  
Canepa  2009:  26. 
244  One  kentenarion  equals  to  100  Roman  lbs.  (32  kg),  see  Greatrex  1998:  272,  ODB  
1121. 
245  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5.  The  anonymous  medieval  author  suggested  that  the  Persians  
collected  200  kentenaria  of  gold  and  silver,  Chr.  1234  66. 
246  Euagr.  HE  4.26. 
247  For  the  veneration  of  the  True  Cross,  see  Frolow  1961:  320-39,  Wortley  2009:  1-
10. 
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pieces in Antioch.248 While this relic, along with the icon of Kamouliana,249 was later 
transported to Constantinople by the imperial envoy Zemarchos, presumably in order 
to protect the capital of the Empire from the threats of misfortunes, the other half was 
kept in Apamea.250 When the men of Adarmahan ravaged Apamea in 573, a priest hid 
it inside a well so that the enemies could not capture it. Even though he was taken 
captive by the Persians, the priest, ‘was able in some way or another’,251 to inform 
Magnos252 where he had placed the True Cross. Magnos then told Varanes, a local 
aristocrat of Apamea, who in the end found this relic and sent it to the capital of the 
Romans. 
Clearly the Sasanids noticed the wealth possessed by the Empire’s secular elites, 
and their property was removed as well. In 542 Ḵosrow I aimed to invade Palestine 
and plunder Jerusalem because ‘…this was…peopled by wealthy inhabitants’ 
(χώραν…πολυχρύσων οἰκητόρων).253 In Amida, the Sasanids took beautiful clothes 
from Ishaq bar Bar’ai, a powerful and rich (honorary)254 consul who had bequeathed 
his wealth to the church several years before. A record about Ishaq’s wealth and 
power at that time can be further found in the works of John of Ephesos, in which he, 
as a patrician, was portrayed as a ‘mighty and great and eminent above all who were 
in the East’.255 Finally, even the building materials of civic buildings were not spared. 
                                            
248  Mich.  Syr.  10.1. 
249   Cedrenus   1.684-5.   Kitzinger   1954:   99-100,   114-5,   Cameron   1979:   18ff,   Klein  
2004:  288. 
250  Menander  fr.  17,  Mich.  Syr.  10.1.  Glanville  Downey  dated  this  event  to  the  reign  
of   Tiberios   II,   Downey   1961:   564.   However,   according   to   both   Menander   and  
Michael  the  Syrian’s  works,  it  is  evident  that  it  was  Justin  II,  after  listening  the  advice  
of  the  patriarch  of  Constantinople,  ask  his  envoy  to  transport  this  relic  to  the  capital. 
251  Menander  fr.  17. 
252  On  the  life  of  Magnos,  see  Feissel  1985:  465-76.  I  owe  this  information  to  D.  
Kennedy  2010:  182-3. 
253  Prok.  Wars  2.20.18.  See  below,  pp.  209-10  for  further  analysis  of  this  statement. 
254  PLRE  II:  s.v.  Isaac  1. 
255  Joh.  Eph.  Lives,  PO  17.191. 
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In Amida bronze statues, sundials and marbles were collected,256 while in the sack of 
Antioch, beautiful marble slabs, stones and even pictures were pillaged and exported 
into the land of the Persians.257 
In the end the victorious enemies sent the booty back to their homeland. 
Sometimes they simply carried what they had plundered with them, possibly returning 
back to the Persian Empire directly, and in other instances, as the case of 
Adarmahan’s forces in 573 shows, the Sasanids left258 Apamea and rejoined Ḵosrow 
I’s forces as quickly as possible.259 That is, the booty from this metropolis would have 
been held by Adarmahan’s soldiers possibly until the fall of Dara. The Sasanids 
sometimes used other more effective ways to transport the valuable goods. In 503, 
after seizing booty and ‘everything they liked’,260 they placed their loot on rafts and 
send it back to their country that way261 because Amida was located not very far away 
from the river Tigris. 
Apart from being pillaged by the victorious Sasanids as booty, local people’s 
property could have been looted by Roman soldiers, as well. At the beginning of the 
sixth century, Roman soldiers billeted many eastern cities. Sometimes the social elites 
could have been spared from being afflicted with such experiences, and those from 
Edessa chose to pay money and to provide necessities to the Roman army in 
advance, 262  while in other cases, according to Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, both 
‘nobles and commoners’263 became victims. 
                                            
256  Zach.  HE  7.4.  On  late  antique  public  clocks,  see  Anderson  2014:  23-32. 
257  Prok.  Wars  2.9.16,  Joh.  Lyd.  De  Mag.  3.54,  Ps.  Dion.  II.64,  Mic.  Sty.  9.24,  Bar  
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In Prokopios’ Wars, a Roman countryman approached Glones, the Persian 
commander who was in charge of defending Amida, saying that ‘when some Roman 
soldiers chanced upon me (for, as you know, they are constantly wandering about the 
country here in small bands and doing violence to the miserable country-folk), they 
inflicted upon me blows…takng away everything’.264 Although a close reading of 
Prokopios’ text indicates that what this merchant said was actually a pretext to entice 
the Persians to leave the city,265 and Geoffrey Greatrex has rightly observed that our 
author seems to have focused on the most entertaining and dramatic parts elements,266 
sometimes the arrival and presence of the Roman army would have created havoc 
among local populations. The most detailed testimonies come from the Chronicle of 
Pseudo-Joshua, in which the author suggested that ‘when those who came to our 
assistance ostensibly as saviours were going down and coming up, they looted us in a 
manner little short of enemies’.267 The houses of not only the ordinary people but also 
those living in rural areas, monasteries and ascetics were occupied,268 and the soldiers 
also plundered the inhabitants’ cattle, provisions and necessities.269 Therefore, many 
civilians could have lost their property; the Edessenes were delighted after the 
departure of the Roman army from the frontier.270 
 
Destruction 
Many Roman cities and fortresses were attacked or besieged by the Sasanids in the 
sixth-century. If Prokopios and other contemporary writers are to be believed, some 
of them like Sura, Antioch and Apamea were either destroyed or burned, while others 
such as Amida and Dara seem to have been spared. In subsequent discussion I will 
present and analyze available literary and material data both to discuss the validity of 
                                            
264  Prok. Wars 1.9.7. I owe this information to Geoffrey Greatrex. 
265  Ibid.,  1.9.5-6. 
266  Greatrex  2010:  246. 
267  Josh.  Styl.  86. 
268  Ibid.,  95. 
269  Ibid.,  86,  93. 
270  Ibid.,  87. 
 129 
literary accounts and, tentatively, to estimate the scale of destruction caused by the 
Sasanids’ invasion. 
In summarising what Ḵosrow I’s forces had done against the Romans, Prokopios 
pointed out that he ‘fired every structure and razed it to the ground’.271 In the spring 
of 540 the furious shah razed Sura to the ground,272 and two years later Kallinikos 
was destroyed as well.273 More than thirty years later, both the Greek and Syriac 
historians reported that having placed all booty outside the city wall, the soldiers of 
Adarmahan burned Apamea before they returned to Persia (See  map  5  for  the  design  
of  this  city  in  Late  Antiquity  and  the  location  of  the  destroyed  buildings).274 The most 
detailed account, however, was Prokopios’ description of the destruction of Antioch 
in 540. Having removed most valuable goods from it, the Persians are reported to 
have burned this metropolis into debris. 275  A dismaying picture was provided in 
Buildings: 
… he (i.e. Justinian) rebuilt the whole city, which had been completely burned 
by the enemy (ξύμπασαν δὲ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων καταφλεχεῖνων 
ἀνῳκοδομήσατο τὴν πόλιν αὐτός)…everything was everywhere reduced to 
ashes and leveled to the ground (τετεφρωμένων γὰρ πανταχόσε καὶ 
καθῃρημένων ἁπάντων)…there were no longer public stoas or colonnaded 
courts in existence anywhere, nor any market-place remaining.276 
Prokopios  also  stated  that  ‘in  this  capture  the  whole  city  (Antioch)…was  destroyed’  
(ἐν   ταύτῃ   δὲ   τῇ   ἁλώσει   ξύμπασα   ἡ   πόλις…διέφθαρται)277  when   he   mentioned   the  
calamities  suffered  by  the  Antiochenes  in  the  first  half  of  the  sixth  century.  Euagrios,  
who  used  Prokopios  as  one  of  his  main  sources  in  his  Church  History,  further  noted  
that  ‘he  (i.e.  Prokopios)…records…how  Ḵosrow  destroyed  everything  by  killing  and  
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burning’.278 Such statements, however, are contradicted by Prokopios’ own report 
about the details of the sack of Antioch. Several buildings of this city were actually 
spared. For instance, one church was left intact, and many houses at the edge of the 
city remained untouched.279 Moreover, while those lying outside the fortifications 
were burned by the Persians, the fortifications and the church of Julianos where the 
ambassadors sojourned were left unharmed as well.280 
If we take all these narratives at face value, then the wholesale destruction of a 
conquered city seems to have been a common strategy for the Sasanids in the sixth 
century. However, a closer examination of archaeological evidence suggests that it 
was not always the case. Of course sometimes the possible traces of destruction can 
be noted. There are several pieces of evidence in Antioch (See  map  6  for  the  locations  
of   these   traces   of   destruction): 281 the building of Bath F which stood near the city 
walls, another building which was located at the west side of the city, and finally, the 
structure of the colonnaded street. The results of excavations indicated that Bath F 
was destroyed in the great earthquake of 526. Thereafter, as suggested by its 
inscription,282 it was used by the Antiochenes during the first decade of Justinian’s 
reign, and then destroyed by a great fire, possibly due to the sack by the Persians in 
540.283 The fate of another large building, the House of Aion, was quite similar to that 
of Bath F: after its first destruction by earthquake, this building was repaired, in a 
smaller scale, and continued to be used. It was destroyed by fire, which may also be 
identified with the invasion of the Persians in 540.284 Finally, at the northeastern part 
of this city, the traces of ‘a general destruction…casued or accompanied by severe 
                                            
278  Euagr.  HE  4.26. 
279  Many  houses  of  the  area  of  Cerataeum,  the  Jewish  quarter,  were  left  unmarred,  
possibly  because  of  its  isolation  from  the  main  part  of  Antioch,  see  Downey  1961:  
544  for  further  information. 
280  Prok.  Wars  2.10.6-9. 
281  For  the  narrative  of  Antioch’s  remaining  fortifications,  see  Crow  2013:  400-8. 
282  Stillwell  1941:  9. 
283  Stillwell  1941:  9,  Levi  1947:  366-8. 
284  Stillwell  1941:  11-2,  cf.  Levi  1947:  195-8. 
 131 
fire’285 was observed at another building. The layers of the so-called main street, 
which extended over Antioch’s center, could be another testimony.286 Judging from 
the surveys around the mosque of Habib al-Najjâr, Jean Lassus pointed out that the 
pavements were rebuilt by Justinian after the conflagration by the Persians. He further 
noted that the catastrophes in the first half of the sixth century such as the earthquakes 
and then the invasion by Ḵosrow I in 540 had not only damaged the original Roman 
road287 but also elevated the street level.288 
The results of the excavation works conducted in the twentieth century at 
Apamea are helpful as well in gauging the scale and extent of Adarmahan’s 
destruction in this metropolis in 573.289 According to the report of archaeologists, the 
rubble and traces of burning suggested that some grand buildings were destroyed, 
possibly in the Sasanids’ invasion and sack in 573.290 The evidence from the building 
of the Atrium Church is exceptionally clear: traces of burning were evident at the 
pavement of the martyrion, and the mosaics were even swollen and crinkled as the 
result of great fire and water pouring on it.291 Also, a dark spot indicative of high 
combustion can also be observed.292 In addition, although only parts of the House of 
the Deer, a grand Roman villa which is located in the north-eastern sector of this city, 
have been excavated so far, 293  what we can learn from the results of current 
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campaigns is significant.294 After studying different layers of this site, archaeologists 
concluded that the lowest destruction layer corresponded with the period of this 
house’s destruction, which could be dated from the end of the sixth century to the 
beginning of the seventh century.295 Again, traces of burning were evident from the 
sixth-century mosaic which was found in rooms A and C.296 In the same destruction 
layer, other material traits, including fragments of jars and bronze utensils, were 
excavated in the room H.297 Finally, the burnt fragments of mosaic were unearthed 
from the rooms which collapsed during the fire which destroyed the whole house.298 
In short, several, if not all, buildings of Apamea experienced large-scale 
destruction either in the sixth or in the seventh centuries. However, there are other 
possible factors which would have resulted in similar traces of destruction, such as 
earthquakes and arson.299 Earthquakes in neighbouring areas might have shattered and 
even resulted in the demolition of certain buildings in Apamea, but both 
contemporary and later authors report nothing about either severe destruction or 
conflagrations caused by earthquakes in this metropolis. Since both the Atrium 
Church and the Roman houses were all magnificent buildings of Apamea, their 
destruction in earthquakes would surely have been noted by historians of either the 
Greek-speaking or the Syriac-speaking communities. It is thus possible to suggest that 
these fabulous Roman villas and the Atrium Church might have been destroyed in the 
invasions of the Sasanids rather than in the natural disasters or the conflagrations. 
However, not all material data support the cities’ destruction in the Persian wars, 
and sometimes it seems that the results of archaeological excavation are contradicted 
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by the reports of contemporary authors. Euagrios wrote that not only the cathedral of 
Apamea, but also the icon which was commissioned to commemorate the miracle of 
the Holy Cross in 540,300 were destroyed together by the forces of Adarmahan in 
573.301 In the twentieth century, the archaeologists excavated a church which can 
possibly be identified with the cathedral of Apamea,302 but no traces of the destruction 
of this important building have ever been reported.303 In fact, in many cases existing 
material data proves too scant to establish any firm conclusion. The results of a series 
of archaeological excavations in North Syria suggest that while it is difficult to find 
any significant material traits of the Diocletianic walls of Sura (Map 7), that is, the 
eastern part of its city wall, the Justinianic one—the western citadel—was built 
splendidly. Scholars argue that such a dearth of material data may result from the sack 
by Ḵosrow I’s  forces,304 but no further supporting evidence has been found. 
Therefore, while at first glance all these traits could be corroborated with the 
information from historical texts,305 a critical examination makes clear that it is highly 
risky to rely on such partial and ambiguous data. The cases of Antioch are excellent 
examples. Archaeologists assumed that the great fire which destroyed the Roman bath 
and another building might have resulted from Ḵosrow I’s invasion, and that it was 
Ḵosrow I’s sack which caused the destruction of the former Roman pavements. 
According to the excavators, since the engineers did not clear out the pavement before 
conducting their new construction work, the debris in situ could have elevated the 
street level.306 
Since we have no way of knowing whether both the building of Bath F, which 
stood at the north-eastern side of the city, and another huge building which was built 
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in the western side were destroyed in the same conflagration around the same time 
(Map 5), it is nearly impossible to know the reasons for their destruction. Supposing 
that they were destroyed in the same great fire roughly at the same time, the cause of 
the fire remains another problem—it was not necessarily caused by the incursions of 
the enemies, and it could have resulted from other kinds of disasters of both natural 
and human origin, such as earthquake or arson. 
 Since severe earthquakes were sometimes accompanied by extensive fire 
damage, the possible effects of seismic waves on local buildings from the second half 
of the sixth century onwards should be examined. In 551, an earthquake occurred 
throughout the Middle East, including the surrounding areas of Antioch, and caused 
terror and destruction in several cities.307 In 577, another earthquake which might 
have resulted in the collapse of Antioch’s buildings 308  struck the capital of the 
Empire. Two more great earthquakes were observed in the last quarter of the sixth 
century. One of them tore down all the buildings at Daphne and destroyed many 
architectural works of Antioch in 577,309 while many buildings in Antioch again were 
brought to the ground by another one in 588.310 Finally, the last earthquake of our 
period took place at the very beginning of the seventh century.311 In short, while 
traces of destruction can be observed from these buildings in Antioch, no assured 
answer can be found so far from the material evidence,312 and it is too precarious to 
try to link the archaeological findings with the available literary sources. 313  The 
explanation regarding the colonnade street’s destruction and rebuilding remains 
unsatisfactory as well. Of course the destruction and the ensuing work of 
reconstruction could have elevated the street level. However, if we cannot discern the 
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damage caused by other types of disasters, the difference between the main street’s 
levels could have been merely the results of two successive earthquakes in 526 and 
528. 
In short, many buildings of Antioch could have been destroyed, while Sura and 
Kallinikos, as important frontier citadels, would have been destroyed by the Persians 
lest they were occupied by the Romans. Nevertheless, the discussion above has shown 
that Prokopios, who explicitly reported that these cities were razed to the ground, 
seems to have exaggerated the scale of destruction. What Prokopios reported in his 
works needs to be read together. In the Wars, Sura was destroyed by Ḵosrow I,314 and 
according to the accounts in the Buildings, the Great King took this city within an 
hour because its feeble fortification could not withstand the Persians’ assaults.315 
Later on, Sura, like Kallinikos, was rebuilt by Justinian so that ‘it should no longer 
yield to the enemy’s assaults’.316 In the Buildings, Prokopios again put a lengthy 
description of the shah’s wholesale destruction of Antioch together with Justinian’s 
subsequent efforts to rebuild this metropolis. More importantly, eventually Antioch 
became more splendid than before.317 The exaggeration of the Persians’ atrocities,318 
therefore, could have served as an antithesis in order to aggrandise the benevolence of 
Justinian,319 a great patron and builder of his realm. 
The Sasanids’ strategy in treating the fortifications and the buildings of both 
Amida and Dara seem to have been different, and many of them seem to have been 
kept intact. In the early sixth century, neither Syriac nor Greek authors noted any 
large-scale destruction caused by the Sasanids in Amida. Prokopios stated that 
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‘neither Glones nor Kawād, nor indeed any other of the Persians, saw fit either to tear 
down or to destroy in any other way any building in Amida at any rate’.320 Only later, 
when Glones perished in the ambush of the Romans,321 did his son, furious at the 
death of his father, set fire to the sanctuary of Saint Symeon where his father had 
stayed before. 322  What Prokopios recorded can be further supported by Pseudo-
Joshua, who related that the Persians captured Amida ‘(merely) with ladders, while 
the gates were not opened, nor the all breached’,323 and the invaders rushed into city 
even without opening the gates. Such accounts should be doubted on the ground that 
later on the victorious king Kawād entered Amida on an elephant,324 and it would 
have been impossible for such a huge beast to cross the fortifications without opening 
the gates at all. Instead what Pseudo-Zachariah reported may be correct: after taking 
control over the whole city, the Sasanids eventually descended from the walls and 
opened the gates.325 Similar strategies were adopted by Ḵosrow I seventy years later. 
Clearly the Persians managed to conquer Dara by using different types of siege 
engines,326 and such a prolonged siege might have damaged the buildings of this 
citadel. However, no report regarding the destruction was mentioned by either Greek 
or Syriac authors. In fact, the remains of its fortifications, especially the traces of 
certain parts of curtain walls and watch towers can be observed in the twentieth 
century.327 While the shah must have plundered Dara as far as he could, it seems that 
he did not destroy the building works thoroughly. 
The material data we have at both Amida and Dara seems to be less helpful: we 
know that certain parts of the fortifications which can still be observed today at 
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modern Diyarbakir328 date to Late Antiquity,329 but we know less about the building 
schemes inside this frontier city. Therefore, it is difficult to study the destruction 
caused by Kawād’s soldiers. The site of Dara has been partially excavated, and 
recently two short reports have been published.330 I should turn to literary sources to 
examine the situation of these two cities. It should be pointed out that the use of siege 
engines by the Persians in the winter of 502-3 331  could have damaged certain 
buildings, such as the fortifications and the civic buildings inside Amida. Therefore, 
Prokopios’ claim, that Kawād ‘had gone his way without doing the least damage to 
the buildings’ (ταῖς οἰκοδομίαις ὡς ἥκιστα λυμηνάμενος ἀπιὼν ᾤχετο),332 should not 
be taken at face value. Rather, what our author had in mind might to contrast what 
Kawād had done and the immense destruction cased by his son Ḵosrow I’s invasions. 
In the postwar period, a series of building works were conducted by Anastasios, and 
these schemes could have resulted from the destruction caused by the forces of 
Kawād. The construction of two particular buildings—a church which was dedicated 
to the Forty Martyrs and a bridge across the Tigris333—deserves further analysis: the 
former had been considered as a refuge for the Amidenes, while Kawād might have 
used the latter to cross the Tigris in the autumn of 502.334 That is to say, both of them 
had already existed on the eve of Kawād’s invasion. It is possible that these buildings 
were either destroyed or damaged during the invasion and occupation of the Persian 
soldiers from 502 to 504. 
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Both the advantages and shortcomings of the literary and material data can be 
noted from the analysis and discussion above. Contemporary authors sometimes 
preserved detailed accounts of a city’s destruction, but in other cases much less detail 
can be gleaned from their texts. The results of archaeological excavations are 
indispensable for judging historical accounts’ validity, but many sites have never been 
excavated properly, and the scarce information makes it difficult to obtain a more 
thorough picture. Several concluding remarks on the cities’ destruction can be made. 
While some cities like Sura, Antioch and Apamea were said to have been razed to the 
ground, such statements contradict the results of archaeological campaigns. The traces 
of destruction, which can sometimes be observed, prove to be moderate, and so far 
nothing related to a thorough destruction can be securely confirmed.335 The Sasanids’ 
invasion and conquest must have resulted in the damage or destruction of the 
buildings in a conquered city, but much remains to be done with the help of further 
excavations. 
The conclusion of this chapter is two-fold. Whereas the examination of what we 
can extract from various types of sources surely answers some questions, more 
questions are raised,  and  several  examples  will  suffice  to  illustrate  these  data’s  limited  
and partial nature. Although Roman civilians suffered at the hands of both the 
Persians and the Romans, nearly all contemporaries merely stressed   the   Sasanids’  
atrocities  and   the  Romans’  calamities. Another limitation of literary accounts lies in 
the study of the Persians’   treatment of the conquered Roman cities. Prokopios and 
other classicising   historians’ statements, in which some cities were razed to the 
ground, cannot always be supported by available archaeological data and other 
contemporary sources. In most cases, the   material   data   of   the   Sasanids’   sieges   of  
Roman cities proves to be rather sketchy. Although sometimes traces of destruction 
can be observed, other testimonies are far less conclusive. Many buildings of the 
conquered Roman cities could have been destroyed or damaged in the Persian wars, 
but the scale of destruction is still open to debate. 
Information extracted from literary, material and documentary sources, 
nevertheless, remains   the   backbone   of   this   chapter’s   investigation. Thematically 
speaking, the loss of life, the plundering of property and the destruction of buildings 
                                            
335  Cf.  Petersen  2013:  350. 
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seem to have been the common features of Roman civilians’ wartime fates. 
Meanwhile, some particular features can be noted, and the Sasanids seem to have 
adopted different strategies under different circumstances in order to achieve different 
purposes. Admittedly many civilians would have perished as the siege progressed, but 
not every city suffered from postwar massacres or executions. Although sexual 
violence against the   Empire’s   female population can be noted in many cases, 
sometimes those from higher social class seem to have been treated more leniently. 
Finally, having looted the wealth of the  Empire’s  ecclesiastical and secular elites, the 
Persians merely destroyed some cities and left others intact. The above results will 
serve as the foundation of further investigations in chapter 6. Both the similarities and 
distinctiveness of these phenomena will be included to establish a paradigm of Roman 
civilians’   wartime   experiences, and they will be further contextualised in the 
Romano-Persian relations to discuss to what extent different factors would affect the 




Chapter 4. The movement, capture and transportation of citizens 
In  the  sixth-century  Persian  wars,  many  Roman  civilians  left  their  cities  and  moved  to  
other   places   for   a   variety   of   reasons.   Their   movements   can   be   divided   into   three  
categories:   some   citizens   took   refuge   outside   their   hometown   or   escaped   to   other  
places  when  enemies  invaded  the  Empire,  while  others  might  become  hostages  under  
the  control  of  the  Persians.  Finally,  many  people  were  captured  and  transported  either  
to  the  Persians  or  to  the  nomads. 
 
Refugees 
While many people moved from rural areas into the city so that they could be 
protected by the fortifications, a city’s inhabitants became the refugees in an 
‘outward’ movement, meaning they went from a city to the nearby rural areas. After 
the Romans’ morale was diminished, some of them chose  to  leave  their  hometown  or  
desert  their  posts  in  order  to  escape  the  potential  suffering,  violence  and  chaos  caused  
by  the  Persians’  military  operations. Contemporary writers documented the presence 
of refugees from Amida, Antioch, Kallinikos and Sergiopolis, which were all cities 
the Sasanids either attacked or passed by during the sixth century. 
Although in most cases we have no access to Roman civilians’ observations of 
the Persians’ military activities, certain remarks of local people’s morale can be 
noted. The study of the circumstances of these sixth-century sieges suggests that 
while contemporaries could have exaggerated the feebleness and unpreparedness of 
the Romans in confronting the Sasanids,1 the state of the cities’ fortifications would 
have been an important factor which led to the Romans’ exile. Having signed the 
Eternal Peace in 532, the Empire’s military personnel were diverted to North Africa 
and Italy for Justinian’s Reconquista, and the cities’ fortifications fell into decay.2 
Prokopios, our chief source for Ḵosrow I’s campaigns in the middle of the sixth 
century, described the poor defences of eastern cities like Antioch and Kallinikos in 
                                            
1  See,  for  example,  p.  208  for  the  discussion  of  the  Persians’  siege  of  Amida  in  the  
autumn/winter  of  502-3. 
2  Whitby  1986a  728-9,  Greatrex  1998:  219-20. 
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540 and 542, respectively. 3  The inhabitants from these cities would easily have 
observed the ruinous state of defensive works, and their deterioration could have 
caused concern. In  531,  the  Persians  and  their  Arab  allies  had  besieged  Gabboulon,  a  
city  not  far  from  Antioch.  They  ‘made  wooden  engines,  breached  and  destroyed  the  
walls’   and   then   ‘killed   everyone   they   found   and   also   took   captives’. 4   Even the 
enemies merely reached the nearby area of this metropolis; the Antiochenes must 
have been terrified by their military   activities.   Many   of   them   fled   to   the   coast   of  
Syria,5 an  action  which  might  have  resulted  from  not  only  the  fear  of  the  Persians  but  
also   the   desolate   situation   of   this   great   city,   which   had   just   recovered   from   a  
conflagration  and  fatal  earthquakes  approximately  five  years  earlier.6  Ten  years  later,  
the   Persians   invaded   again,   and   this   time   Antioch   became   their   main   target.   The  
terrible   memories   from   531   could   have   remained   lively   for   those   living   in   this  
metropolis,   and   both   the   city’s   feeble   defence   and   the   lack   of   proper   armed   forces  
would  have  created  havoc  among  civilian  populations,  as  well. 
The Sasanids’ victory and the calamities of their compatriots would have 
shocked the Romans as well. In 502, the Great King had already conquered 
Theodosiopolis before reaching Amida, and his allies had ransacked the Empire’s 
frontier region.7 The Amidenes could have become terrified after learning of Kawād’s 
military activities and the atrocities committed by his soldiers. Although Ḵosrow I 
neither passed by nor attacked Sergiopolis in 540, the inhabitants could have known 
what happened in the conquered cities. Such memories would have stayed vivid when 
the Great King invaded the Empire again two years later and prompted the 
Sergiopolitans to escape. 
Finally, the lack of official support could have reduced the Romans’ esprit de 
corps.  The  situation  inside  Antioch  in  the  middle  of  the  sixth  century  is  an  excellent  
example.   In   Libanios’   age,   the   zenith   of   this   metropolis’   fortunes,   there   were   four  
                                            
3  Prok.  Wars  2.6.10-3  (Antioch),  2.21.30-1  (Kallinikos). 
4  Mal.  18.60.  See  Greatrex  1998:  196-9  for  the  Persians’  invasion  and  raids. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid.,  17.16,  20,  18.27,  Prok.  Wars  2.14.6. 
7  Josh.  Styl.  48,  50-2. 
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‘authorities’:  the  council,  the  emperor,  the  imperial  officials  and  the  generals.8  Things  
were   different   during   the   reign   of   Justinian.   As   outlined   above,   it   seems   that   the  
temporary   council   was   still   an   active   authority.9  Nonetheless,   without   any   military  
protection,  they  would  have  helplessly  watched  the  invading  enemies.  The  absence  of  
civic   leaders   must   have   aggravated   the   situation.   It   is   surprising   that   the   relevant  
governors   were   never   present   on   any   occasion,10  including   the   consular   of   Syria   I,  
who  was  in  charge  of  internal  civic  affairs.11  They  neither  joined  the  discussion  with  
other  dignitaries  in  the  temporary  council  nor  came  up  with  any  positive  strategies  or  
proposals  to  deal  with  the  coming  Persians. 
The  arrival  of  Germanos,  a  ‘new  headship’  of  military  affairs,  might  have  raised  
the  morale   of   the   Antiochenes.   However,   having   realised   that   it   was   impossible   to  
acquire   reinforcements   from  Constantinople,  Germanos   feared   that   the  Persian  king  
would  ‘come  against  the  city  (i.e.  Antioch)  with  his  whole  army’  in  order  to  capture  
both   Antioch   and   the   nephew   of   Justinian.12  Other   Antiochenes   shared   Germanos’  
idea,  and  such  terror  may  have  directly  led  them  to  offer  money  to  buy  the  peace  from  
their  enemies. Being  a  prominent  figure  in  the  public  life  of  cities  in  Late  Antiquity,13  
the  bishops’  involvement  in  secular  affairs  can  be  proved  by  numerous  laws  issued  in  
the   sixth   century.14  The   sudden   departure   of   Antioch’s   patriarch   before   the   siege,  
therefore,   could   possibly   have   been   another   blow   to   the   Romans’   morale.  Had the 
reinforcements led by Theoktistos   and  Molatzes not reached Antioch, many more 
inhabitants would have escaped to safer places in 540.15 
                                            
8  Liebeschuetz  1972:  101-17. 
9  Regarding  the  discussion  of  the  role  played  by  city  councils,  see  Liebeschuetz  2001:  
107-9,  Rapp  2004:  175. 
10  Kennedy  and  Liebeschuetz  1988:  78. 
11  Liebeschuetz  1972:  110.  The  office  of  another  important  official  comes  Orientis  
experienced  huge  transformations  in  the  administrative  reforms  of  the  530s,  see  
Kennedy  and  Liebeschuetz  1988:  77,  Kelly  2004:  72. 
12  Prok.  Wars  2.6.15. 
13  Segal  1955:  114-5,  Garsoïan  1973-4:  120-2,  Rapp  2005:  16-8. 
14  Liebeschuetz  2001:  151-5,  Rapp  2004:  171,  176-7. 
15  Prok.  Wars  2.8.2. 
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It is impossible to provide a prosopographical catalogue of all the social elites 
who escaped, but occasionally some information was noted in the texts. The patriarch 
of Antioch, Ephraem, escaped to Kilikia in 540.16 More  than  30  years  later,  the  arrival  
of  the  Sasanids  must  have  shocked  the  civilians  in  the  Empire’s  eastern  provinces:  the 
bishop of Dara left his see in 573,17 and Gregory, the patriarch of Antioch, fled taking 
with him the sacred vessels. While some of them returned to their sees after the 
departure of the Sasanids, their life as refugees, like those of other more humble 
Romans, remains unknown. 
Most refugees must have been ordinary people. Some holy men played vital 
roles and provided shelter to these Romans. The Sasanids did not grant any kind of ad 
hoc immunity to Christian holy men during wartime, nor did the Great King show his 
respect to them from the outset. Rather, what we can notice from contemporary 
accounts is a three-stage scenario: at the beginning, the invading enemy managed to 
attack either these holy men or the Romans; in the second stage, the aggressors were 
prevented from attacking because of miracles; and in the last stage, the enemy 
soldiers’ obedience or fear were stressed. 
When Kawād began to besiege Amida in the second half of 502, some 
inhabitants of this frontier city could have escaped. At that time, there was a holy man 
named Jacob who lived in Endielon, which was not far away from Amida.18 Having 
astonished both the Persians and Kawād himself by performing a miracle through 
which those who intended to shoot him with arrows were stopped in their tracks,19 
Jacob then requested the Persian king ‘to grant to him all the men who during that war 
should come to him as fugitives’. Kawād agreed to that, and hence there were ‘great 
numbers of men…flocking to him from all sides and found safety there’.20 Prokopios 
did not specify where these refugees came from, but presumably most of them would 
                                            
16  Ibid.,  2.7.17.  For  further  information  on  the  life  of  Ephraem,  especially  his  
experiences  in  administrative  affairs,  see  Joh.  Nik.  90.23.  PLRE  II:  s.v.  Ephraemius. 
17  Honigmann  1951:  240-1. 
18  Prok.Wars  1.7.5. 
19  Ibid.,  1.7.8-9. 
20  Ibid.,  1.7.11. 
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have been either citizens from Amida or its nearby areas. Nearly 40 years later, some 
Romans took refuge at the monastery of St Symeon Stylite the Younger. Having been 
prevented from attacking these Romans by the holy man’s miracles, the soldiers of 
Ḵosrow   I retreated from the vicinity of Antioch.21 This place, therefore, served as a 
refuge for these Romans. The refugees from Amida and Antioch thus survived the 
carnage of the Persian wars.  
We have much less information regarding the possible destinations of other 
Roman refugees during wartime. In the early sixth century, after Nonnos, who as the 
church’s steward was captured in the sack of Amida and eventually returned, was 
ordained as a bishop, he dispatched Thomas his chorepiskopos, a subordinate of the 
bishop who was in charge of the rural churches,22 to oversee the Amidenes who were 
living in Constantinople.23 While this community of those from Amida in the capital 
of the Empire is of interest, the distance between Amida and Constantinople makes it 
less likely that the immigrants from a frontier city would have chosen to take refuge 
in the capital when Kawād’s soldiers approached their hometown.  Instead, they would 
have preferred other nearby cities or fortified sites in which they could be protected 
during wartime. Some of those living in the frontier areas took refuge at Edessa, a city 
whose fortifying works had been strengthened 24  after a series of disasters at the 
beginning of the sixth century. When Patrikios, a Roman officer, intended to approach 
Edessa with his son Vitalianos and soldiers, it was these refugees who informed him 
about the situation around this city.25 Having noticed the arrival of the Persians in 
502, some Amidenes could have chosen to flee there. After the Persians retreated 
from Amida, some refugees were able to return to their hometown, and they received 
gifts from the emperor. 26  The report of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, however, is 
somewhat more ambiguous. He related that money and gifts from both the emperor 
and Flavian, the patriarch of Antioch, were soon dispatched to this frontier city and 
                                            
21  V.  Sym.  Styl.  Iun.  59-60. 
22  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  100. 
23  Josh.  Styl.  83.  See  also  Ps.  Dion.  II,  7. 
24  Ibid.,  52. 
25  Ibid.,  60. 
26  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
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then distributed among the poor, and hence ‘all those who were roaming around in 
other regions gathered there (i.e. at Amida)’.27 Even though we have no idea who 
these ‘wanderers’ were, we can conjecture that they had been forced to go into exile 
because of the misfortunes in the past few years, and some of them could have come 
from Amida. 
On   the  eve  of  Ḵosrow   I’s   arrival   in  540,   the  Romans’  morale   in  Antioch  was  
greatly  diminished,  and  some  of  them  ‘fled  as  each  one  could’,28  possibly  to  Seleukia  
Maritima,29  the   main   port   of   Antioch.   Had   help   not   arrived   from   Lebanon,   more  
inhabitants  would  have  chosen  exile.30  When  faced  with  Ḵosrow   I’s  soldiers   in  542,  
the  reaction  of  those  living  in  Kallinikos  was  similar.  The  rich  citizens  noticed  that  the  
enemy  was  approaching  and  escaped  to  other  fortified  places  with  their  most  precious  
treasures   (οἱ   μὲν   εὐδαίμονες   αὐτῆς   τῶν   οἰκητόρων   ἐς   ἕτερα   ἄττα   ὀχυρώματα  
ἀπεχώρησαν),31  and few people remained in Sergiopolis because ‘those in the bloom 
of youth had departed’.32 That is, those who were capable of escaping had fled to 
other places. When the detachment of Adarmahan arrived at Antioch in 573, only a 
few people stayed in this metropolis. Later, Ḵosrow I, who was in his seventies at that 
time, led the army in person, invaded Armenia and seized some cities, but people 




                                            
27  Josh.  Styl.  83. 
28  Prok.  Wars  2.8.2. 
29  Jord.  Rom.  376.   
30  Prok.  Wars  2.8.2. 
31  Prok.  Wars  2.21.31,  cf.  Honigmann  1935,  Dillemann  1962,  Crow  2013:  411-2.  On  
the  similar  cases  of  settlements  of  other  regions,  see  Agath.  2.13.4,  Ward-Perkins  
2000:  335-6,  Curta  2001:  208,  Decker  2006:  499-520.  For  the  epigraphic  testimony,  
see,  for  example,  IGLS  1811,  Foss  1997:  234-5. 
32  Euagr.  HE  4.28. 
33  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.8. 
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While   both   social   elites   and   ordinary   people   could   have   escaped   from   their   home  
cities   or   posts   to   other   places   in   wartime,   only   those   from   the   higher   echelons   of  
society  would   have   been   sent   to   the   Persians   as   hostages.34  The   Persians   asked   the  
Romans  to  send  hostages  usually  to  procure  potential  economic  or  political  profits  in  
the   near   future.   Prokopios   pointed   out   that   to   send   someone   as   a   hostage   to   the  
invading  enemies  was  a  decision  which  was  ‘much  against  his  will’.35  Since  we  have  
no  personal  accounts  of  any  of  those  sent  as  hostages  to  the  Sasanids,  the  information  
we  have  regarding  their  experiences  or  feelings  is  rather  limited.  Some  of  them  could  
possibly  have  been  taken  back  to  Persia,  though  temporarily,  while  others  would  have  
been  simply  detained  and  went  together  with  the  Sasanids  until  their  release.  Whether  
they  would  be  treated  as  prisoners  or  guests  or  something  in  between  is  impossible  to  
tell. 
It   should  be  noted   that  all   these  Romans   in   the   following  cases   served  as  one-
way  hostages.  That  is,  while  the  Romans  handed  over  their  compatriots,  the  Sasanids  
did   not   send   hostages   in   return.36  In   the  Anastasian  War,   as   a   native   of  Edessa,   the  
comes  Basil  was   sent   by   the  Roman   general  Areobindos   to  Kawād   as   a   hostage   to  
guarantee  that  the  Romans  would  not  attack  the  Persians  when  they  retreated.37  When  
the  shah  wanted  to  make  peace  with  the  Romans,  Basil,  along  with  other  prisoners  of  
war,  was  sent  back  to  the  magistros  Celer.38  In  540  the  shah  asked  for  hostages  from  
the   ambassador,39  and   they   were   soon   released   after   Ḵosrow   I   received   Justinian’s  
letter.40  When   the   Sasanids   invaded   the   Empire   again   two   years   later,   messengers  
were  sent  by  Belisarios  to  the  shah  to  discuss  the  truce.  Again  the  Persians  asked  the  
                                            
34  For  the  exchange  of  hostages  between  Rome  and  Persia,  see  Lee  1991:  369-74,  cf.  
Matthews  1989b:  29-49.   
35  Prok.  Wars  2.21.27,  Anecd.  12.6-7. 
36  Lee  1991:  369.  This  pattern,  however,  can  be  noted  in  the  diplomatic  relationships  
between  the  Empire  and  the  Germanic  people  as  well,  Nechaeva  2014:  55.   
37  Josh.  Styl.  61. 
38  Ibid.,  80.  Cf.  Theoph.  A.M.  5997-8,  in  which  Basil,  who  was  detained  by  the  
Sasanids  ‘contrary  to  the  agreements’,  was  ransomed  by  the  Romans. 
39  Prok.  Wars  2.10.24. 
40  Ibid.,  2.13.2. 
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Romans  to  give  them  ‘someone  of  their  notable  men’  as  a  hostage  so  that  ‘they  might  
carry   out   their   agreement’.   Belisarios   then   went   to   Edessa   and   chose   John,   son   of  
Basilius,  ‘the  most  illustrious  of  all   the  inhabitants  of  Edessa  in  birth  and  in  wealth’  
(γένει  τε  καὶ  πλούτῳ  πάντων  τῶν  Ἐδεσσηνῶν  διαφανέστατον)  to  the  enemies.41 
                While  the  furious  Ḵosrow  I  refused  to  send  John  back  to  the  Empire  in  542,  he  
agreed  to  sell  him  because  he  had  become  a  captive  of  the  Persians.  This  time  neither  
political  nor  ecclesiastical  authority  managed  to  rescue  this  prisoner  of  war,  and  it  was  
John’s  grandmother  who  raised  2,000  pounds  of  silver,  and  strove  to  buy  her  grandson  
back.42  However,  after   the   ransom  was  delivered   to  Dara,  this  proposal  was  rejected  
by  Justinian  for  ‘the  wealth  of  the  Romans  might  not  be  conveyed  to  the  barbarians’.43  
Later  on  John  became  sick  and  died.   
 
Captives 
The   third,   and   the   most   extensively   reported   category   of   people’s   involuntary  
movement  in  wartime  is  capture  and  transport  as  prisoners  of  war.  From  the  time  of  
Shapur   I   onwards,   the   victorious   Sasanids   deported   Romans   from   the   conquered  
villages,  cities  and  metropoleis  and  sent  them  back  to  their  territory.  The  situation  in  
the   sixth   century   remains   similar:   after   subduing   the   cities   of   Roman   Syria   and  
Mesopotamia,  the  Great  Kings  would  deport  the  survivors  from  the  Empire  to  Persia.  
I  will  divide  the  following  discussion  roughly  in  chronological  order.  In  the  first  part,  
relevant   texts   will   be   analyzed   to   answer   the   most   basic   questions:   who   were  
transported   by   the  Sasanids,   how   and   from  where?  Second,   I  will   reconstruct   these  
Romans’  possible  experiences  and  lives  during  their  captivity,  both  inside  and  outside  
the  Persian  Empire  by  examining  the  places  they  inhabited  and  the  Persians’  policies.  
Thirdly,  I  will  discuss  the  possible  types  of  ‘return  journey’  of  these  prisoners  of  war  
by  taking  into  account  the  roles  played  not  only  by  the  authorities  of  Rome  and  Persia  
but  also  by  the  captives  themselves. 
                                            
41  Prok.  Wars  2.21.27. 
42  Prok.  Anecd.  12.7-8. 
43  Ibid.,  12.9.  See  below,  pp.  198-200,  255-6  for  Justinian’s  possible  attitudes  to  the  
elites  captured  by  the  Persians  in  540. 
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Categories of captives 
Although in most cases our historians did not preserve the names of particular 
individual deportees, several categories of personnel targeted by the Sasanids can be 
established. They sometimes aimed to transport certain groups or professions of 
people from the Empire. Thus distinguished local craftsmen were collected and 
removed from Amida in 503. They must have been important assets for the shah 
because they, together with the captured local elites, were apparently regarded as the 
‘king’s captives’ by Kawād.44 Besides, the Sasanids captured the Amidenes apart 
from ‘those who were able to hide themselves, together with the elderly people and 
the disabled ones’,45 or, as Ferdowsī reported in the case of Antioch, those who were 
suitable for military service.46 Another example comes from the sack of Antioch by 
Ḵosrow I. Prokopios reported that the king of kings removed the charioteers and 
musicians from this metropolis47 and sent them to Mesopotamia. 
The second category of captives comprised the surviving social elites, including 
members of the civic and ecclesiastical administration, inside the conquered cities. 
Some notable individuals seem to have been simply removed without being 
humiliated. For example, Nonnos, the steward of the church of Amida, was captured 
together with other civilians in 503, 48  but our sources are silent regarding his 
treatment by the Persians. In 540, the bishop of Sura stayed in this city when the 
Persians arrived and later on served as an envoy to negotiate with the Sasanids,49 but 
it is unclear whether he was captured together with other citizens or not. Many local 
elites must have been removed in the sack of Antioch, as Justinian possibly managed 
to rescue them several years later.50 Finally, we are informed that the bishop of 
                                            
44  Zach.  HE  7.4.  For  the  discussion  of  Kawād’s possible motivation in transporting 
these craftsmen, see below, pp. 217-9. 
45  Josh.  Styl.  53. 
46  Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  7.258. 
47  Prok.  Wars  2.14.2. 
48  Josh.  Styl.  83. 
49  Prok.  Wars  2.5.13. 
50  See  below,  pp.  198-200,  255-6. 
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Apamea was captured and transported to the lands of the Sasanids,51 but his identity 
remains unclear. Since these Romans were resettled in the city Better Antioch of 
Ḵosrow, the bishop, if still alive on arriving at Ctesiphon, might have been relocated 
to this city along with his flock. 
The fates of some captured social elites in Amida, especially those who were in 
charge of this city’s defences, seem to have been more extreme. Having seized 
valuable goods from different places of Amida, the Persians then began to search for 
the leaders of the city and its administrators. Many, if not all, of them must have been 
deported to the territory of the Persians, including Leontios, the head of the city 
council,52 and the Governor Cyrus. Although Kawād did not slaughter them,53 he 
managed to humiliate these local elites in retaliation for the hardships he and his 
soldiers had endured in the wintertime of 502 and 503. Both Leontios and Cyrus, who 
had been shot with arrows and wounded severely before,54 were forced to wear filthy 
garments and pig ropes on their necks, and they were even asked to carry pigs and 
were humiliated by being paraded through the streets of Amida. 55  The Persians 
shouted that ‘Governors who do not govern the city well and do not order its people 
not to insult the king deserve an insult such as this’.56 In other words, these governors 
should have chosen to obey the will of Kawād and surrendered the city to the Persians 
rather than lead their fellow citizens to resist them for so many days. 
Some captives’ identities can be deduced from contemporary testimonies. For 
example, the soldiers of Kawād did not kill all the refugees in the school of Urtaye, 
and later the survivors were carried away from Amida.57 Therefore, some monks 
could have been deported together with other inhabitants. In other cases, the Persians 
seem to have removed many nameless Romans from Apamea, Antioch and other 
                                            
51  Euagr.  HE  5.10,  cf.  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6. 
52  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
53  Cf.  Ammianus  19.9.2,  in  which  some  Roman  elites  were  killed  after  the  siege  of  
Amida  was  concluded  in  359. 
54  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Joh.  Eph.  Lives,  PO  19.219. 
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cities.58  In   a   recent   study,  Kathy   L.  Gaca  argued   that   the   focus   of   selling   people   as  
chattle   slaves   (ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον)   in   Greek   historiography   primarily  
concerned   young   women   and   self-mobile   children, 59   while   the   male   combatants  
would   have   received   different   treatments.   This   argument   may   be   helpful   for  
unearthing   the   hidden   details   regarding   the   fates   of   the   conquered   Romans,   and  
similar  images  were  preserved  in  the  works  of  medieval  Islamic  authors.  For  example,  
while   in   542   Prokopios   simply   reported   that   Ḵosrow   I   enslaved   the   inhabitants   of  
Kallinikos,60  such   activities   could   have   resulted   in,   first,   the   disarming   or   killing   of  
the  male  citizens  and,  second,  the  capture  and  deportation  of  the  remaining  Romans. 
However,   a   close   reading   of   contemporary   texts   indicates   that   this   argument  
cannot   be   applicable   to   the   situation   of   the   sixth-century  Empire.   Information   from  
contemporary   Syriac   texts   is   of   use.   In   the   case   of   Amida,   the   author   of   Pseudo-
Zachariah’s  Church  History   related   that   those  who  were   sent   to   the  Caucasus   took  
wives   there. 61   Although   we   do   not   know   whether   they   married   Roman   or   local  
women,   clearly   some   males   were   deported   by   Kawād.   Second,   as   already   shown,  
‘ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον’   was   a   frequently   used   word   in   many   classicising  
historians’   texts,62  but   neither   Prokopios   nor   Theophylaktos   nor   John   of   Epiphania  
ever  reported  that  the  Great  King  only  sold  women  and  children  from  the  cities  of  the  
Empire   as   chattle   slaves.63  Rather,   the   objects   of   these   accounts   were   usually   the  
inhabitants  of  a  conquered  Roman  city,  which  presumably  included  men,  women  and  
children.   In   short,   even   though   these   classicising   authors   used  
                                            
58  For  Sura,  Antioch  and  Kallinikos  in  the  540s,  see  Prok.  Wars  2.5.26,  2.9.14,  
2.21.32.  For  Apamea  and  Dara,  see  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6,  Joh.  Epiph.  4,  Th.  Sim.  3.10.9,  
Euagr.  HE  5.10,  Greg.  Tur.  Hist.  4.40  and  Euagr.  HE  5.10,  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5,  Joh.  
Epiph.  5  respectively. 
59  Gaca  2010:  157. 
60  Prok.  Anecd.  3.31. 
61  See  below,  p.  186  for  the  situation  of  these  Romans. 
62  See  above,  pp.  56-8. 
63  Cf.  Prok.  Wars  4.8.22,  4.21.14,  5.10.29,  6.7.29-30,  6.10.1,  7.38.18,  8.18.24,  in  
which  ‘ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον’  was  used  to  describe  the  enslavement  of  non-
Roman women and children. 
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‘ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον’   frequently   in   their   works,   there   is   no   clear   distinction  
between   the  Sasanids’   treatment  of   the  Empire’s  male   and   female  population   in   the  
sixth  century,  and  what  the  Sasanids  intended  to  transport  to  Persia  could  have  been  a  
whole  community  rather  than  any  particular  gender  or  age  groups. 
Occasionally the Persians seem to have been keen to capture Roman populations. 
When Ḵosrow I besieged Edessa in 543, the Arab allies and some Persian soldiers 
were deployed at the rear of his army so that ‘when the city was captured, they might 
gather in the fugitives and catch them as in a drag-net’.64 In other cases the Persians 
seem not to have managed to capture all the inhabitants from the places they 
conquered, and many people were spared. As mentioned before,65 the deportation 
made by Kawād from Amida in 503 was not a comprehensive one, and clearly certain 
groups of people were the focus of the victors. Apart from the garrisoned Persian 
soldiers, John bar Hablâhâ, one of the city’s wealthy inhabitants, Sergios bar Zabduni 
and others were appointed to govern their remaining fellow citizens.66 The suffering 
of the Amidenes in the famine67 in the subsequent periods indicates that many of them 
still inhabited Amida after the departure of Kawād and his forces. Again, even if the 
deportation made by Ḵosrow I from Antioch was great, not everyone was led into 
captivity, and the reading of Prokopios’ text suggests that some of them even 
participated in the rebuilding work of their hometown, ‘[…] it became impossible for 
the people of Antioch to recognise the site of each person's house, when first they 
carried out all the debris, and to clear out the remains of a burned house […]’.68 
In 573, the shah, according to Euagrios, ‘led forth everyone, a countless 
number…most he took as prisoners’ from Dara.69 His account can be corroborated by 
John of Ephesos, who reported that Ḵosrow I ‘took the people captive…emptied it of 
its inhabitants’.70 Nevertheless, in fact the Sasanids did not capture and transport the 
                                            
64  Prok.  Wars  2.27.30. 
65  See  above,  pp.  148-9. 
66  Zach.  HE  7.4-5. 
67  Ibid.,  7.5,  Josh.  Styl.  76-7,  Prok.  Wars  1.9.22. 
68  Prok.  Aed.  2.10.20. 
69  Euagr.  HE  5.10. 
70  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5. 
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whole population from this frontier city, and some Romans remained there at the end 
of the sixth century. Here the testimony of Theophylaktos is useful: after being ousted 
by his general Bahrām at the very beginning of his reign, Ḵosrow II fled to the Roman 
Empire in order to seek assistance from the emperor Maurice. When the Persians 
entered Dara and prepared for the shah’s return, Ḵosrow II himself choose to stay in 
‘the walled precinct at the notable shrine of the city, where the Romans performed the 
mysteries of religion’.71 Such an insolent action enraged the inhabitants because ‘the 
elder Ḵosrow (i.e. Ḵosrow I) had made no move to insult their religion after he had 
captured the city’.72 Marlia Mundell Mango pointed out that they may have been the 
Nestorians who were transported by Ḵosrow I after his conquest of Dara.73 While 
certain Persian Dyophysites, both clergy and laity, might have been new immigrants 
after 573, these furious citizens must surely have been the local Romans. Since this 
episode happened before Ḵosrow II’s decision to return Dara to the Romans,74 Dara 
was clearly still under the occupation of the Sasanids, and these people could not be 
Roman immigrants from other places. Moreover, from what they said we can 
conclude that some of them could have either known or even experienced the siege of 
573 themselves. That is to say, presumably they were Miaphysites who were either 
the survivors of the sack of Dara or the descendants of those survivors. 
 
Destinations 
Examination of the Greek, Syriac and Arabic texts suggests that having been removed 
from their hometown by the Persians, many deportees were sent to different places 
both inside and outside the Persian Empire. At the beginning of the sixth century, the 
Persians first sent the prisoners of war from Amida to the Mount of Singara, the 
                                            
71  Th.  Sim.  5.3.4.  It  must  have  been  the  church  built  by  either  Anastasios  or  Justinian  
at  Dara. 
72  Ibid.,  5.3.5. 
73  Mango  1975:  222. 
74  Th.  Sim.  5.3.10,  Euagr.  HE  6.19.  Not  long  afterwards  the  Persian  satrap  Dolabzas  
returned  the  keys  of  Dara  to  Maurice.  See  Th.  Sim.  4.13.24  for  the  Sasanids’  decision  
to  return  this  Roman  citadel. 
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frontier zone of the Persian Empire near Nisibis (Map 1, zone 3FG),75 but this place 
was not their final destination. These captives were removed to at least three different 
places. According to the Chronicle of Seert, these people were transported to 
Seleukia, which was located either in southern Mesopotamia or in Kūzestān (Map 
3).76 The information about the second possible site comes mainly from the works of 
medieval Arab historians. In Dīnavarī’s work, the captives were sent back to the 
Persians’ country after the conquest of Amida and Mayyāfāriḳīn (Martryopolis).77 
Kawād then commanded that a new place Abarqobāḏ should be established between 
Fārs and Ahvāz to resettle these Romans.78 While in the Islamic period this place was 
actually located between Baṣra and Vāseṭ and to the east of Tigris River,79 it should, 
as other scholars have stated, 80  be identified with Arraǰān, Buqubadh, or Wām 
Qubādh,81 a city which was established in the province of Fārs (Map 3) and obtained 
a new toponym Beh az Āmed-e Kawāḏ, ‘Better Amida of Kawād’ in the sixth century 
after the arrival of the captives from Amida. 
Unlike his father’s strategies in the Anastasian war, after the sack of Antioch, 
Ḵosrow I sent all his captives together to a place in lower Mesopotamia, an area 
which was called Sawad,82 the ‘dark lands’ of lower Mesopotamia83 by al-Ṭabari. 
These Romans were resettled to ‘a place one day’s journey distant from Ctesiphon’ 
(See  Map   9   for   the   possible   locations   of   this   city   and   other   important   sites   around  
Ctesiphon),84 the political nucleus of his empire. The site which Ḵosrow I used to 
                                            
75  Josh.  Styl.  53. 
76  Chr.  Seert  2.17,  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  62. 
77  Dīnavarī  68.  The  conquest  of  this  city  was  only  mentioned  by  Arab  historians,  cf.  
Prok.  Prok.  Aed.  3.2.4-7,  in  which  the  Romans  surrendered  it  immediately. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Bosworth  1982:  64. 
80  Streck  and  Wilber  1965:  659,  Streck  1960:  3,  see  also  Nöldeke  1879a:  146,  
Pourshariati  2007:  130. 
81  al-Ṭabari  1.887-8. 
82  Ibid.,  1.959. 
83  Bosworth  1999:  14. 
84  Prok.  Wars  2.14.1. 
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settle these Antiochenes was actually a new city that was established at the east bank 
of Tigris.85 This place seems to have become a preferred site for the Great King to 
resettle his captives from other Roman cities in the sixth century. In 573, the Sasanids 
again sent the Apameans, and, possibly along with those from Dara, to this place.  
Nevertheless, here we have two different versions of events. While John of 
Ephesos stated that those captured from these two cities were transported to this 
area,86 Theophylaktos noted that the shah decided to put the captives from Dara into 
the so-called ‘Oblivion Prison’,87 a place which was located in the inner part of Media 
and in the region of Bizae (Beth Huzaye) and not far from the city of Bendosabora.88 
Since the use of ‘Media’ by Theophylaktos is often ambiguous,89 we are unable to 
know where the ‘inner part of Media’ was. The second half of his account, however, 
proves to be correct, as the Armenian historian Moses Khorenatsi placed this prison in 
the region of Kūzestān.90 In the nineteenth century, Henry Rawlinson noticed a ruined 
Sasanian fort at the foot of Gilgird, the mountains which run along the river Kārūn,91 
but no further information regarding the function and history this site can be found. 
The captives from Dara were imprisoned by Ḵosrow I in southwestern Iran. 
According to the accounts of late antique writers,92 as a royal prison, the castle of 
Oblivion seems to have served as a place in which both the Persian and non-Persian 
magnates or nobles were detained. The ‘trouble-makers’ of the Great King’s regime 
such as the Qadishaye, a people who revolted and attacked Nisibis during the reign of 
Kawād,93 were imprisoned as well. Nevertheless, even if the Sasanids had ever sent 
them to this prison, there was no point in detaining their women, children and others, 
and presumably only the chieftains could have been imprisoned. If Theophylaktos is 
                                            
85  al-Masʿūdī  Les Prairies d’Or  6.108/181.  Fiey  1967a:  26,  el-Ali  1968-9:  431. 
86  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.19. 
87  Th.  Sim.  3.5.4. 
88  Ibid.,  3.5.2.  This  was  the  Greek  name  of  the  city  Gondēšāpur. 
89  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  104-5. 
90  Mos.  Khor.  3.35. 
91  Rawlinson  1839:  83-4,  87,  cf.  Kettenhofen  1988:  100. 
92  See  below,  pp.  184-5. 
93  Josh.  Styl.  21-2,  24. 
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to be believed, those who were captured at Dara were sent to this place. We have no 
idea how many Romans were deported from this frontier city,94 nor do we have any 
idea about the size of this prison, but it is difficult to believe that all these prisoners of 
war would be imprisoned at once. If we regard being detained in the Sasanids’ castle 
of Oblivion as a certain type of punishment, 95  then only the leading Romans, 
particularly the surviving military and civic leaders who led their fellow citizens to 
defend Dara for half a year, would be cast into this prison and kept under surveillance. 
Apart from being transported to these Persian cities and the Sasanids’ royal 
prison, some captured Romans were sent to the places outside the Persian Empire. 
Relevant information regarding the fates and destination of the captured Amidenes 
can be deduced from the detailed accounts of the Church History of Pseudo-
Zachariah. The author’s knowledge of these events seems to be based on the 
testimony of John of Resh’aina (Theodosiopolis), who came from the monastery of 
Bet Ishaquni,96 a place located near Amida, and of Thomas the Tanner;97 both of them 
were among the deportees who were captured by the Persians from the Empire and 
sold to ‘the land of the Huns’. Therefore these Romans survived their captivity for 
several decades. K. Czeglédy pointed out that many other prisoners of war must have 
been deported to the same place,98 but no further information can be found to support 
this argument. 
While Pseudo-Zachariah did not record who these Romans were, the analysis of 
his accounts makes it possible to establish their identity. There are two major cases of 
deportation in the sixth century: one from Amida and Roman Armenia in the reign of 
Anastasios, another from Antioch and other places in the reign of Justinian. Since 
those captured by Ḵosrow I in 540 were sent to lower Mesopotamia, either these 
returned Romans themselves or their ancestors must have been captured when Kawād 
                                            
94  See  below,  pp.  264-73  for  the  discussion  of  Syriac  writers’  figures  of  deportation  
from  Dara. 
95  See  below,  p.  209. 
96  See  Zach.  HE  8.5,  Palmer  1990a:  XXI,  Menze  2008:  152  for  this  site’s  possible  
location.  I  owe  this  information  to  Greatrex  et  al.  2011:  305. 
97  Zach.  HE  12.7. 
98  Czeglédy  1971:  146. 
 156 
invaded the Roman Empire. Apart from Theodosiopolis, Martyropolis, and, most 
importantly, Amida, the Persians were not able to capture any Roman city from 503 
onwards. Thus these Romans must have been captives in the first phase of Kawād’s 
invasion. While it remains unclear whether the Persians sacked and deported the 
inhabitants of Theodosiopolis or other minor places in his campaign at the beginning 
of the sixth century,99 most of these captives must have been captured at Amida, a 
relatively populous and important city in northern Mesopotamia. 
The examination of passages from Pseudo-Zachariah indicates that these 
Amidenes were sent to the Caucasus, a place inhabited by different ethnic groups of 
people from central Asia. A brief survey of the northern frontier of Persia in the early 
sixth century is necessary. While from the second half of the fourth century onwards 
different groups of nomadic peoples began to emigrate to Eurasia and became the 
masters of the northern frontier of both Rome and Persia,100 in the sixth century, it 
was the Sabir Huns, a Hunnic group who lived in the region north of the Caucasus 
(Map 2),101 and the Hephthalites, who established their hegemony at the northern 
frontier of the Persian Empire,102 who played dominant roles in the politics of the 
Sasanids for many decades in the sixth century. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
continuator of Zachariah’s text indicates that the term ‘Huns’ in the Church History 
was usually used to refer to the Sabir Huns, rather than the Hephthalites.103 Therefore, 
these Romans would have been sent to the territory under the control of the Sabir 
Huns. 
More clues come from the people met by these Roman prisoners of war in the 
subsequent years. At the very end of Justin I’s reign, a Roman ambassador, Probos, 
the nephew of the late Anastasios, was sent to Crimea in order to recruit soldiers 
among the Huns living there.104 While he did not achieve the expected goal, Czeglédy 
                                            
99  Josh.  Styl.  48,  Ps.  Dion.  II,  5.  Cf.  Greatrex  1998:  80,  in  which  Pseudo-Joshua’s  
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104  Prok.  Wars  1.12.6.  cf.  Greatrex  1998:  143-4. 
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suggests that Probos continued to go eastwards and tried to enlist mercenaries.105 
Since at that time he seems to have been in touch with the deportees from Amida,106 it 
follows that they must have been sent to the area east of the Black Sea. Several years 
later a group of missionaries led by Qardust, a bishop from Caucasian Albania, went 
to the Caucasus to evangelise people living there and talked to these Amidenes.107 
Instead of passing this area through the Derbend Pass,108 which was under the control 
of the Sasanids, they chose to climb the mountains to reach their destination. The 
location of the kingdom of Albania may thus be helpful for us to locate the possible 
destinations of these Roman prisoners of war. In Late Antiquity this kingdom lay 
between the western side of the Caspian Sea and northeast of Persarmenia (Map 2).109 
The third destination of these Amidenes would thus have been the Caucasus. 
 
From Rome to Persia: routes and treatments 
Although both contemporary and later authors did not often relate the details about 
the deportees’ calamities, it is possible to reconstruct their possible postwar 
experiences by examining several factors, including the distance they might have 
walked between the places they had been captured and their destination, the 
environment of the Empire’s eastern provinces, and finally, their treatments at the 
hand of their captors. The depiction of the sufferings of the captives from Sura in the 
spring of 540 is a good starting-point. Even though they had been purchased by 
Kandidos and then released not long afterwards, the torments already emaciated these 
deportees: most of them had died, and even those who survived were ‘unable to 
support the misery which had fallen to their lot, and succumbed soon afterwards’.110 
Prokopios did not record when the shah released the prisoners, and we do not know 
where they were ransomed. Ḵosrow I could have decided to sell all of them either at 
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106  Zach.  HE  12.7. 
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110  Prok.  Wars  2.5.33. 
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Sura or at Sergiopolis,111 another Roman city located not far away from Sura. In any 
case we know that the Great King ‘led his army forward’ to continue his campaign 
after this settlement.112 Undoubtedly the captured Romans must have been released 
before reaching Hierapolis, the next destination of the Persians.113 
In the case of Antioch, the detailed accounts in both Prokopios and other oriental 
texts makes it possible, though only tentatively, to reestablish the possible routes 
taken by Ḵosrow I and his forces in the campaign of 540. The detailed data in 
Prokopios’ works are of vital importance. After leaving Antioch, Ḵosrow I first went 
to Seleukia, the port of Antioch, then to Apamea.114 Then the Persians passed by 
certain important cities including Chalkis115 and Edessa.116 Finally, they collected 
money from the citizens of Konstantia and Dara before reaching the border.117 Apart 
from Apamea, Edessa and Batne (Map 1, zone C3), the Syriac authors failed to 
mention the extortions made by Ḵosrow I at other Roman cities and towns, and the 
information in their works is too fragmentary to be useful here. Some of them also 
stated that Ḵosrow I attacked Kallinikos and Barbalissus and captured their 
populations,118 but all these accounts must belong to the later campaign of 541-2.119 
The difference between Prokopios and the Arab historians is significant. 
According to the latter, at the beginning, the Persians captured several important 
cities, including Dara, al-Ruha (Edessa), Manbij (Hierapolis). Then they conquered 
Qinnasrin (Chalkis), Halab (Beroea) and Antioch. Finally, Hims (Emesa) and other 
cities were subdued as well.120 That is, Ḵosrow I did not circumvent the strongholds 
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of the Romans, and chose to march through the area between the Tigris and 
Euphrates. This argument is contradicted not only by Prokopios’ accounts121 but also 
by the experiences of military failure by the Persians in the past ten years. Having 
learned from the failures at Dara in 530, Kawād chose to invade the Empire along the 
river Euphrates.122 While the base of the dux of Mesopotamia had been transferred 
from Dara to Konstantia after the treaty of the Eternal Peace was signed in 532, the 
Sasanids would have dreaded the potential presence of armed forces at these frontier 
citadels. Therefore it is surely inconceivable that Ḵosrow I would have chosen to 
invade the Empire directly in 540 without having learned from the mistakes of his 
ancestors, and the information provided by the Arab historians, which might have 
been based on exaggeration or propaganda,123 should not be trusted. 
In short, while we do not know the exact routes in the second half of this ‘forced 
journey’, that is, from Dara to Ctesiphon, it is possible to reconstruct the routes of the 
Persians inside the Roman Empire with the help of Prokopios’ narratives (Map 4); 
suffice it to observe that the distances the deported Romans might have walked were 
much longer than the distances their compatriots had walked from Sura to (possibly) 
Sergiopolis in 540. Since it would have been a journey of more than 1,200 km,124 the 
tribulation of the Antiochenes after the sack of their city must have been far greater 
than that of the citizens of Sura, and many of them would have perished before 
reaching Persia. 
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The situation of other cases is much less clear. We know that the soldiers of 
Kawād transported the Amidenes to the Singara Mountains first, then took them to the 
Caucasus, and to Fārs and, possibly, Seleukia. In 573 Ḵosrow I’s general Adarmahan 
arrived at Dara after leaving Apamea, and the Roman prisoners of war were counted 
in Ḵosrow I’s presence. As suggested by the Chronicle of Michael the Syrian and 
Ferdowsī’s Šāh-nāma, the Persians also attacked many cities in this campaign, such 
as Halab (Beroea), Sakila (Seleukia?) and other places.125 However, since we have no 
idea whether Adarmahan arrived at these places after the sack of Apamea, it is 
impossible to reconstruct the route his forces took from this metropolis to Dara. Later 
the Roman captives were ‘divided among the troops’ and transported to the Persian 
Empire.126 It seems that the Persians did not transport these deportees to the nearby 
area of Ctesiphon instantly. Rather, these Romans were carried to Nisibis and 
sojourned there, perhaps in order to wait for the main force led by Ḵosrow I himself 
for a certain period of time. After Ḵosrow I left Dara with his captives and booty, all 
these Roman deportees were counted again at Nisibis,127 presumably to check how 
many individuals his fellow soldiers and generals had captured and snatched from 
these battles. 
The issue of those who were sent to the Caucasus, that is, outside the Persian 
Empire, needs to be addressed. Having been captured and then transported to Persia, 
these Amidenes eventually were sold to the Huns and left the Persian Empire ‘from 
the gates’. While we cannot deny the possibility that ‘the gates’ in the text could have 
been the gates of the Persians’ fortifications on the borderline in the Transcaucasus, 
another more plausible explanation can be found: these prisoners of war might have 
been led through the so-called Caspian Gates to the land of the nomadic people,128 
which can be identified with the Dariel pass,129 the northern-most site on the borders 
of the Persian Empire (Map 2). In the first decade of the sixth century this strategic 
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location was still under the control of the Sabir Huns rather than the Sasanids.130 In 
504, they began to invade the Persian Empire,131 and later on even tried to hand over 
the control of this fortress to Anastasios in order to ask money from the Romans.132 It 
was not until the death of Ambazouces, their ruler, that Kawād seized this site 
successfully. 133  Henry H. Howorth dated this event to 508, two years after the 
conclusion of the Anastasian War.134 If he is right, then the Persians would have 
controlled the Dariel pass after this date, but no further supporting evidence can be 
found from our texts. We do not know to what extent the Sabir Huns controlled the 
checkpoint at the Dariel pass in the first decade of the sixth century, but it would not 
have been easy for the Persian merchants (or even soldiers) to transport these 
Amidenes by using this route. The alternative is that these Romans could have been 
sold in the Caucasus by the Persians, possibly at Derbend, a Persian city at the narrow 
pass between the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea where merchants from different 
countries and areas would meet,135 and then would have gone through this pass over 
to the Huns. 
In short, apart from the case of Antioch, it is nearly impossible to reconstruct the 
itinerary of the captured Romans from Amida (503), Apamea and Dara (573) because 
of the sketchy information from our texts. The problem is aggravated by the fact that 
except for the so-called Royal Road established by the Achaemenids, 136  our 
knowledge about the road system inside the sixth-century Sasanian Empire is limited. 
Therefore it is not easy to identify the routes chose by the Sasanids for sending their 
captives. Nevertheless, these Romans would have walked several hundred miles from 
the Empire to their destinations. 
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The natural environment of Syria and Mesopotamia, especially climatic 
conditions, needs to be taken into consideration. Since Kawād crushed the resistance 
of the Amidenes in January, the survivors must have been captured soon afterwards. 
While Kawād himself stayed in this city for several months and left it in the spring,137 
the survivors had been carried away by a detachment of Persians in the winter of 
503. 138  Seventy years later, Dara was conquered by Ḵosrow I in the middle of 
November.139 All these Romans must have been deported from their homeland to 
their first destination in the Persian Empire in the chilly winter of northern 
Mesopotamia. 
The scorching and rainless summer of Mesopotamia could have been proved 
fatal.140 In 540, the Persians captured Antioch in June,141 and finished their invasion 
right before the end of summer. 142  Undoubtedly they invaded Antioch and then 
returned through Mesopotamia in the hottest period of the whole year, i.e. from June 
to September. The mean maximum temperature in summer in this region, which 
would have been nearly 110° F, 143  would have proved fatal for many captured 
civilians. On this we have an excellent example from the other side. In the autumn of 
584, having captured many distinguished prisoners of war from Nisibis and other 
places of the Persian Empire,144 the magister militum per Orientem, Philippikos145 
retreated back to the Empire because of the coming of the Sasanids. The Romans, 
having been vexed by the lack of water, began to slaughter some of these Persian 
captives who went along the road to Theodosiopolis-Resaina. While the soldiers 
spared children ‘out of pity for their immature youth’, the shortage of water soon 
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destroyed other survivors.146 Other similar, but less relevant cases can be found in the 
Roman soldiers’ experiences. In the summer of 363, Ammianus Marcellinus 
frequently mentioned the heat of Mesopotamia in the campaign of Julian the 
Apostate.147 In the reign of Justin I, having returned from their unsuccessful attack 
against Nisibis and the fortress of Tebetha, the Romans managed to return to Dara in 
the summer. The excess of heat, however, was certainly fatal for the soldiers who 
‘died of thirst on the road… [others] were lost to the army [who] flung themselves 
into wells in the wilderness and were drowned, and the rest perished on the road’ 
afterwards.148 
The way the Persian removed these deportees should also be analyzed. In 503, 
the enemies fettered the captives from Amida,149 possibly in order to prevent any 
chance of uprising or revolt. Similar accounts can be found in both Greek and Arabic 
texts. In the Life of St. Simeon Stylites the Younger, a Roman soldier who had 
participated in battles against the Persians before was ‘tied up with iron’,150 that is, 
became a captive. If Ferdowsī is right, the captured Romans’ hands and feet were 
scraped by the heavy bonds and shackles they wore when they reached 
Mesopotamia.151  
To sum up, the arrival and invasion of the Sasanids in the sixth century led to 
different types of population movements. Many people escaped from their hometowns 
to safer places, while some social elites of the Roman Empire were sent as hostages. 
The most significant feature   of   civilians’  movements in the Persian wars, however, 
was deportation, and both elites and ordinary people were likely to be captured and 
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sent  either  to  Persia  or  to  the  nomads.  Few  details  regarding  the  Persians’  treatment  of  
these Romans and the circumstances of their deportation can be unearthed from 
existing sources with certainty, but many of them must have perished before reaching 
their destinations.   
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Chapter  5.  The  afterlives  of  civilians  outside  the  Empire 
Roman prisoners of war were eventually resettled to different places both inside and 
outside the Persian Empire in the post-siege period. In this section I will try to answer 
two questions. First, to what extent can we know the treatment of these captives by 
both the Sasanids and the Sabir Huns to whom these Romans were sold? Second, 
what would the life of these captives have been like, either inside or outside the 
Persian Empire? 
 
The Pseudo-Roman cities 
Since both Kawād and Ḵosrow I sent some Roman captives to cities within their 
realm, the features of these places should be discussed. Scholars have pointed out that 
the Sasanian monarchs only established new cities either in their ancestral domains 
where the control could be effectively secured or in the newly conquered zones or in 
remote areas.1 Since the neighbouring area of Ctesiphon and the province of Fārs 
were neither conquered frontier places nor remote areas, the cities which were used to 
accommodate Roman prisoners of wars in the sixth century would have been 
established in the ancestral land of the Great King. In 503 Kawād transported the 
Amidenes to an existing city instead of building a new one. While nearly all Arabic 
historians suggested that the city Better Amida of Kawād was founded by Kawād, al-
Ṭabari wrote that it already existed in the third century as Ardašīr I (r. 224-40) passed 
by this city to conquer his enemies.2 The shah, therefore, did not establish it ex nihilo, 
and he might have merely rebuilt this city in the early sixth century.3 Having deported 
the Antiochenes to lower Mesopotamia in 540, Ḵosrow I sent the city plan to his 
lieutenant,4 and ordered that a new city ‘Better Antioch of Ḵosrow’ should be built.5 
However, the date of this city’s construction remains unknown because neither 
classical nor oriental authors preserved relevant information in their works. It was 
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established, according to al-Thālibī,  a prominent Arab writer from the eastern part of 
the Islamic world in the tenth century, by the artisans and the workers from both 
Persia and the Roman Empire.6  
The toponyms of these places should be addressed further. To name/rename the 
Persian cities after another conquered Roman one seems to have been a tradition 
which can be traced back to the middle of the third century. Having sacked Antioch 
and other Roman cities and transported the captured Roman citizens back to his 
territory,7 Shapur I rebuilt the city ‘Better Antioch of Shapur’, that is, Gondēšāpur8 in 
southwestern Iran to accommodate them. The naming of this Better Amida of Kawād 
and Better Antioch of Ḵosrow I respectively in the first half of the sixth century was 
thus in continuity with the practice of their predecessors, presumably in order to 
commemorate the shahs’ victory, conquest and greatness.9 
While the official name of the city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow was Veh-Antiokh-
Ḵosrow, the Persians would have called it Rumaghan—‘the city of the Romans’, 
while in Aramaic works its name was Mahoze Hedata, the ‘New City’. 10 In the 
Miracles of Saint Anastasios of Persia in the early seventh century, the name of this 
city was Neapolis—the ‘New City’. 11  Since this testimony came from a certain 
charioteer who had worked in that place, such a toponym could have been common 
among local people, or, at least, among the Greek-speaking population. In the Islamic 
period, this city was mentioned frequently by Arab historians and geographers under 
different names. Sometimes, as stated in the Chronicle of Seert, they called it al-
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Rumiya (the Roman city),12 and in other cases its original name was preserved. For 
example, Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī, a tenth-century Persian philologist and historian, 
reported that ‘the area of al-Mada’in (i.e. the areas around Seleukia and Ctesiphon) 
consisted of seven cities… (including) Veh-Antiokh-Ḵosrow’. 13  Finally, both 
Dīnavarī and Ferdowsī called it Zabr-Ḵosrow14 and Zib-i-Ḵosrow,15 which mean ‘the 
ornament of Ḵosrow’. In the Armenian history attributed to Sebeos, another name 
Shahastan-i Nok-noy, which was unknown to any other source, was mentioned.16 All 
of them seem to have been the epithets of this ‘Better Antioch’,17 but their contexts 
and origins are unclear. 
Although many late antique and medieval authors mentioned the places where 
the captured Romans were sent, the ruined state today of many Iranian cities, such as 
Gondēšāpur 18  and Better Amida of Kawād 19  prevents us from reconstructing the 
possible situation inside these cities in the late Sasanian period. Our best bet, and in 
fact the only case that we can analyze in some detail comes from the Better Antioch 
of Ḵosrow. The field surveys by German archaeologists in the early twentieth century 
showed that there were several ancient towns and cities in the areas adjacent to 
ancient Ctesiphon. Among them the site of Bostān-e-Kesrā (the gardens of Ḵosrow) is 
noteworthy with respect to three of its architectural features. The fortifications, 
including watch towers and curtain walls, might have been built around this site in 
Late Antiquity.20 The design of the ruined walls is interesting: while the surface of 
their inner side is vertical enough, the outer part is ‘inclined with a great pronounced 
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slope’.21 Meanwhile, it seems that a system of drainage and canals were built ‘to 
supply water for the particular needs of the enclosed area’.22 More significantly, from 
aerial photographs one can still guess that ‘parallel streets’ might have been designed 
and established in this area.23 The original function of the site of Bostān-e-Kesrā 
remains a controversial issue among scholars.24 Some argued that it might have been 
the site of ‘Better Antioch of Ḵosrow’,25 while others thought that it could have been 
the hunting reserve, the royal zoo or the Persian kings’ paradeisos.26 Judging from the 
mighty fortifications there, Ḵosrow I would have resettled the deportees there and 
then erected these buildings both to sustain their life and to prevent them from 
escaping. 
However, even in the case of Better Antioch of Ḵosrow the available 
archaeological data remains too insufficient and fragmentary to form a clear picture, 
and it is necessary to resort to literary sources to understand this city’s possible 
architectural arrangements. Again, this site received much more attention than other 
similar settlements in literary sources. Although it is difficult to know whether the 
Sasanids always had the conquest of Antioch in mind,27 as the only Roman metropolis 
which was conquered and sacked by the Sasanids between Shapur I’s invasions in the 
third century and the final great war of Ḵosrow II in the seventh century, such a great 
military success clearly deserved to be emphasised in Persian-Arabic historiography. 
Ferdowsī recorded that this city was built ‘like Antakiva (i.e. Roman Antioch), (as) 
radiant as a lamp’.28 In other Arab historians’ works, this city was built according to 
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the plan of the ‘Roman Antioch’, which included ‘the number of its houses, streets, 
and everything contained in it’,29 and the deportees could even find their own house 
which was ‘so exactly resembling their former one in Antioch’.30  
While it is difficult to believe that this city was, as suggested in the Šāh-nāma, a 
paradise with ‘all rosaries and mansions, parks and gardens’,31 a Roman bath and a 
hippodrome, as reported by Prokopios, were built for the Antiochenes,32 and the 
deportees could ‘have free access to their other luxuries’ (ταῖς ἄλλαις τρυφαῖς 
ἀνεῖσθαι ἐποίει).33 Henning Börm argued that the narratives here cannot be taken 
literally; rather, they were merely the ‘Roman’ features which Prokopios used to 
portray this ‘Roman city’.34 However, it was not the first time that the Persian kings 
had constructed baths. In the late fifth century, Balaš (r. 484-8), the brother of Fīrūz 
(r. 459-84), irritated the Zoroastrian priests35 because he wanted to build baths in his 
empire.36 When Kawād sojourned in Amida, he used the bath of Paul the son of 
Zaynab in Amida.37 The Great King must have been satisfied by it for after returning 
to his empire the shah ordered that baths should be built in all cities of his empire.38 In 
576, Ḵosrow I told Theodoros, a Roman ambassador that ‘…we will together enter 
into Theodosiopolis, and there you shall bathe and refresh yourself, and then I will let 
you go’.39 Whether the shah simply wanted to show his generosity to Theodoros or 
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30  Ibid.,  Dīnavarī  70. 
31  Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  7.  259. 
32  Prok.  Wars  2.14.1. 
33  Ibid. 
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just wanted to mock him we do not know, but Ḵosrow I must have been aware of 
these customs of the Romans. The construction of such a building in a newly-
established city would not have been impossible if Ḵosrow I did intend to build a 
‘Pseudo-Roman’ city inside his realm. 
Ḵosrow I also considerably embellished his Antioch. According to the accounts 
of the tenth-century Arab historian and geographer al- Masʿūdī, brilliant and colourful 
stones40 were imported from the Roman Empire to Persia after the peace treaty with 
the Romans was signed, and the shah decorated the inner part of Better Antioch’s city 
walls with mosaics.41 Theophylaktos reported that ‘Justinian provided Ḵosrow son of 
Kawād with Greek marble, building experts, and craftsmen skilled in ceilings, and 
that a palace situated close to Ctesiphon was constructed for Ḵosrow with Roman 
expertise’.42 In the early twentieth century, a few mosaic cubes in glass and pieces of 
marble were unearthed in Ayvān-e  Kesrā, the ‘Arch of Ḵosrow’, in the surrounding 
areas of Ctesiphon.43 The Persian king might have used them to decorate both this 
new palace and this ‘satellite city’, an action which, as Matthew Canepa has argued, 
might have resulted from the shah’s cultural interest.44 Modern commentators stated 
that there is no further evidence to verify Theophylaktos’ words,45 and it is possible 
that the Persians could have acquired these raw materials by other means. These 
decorative elements could represent the booty from Antioch in 540. This possibility is 
further corroborated by the information preserved in Greek, Syriac and Arabic 
works46 for they all reported that the Sasanids removed the marble slabs and other 
building materials from Antioch. In short, what Ḵosrow I used in these building 
works might have been the spoils which had been plundered by his forces from 
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Antioch or other places both as a symbol of triumph and as a demonstration of power, 
and what Theophylaktos wrote could have been a kind of ‘apologia’ for the sack of 
Antioch in 540.47 
While Ḵosrow I might have managed to create a replica of what he had 
conquered near his capital, certain techniques were also adapted to control and 
monitor these prisoners of war. According to the information from John of Ephesos, 
there was a strong garrison with less than five hundred men, but we do not know 
whether these Persian soldiers were parts of the Sasanids’ capital defence system or 
stationed merely for guarding these Romans. Additionally, an earth wall was built 
around their living areas,48 and the traits of this construction could still be observed in 
the Islamic period.49 The last effective bulwark was the geographical location of this 
city, which was built on the eastern side of the Tigris.50 In the fourth century, the 
Romans found that it was extremely dangerous to cross the river without the help of 
boats or bridges,51 and the Muslim forces also faced the Tigris’ formidable torrents in 
637.52 Thus it would be nearly impossible for the captives to cross the river and 
escape back to their homelands. 
We cannot establish the identities of those Persian officials dispatched by the 
shahs to rule these Romans because of the patchy sources, but occasionally clues can 
be found in our texts. The most important information regarding the city Better 
Amida of Kawād is a Sasanian seal in which the name of this place, along with two 
other cities, Bīšāpūr and Eṣṭaḵr (Map 3), was inscribed.53 This seal belonged to an 
āmārgar, a provincial officer who was in charge of financial affairs.54 We know that 
an āmārgar could have been assigned to collect tax and handle property matters in 
                                            
47  Coates-Stephens  2003:  346. 
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51  Ammianus  24.8.2,  25.6.12-4. 
52  al-  Balādhurī  The  origins  of  the  Islamic  state  9.6/418. 
53  Pirenne  and  Devos:  1962:  104-5.   
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provincial cities,55 and the existence of such an officer suggests that this city was 
under his jurisdiction, but nothing about the identity of this seal’s holder can be 
established at present. 
Much more information regarding the ‘mayor’ of the city Better Antioch of 
Ḵosrow can be found. In the Acts of George (Mihramgushnasp), a Christian convert 
and martyr who was executed by Ḵosrow II in the early seventh century, the author 
suggested that his grandfather, who was a member of the royal family, had been the 
‘prefect’ of this new Antioch.56 Arab and Persian authors, including Dīnavarī, al-
Ṭabari, al-Thālibī, and finally, Ferdowsī, thought that the ‘mayor’ of this city was a 
Christian from either Gondēšāpur,57 or Ahvāz,58 another city located in the province 
of Kūzestān in southwestern Iran. 59  While Dīnavarī stated that this man was a 
lieutenant called Yazdfana, al-Ṭabari recorded his name Baraz,60 who ‘had been the 
head of the artisans and craftsmen working for him (i.e. the shah)’.61 Joseph Nasrallah 
suggested that this officer might have been the ‘protector’ of the Roman prisoners of 
war,62 but no material testimony could be found to support this argument. 
All these works give us some clues regarding the possible social and religious 
identities of this ‘mayor’ or the Great King’s deputy who was nominated to preside in 
this city. The first possibility is that Ḵosrow I entrusted the rule of the Antiochenes to 
members of the royal family. The importance of lineage had been emphasised by 
Kawād at the end of the fifth century: ‘the offices (of the Persian empire)…shall not 
be conferred upon others than those to whom each particular honour belongs by right 
of birth’.63 However, two uprisings must have shattered Ḵosrow I’s confidence and 
raised his suspicions about his relatives. In the 530s, some discontented Persian 
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magnates and Zames,64 Ḵosrow I’s brother, led a revolt and managed to overthrow his 
rule. In the subsequent large-scale punitive purge of Persian aristocracy, Ḵosrow I not 
only killed Zames by his own hand, but also ordered that all the accomplices, 
including all his own brothers and their male offspring, should be slaughtered 
together.65 Malalas also reported that the Persian magnates and the magi, who were 
irritated by the Great King’s religious policy, initiated a plot to depose Ḵosrow I 
shortly after his enthronement.66 In the middle of the sixth century, another armed 
uprising took place. During the war with the Romans, Ḵosrow I fell ill and returned to 
his empire, and the rumours of his death or illness were soon spread by others.67 
Anōšazād, his oldest son who was banished in Gondēšāpur at that time, decided to 
break into the prison and rebel against his father with the help of local Christians. 
This insurrection was suppressed by the forces of the shah’s lieutenant at Ctesiphon. 
Anōšazād was either blinded or imprisoned again by his father, and his followers 
were executed.68 
Considering all these events and their possible effects, as Michael Bonner has 
suggested, it must have been risky for the Great King to delegate a high-ranking 
Persian to monitor these captives in the 540s.69 Rather, it would make more sense to 
assign the post of mayor to a person, possibly a Christian, who would have been more 
loyal to him70 so that this officer could oversee these captive Christians in this ‘Better 
Antioch’. It is true that sometimes Christians were suspected of disloyalty to the 
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regime of the Sasanids,71 but in other cases they were recruited into the bureaucracy 
of Persia, served as spies or diplomats, and even became important agents to secure 
the loyalty of their co-religionists for the shahs.72  
Obviously we will never know the identity of this governor, but he could have 
been a member of the Dyophysite church, possibly a royalist bishop,73 who would 
have surely helped the shah exert his control over the inhabitants of this newly-
established city. This decision must have come from Ḵosrow I’s appraisal of the 
political realities in his empire, not from his ‘tenderness and sympathy’.74 It seems 
impossible that Ḵosrow I was willing to grant him great power to monopolise the 
resources of this city, and the words of Ferdowsī, in which the mayor was granted 
with authority, wealth and even an army, should be rejected.75 The reason is simple: it 
was quite risky to have a Christian governor with his forces, resources and even 
potential followers near the heart of his empire. If the figure given by John of Ephesos 
is trustworthy, there could have been around 30,000 residents in this ‘Better Antioch’ 
in the second half of the sixth century.76 Ḵosrow I might have nominated someone to 
help him oversee these Antiochenes, but he must surely not have intended to create a 
‘warlord’ who could challenge and even threaten his authority and security near 
Ctesiphon. This mayor should never have become an obstacle for him. 
We have no idea whether all these captives really ‘lived a life of luxury’, as 
suggested by Prokopios,77 nor is it clear whether the civic life of Roman Antioch was 
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actually copied or imitated in this ‘Persian Antioch’, but sometimes we can glimpse 
the life in exile of certain groups of people. In the first half of the seventh century, 
some charioteers went to the ‘New City’ (i.e. the New Antioch established by Ḵosrow 
I in the sixth century) and received their salary.78 Later, the situation around the 
Sasanids’ political nucleus was reported by Kalotychos, a certain charioteer of the 
circus79 in the ‘New City’, to the writer of the holy man’s Miracles.80 The charioteer 
Kalotychos is not otherwise attested, and the only information we have is that he 
came to Constantinople afterwards to finish his career.81 His name suggests that he 
was of Greek origin, but it is impossible to know whether he was a descendant of the 
captured Romans or not. Since neither Kawād nor Ḵosrow I’s successors had ever 
managed to remove charioteers from the Roman Empire, those captured from Antioch 
in 540 must have been the first batch of professional charioteers in the Persian 
Empire, and they could have acted as masters transferring and preserving the 
knowledge of chariot racing in Iran. While  some  of  these  charioteers  in  the  reign  of  
Ḵosrow   II  might   have   been   the   descendants   of   these  Antiochenes,   clearly  many   of  
them  must  have  been  non-Christians  for  they  promised  to  believe  in  St  Anastasios  the  
Persia   after   observing   the   miracle   performed   by   this   saint. 82  While it remains 
unknown to us whether they would play similar roles in the civic life of this ‘Pseudo-
Roman’ city, it is evident that as inhabitants in the political and administrative 
nucleus of Persia who received their salaries from the Shahanshah,83 they would have 
mainly served the king, perhaps just in the hippodrome of the ‘New Antioch’. Finally, 
as shown above, some of them, such as Kalotychos, had their own apprentices who 
could have been engaged in the same profession together, and we can thus assume 
that the number of these charioteers might not have been negligible in the seventh 
century.  
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Although we do not know whether Ḵosrow I adopted similar policies in treating 
the captives from other places like Apamea and Kallinikos, he had supreme authority 
over these Antiochenes, and intended to treat these ‘immigrants’ as his own 
subjects.84 In fact it seems that nearly all of our texts suggest that the Great King 
treated those from Antioch magnanimously and generously.85 He granted them certain 
legal privileges under his sovereignty, 86  possibly to protect his ‘booty’ from the 
menace of other powerful groups, such as the Zoroastrian priests or other magnates. If 
a slave happened to escape to this city, and anyone of the inhabitants identified him as 
his relative, their original owner was not able to take him away.87 Meanwhile it seems 
that the basic needs of these captives must have been fulfilled, and Ḵosrow I even 
provisioned them ‘at public expense more carefully than in the fashion of captives’.88 
Jean Maurice Fiey noted a similar case at the end of the fourth century,89 in which a 
group of Persians and Romans captives liberated from the Huns by Persian forces 
were treated by the shah kindly and received rations of bread, wine and oil,90 to 
illustrate the gentle manners with which Sasanids treated the ‘forced guests’ in this 
city.91 Indeed, such a benevolent treatment would not have been uncommon in Persia. 
In another sixth-century work, an anonymous author suggested that the Persians 
treated their subjects with care in the time of famine. 92  However, it should be 
emphasised that the patterns and contexts of these instances were quite different. In 
the case of the Hunnic invasion, there was no conflict between these two great 
powers, and the Romans might have been considered by the Persians merely as the 
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spoils which they seized from the Huns. Things were different in 540; by this time the 
Antiochenes were not only the spoils, but also, more importantly, the opponents of 
Ḵosrow I’s regime, and some of them would have killed many Persians during the 
defence of Antioch in the Great King’s campaign. 
In spite of the detailed accounts in extant literary texts about the Persians’ 
treatment of the captured Romans, we know little about the social status of these 
captives in the Persian Empire. While neither Prokopios nor other contemporaries 
have ever mentioned explicitly that the captured Romans were sold as chattle slaves 
after being taken by the victorious Sasanids in wartime, many classicising historians 
used ἀνδραποδίζω/ἀνδράποδον,  a  word  that  may  imply  captives  were  sold  as  chattle  
slaves,   in   describing   the   deportation   of   the   defeated   Romans.   Therefore,   for   these  
contemporaries   enslavement   was   possibly   believed   to   be   the   ultimate   fate   for  
prisoners  of  the  Persian  wars.93 A piece of information comes from the Passio of St 
Golinduch, an aristocratic Persian noble woman who died in the reign of Ḵosrow II. 
The anonymous author reported that some prisoners of war worked for her husband.94 
We know that Golinduch was martyred under Hormozd IV,95 that is, in the last 
quarter of the sixth century, but her birthdate remains unknown to us, and the only 
information we know is that she converted to Christianity in the reign of Ḵosrow I, 
for the shah, failing to convert her back, detained her in the castle of Oblivion. Some 
possibilities can be excluded. Since after the peace treaty was signed in 532, the 
captives or hostages taken in wartime were to be returned, 96  the servants of 
Golinduch’s husband must have been captured either in the Anastasian War (502-6) 
or in the second phrase of Justinian’s Persian war. They, however, could not have 
been Antiochenes because, as I argued above,97 it is unthinkable that Ḵosrow I would 
put them under the authority or ownership of anyone else in his empire. The situation 
of the Amidenes is much more complex for we do not know whether Kawād had 
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given any of them to the nobles of his realm. However, even if some of them were 
working for these magnates, it is hard to imagine that they would have survived for 
more than thirty or even forty additional years. Finally, if the accounts in the Greek 
version of her Passio are reliable, then Golinduch was imprisoned for eighteen 
years.98 Since she died in 591, then this Persian convert must have been put into 
prison before 573. As shown already, Ḵosrow I subdued Dara in the November of that 
year, and the captives from there and the Apameans might have arrived at the 
heartland at the end of that year. It is almost impossible that the Great King could 
have sent them to the households of other magnates in the same year. In my mind, 
these servants must have been captured from Kallinikos or other places in the shah’s 
post-540 invasions. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, in other cases the Great King adopted various 
strategies to treat the prisoners of war from the Empire’s different cities. While those 
captured from Antioch and Apamea were resettled in the Pseudo-Roman cities, some 
inhabitants from Dara were cast into the royal prison. Therefore, instead of selling all 
these prisoners of war as slaves, the Sasanids seem to have treated them under 
different circumstances. These captured Romans, on the other hand, could have been 
allotted to other types of professions. In the reign of Ḵosrow I, as observed by 
Theophylaktos, those who were deported from Antioch might have joined the 
construction work of his palace at Ctesiphon, 99  including the arched hall of the 
Ayvān-e   Kesrā, 100  but we will never know whether Ḵosrow I transported these 
prisoners of war from this metropolis simply because he needed certain workers to 
build his new palace and neither Prokopios nor other oriental authors reported that the 
shah transported builders in 540. A more plausible explanation is that being one of the 
most important cities of the Roman Near East, many professional architects and 
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artisans must have lived in Antioch,101 and some of them might have been deported 
together with other civilians in the sack of this metropolis. When the shah wanted to 
build a new palace at his capital, these people would have been enlisted from the city 
Better Antioch of Ḵosrow which is not very far away from Ctesiphon.   While   the  
farmers  belonged   to   the   third  estate  of  Sasanian   society,  both   the  craftsmen  and   the  
merchants  were  regarded  as  the  lowest  stratum.102  Therefore,  no  matter  which  type  of  
profession  these  Roman  prisoners  of  war  might  have  joined  in  the  sixth  century,  they  
would  have  served  in  the  lower  echelons  of  Sasanian  society,  and  it  was  not  easy   to  
break  the  strict  social  hierarchy.103 
In most cases the role played by these immigrants in the process of 
Christianisation of the Persian Empire would have been minimal,104 for the cities 
sacked by the Sasanids, such as Amida and Dara were merely small frontier cities 
with small populations.105 Even though the Great Kings managed to capture many 
Romans from Antioch and Apamea, two metropoleis of Roman Syria, many of them 
would have perished before reaching the Persian Empire. Coming from Christian-
dominated cities in the sixth-century Empire, most deportees from Amida, Antioch 
and other places must have been Christians, and their deportation would have 
increased the numbers of Miaphysites not only in Iraq106 but also other areas both 
inside and outside the Persian Empire. In the sixth century, the continuator of 
Zachariah preserved the details about the dreams of Qardust, a bishop from Albania in 
his Church History, which are significant. In the first dream, an angel told him that 
‘…I have authority over these captives who have gone into the nations from the land 
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103  Tafazzoli  1974:  191. 
104  Morony  1984:  372-3. 
105  See  Appendix  2  for  further  discussion  of  this  issue. 
106  Some  scholars  shared  this  viewpoint,  see,  for  instance,  Labourt  1904:  199,  Oates  
1968:  114,  Rassam  2005:  65,  contra  Morony  1984:  372-3. 
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of the Romans, and have offered their petition to God’. 107  The caring for these 
displaced people thus resulted in the arrival of these clerics, and, more importantly, 
the subsequent Christianisation of the area they inhabited. 
Little is known of the religious life of the deported Christians in the Persian 
Empire, and no report about persecutions on religious grounds can be found in our 
texts.108 Information about the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the deported Christians is 
fragmentary. In the Synodikon Orientale, the signature of the bishop of Mahoze 
Hedata, Claudianos,109 was attested in the synod of 554,110 but J. B. Chabot argued 
that this city was Rēv-Ardašīr, the seat of the metropolitan of Fārs, rather than the 
‘Better Antioch’ at Ctesiphon, for the signature of this prelate was found among the 
signatories of his peers from other metropoleis in this area.111 In the sixth and seventh 
centuries, the Persians launched sporadic persecutions of Christians and some of them 
were executed,112 but the situation seems to have been much less harsh in previous 
centuries. In the peace treaty of 562, the status of Christians in the Persian Empire 
seems to have been improved. From then on they could build churches, worship and 
sing hymns freely in Persia.113 The successor of Ḵosrow I, Hormozd IV, even stated 
that the Christians, as important supporters of his power, should not be persecuted,114 
and Ḵosrow II was not a zealous persecutor either.115 Since the main targets were 
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114  al-Ṭabari  1.991. 
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high-ranking Persian apostates,116 Christians captured from the Empire would not 
have been targeted. 
While many Miaphysites would have been deported, the issue of the existence of 
captured Chalcedonians who were deported from the Empire is much more complex. 
We know little about their activities,117 and even the Chalcedonian historians left few 
accounts about their coreligionists.118 Neither Theophylaktos nor Euagrios mentioned 
Ḵosrow II’s construction of churches, and results of archaeological campaigns are 
meagre. In the twentieth century, an ecclesiastical building was unearthed in Kōḵē,119 
one of the major cities located near Ctesiphon, but the date of this church cannot be 
confirmed,120 nor can we establish the connection between it and Ḵosrow II's building 
activities. Therefore we shall resort to the accounts from some medieval texts. 
Agapios reported that having won the civil war with the help of the Romans,121 
Ḵosrow II built two churches for the Christians,122 while one of them, which was 
constructed at al-Madai’n’, was dedicated to saint Sergios, another was dedicated to 
the Theotokos. Similar narratives were preserved by other non-Chalcedonian authors. 
In the Chronicle of Michael the Syrian,123 Ḵosrow II constructed three great churches 
after his marriage to Maria, the daughter of Emperor Maurice, one dedicated to 
Theotokos, another to the Apostles, and finally one to the martyr saint Sergios. In the 
anonymous Chronicle of 1234, the Persian king built two churches for his wife, one to 
saint Sergios, the other to the Theotokos.124 Finally, from the Chronicle of Seert, we 
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117  Fiey  1967b:  416. 
118  Nasrallah  1975:  154. 
119  On  the  excavations,  see  Reuther  1929:  434-51. 
120  Reuther  1929;;  449-51,  Okada  1991:  76,  Gullini  1966:  34. 
121  See  Whitby  1988:  297-304,  Flusin  1992.2:  99-102  for  a  sketch  on  the  Sasanids’  
civil  war. 
122  Fiey  1961:  102-14,  Fowden  1999:  135-41  for  a  broader  political  and  diplomatic  
context  of  these  events. 
123  Mich.  Syr.  10.23. 
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know that the Shahanshah built two churches for his wife Maria, and established 
another church and a castle in the region of Bēṯ Lāpāṭ125 for another wife, Shirin.126  
Ḵosrow II’s patronage of church buildings was therefore well testified in 
Chalcedonian, Miaphysite and Dyophysite works. While Agapios stated that these 
churches were built for Christians, presumably Chalcedonians,127 the Miaphysites and 
the Dyophysites recorded that they were built for the Christian wife of the shah.128 
Although some medieval Christian and Islamic authors recounted Ḵosrow II’s 
marriage to Maria, the daughter of Maurice, this woman was actually not attested in 
contemporary sources, and scholars have recently doubted the historicity of this 
event. 129  Therefore, these churches would have been built for Shirin, the shah’s 
Christian wife from Kūzestān.130 As the queen favoured the Miaphysites,131 the shah 
could possibly have built the churches for that community around his capital.  
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that these churches were constructed 
for the Chalcedonians of the Persian Empire, and it could have been a politically 
motivated132 policy that Ḵosrow II used to show goodwill to Maurice. Since the 
Roman emperor was a supporter of the Chalcedonian doctrine, it would have made 
sense for the shah to have a Chalcedonian bishop to establish the ‘orthodox’ 
ecclesiastical hierarchy in Persia. According to Agapios, the Great King not only 
invited the patriarch of Antioch, Anastasios, to consecrate these churches133 but also 
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established some Christian priests and deacons. 134  It would be impossible for 
Anastasios to have come to Persia as a patriarch because, as Bernard Flusin has 
shown, his second term as patriarch began after 593;135 but the Great King could have 
invited him, a former Chalcedonian patriarch,136 to his realm.   
To conclude, while nothing pertaining to the scale and hierarchy of their 
community can be securely attested in contemporary or later literary sources, some 
Chalcedonians might possibly have inhabited the area around Ctesiphon.137 Since the 
Persian Church aligned itself with the Dyophysites, these Chalcedonians might have 
come from outside Persia; that is, some of them could have been the descendants of 
the Roman prisoners of war captured by Ḵosrow I in 540 and 573. 
Golinduch converted to Christianity after talking with some Christian prisoners 
of war. At first glance, the conversion of captors living outside the Empire by the 
Christians they had captured seems to be a rather popular literary motif in Late 
Antiquity, and such a connection was a literary topos rather than historical reality.138 
The scenario of these stories remains similar: the captors were converted to 
Christianity through the miraculous healings of their captives. Rufinos provided his 
readers with a quite lengthy account of the conversion of the Iberians in the reign of 
Constantine I after the ‘celerity of the cure, and the miraculousness and healing of 
faith’ of a female Christian captive Christian woman.139 At the northern frontier of the 
Empire, according to Sozomenos, ‘many priests of Christ who had been taken captive, 
dwelt among these tribes (i.e. of the Germanic peoples)…healed the sick…cleansed 
those who were possessed of demons…led a blameless life.’140 After they observed 
such activities by Christians, these barbarians were eventually baptised and gathered 
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139  Ruf.  HE  10.11,  Sokr.  HE  1.20,  Soz.  HE  2.7. 
140  Soz.  HE  2.6.2-3. 
 184 
into churches.141 Also, the people of Yemen were converted because of the healing of 
a Christian virgin Theognosta who ‘had been carried off captive from a convent on 
the borders of the Roman Empire and had been conducted to the king of Yemen and 
presented to him as a gift’.142 
The differences between these accounts and the narratives of Golinduch’s 
conversion should be pointed out. While the church historians above usually 
furnished their texts with the miracles and deeds of these Christian captives, nothing 
similar can be found in the case of Golinduch. Even though sometimes it was the 
clerics who converted the captors, in most cases it was the Christian women who 
acted as the ‘agents’ of evangelisation. In the martyrdom of Golinduch, the scenario is 
actually reversed: it was the male servants, the Christians, who played a crucial role in 
the conversion of a Zoroastrian aristocratic woman.143 
 
The royal prison and the nomads 
Apart from the Persian cities discussed above, the royal prison named the Castle of 
Oblivion was also used as a place of detention for Roman captives.144 While the 
Persians constructed several jails near their capital Ctesiphon,145 this place ‘Lethe’ 
(Λήθη), was certainly well-known by both the Sasanids themselves and their 
neighbors. Theophylaktos reported that its Persian name was Giligerdon (Γιλιγέρδων 
ὄνομα ἀῦτῷ).146 Prokopios wrote that it was forbidden for the Persians to mention 
anyone who was jailed there, and ‘death is the penalty for the man who speaks his 
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name’ (ἢν γάρ τις ἐνταῦθα ἐμβληθεὶς τύχῃ, οὐκέτι ὁ νόμος ἐφίησι μνήμην αὐτοῦ 
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θάνατος τῷ ὠνουμακότι ἡ ζημία ἐστί).147 
The nature and character of this place of detention should be summarised. 
Theophylaktos provided a rather informative passage about this place:  
…adjacent to this fort is also a prison…The place is dedicated to royal wrath, 
like a fertile tract to a god, and it would not be inapposite if someone were to call 
the fort a precinct of hatred. Here, then are enclosed all those caught in the nets 
of the king’s displeasure, some of them his subjects, others prisoners of war 
(πρόσεστι δὲ τούτῳ καί τις είρκτή...ὁ δὲ χῶρος ὥσπερ γῆ θεῷ ὀργὰς βασιλικῷ 
θυμῷ ἀνατίθεται, καὶ τέμενος δυσμενείας ἀποκαλῶν τις τὸ φρούριον οὐκ ἂν 
ἁμάρτοι τοῦ πρέποντος. ἐναποκλείονται τοίνυν ἐνθάδε ὅσοι τοῖς δικτὐοις τῆς τοῦ 
βασιλέως λύπης ἁλίσκονται, τοῦτο μὲν ὑπήκοοι, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δορίκτητοι).148 
Thus not only the captives from Dara but also other groups were put into this jail. 
All these prisoners could have been treated differently by the Great Kings. Some 
received milder treatment since they would have been considered as hostages rather 
than prisoners.149 From the case of both the captured Armenian rulers150 and other 
Persian nobles like the apostate Golinduch,151 on the other hand, we know that some 
prisoners were chained in shackles and collars. Nevertheless, as the deportees from 
Dara left nothing regarding their own lives and sufferings in this prison, and neither 
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Theophylaktos nor other authors mentioned such details in their works, no secure 
conclusion can be established. 
From the first years of the sixth century, some deported Amidenes began their 
new life in the land of the Huns. According to the continuator of Zachariah, these 
captives took wives and even started families, possibly with other Romans, or with 
local people, in the Caucasus. Due to the lack of both literary and material data, our 
understanding about the Sabir Huns is limited,152 and it is impossible to tell how they 
treated these Romans. The close reading of our texts indicates that sometimes these 
Romans met visitors from the Empire or neighboring countries and even stayed with 
them for a certain period of time. When the envoy of Justin I, Probos, arrived at this 
area, they told him about the saints among the Sabir Huns. Several years later,153 these 
deportees had a chance to talk to the priests from Albania as well.154 These captives 
and their descendants might thus not have been isolated from the outside world. If 
these priests, as Czeglédy suggested,155 did care for these deportees there, their life 
under the rule of the Sabir Huns may have been less traumatic. Later, another 
Armenian bishop Macarius formed another group of missionaries, who went to the 
Sabir Huns and ‘built a brick church, planted plants and sowed various kinds of 
seeds’.156 The source, however, recorded nothing regarding the interaction between 
the Amidenes and these Armenians. 
 
Back to the Empire 
While many captives who were transported to the Persian Empire would have stayed 
there for the rest of their life, others were fortunate enough to return to their homeland 
successfully.  In  the  sixth  century,  the  details  about  the  exchange  of  captured  military  
leaders   between   Rome   and   Persia   can   sometimes   be   gleaned   from   our   texts.   For  
example,   in   531   the   Sasanids   invaded   Osrhoene   and   captured   Domnentiolos,   the  
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nephew  of  Boutzes,  together  with  the  fort  of  Abgersaton.157  The  counterstrike  of  the  
Romans  occurred  soon  afterwards  and   this   time  Yazdgerd,   the  nephew  of  Hormozd,  
the   governor   of  Arzanene,  was   captured.   Later   on   he  was   released   in   exchange   for  
Domnentiolos.158  Also,  other  captives  and  hostages  were  sent  back  when  the  truce  of  
the  Eternal  Peace  was  signed.159  Since  in  the  reign  of  Justin  I  and  the  early  years  of  
Justinian  the  Sasanids  never  conquered  any  Roman  city,  few  citizens  would  have  been  
captured  as  prisoners  of  war   in   the  Persians’   campaigns.  More   importantly,  nothing  
regarding   prisoner   exchange   involving   ordinary   people   between   these   two   great  
powers  can  be  found,  and  neither  Anastasios  nor  Justinian  nor   their  successors  ever  
tried  to  send  captured  Persians  back  in  exchange  for  the  subjects  of  the  Empire. 
The   methods   of   returning   to   the   Empire   can   be   divided   into   two   categories:  
sometimes these deportees would escape from their captivity, while in other cases 
they were either released by the Persians or ransomed by the ecclesiastical or political 
authorities of the Empire. Some Romans decided to escape before leaving the Empire. 
The captives who were collected in the school of Urtaye at Amida managed to escape 
when the city was thrown open because, it was reported, ‘God delivered us and 
strengthened us’. 160  In other words, they must have fled when the Persian were 
leaving this city. We know that the captors’ control over these Romans was 
sometimes lax. For example, when the Sasanids began to return to their land through 
Roman Syria and Mesopotamia in 540, Ḵosrow I ordered that they must cross the 
temporary bridge at Obbane as fast as they could because it would be dismantled 
shortly, possibly for strategic reasons. Three days later, some of his forces were left 
behind, and these ‘disbanded’ troops returned to the place where they came from.161 
However, since we have no idea how the Great King divided the captured 
Antiochenes among his forces, no firm conclusion can be established regarding the 
possible impact of this event upon the transportation of the Romans. 
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In spite of being transported to distant places and having to face challenges, 
dangers and difficulties, at least two groups of deportees managed to escape from the 
places where they were sent and return to their homeland. In the middle of the sixth 
century, some of those who had been sold to the Sabir Huns managed to cross the 
Caucasus. If the testimony of these survivors in the Church History of Pseudo-
Zachariah is correct, then the terminus post quem of their escape should be 553 for 
they had stayed in this area for more than fifty years. The internal evidence of the 
continuator of Zachariah’s account is helpful for dating the possible date of these 
Romans’ return. When he inserted the brief introduction of the nations of the world, 
the author stated that he wrote this chapter (i.e. the seventh chapter of the twelfth 
book) in ‘the year 28 of the serene emperor Justinian…the year 866 of Alexander, and 
the 333rd Olympiad’.162 The composition date of this part should be dated to 554/5,163 
and these Amidenes must have arrived at their hometown before this date. 
If these displaced people chose to make their way back to Amida by going 
through Persarmenia, it must have been an arduous march for they would have faced 
at least two main obstacles: first, the Persian soldiers stationed in forts and 
checkpoints and second, the steep cliffs and mountains of the Caucasus. The control 
of this mountainous area, especially the Derbend and the Dariel passes, was always 
important for the Persians as the nomadic peoples would have broken their line of 
defence by passing through these two strategically important channels.164 In the sixth 
century, Kawād started to focus on the defence of the Transcaucasus by erecting a 
series of building works to ward off the possible raiders from the north. Another 
route, the Derbend pass, had become the stronghold with the fortifications finished in 
in the sixth century by the Sasanids.165 While it is difficult to know how far the 
Sasanids actually controlled the northwestern borderline of their Empire, in order to 
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avoid the threats of the Persians, the escaping Romans might have chosen to cross the 
mountains in order to reach their own territory, and this would have been a very 
difficult task. Here an account in Pseudo-Sebeos’ work deserves to be quoted. When 
the Muslims were defeated by the people living in the north in the seventh century, 
the survivors ‘made for the mountain, for the difficult terrain of the Caucasus 
mountain. With the greatest difficulty they came out through the ridges of the 
mountain’.166 
In the last decades of the sixth century, the sufferings and torments experienced 
by those from Dara in the castle of Oblivion eventually united them and other 
detainees together and they began to regard each other as ‘their brother in distress’.167 
The Roman prisoners of war clearly played a decisive role in the ensuing uprising; 
they used all available weapons, killed the guards168 and finally led their compatriots 
out of the jail and returned to the Roman land ‘after many experiences and 
achievements’.169 If Theophanes the Confessor is right, these Romans even went to 
Constantinople.170 
When these Romans returned to the Empire is open to debate. Norman Baynes, 
who pointed out the inconsistency of Theophylaktos’ narratives, was inclined to leave 
this issue open.171 Claudia Ciancaglini argued that it might have taken place in the last 
years of Ḵosrow I,172 which is at odds with other scholars. Judging from the following 
sections about the battle at Martyropolis,173 Peter Schreiner placed it in 588.174 The 
detailed analysis and dating of Theophylaktos’ sections, however, leads us to propose 
                                            
166  Sebeos  51. 
167  Th.  Sim.  3.5.6. 
168  See  ibid.,  4.6.8  for  the  information  regarding  the  situation  inside  this  prison:  there  
was  a  Persian  commander  ‘who  was  an  officer  and  held  authority  over  a  company  of  
soldiers’  when  Kawād  was  imprisoned. 
169  Ibid.,  3.5.7. 
170  Theoph.  A.M.  6080. 
171  Baynes  1912:  35-6. 
172  Traina  and  Ciancaglini  2002:  402,  407. 
173  Th.  Sim.  3.5.8-10,  cf.  3.4.2-4. 
174  Schreiner  1985:  273,  which  was  supported  by  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  292. 
 190 
another possible date. His preceding chapters175 provide the general outline of the 
affairs of Thrace and other western provinces in the winter of 588/9.176 Since the 
escape of these prisoners of war, according to Michael Whitby, is linked 
chronologically to these events,177 this event might have taken place in 589, that is, at 
the very end of Hormozd IV’s rule. At that time the unstable political situation in 
Persia eventually resulted in the abdication of Hormozd IV and the Persian civil war: 
in 589, the general Bahrām, who came from the house of Mihran,178 led a mutiny 
against the ruling shah after defeating the Turks.179 Hormozd IV began to summon 
troops from nearby areas to put down the usurpation either in late 589 or at the 
beginning of 590,180 Since from then on the king’s armies might have been occupied 
in crushing the forces of Bahrām, the escapes from the ‘castle of Oblivion’ would not 
have been noticed. Secondly, growing discontent within the Persian Empire181 might 
have facilitated the escape of these prisoners of war. If the shah did ‘reduce military 
pay by a tenth…(and) compel the army to face great dangers’182 in his reign, then the 
morale of the Sasanian armed forces must have been low. Even though we have no 
further information regarding this shah’s internal policies in treating specific areas, 
control over the inner part of his empire could have become lax at the end of his 
reign. These deported Romans could have exploited these conditions to escape from 
the prison. 
While we do not know what route the escaped Romans took from the remote site 
near the Zagros Mountains to the capital of the Empire, it must have been an 
extremely risky adventure. For these Romans to traverse the fertile plain of Persian 
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Mesopotamia was the most expedient way to return home, but there were several 
major obstacles. Clearly it was difficult to cross both the Euphrates and the Tigris 
without the help of boats or bridges.183 In addition, since this zone had become for 
many years the political and economic centre of the Sasanian Empire with certain 
important cities like Seleukia-Ctesiphon and its satellite cities, it was difficult to go 
through the nucleus of the Persian state without alarming the soldiers stationed 
there,184 and a series of strongholds, forts and even walls had been constructed to 
form a line of defence.185 Nonetheless, it was possible that these Romans could have 
been assisted by other groups of people in order to escape the pursuit of the 
Persians.186 
Having arrived at Constantinople, these escaped Romans were welcomed and 
greeted by the reigning emperor Maurice.187 This is the last piece of information we 
have regarding these escaped Romans. Some of them might have spent their 
remaining years in the capital, but it was not impossible that others managed to go 
back to Dara. Again the material remains prove to be helpful. Among the numerous 
burial places of the necropolis which is located to the west of ancient Dara (See  Map  
                                            
183  See  above,  p.  171. 
184  See  Howard-Johnston  2012:  110  for   the  possible   troops  employed  at   the  capitals  
and  cities  in  Mesopotamia. 
185  The   fortifications   alongside   the   Euphrates   were   built   possibly   for   deterring   the  
raids  from  the  tribes  of  the  Arabs,  see  Frye  1977:  8-11,  1983:  139,  Howard-Johnston  
2012:  96-8. 
186   Michael   Whitby   suggested   that   the   people   imprisoned   there   should   be   the  
Kadasenes  (Καδασηνοὶ)  who  were  living  in  the  surrounding  areas  of  Caspian  Sea,  see  
Strabo  11.7.1,  Whitby  and  Whitby  1986:  78,  see  Syme  1988:  137-50,  Schmitt  1990:  
62  for  more  details.  Whether  they  can  be  identified  with  the  Kadishaye,  who  inhabited  
in   the   Singara   Mountains   (Καδισηνοὶ), remains controversial,   see   Nöldeke   1879b:  
157-61,  Greatrex  1998:  50-2,  77,  111. 
187  Theoph.  A.M.  6080. 
 192 
8   for   the   relative   positions   of   these   sites), 188  one spacious tomb, along with its 
decorative figures (Fig.1) is noteworthy. It is clearly a gigantic Christian burial 
monument, but the identities of those buried there remain unknown because most of 
the numerous Greek and Syriac inscriptions and eiptaphs at this site were no longer 
legible.189 Nonetheless, it was generally agreed that the motif of this relief was the 
scene of Ezekiel entering the Valley of Dry Bones, a well-known vision from the Old 
Testament.190 
While the date of this tomb chamber can be fairly dated to the sixth century,191 
the contexts of commissioning this motif192 in such an unusual large scheme—the 
entire design is around 5 meters wide193—near this frontier bulwark of the Empire 
needs to be investigated further. Several possibilities have been proposed. Someone 
might have chosen this theme because of the strong eschatological connotation of 
Ezekiel’s vision194 and commissioned this project at the beginning of Anastasios’ 
reign when the Christians were expecting the Second Coming of Christ at the end of 
the 6,000 years after the creation of the world. 195  The situation of northern 
Mesopotamia at the beginning of the sixth century must have intensified these 
opinions among the local population. They were afflicted not only by the invasions of 
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the enemies but also by other natural disasters.196 Since Dara was constructed not long 
after these disasters, such experiences must have been quite vivid for its inhabitants. 
Another explanation deserves to be examined more closely. Maria Mundell Mango 
noted that after the return of Dara to the Romans by Ḵosrow II in 591 certain captives, 
along with those who escaped from the castle of Oblivion, might have returned to 
their hometown and chosen this theme which was quite appropriate to their own 
experiences to decorate their burial site.197 These captives could have observed the 
gigantic rock-reliefs of the Sasanian kings either at Ctesiphon or at other places, and 
influenced by these, might have commissioned such grand monuments.198 
Since we do not know whether those who were resettled in Better Antioch had 
ever returned to the Empire in the reign of Maurice,199 it is better to have reservations 
about the first suggestion. The second argument is much more plausible. We cannot 
reestablish the route taken by these Roman prisoners of war from Mesopotamia to the 
castle of Oblivion, but some hypotheses may be made. While they would probably 
never have visited Naqsh-e Rustam, the necropolis of the Persian rulers located not 
far away from Persepolis,200 they might have been impressed by the huge rock reliefs 
and building works in the heart of the Zagros Mountains. 201  Oliver Nicholson 
provides us with another revised argument. Since it was forbidden for Zoroastrians to 
inter the corpses of the dead,202 they usually chose rock-cut places to place them, but 
it is not always easy to find such places outside the Persian Empire. The victorious 
Persians might have considered the quarry as an alternative place to dispose of the 
skeletons of both the Romans and their compatriots after conquering this Roman 
fortress. When these captives came back to their homeland in 591, the bones of their 
dead comrades might have still been observed outside the city. Thus this relief might 
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have been constructed to commemorate their compatriots who died in the siege of 
Dara around twenty years ago.203 
For those who were housed near Ctesiphon, the hope of returning to their 
ancestral land was revived at the end of the sixth century. When the civil war between 
Ḵosrow II and Bahrām broke out, a Persian general who supported the shah’s rule, 
Mebodes, delivered a letter in Greek to the prisoners of war in this ‘new Antioch’, and 
promised that if they handed in the supporters of Bahrām, then they would be 
released: 
Romans, believers in Christ Jesus our Lord, send greetings to the 
inhabitants of Persian Antioch.…we have come to this land in order to 
rescue from the entrails of Persia you who have grown old in misery…so 
that our objective may achieve fulfillment and your yearning, brothers, may 
result in joy, surrender to us those who have fled to your city of Antioch 
and those who support Bahrām’s cause.204 
This letter was quoted by Theophylaktos in his work, and it must have been a quite 
touching message for the descendants of the deported Romans. Unfortunately, after 
the Jews and those involved in Bahrām’s revolution were executed, Mebodes went 
back on his word and collected the precious goods in Ctesiphon, and the Romans 
were never released back to the Empire by the Persians.205 
Other Roman captives were released by the Persians under certain conditions. 
When Kawād sought to sign a peace treaty with the Romans because of the 
approaching Sabir Huns, he sent back the ‘eminent people whom he had taken captive 
from Amida’, possibly in order to show his sincerity to the emperor and his envoy.206 
At the beginning the Roman magister officiorum Celer intended to execute these 
former Roman governors because of ‘their laxity that the places they were guarding 
had been delivered (to the enemy)’,207 but in the end they seem to have been forgiven. 
We also know that the steward of the church of Amida, Nonnos, was released back to 
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the Empire later and was even appointed as the bishop of Amida, but the context of 
his release remains unclear. 
In other cases the manner of the release and ransoming of the captives were 
intertwined. Having destroyed Sura and captured the remaining Romans. Prokopios 
reported that the shah, ‘either through motives of humanity or avarice, or as granting a 
favour to a woman’,208 wanted to sell them soon afterwards, and asked the bishop of 
Sergiopolis Kandidos to purchase these Romans. However, the Great King’s 
motivation deserves futher study. Although Kandidos refused this proposal at the 
beginning, the King of Kings seems to have been unyielding: he ordered the bishop to 
promise to pay off the money later in a contract.209 The captives from this frontier city 
were thus released by paying small sums of money.210 But Kandidos never paid off 
the remaining ransom. When the Great King led his soldiers to invade the Empire two 
years later, the bishop was detained, tortured and never released back to the Empire 
because he broke his promise, apparently because of lack of funds.211 
The second example also comes from Ḵosrow I’s Roman campaign in 540. After 
the sack of Antioch, the Roman ambassador agreed first to make a one-off payment of 
fifty kentenaria to the shah, and second to give the Persians five kentenaria 
annually.212 After Justinian ratified these terms, Ḵosrow I wanted to sell all of the 
captured Antiochenes to the Romans before his departure to profit once more.213 The 
eagerness of the Edessene people to rescue their compatriots was impressive: 
…there were not a person who did not bring ransom for the captives and 
deposit it in the sanctuary…the harlots took off all the adornment which 
they wore on their persons…any farmer who was in want of plate or of 
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money, but who had an ass or a sheep, brought this to the sanctuary with 
great zeal.214 
Unfortunately, this proposal was refused by Bouzes, who thought that ‘this (decision) 
would bring him some great gain’,215 and all the endeavours failed in the end. 
Some Romans, including the emperors themselves, noticed, and even responded 
to the news of the deportation of these captives. The examination of these events will 
be helpful in analyzing their attitudes. Having returned to the capital, the Roman 
envoy Probos reported what he had observed in the land of the Huns. However, 
Justinian merely ‘caused thirty mules to be loaded by the administration of the Roman 
cities that were near, and sent them with flour, wine, and oil, garments and other 
wares and sacred vessels…gave them the animals as a gift’.216 The comparison with 
Malalas’ account, in which the gifts, silver vessels and money were mentioned, 
suggests that the recipients of these lavish goods were the Christians among the Huns, 
presumably those who were converted by the missionaries from Caucasian Albania, 
rather than the surviving Amidenes.217 
Another example comes from the reign of Tiberios II. Having been captured 
from their homeland and taken to Persian territory, hatred and nostalgia would 
probably have been common among the prisoners of war. In the second half of the 
sixth century, those who were resettled in the Better Antioch of Ḵosrow endeavoured 
to escape to their homeland from southern Mesopotamia. They decided to cooperate 
with the Persian guards, and bribed one of them with 500 drachmae which were 
collected among the Romans. 218  One night two captives, Benjamin and Samuel, 
absconded from the city and sent a message to the reigning emperor Tiberios II. John 
of Ephesos quoted this letter in length: 
We are shut up here to the number of more than thirty thousand men; and 
the Persians who guard us are not more than five hundred. If…one Roman 
general be sent, and show himself outside the walls, we will slay the 
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Persians, and break out of the city, and return in safety to the Roman 
territories.219 
Nevertheless, this proposal was rejected by Tiberios II, who ‘paid it no attention, and 
acted as though it was not true’.220 
The narratives of John of Ephesos, as the sole source about this event, have to be 
scrutinised in order to date this conspiracy. The escaped captive Benjamin not only 
arrived at Constantinople successfully but also came to visit John himself.221 While 
this information may be justified because John of Ephesos spent the last decades of 
his life not very far away from the capital,222 it does not tell us the exact date of this 
event. The chronological order of John of Ephesos’ accounts in his Church History 
seems to be helpful.223 First he mentioned the strikes made by Maurice in 578 in 
Arzanene.224 After the narrative of these Roman captives’ failed attempt he then 
focused on the affairs on the eastern frontier, and talked about the life of Ḵosrow I,225 
the shah’s shock and anguish which resulted from the successful campaign of 
Maurice, and finally, his death in 579.226 Thus even though he inserted Maurice’s 
expedition with al-Mundhir which took place in 581227 abruptly before what happened 
in the Better Antioch of Ḵosrow, it may be safe to place this abortive uprising either 
in 578 or in 579. 
Prokopios   also  noted   the  deportation  of  Romans  who  were   sent   to   the  heart  of  
the  Persian  Empire  by  Ḵosrow  I  after  the  sack  of  Antioch.  After  Belisarios  arrived  in  
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the   East,   the   Romans   soon   undertook   an   invasion   of   the   Persian   Empire   and   even  
penetrated  into  Assyria  in  retaliation  for  the  shah’s  attack  in  540.  While  Arethas,  son  
of   Gabalas,   led   his   forces   crossed   the   Tigris   and   pillaged   many   places   without  
confronting   any   major   hindrance, 228   the   Romans’   success   was   limited 229   and  
Belisarios   soon   retreated   from   Mesopotamia.   In   the   Secret   History   Prokopios  
criticised  Belisarios  vehemently,  writing  that  had  Belisarios  not  been  distracted  by  the  
desire   to   meet   his   wife   Antonina,230  he   could   have   ‘reached   the   city   of   Ctesiphon  
without  encountering  any  opposition…rescued  the  prisoners  from  Antioch  and  all  the  
other  Romans  who  chanced  to  be  there’.231 
The first, and possibly the only case of rescuing the prisoners of war from the 
hands of the Sasanids in the sixth-century Romano-Persian wars was initiated by 
Justinian after the sack of Antioch. In 545, two envoys, the new magister militum 
Konstantianos and Sergios, proceeded to Ctesiphon in order to arrange a truce with 
the Persians.232 The Persians dictated terms to them: the Romans should give Ḵosrow 
I both money and a distinguished physician, Tribunos,233 so that the shah could ‘live 
with him for a year’.234 Being a man who was nurtured intellectually and ‘inferior to 
none in medical skill’,235 he had cured the Persian king of a severe illness before, and 
received many precious gifts.236 According to the continuator of Zachariah, he even 
became the archiatros, the chief physician of the shah.237 After his recovery from 
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sickness, Ḵosrow I told his doctor that ‘he could ask for whatever he wanted’.238 At 
this moment Tribunos asked for the release of certain Roman elites who were 
captured in wartime. 239  This time this Iranian king did demonstrate his political 
magnanimity: he not only released those who were requested by Tribunos because of 
their social status, but also sent more Roman captives back to their homeland.240  Since  
these  social  nobles  were  requested  by  name,  clearly  the  ambassador  must  have  had  a  
kind   of   register   in   which   such   details   were   mentioned   at   hand.   Therefore   while  
Ḵosrow  I’s  invasion  must  have  resulted  in  turmoil,  the  imperial  authority  might  have  
been  able  to  monitor  the  impact  of  the  Sasanids’  military  activities  on  the  social  elites. 
In the Chronicle of Seert another similar story was inserted between the 
persecution of Mar Aba, which was initiated by the Zoroastrian priests and the revolt 
of Ḵosrow I’s son in the middle of the sixth century. Having been struck by a serious 
disease, Ḵosrow I wrote to Justinian to send him a good doctor. Then a physician 
Trikhoma was sent to the shah by the Romans. Before the ambassador’s departure to 
Persia, the empress (i.e. Theodora) enjoined him to rescue the Romans from the 
Sasanids: ‘if the king offers you the gold mines, the money of the Persians, the pearls 
of the sea and the treasures of Ḵosrow I, don’t accept them…merely ask him to return 
the Christians from Antioch who had been taken as captives’.241 When the doctor 
begged Ḵosrow I to release these captives back to their homeland, the shah became 
furious and rejected this proposal immediately. It should be pointed out that in this 
work the kindness of the Iranian king of kings was emphasised again. Even if he 
refused the ambassador to release his captives, the shah still granted him luxurious 
gifts, while Theodora had this greedy physician executed later. 
The military activities of the Sasanids in Roman Syria and Mesopotamia before 
545 should be analyzed to establish the possible identity of those who were included 
in Tribunos’ checking list.242 After the invasion of Ḵosrow I in 540, the second blow 
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to the populations of the eastern provinces soon landed in 542. This time the target of 
the Persians was to penetrate into Roman Palestine and plunder the treasures of 
Palestine and Jerusalem.243 While the invaders must have laid waste across the land of 
frontier provinces,244 the main victims were those staying in Kallinikos, where many 
farmers were enslaved by the Persians. 245 This was possibly the only large-scale 
deportation made by Ḵosrow I in this period. Since there was no major conflict from 
532 to 540, and there was just one major deportation in the post-540 campaigns, most 
captives in the Persian Empire must have been captured in the 540s, either from 
Antioch or from Kallinikos. Although it is impossible to know how many nobles had 
been deported from these two cities respectively, it is likely that most of them would 
have been captured from Antioch, a rather populous and important city in Roman 
Syria, and some of them must have been mentioned in the ‘checklist’ of Tribunos. 
In this chapter, both literary and material data have been collected and used to 
investigate   the   deportees’   lives   outside   the   realm   of   the   Romans.   Clearly, being 
deported from the Empire seems to have been the norm, but it was not the end of the 
captured  Romans’  story.  Many  of  them  were  resettled  to  the  ‘pseudo-Roman  cities’, 
which were either established or rebuilt by the Great Kings. Some, if not all, of those 
who were deported from Amida, according to Pseudo-Zachariah, were sold to the 
Sabir Huns. Finally, if Theophylaktos is to be believed, some captives from Dara 
were cast into the royal prison in southwestern Iran. Much less detail regarding these 
Romans’  lives  can  be  uncovered  from  our  sources,  but  those  who  were  housed  in  the  
city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow seem to have received milder treatments. Although 
only Justinian managed to rescue civilians back to the Empire, other prisoners of war 
returned to their homeland via a variety of means; some of them passed through the 
mountainous area of the Caucasus, and others escaped from the prison. Those who 
had sought help from the Empire’s   authorities, however, failed in the end.
                                            
243  Prok.  Wars  2.20.18. 
244  The  Persians  had  tried  to  besiege  Sergiopolis  but  failed,  Prok.  Wars  2.20.1-16,  
Euagr.  HE  4.28,  cf.  Th.  Sim.  5.13.2. 
245  Prok  Wars  2.21.32,  Anecd.  3.31. 
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Chapter 6. Persian policies, imperial responses and civilians’ 
fates 
Although comparative textual analysis suggests that it is difficult to recover the 
particularity of people’s wartime experiences, for the accounts we have may lapse 
into the generic,1 some of the details of urban Romans’ misfortunes after their cities 
were conquered can be established through the examination of available sources.2 
While  people’s  wartime  experiences  at  different  places  and  occasions  sometimes  seem  
to   be   similar,   this   does   not   mean   that   civilians   living   in   every   city   in   the   Empire  
would  always  be   treated  by   the  Persians   in   the   same  way.   Instead, a more complex 
picture of their wartime experiences in the Persian wars emerges.   Both common 
features of these civilians’ wartime experiences in a sacked city and particularities 
gleaned from different case studies will certainly be included into our discussion. 
Thereafter, by examining both the Persians’ policies in treating the conquered 
Romans and imperial   authorities’   different   reactions   and   attitudes to the enemy’s 
invasions, this chapter aims to provide some overall explanations for Roman 
civilians’ fates in the conflicts between Rome and Persia.  
 
Persian perspectives 
Given the fact that no contemporary middle Persian text on the Romano-Persian wars 
has been preserved, it is risky to rely on Roman or Christian accounts to probe the 
Sasanids’ intentions and motivations. Nevertheless, some tentative remarks can still 
be made through a close examination of our case studies.  In  these  armed  conflicts  the  
Persians   would   either   attack   or   just   pass   by   a   Roman   city.   There   were   also   three  
possible   outcomes   of   their   attacks   and   sieges:   first,   the   siege  was   successful   and   a  
Roman   city   was   seized   by   the   Persians;;   second,   the   inhabitants   surrendered   to   the  
Persians,  and  finally  the  Persians  ended  a  city’s  siege.  In  these  cases  Roman  civilians’  
wartime   experiences  would   have   been   affected   by   a   range   of   factors.  There  were   a  
number  of  reasons  why  the  Persians  treated  cities  differently,  depending  on  strategic  
military,  economic  and  political   factors.  While   it  goes  without  saying   that   the  Great  
                                            
1  See  above,  chapter  2. 
2  See  above,  chapters  3-5. 
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King’s  military  activities  and  the  presence  of  his  army  in  the  territory  of  the  Empire  
must   have   been   decisive,   the   importance   of   the   invaders’   experiences   during   the  
sieges,   their   strategies   and   targets   in   campaigns,   and   finally,   the   conflicts’   eventual  
outcomes  should  not  be  overlooked.   
 
Sasanid wartime experiences 
The examination of our case studies suggests that while sometimes we can observe 
the cruelties and atrocities perpetrated by the Sasanids, in other cases a Roman city 
would have received lenient treatment: in the Anastasian war those living in 
Martyropolis (502) were treated kindly by Kawād, and no massacre was reported in 
Kallinikos (542) or Apamea (573). In this section I will argue that the difference 
between these cases can be explained by the invaders’ rather different wartime 
experiences. The difficulties of such long and perilous sieges, especially the Romans’ 
stubborn resistance and the difficult weather conditions, could have instigated 
Sasanids to inflict retribution on the survivors, such as to slaughter those cities’ 
remaining inhabitants, and, possibly, to send the captives of these places to more 
remote areas, either to the barbarians or to the imperial prison. I will examine some 
significant cases such as Amida, Antioch and Dara both to illustrate the circumstances 
faced by the Sasanids and to illustrate the possible connection between the invaders’ 
experiences and their treatment of the surviving Romans. 
        Both natural and human factors seem to have affected the rate of Persian 
casualties in their sieges of Roman cities. Apparently the chilly winter of northern 
Mesopotamia was not a suitable season for the Persians to initiate invasions, who 
were ‘brought up in a hot climate’.3 A sixth-century case illustrated the Persians’ 
difficulty in launching sieges effectively: when Kawād’s generals were laying siege to 
Martyropolis in 531, their activities were hindered by the adverse weather, along with 
rain and mud.4 More examples can be observed in the previous centuries. In 359, 
Shapur II decided to retreat to his homeland from the Empire because of ‘the rapidly 
approaching end of autumn and the rising of the unfavourable constellation of the 
                                            
3  Strategikon  11.1. 
4  Zach.  HE  9.6. 
 203 
Kids’. 5  Sokrates Scholastikos, the church historian of the fifth century, not only 
commented that ‘the races of Persia were greatly enfeebled and totally spiritless in 
winter…from their inability to endure cold, they abstain from military service at that 
season’, but also quoted a proverb ‘a Mede will not then draw his hand from 
underneath his cloak’6 when mentioning Julian the Apostate’s Persian campaign.  
        Although the Sasanids besieged both Amida and Dara in winter, it seems that the 
wintry weather only acted as a hindrance in the siege of Amida. If Prokopios is right, 
the siege of this frontier city from 502-3 seems not to have been planned by Kawād, 
who ‘invaded the land of the Armenians, moving with such rapidity…plundered the 
greater part of it in a rapid campaign’.7  While he must have observed the potential 
difficulties and risks of fighting in wintertime as his forces arrived at Amida in 
October of 502,8 Kawād still chose to besiege it, possibly thinking that to capture a 
frontier city like this would not be a difficult task. However, as we can observe from 
contemporary texts, the siege did not go smoothly, and the weather was unendurable 
for the besiegers: their clothes could not protect them in cold weather, and such 
adverse weather even made their bows less effective.9 
Several human-related factors need to be discussed, as well. Obviously, due to 
the lack of sources, we will never access the Persians’ voices, but a prolonged and 
difficult siege must have been extremely frustrating. 10  From 502 to 503, many 
Persians perished due to both the gruelling resistance of Amida’s inhabitants,11 who 
‘showed an unexpected fortitude in holding out against dangers and hardships’12 for 
                                            
5  Ammianus  19.9.1. 
6  Sokr.  HE  3.21.1-2. 
7  Prok.  Wars  1.7.3.  Cf.  Greatrex  1998:  83  on  Prokopios’  exaggeration  of  the  Great  
King’s  sudden  presence. 
8  Zach.  HE  7.3. 
9  Ibid.  See  also  Strategikon  11.1:  ‘They  (i.e.  the  Persians)  are  really  bothered  by  cold  
weather,  rain…all  of  which  loosen  their  bow  strings’. 
10  Lee  2007a:  136,  Lenski  2007:  232. 
11  Josh.  Styl.  53,  Prok.  Wars  1.7.27. 
12  Prok.  Wars  1.7.4. 
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almost one hundred days. 13  In 573, the Persians underwent many difficulties in 
besieging Dara, arguably the most important fortress of the Empire’s eastern front, 
and many of them were killed as well.14 Compared with most of the cases of conflicts 
between Rome and Persia in the sixth century, the siege of Dara in 573 was surely the 
longest one. Euagrios wrote that the Persian king spent more than five months 
besieging this Roman fortress continuously,15 but the Sasanids actually attacked this 
frontier fortress for approximately six months.16 
While in other cases he Sasanids finished the siege of a Roman city swiftly, and 
sometimes the Romans chose either to surrender their city or to pay ransom to the 
Great King, the enemy occasionally encountered fierce resistance at cities like Sura 
and Antioch. In  the  absence  of  any  precise  date,  it  is  difficult  to  know  how  long  the  
siege   of   these   two   cities   in   540   persisted.   Since   the   Persians   penetrated   into   the  
Empire   in   spring,   and   reached   the   border   in   Mesopotamia   again   by   the   end   of  
summer,17  apparently   both   of   them  would   have   been   stormed   by   the   Persians   in   a  
short  time.  Therefore,  the  mass  killings  in  Sura  and  Antioch  would  have  resulted  from  
the   fierce   opposition   they   encountered.   In   the   Buildings,   Prokopios   stated   that   ‘it  
(Sura)  did  not  hold  him  (Ḵosrow I)  off  for  so  much  as  a  half-hour,  but  was  captured  
immediately  by  the  Persians’.18  Such  a  statement,  which  emphasises  the  vulnerability  
of  Sura’s  previous   fortifications  and   the  achievement  of   Justinian,  who   ‘surrounded  
the  entire  fortress  with  a  very  stout  wall…that  it  should  no  longer  yield  to  the  enemy's  
assaults’,19  in   the   post-540   period,   may   have   been   an   exaggeration.   The   Romans,  
under   the   leadership  of   the  Armenian  general  Arsaces,  defended   their   city   valiantly  
and   killed   many   Persians   (…ἐνθένδε   τε   μαχόμενος   ἰσχυρότατα   καὶ   πολλοὺς   τῶν  
πολεμίων   κτείνας,…)20  when   Ḵosrow I   decided   to   attack   the   fortifications   of   Sura.  
                                            
13  Josh.  Styl.  53,  Chr.  Ede.  80. 
14  Mich.  Syr.  10.9. 
15  Euagr.  HE  5.10. 
16  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5,  Chr.  1234  66. 
17  Prok.  Wars  2.13.29. 
18  Prok.  Aed.  2.9.1. 
19  Ibid.,  2.9.2. 
20  Prok.  Wars  2.5.11. 
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While  the  inhabitants  soon  decided  to  surrender  their  city  because  of  the  unexpected  
death   of   their   general,   the   shah   was   angered   by   the   Romans’   resistance.   After   the  
departure  of  the  reinforcements  led  by  Theoktistos  and  Molatzes,21  the  Antiochenes’  
resistance   was   impressive,   and   they   even   strove   to   drive   the   invaders   back  
courageously  with  the  few  weapons  at  hand  after  Ḵosrow I’s  soldiers  had  successfully  
entered  into  this  metropolis,22  was  impressive. 
These cases, together with the prolonged sieges of both Amida and Dara, deserve 
further study to investigate the contexts of the defenders’ resistance. The prolonged 
and fierce resistance during a city’s siege would have been determined by the 
situation both outside and inside the targeted city. Although the Persians besieged 
many Roman cities in the sixth century, these cases can actually be divided into two 
categories in terms of these sieges’ different circumstances. In most cases, the Great 
King merely asked the Romans in a certain city to pay ransom, and the fortifications 
were assaulted only if the request was denied. However, it is interesting to note that 
the Persians promptly attacked the Empire’s frontier cities such as Amida, Sura and 
Dara, and managed to capture them as soon as possible. It could thus have been a to-
fight-or-die situation for the Romans, and usually the defenders fought tooth and nail 
to defend their cities. 
The sense of solidarity among the defenders could have been another important 
factor. Noel Lenski suggested that apart from the civilian population’s solidarity, the 
soldiers, presumably the limitanei, usually garrisoned the same place for a long time, 
and they would have assiduously resisted in wartime.23 In addition, the presence of 
ecclesiastical, civic and military leaders, together with substantial forces, would have 
appeased the uneasiness among a besieged city’s population and boosted their 
morale.24 Prokopios highlighted the role played by the forces of   Theoktistos   and  
Molatzes in strengthening the Antiochenes’ morale in 540,25 and the Romans at Dara 
                                            
21  Ibid.,  2.8.17. 
22  Cf.  Prok.  Wars  1.17.37,  in  which  al-Mundhir’s  observation  was  provided. 
23  Lenski  2007:  231. 
24  Cf.  above,  pp.  141-2. 
25  Prok.  Wars  2.8.2. 
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warded off the Persians successfully under the leadership of Martinos.26 The retreat or 
death of these commanders, however, did not always lead to the collapse of the 
Romans’ morale. 27  In 540, the Romans at Sura decided to surrender after their 
commander, Arsaces, was killed;28 but in 573, more than 30 years later, the siege of 
Dara lasted for six months even though Sergios, the dux Mesopotamiae, was killed 
during the siege.29 Bishops could motivate their flock’s resistance, but in a number of 
instances we learn that sometimes the Romans defended their cities courageously 
without them. While the bishop of Amida died before the arrival of Kawād’s forces,30 
the Sasanids spent more than three months in besieging this city. Seventy years later, 
the bishop of Dara deserted his post and left the city  before  the  siege  began,  but  the  
inhabitants’  stubborn  resistance  was  well  attested  by  both  Greek  and  Syriac  texts. 
An interesting, but controversial issue of the Persians’ experiences was the 
mockery of the Romans against the military skills of the Persians’ commander, that is, 
the Great King,31 a repeated scenario in contemporary Greek and Syriac accounts. 
Having observed that the attacks of the Persians proved to be ineffectual, the 
Amidenes, according to Pseudo-Zachariah, ‘the disorderly ones’, 32  ‘began to 
laughingly jeer at the barbarians from the fortifications’,33 and some prostitutes even 
‘shamelessly drew up their clothing and displayed themselves to Kawād…those parts 
of a woman’s body which it is not proper that men should see uncovered’.34 In 540, 
the citizens of Antioch not only ‘heaped insults upon Ḵosrow I from the battlements 
and taunted him with unseemly laughter’35 but also managed to shoot Paulos, the 
                                            
26  Ibid.,  2.13.16. 
27  Contra  Petersen  2013:  317. 
28  Ibid.,  2.5.12,  cf.  Lenski  2007:  232. 
29  Cf.  PLRE  III:  s.v.  Sergius  7  for  the  successful  military  experiences  of  Sergios,  the  
commander-in-chief  of  the  Romans. 
30  Zach.  HE  7.3. 
31  Petersen  2013:  318. 
32  Zach  HE  7.4. 
33  Prok.  Wars  1.7.17. 
34  Ibid.,  1.7.18. 
35  Ibid.,  2.8.6. 
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interpreter who was sent by the Great King to ask money from the Romans, to death. 
Ḵosrow I, being irritated by such premeditated provocations, commanded his soldiers 
to storm the fortification.36 More than thirty years later, the confident defenders of 
Dara despised the king, saying that ‘he (Ḵosrow I) will get only shame from this as 
from his other attempts’ when the attacks were renewed by the Persians. 37 
Nevertheless scholars suggested that some of these accounts could have been literary 
commonplaces,38 and it is impossible to probe into the Sasanids’ perception and 
understanding of these activities. The connection between their embarrassing 
experiences and the Great King’s treatment of the defeated Romans cannot be 
established with certainty. 
During  such  deadly  conflicts  against  the  Romans,  many  Persians  must  have  been  
killed   as   the   sieges   progressed,   and   the   casualties   of   the   Persian   nobles   were  
sometimes   considerable. Here,   we   can   notice   the   clearest   relationship   between   the  
besiegers’   experiences   and   their   treatments   of   and   retaliations   against   the   defeated  
Romans   in   the  postwar  period.39  Having  been  persuaded  by   the  peers  of   those  dead  
magnates,   the  shah  could  have  ordered   the subsequent massacre as a vindictive and 
bloody punishment. Pseudo-Zachariah mentioned the thirst of the Persians for 
revenge in 503; some important officers approached Kawād, saying that ‘Our families 
and our brothers have been killed in battle by the inhabitants of the city’.40 Thus, they 
                                            
36  Ibid.,  2.8.7. 
37  Joh,  Eph.  HE  6.5. 
38  Debié  2003:  619-21. 
39  The  atrocities  committed  by  the  enemy  in  531 could have instigated the Roman 
commanders to take revenge on the Persians later. For the opinions of these generals, 
Belisarios and the Roman soldiers at Kallinikos, see Prok. Wars 1.18.16-26, Greatrex 
1998: 198-9. Civilians’ calamities must  have  become  known  to  local  people,  Mal.  
18.59,  see  also  Zach.  HE  8.5.  I owe this idea to Geoffrey Greatrex. 
40  What  happened  in  the  aftermath  of  the  siege  of  Naples  in  536  is  illuminating.  
Having  eventually  crushed  the  resistance  of  the  Goths,  according  to  Prokopios,  the  
soldiers  of  Belisarios,  ‘were possessed with fury, especially those who had chanced to 
have a brother or other relative slain in the fighting at the wall’,  began  to  slaughter  
everyone  they  encountered  indiscriminately,  Prok.  Wars  5.10.29. 
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asked their king to give them one tenth of the population ‘as compensation for 
vengeance’. 41  Kawād agreed with their proposal, and his soldiers ‘gathered and 
counted out and gave to them in proportion to the group’.42 Then these Romans were 
executed in every manner. 
In  540  Ḵosrow  I  became  furious  and  wanted  to  punish  the  inhabitants  of  Sura  as  
these   Romans,   instead   of   surrendering   their   city,   raised   against   his   soldiers   with  
weapons  and  slain  many  Persian  notables.43  Later,  while  his   troops  who  had  entered  
Antioch  encountered  opposition,   the  Great  King  had  not  yet  decided  what   to  do:  he  
then  called  the  ambassadors,  presumably  in  order  to  discuss  something  with  them44—
possibly  in  order  to  extort  a  large  amount  of  money  from  the  inhabitants.  However,  at  
that   moment   a   certain   Persian   officer   Zaberganes,   whose   opinions   could   have  
represented  the  sentiments  of  the  Persians  whose  relatives  or  comrades  were  killed  or  
injured  by  the  Romans  in  the  siege,  stated  that  the  citizens  should  be  punished: 
…they   (i.e.   the   Antiochenes)   both   before   fighting   offer   insults   to   your  
kingdom   (i.e.   the   Persian   Empire),   and   when   they   are   defeated   dare   the  
impossible   and   do   the   Persians   irreparable   harm…these  men   have   set   an  
ambush   in   a   captured   city   and   are   destroying   the   victors   by   means   of  
snares…45 
Such  words  can  be  studied  together  with  what  the  shah  told  the  Roman  ambassadors  
in  the  sack  of  Antioch:  ‘all  the  notables  of  the  Persians  were  harassing  me  unceasingly  
with   their   demand   that   I   should   drag   the   city   as   with   a   net   and   destroy   all   the  
captives’.46   We   do   not   know   whether   it   was   the   shah’s   pretext   of   the   post-siege  
massacre,   but   clearly   the   death   of   Persian   soldiers   and   magnates   must   have   been  
unendurable  for  the  surviving  Persian  nobles  and  the  shah  himself. 
Last but not least, fierce resistance could possibly lead to the cruel treatment of 
Roman prisoners of war. Due to our lack of our knowledge about the Sabir Huns and 
                                            
41  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Prok.  Wars  2.5.14. 
44  Ibid.,  2.8.30. 
45  Ibid.,  2.8.31-2. 
46  Ibid.,  2.9.6. 
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their economic relationship with the Sasanids in the sixth century,47 it is difficult to 
contextualise the selling of the Amidene prisoners of war by Kawād in the early sixth 
century, and we do not know whether he had intended to replenish his treasury by 
selling these Romans to the nomads. These captives might have been exiled for the 
second time to the distant land by the shah because of the difficulties his forces faced 
in the siege of this frontier city. In the second half of the sixth century, the contrast 
between the treatment of those from Apamea and Dara is evident. The forces of 
Adarmahan subdued the former almost without resistance, but the shah himself and 
his troops had experienced a tortuous siege at Dara for six months. While the 
Apameans were sent to the city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow, it is not unreasonable that 
Ḵosrow I would have treated the deportees from Dara, particularly the surviving 
social elites more harshly and interned them in the imperial prison. 
 
Economic profits 
The acquisition of portable wealth from the Empire was crucial for the Persians;48 
they seized valuable goods or, more frequently, bullion from the cities they sacked, 
conquered, or even just passed. The situation inside both the Empire and the Persian 
court needs to be analyzed briefly in order to understand why the Persians plundered 
the possession of the Romans so regularly. 
       Based on literary and material sources, what follows is a brief examination of the 
possible wealth accumulated by the citizens living in the cities attacked or targeted by 
the Sasanids. Considering our lack of detailed knowledge about the activities of 
Persian spies or informants, we cannot assume that the Persians would obtain all 
relevant information about every city of the Roman Empire, but sometimes they seem 
to have known what kinds of wealth were possessed by those living in their target 
cities. When  Ḵosrow   I and   his   forces   arrived   at  Euphratesia   in   542,   he   intended   to  
‘lead  the  army  straight  for  Palestine,  in  order  that  he  might  plunder  all  their  treasures  
and   especially   those   in   Jerusalem’.49  Such   information   might   have   come   from   the  
                                            
47  On  the  trade  relations  between  them,  see  the  short  article  by  Richard  Frye,  Frye  
1972:  263-9. 
48  Daryaee  2009:  143-4. 
49  Prok.  Wars  2.20.18. 
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Samaritans,   who,   having   revolted   in   the   reign   of   Justinian,   went   over   to   Kawād,  
promising   that   they  would   hand   over   Jerusalem,   ‘a   city  which   possessed   donations  
from  various  emperors,  both  a  large  sum  of  gold  amd  an  untold  quantity  of  precious  
stones’   to   the   Sasanids. 50   Relevant   information   obtained   from   their   allies   was  
important   as   well.   For   instance,   al-Mundhir, the Lakhmid king, told Kawād that 
Antioch ‘surpassed all the cities of the Empire in wealth, size and population’ when 
Kawād managed to launch attacks against the Romans again in 531.51  Therefore, 
clearly considerable wealth could still have been housed by its inhabitants of this 
metropolis even after the earthquakes in 526 and 528.  
        The inhabitants of the Empire’s cities must have accumulated considerable 
wealth in the sixth century. Being one of the wealthiest cities of Roman Syria and the 
capital of Syria Secunda from the beginning of the fifth century, the wealth of 
Apamea is well attested by both literary and material sources. John of Ephesos 
thought that this city ‘was full of the accumulated wealth of many years, and rich 
beyond most of the cities of the east’.52 In the itinerary of Antoninus, a pilgrim of the 
sixth century, this city was said to be one of the most splendid of Syria Secunda.53 
Euagrios, who came from Epiphania, a city not far away from this metropolis, 
reported that Apamea was eventually ruined by time at the second half of the sixth 
century,54 but this image was disproved by the results of a series of archaeological 
campaigns by Belgian archaeologists.55 In the sixth century, a series of buildings were 
erected under the sponsorship of different social groups.56 For example, in the case of 
the cathedral, the generosity of bishops and ecclesiastical authorities was proved by 
                                            
50  Mal.  18.54,  cf.  Theoph.  A.M.  6021,  where  he  mistakenly  stated  that  it  was  Ḵosrow  
I who  was  lured  with  this  proposal. 
51  Prok.  Wars  1.17.36.  On  the  wealth  of  Antioch,  see  Liebeschuetz  1972:  92-100.  For  
the  territorium  of  it,  see  40-1,  61-73. 
52  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6. 
53  Antonini  Placentini  Itinerarium  46. 
54  Euagr.  HE  5.10. 
55  See  Balty  1989:  83,  87,  90-2  for  the  building  works  conducted  in  the  sixth  century. 
56  Balty  1989:  91. 
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the contents of mosaic inscriptions. 57  Also, the rebuilding of a huge villa (the 
Triclinos House) in 539, possibly with its amazing mosaic decorations, suggested that 
at least in the reign of Justinian the local elites still held sufficient wealth to undertake 
such a significant building scheme.58 
After its construction at the beginning of the sixth century,59 the population and 
wealth of Dara, a city ‘heavily fortified at the throats of the Persians’,60 grew rapidly 
since the emperor ‘freed all of the settlers61…donated to each one his own land and 
his own dwelling…contributed several hundred pounds of gold for the building of the 
church of the city’.62 In order to erect this city as quickly as possible, Anastasios 
demonstrated his generosity by providing a very large payment to the workers,63 and 
gave the first bishop, Eutychian, ‘gifts of sacred vessels and gold’ for ‘the 
establishment of ecclesiastical buildings’.64 Since  this  city  had  never  been  conquered  
since   its   foundation,   these   precious   items   could   have   been   preserved   in   its   church  
until  the  Persians’  invasion  in  the  reign  of  Justin  II. 
In the campaign of 573, the wealth of this frontier city must have increased for 
other reasons. In the fifth clause of the peace treaty in 562, both the Romans and the 
Sasanids agreed that ‘Saracen and all other barbarian merchants of either state shall 
                                            
57  According   to   the   four   inscriptions  found  at   the  pavement  of   the  porch,   the  chapel  
and  other  places,  it  was  bishop  Paul  who  conducted  these  building  works  around  533,  
Balty  1989:  86-7. 
58  J.  Ch.  Balty  1969:  112-3,  Foss  1997:  218,  cf.  Balty  1981:  85. 
59  Dara  was  founded  not  long  after  the  Romans’  reoccupation  of  Amida.  The  
construction  of  this  important  citadel  was  reported  in  Greek,  Syriac  and  Latin  texts,  
Prok.  Wars  1.10.13-7,  Joh.  Lyd.  De  Mag.  3.28,  Zach.  7.6.  Also,  see  a  lost  work  of  
Marcellinus  Comes  for  the  dispatch  of  the  outstanding  craftsmen.  For  the  translation,  
see  Croke  1995:  40,  for  the  introduction  of  this  work,  see  Croke  1984b:  77-88. 
60  Joh.  Lyd.  De  Mag.  3.47. 
61  They  were  probably  the  tenant  farmers,  Greatrex  et  al.  2011:  249. 
62  Zach.  HE  7.6. 




not go by strange roads but shall go by Nisibis and Dara’.65 Of course the main 
concern of this clause was the control of these mobile merchants and traders between 
Rome and Persia for they ‘shall not cross into foreign territory without official 
permission’. 66  This agreement would have made these two frontier cities trade 
centres, and those living in Dara must have benefitted from these commercial 
activities. 67  In addition, in Late Antiquity, the villagers took refuge in nearby 
strongly-fortified cities in wartime in order to avoid any possible misfortunes. Since 
for those living in the adjacent areas Dara seemed to be an impregnable citadel, many 
civilians ‘fled thither, carrying their valuables with them’ when the army of Ḵosrow I 
penetrated into their homeland in 573.68 Therefore, we can assume that at the end of 
this year what his soldiers plundered from this city must have included the wealth of 
both Dara’s inhabitants and the refugees who sojourned inside this citadel in wartime. 
An examination of what Kawād did in the Anastasian War indicates that the 
thirst for bullion from the Romans was his primary goal.69 In the era of Balaš, the 
Persians already had to pay tribute to the Hephthalites,70 and the shah ‘found the 
Persian treasury empty and the land ravaged by the Huns’.71 The situation was so 
desperate that the Great King could not maintain his army.72 At the end of the fifth 
century, the newly-enthroned Kawād sent an embassy to the Romans to extort money 
but was then refused by Anastasios.73 Several years later, the situation became even 
worse, and the shah again tried to solve his acute financial problems by trying to 
extort the emperor. This proposal, however, was rejected again.74 Kawād had no 
                                            
65  Menander  fr.  6.1. 
66  Ibid.   On   the   discussion   of   the  merchants,   the   spies   and   information-gathering   in  
Late  Antiquity,  see  Donner  1989:  76-8,  Lee  1993b:  175-6,  Kagan  2011:  162-9. 
67  Mango  1975:  224-5. 
68  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.6. 
69  See  Haarer  2006:  51-3  for  a  short  review  on  these  events. 
70  Prok.  Wars  1.4.35,  Christensen  1944:  297. 
71  Josh.  Styl.  18. 
72  Ibid.,  19. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Prok.  Wars  1.7.1-2,  Theoph.  A.M.  5996. 
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choice now, and then the only, and probably the easiest way of acquire profits was to 
launch a war and seize wealth from the Romans. 
The hunger for booty to replenish the treasury of the Persian Empire would thus 
have prompted the Sasanids to break the peace and launch a sudden attack on the 
Empire.75 What the Sasanids needed in the early sixth century is illustrated by their 
military operations: some Persian forces and their allies were dispatched to harass the 
frontier zone of the Empire and obtained considerable booty from Edessa, Konstantia 
and other places.76 When Kawād found that it was difficult to conquer Amida, he 
asked for a small amount of money from the defenders, saying that he would 
withdraw from this city with such gifts.77 Therefore while the Persians devoted so 
much energy and time to attack Amida, clearly to take something valuable remained 
important. In Ḵosrow I’s campaign in 573, it seems that the acquisition of wealth 
remained vital for the Sasanids as well. When the Great King found that Dara might 
be too well-defended to be conquered, he asked the inhabitants to ransom their city by 
paying tributes, and said that he would withdraw from the battlefield.78 
Having conquered Amida, this frontier city could have been regarded by Kawād 
as a bargaining chip, and it was said that he sent an envoy to extort money from 
Anastasios.79 When the Sasanids arrived at Edessa later, at the beginning they tried to 
extract money from the inhabitants rather than engaging in a serious siege: the Persian 
astabed Bawi told Areobindos that ‘'If you want us to make peace, give us 10,000 
pounds of gold, and ratify with us a treaty giving us the customary gold each year’.80 
Although Areobindos agreed to send 7,000 pounds of gold, the Sasanids were not 
satisfied with it. Later, Kawād himself not only requested the hostages and money 
from the defenders in exchange for withdrawing from Edessa but also even sent 
                                            
75  Josh.  Styl.  50,  Prok.  Wars  1.7.3. 
76  Josh.  Styl.  51-2. 
77  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
78  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.5,  Chr.  1234  66. 
79  Josh.  Styl.  54. 
80  Ibid.,  59.   
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Hormozd, another Persian envoy, soon afterwards to collect 300 pounds of it as a kind 
of downpayment.81 
Kawād’s aim of extracting money from the Romans can be illustrated by another 
event. Having noticed the escape of Roman soldiers because of the chilly winter in 
504, the Persian astabed gave the Roman magistros Celer an ultimatum, saying that 
the besiegers should let the remaining Persians get out of Amida safely or accept a 
new wave of attacks from the Sasanids. We know much less about the details of the 
negotiation, but it is highly possible that once again the Persians managed to extort as 
much money as possible. Apart from what they had plundered in 503, in January 505, 
the remaining Sasanids were permitted to leave Amida, ‘carrying as much as they 
could’.82 Pseudo-Joshua wrote that Anastasios sent gifts and a golden table-service to 
Kawād.83 In the Church History of Pseudo-Zachariah, the Romans gave the shah 
1,100 pounds of gold in exchange for peace and the control of this city.84 
While   it   is   unclear   whether   the   depleted   treasury   was   Ḵosrow   I’s   main  
motivation   for   resuming  hostilities   in   the   spring  of  540,85  we   learn   from  Prokopios’  
Wars  that  acquiring  booty  and  bullion  was  his  main  target,  and  the  annihilation  of  the  
Roman   forces   or   the   annexation   of   the   cities   was   never   a   strategically   important  
object  for  the  Sasanids:  in  most  cases  they  simply  asked  for  money  from  local  people  
and  departed  without  attacking  either   the  soldiers  or   the  civilians   inside  these  urban  
communities.  Having   sacked   Sura,   the   Sasanids   approached  Hierapolis,   a   city  with  
mighty  fortifications  and  many  soldiers,86  and  asked  for  money  from  the  inhabitants;;  
the   shah   acquired   2,000   pounds   of   silver   and   departed.   When   the   bishop   Megas  
entreated  the  shah  on  behalf  of  the  citizens  of  the  East,  Ḵosrow  I  promised  that  after  
                                            
81  Ibid.,  61. 
82  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
83  Josh.  Styl.  81. 
84  Zach.  HE  7.5-6,  cf.  Prok.  Wars  1.9.4  and  Theoph.  A.M.  5998,  in  which  1000  
pounds  of  gold  and  3  talents  were  referred  respectively.   
85  Blockley  1985:  71,  Tate  2004:  751,  Greatrex  2005:  488,  cf.  Christensen  1944:  366,  
Howard-Johnston  1995:  214. 
86  Prok.  Wars  2.6.22. 
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receiving  ten  kentenaria  of  gold  he  would  lead  his  forces  back  to  Persia.87  At  Beroea,  
Ḵosrow   I   demanded   double   the   amount   of   what   he   had   received   from   the  
Hierapolitans   after   noticing   that   the   walls   were   fragile. 88   At   the   beginning   the  
inhabitants  agreed  with  this  proposal,  but  they  only  gave  2,000  pounds  of  silver  to  the  
Persians,89  a  decision  which  led  to  the  subsequent  plundering  and  destruction  of  their  
city.90  The   request  of  money  was  made   through  Paulos,   the   shah’s   interpreter,  upon  
arriving  at  Antioch.91  Prokopios  further  suggested  that  the  Shahanshah  ‘would  accept  
even  less  than  this  for  withdrawing’. 
The  Sasanids  kept  demanding  money  after   leaving  Antioch.  Ḵosrow   I  not  only  
made  an  agreement  with  the  ambassador  that  he  would  receive  1,000  pounds  of  silver  
in  exchange  for  not  inflicting  any  harm  to  the  Apameans92  but  also  asked  the  bishop  to  
give   him   ‘not   only   1,000   pounds   of   silver,   nor   even   ten   times   that   amount,   but  
whatsoever  treasures  were  stored  there…being  all  of  gold  and  silver  and  of  marvelous  
great  size’.93  Finally,   the  citizens  of  Chalkis  and   those   living   in   the  cities  of  Roman  
Mesopotamia  like  Edessa,  Konstantia  and  Dara  were  also  forced  to  ransom  their  city  
by  paying  tribute.94 
Ḵosrow  I  once  again  tried  to  extort  money  from  the  Edessenes  in  543.95  What  his  
envoy   said   in   the   process   of   negotiation   needs   to   be   discussed   further.   If   Edessa’s  
citizens,  the  Great  King  suggested,  did  not  want  to  send  him  Peter  and  Peranios,  the  
Roman  generals  who  bravely  defended  the  city,  96  they  could  choose  either  to  give  the  
                                            
87  Ibid.,  2.6.25,  cf.  ibid.,  2.9.8.  Prokopios  might  have  implied  that  the  shah  would  eat  
his  words  later  for  the  Persians  eventually  sacked  Antioch  soon  afterwards. 
88  Ibid.,  2.7.5. 
89  Ibid.,  2.7.6. 
90  Ibid.,  2.7.19. 
91  Ibid.,  2.8.4. 
92  Ibid.,  2.11.3. 
93  Ibid.,  2.11.24. 
94  Ibid.,  2.12.2,  33-4,  2.13.8,  28.  The  Romans  of  Dara  paid  a  thousand  pounds  of  
silver  to  Ḵosrow I. 
95  Ibid.,  2.26.13. 
96  Ibid.,  2.26.25ff. 
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Sasanids  500  kentenaria  of  gold97  or  to  offer  their  wealth  to  the  invaders:  ‘receive  into  
the   city   some  of  his   associates  who  would   search  out   all   the  money,  both   gold  and  
silver…bring   it   to   him,   allowing   everything   else   to   remain   in   the   possession   of   the  
present  owners’.98 
Jairus  Banaji  argued  that  the  amount  was  the  Great  King’s  estimation  of  Edessa’s  
wealth. 99   Of   course,   the   Persians   must   have   been   aware   of   the   possible   wealth  
amassed   by   the   Romans   in   Edessa;;   in   the   seventh   century,   the   Sasanids   snatched  
112,000  pounds  of  silver  from  its  churches.100  However,  since  no  statistical  data  about  
Edessa’s  wealth  has  ever  been  preserved,  it   is  impossible  to  know  how  rich  this  city  
was   in   the  middle  of   the   sixth   century.   In   addition,   as   shown  already,   this   extortion  
was  actually  an  alternative  provided  by   the  Sasanids  when   the  envoys  were   sent  by  
the  Edessenes,  who  had  been  terrified  by  the  enemies’  attack;;  and  in  this  case,  Ḵosrow 
I’s  utmost   target  was   threatening   the  Romans   to  send   to   the  Sasanids   these  generals  
who  defended  Edessa  at  that  moment.101  Therefore,  such  a  phrase  should  be  regarded  
as   an  exorbitant  demand  made  by   the   shah  who   intended   to  disarm   the  Romans  by  
having   them  deliver   their  military   leaders   to  him,   rather   than  a   sober   assessment  or  
survey  made  by  the  shah  in  wartime. 
While   the   Persians   extorted   money   from   the   Romans   frequently   in   the   sixth  
century,  they  did  not  always  plunder  wherever  they  visited  or  conquered.  Rather,  they  
seem  to  have  intended  to  seize  the  Empire’s  wealth  as  effectively  as  they  could.  If  a  
city   were   too   poor   to   be   extorted,   or,   in   some   cases,   it   had   been   plundered   in   the  
previous  campaigns,  they  would  keep  it  intact  and  turn  their  attention  to  other  targets  
instead  of  invading  it  to  no  avail.  Before  reaching  Sura  in  the  spring  of  540,  Ḵosrow 
I’s  army  arrived  at  the  nearby  area  of  Zenobia,  a  city  which  was  founded  by  Zenobia,  
a  queen  of  the  Palmyrene  Empire.102  Having  observed  that  there  was  nothing  that  he  
                                            
97  At  the  end  Ḵosrow  I  only  received  five  kentenaria  from  the  Edessenes,  see  ibid.,  
2.27.46. 
98  Ibid.,  2.26.39. 
99  Banaji  2002:  227. 
100  Chr.  1234  96. 
101  Prok.  Wars  2.26.38. 
102  Ibid.,  2.5.4. 
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could   extort   because   ‘the   land   was   untenanted   and   destitute   of   all   good   things’,103  
Ḵosrow  I simply forced this city to surrender and departed with his forces. When  the  
Sasanids  invaded  the  Empire  again  in  542,  there  was  no  need  to  plunder  or  attack  the  
citadels   of   Euphratesia   because   ‘he   (i.e.   Ḵosrow I)   had   previously   taken  
everything…as   far   as   Syria,   partly   by   capture   and   partly   by   exacting   money’. 104  
While  Apamea  was  plundered  more  than   thirty  years   later,   the  Persians   left  Antioch  
intact.   In   fact,   Adarmahan did not approach this metropolis himself; instead, he 
directed parts of his forces,105 possibly both to detect whether substantial Roman 
forces had been stationed there or not and, if possible, to try to capture precious 
goods. Having experienced setbacks in attacking this city, Adarmahan decided to 
retreat instead of besieging it. 
The Persians must also have enjoyed the economic benefits of transporting the 
Roman deportees into their empire, and the  possible  profits   could  have  been  multi-
faceted.  In  some  cases  the  capture,  detention  and  release  of  Romans  from  conquered  
places   could   have   procured  more   benefits   for   the   Persians.   In   540   the   Great   King  
twice  tried  to  sell  his  captives  from  Sura  and  Antioch  back  to  the  Romans.  Therefore  
what  Ḵosrow  I  cared  about  at  that  time  was  how  to  extort  money  from  the  Romans  as  
far  as  he  could,  more  than  transporting  the  captives  back  to  his  realm.  These  captives  
might  have  been  considered  to  be  a  ‘bargaining  chip’  by  the  Persians  to  extort  more  
money  from  the  emperor.   
At the beginning of the sixth century, the Persians must have appreciated the 
expertise of some captured Romans, for they, together with local nobles, were called 
the ‘king’s captives’.106 Several possible explanations of Kawād’s motivations and 
purposes in transporting these Roman craftsmen can be provided. The deportation of 
craftsmen from the Roman Empire seems to have been common in Late Antiquity,107 
and the Great King could have used these Romans as ‘technical staff’ in his empire. 
In the third century, the Roman captives were recruited in the construction works of 
                                            
103  Ibid.,  2.5.7. 
104  Ibid.,  2.20.17. 
105  Euagr.  HE  5.9. 
106  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
107  See,  for  example,  Peeters  1924:  307,  cf.  Tafazzoli  1974:  191-6. 
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the Persian Empire’s infrastructure projects.108 Furthermore, the use of mosaic in the 
palace complex of Bīšāpūr, a city built by Shapur I, was attested by extant material 
traces as well.109 Nonetheless, since the building scheme of the city Better Amida of 
Kawād cannot be re-established with any certainty, it is impossible to tell whether the 
Great King actually employed the Amidenes in the building works of this city in the 
sixth century. In the Chronicle of Seert, Kawād established many villages and 
cities.110 Once again, we cannot rule out the possibility that the craftsmen from Amida 
could have possibly been regarded as an important source of manpower, but further 
conclusions cannot be made because of the lack of any further details.  
Scholars had pointed out that after the Amidenes were transported by Kawād 
into Persia, the city Better Amida of Kawād in which they were settled became an 
important centre of linen production,111 but further information cannot be extracted 
because of the fragility of textile products.112 Since this city was located at the frontier 
between the provinces of Fārs and Kūzestān, the craftsmen from Amida could have 
been sent there in order to produce luxury items. From the sixth century onwards, 
possibly because of its resources and location,113 this place developed as an important 
commercial centre, 114  and the local mint seems to have operated even after the 
Muslim conquest.115 While we do not know whether the Sasanids managed to export 
                                            
108  For  the  archaeological  evidences  of  these  works,  see  al-Ṭabari  1.827,  see  also  Lieu  
1986:  478. 
109  Canepa  2009:  75-8  for  relevant  discussion.  For  the  ‘Roman’  elements  at  Bīšāpūr, 
see Ghirshman 1938: 13, 1962: 159, cf. Keall 1989: 287-9. 
110  See  below,  p.  220  for  further  discussion. 
111  Gaube  1986:  519-20,  Christensen  1993:  174,  cf.  Wiesehöfer  1996:  193  for  earlier  
cases  in  the  Sasanian  Empire  and  Canard  and  Cahen:  1960:  345  for  the  information  
from  the  Islamic  period. 
112  Bier  2013:  947. 
113  Barthold  1984:  165. 
114  Stein  1940:  80-1.  Cf.  Le  Strange  1930:  268-9  for  this  city’s  situation  in  the  Islamic  
period. 
115  Daryaee  2003:  11-2,  cf.  Gyselen  1979:  210,  Tyler-Smith  1983:  245  (late  Sasanian  
era),  Tafazzoli  2000:  31-3. 
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these products to the coastal ports of Fārs,116 the geographical location of the city 
Better Amida of Kawād, which lay on the major road between Ctesiphon, Ahvāz and 
the eastern part of the Persian Empire,117 made it possible to transport the products of 
these Romans to the Persian court in lower Mesopotamia. 
While  neither  Prokopios  nor   the  oriental  writers   ever   suggested   the  connection  
between  the  need  for  labour  and  the  deportation  of  the  Romans  in  the  reign  of  Ḵosrow  
I  in  their  works,   the founding of cities and the recruitment of foreign labourers, i.e., 
prisoners of war, from a conquered Roman city would have increased the tax revenue 
of the shah.118 Considering the high mortality the captives would face during the 
arduous trail, removing the young survivors from Amida, as suggested in Pseudo-
Joshua’s Chronicle,119 might have been a practical strategy for the Sasanids because 
their survival rate would have been higher than others. The reconstruction of Arraǰān, 
i.e., Better Amida of Kawād, where these deportees were settled later, could have 
been an important part of Kawād’s building plans. Apart from this city, the shah also 
built other towns, villages and canals in his reign.120 These captured Romans might 
have been considered an important source of manpower for agriculture, which could 
eventually led to the increase of royal revenue.121 
Meanwhile, the changing course of the Tigris, which possibly took place either 
at the end of the fifth century or at the beginning of the sixth century, must have 
provided huge expanses of virgin lands for farming.122 In the reign of Kawād, many 
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villages were established in the area of Mosul and Iraq, that is, the middle Tigris 
districts and lower Mesopotamia.123 In the Chronicle of Seert, the King of Kings then 
transported people from other places to develop agriculture. 124  While Erich 
Kettenhofen argued that they must have been the deported Romans for they were 
permitted to build churches and form convents there, Michael Morony has 
reservations about this interpretation.125 Several possibilities can be suggested. These 
people could have been captives from Amida for, as mentioned above, the compiler 
later also mentioned that the shah managed to deport them to Seleukia. However, if 
the reign of Kawād was treated chronologically here by the compiler, then this event 
might have occurred at the end of the fifth century, and these newly-arrived farmers 
could have been local Christians rather than captives from the Empire. While a solid 
conclusion cannot be reached because of the lack of precise dates and context of this 
passage, clearly Kawād was aware of the importance of agriculture, and the deportees 
could have facilitated the cultivation of Mesopotamia. Later, the system of irrigation 
of the Diyala plains in the sixth century, for example, the Katul al-Kisrawi (Cut of 
Ḵosrow) which drew water from the Tigris, might have been built in lower 
Mesopotamia in the reign of Ḵosrow I.126 This must have created the need for large 
labour forces for agricultural yields, and possibly, for the increase of taxation to 
uphold the bureaucracy and army.127 
More interesting inferences can be made from Ḵosrow I’s selection of the prefect 
to rule the captured Antiochenes in the city Better Antioch of Ḵosrow. If al-Ṭabari is 
right, then his narratives, in which a former head of the artisans was promoted to this 
post, can be further corroborated by the passages in the Šāh-nāma, in which Ferdowsī 
suggested that the Great King regarded this city as ‘a tree that bear fruits’.128 That is, 
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the shah hoped that he could acquire economic benefits from the transportation of 
these Romans, and this city would develop as a centre of manufacturing.129 Then it is 
plausible that an ‘experienced’ man130 who was engaged in the administration of 
artisans before would have been appointed as the governor of this city. 
Finally, Michael Morony’s argument needs to be examined. He argued that after 
540, plague and other factors resulted in the competition of Rome and Persia over the 
available labour force expressed in the deportation of survivors in wars and battles.131 
In order to test Morony’s hypothesis, below I will first identify the cases of plague in 
sixth-century Persia and then analyze the shah’s military activities, particularly the 
deportation frequency in the second half of the sixth century. In the end, I will argue 
that the relationship between the Great King’s deportation of the Romans and the 
demographic losses as a result of the plague proves to be weak. While recurrent 
plague had a profound impact on the economy and demography of the Empire,132 
fewer details about the situation of Sasanian Persia have been preserved in our texts. 
When the Persians wanted to invade the Empire from Atropatene, the shah, together 
with his soldiers, were infected with the pestilence.133 Ḵosrow I decided to retreat 
back to Assyria, ‘where the pestilence had not as yet become epidemic’.134 Later on it 
seems that the Persians must have suffered from the plague as well,135 and the plague 
fell upon the territory of the Sasanids and others,136 but we simply have no idea about 
the extent of the casualties caused by plague or the situation inside Sasanian Persia. 
We can, nonetheless, hypothesise that the plague would have had a significant 
demographic impact on Persia, as was the case in Byzantium and later the Islamic 
realms. 
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From the 540s the Persians fought several times against the Romans. Their 
military activities can be divided into several phases. Ḵosrow I himself invaded the 
Empire again and captured civilians from Kallinikos, a rather populous city,137 and, 
possibly, from other places as well. From the middle of the sixth century, the shah 
was occupied with Lazic affairs for many years. His generals besieged certain cities 
successfully and removed prisoners of war,138 but the scale of deportation must have 
been small. The Mesopotamian front remained relatively untroubled for almost three 
decades, and it was Justin II rather than Ḵosrow I, who was probably in his seventies, 
who rekindled the conflict again in 572-3. Later the victorious shah, who had just 
removed many people from Apamea and subdued Dara, chose to arrange the truce 
with the Romans instead of sending more soldiers to the territory of the Empire.139 In 
the subsequent years the old Great King, intending to penetrate to the inland cities of 
the Empire, such as Caesarea in Cappadocia through Armenia,140 launched another 
invasion in 576,141 sacked several cities and went back. While certain cities were 
destroyed, neither John of Ephesos nor the Greek historians mentioned any cases of 
the Romans’ deportations.142 
In the next stage, from the final years of Ḵosrow I to the end of his son Hormozd 
IV, mostly the Sasanids chose either to raid the Empire143 or to fight with the Romans 
in pitched battles144 rather than engaging in besieging cities.145 We should not deny 
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that some Romans must have been captured in these skirmishes,146 but no traces of 
evidence for massive deportation can be found in this period. Therefore, the above 
examination shows that apart from Apamea and Dara the Persians did not capture 
many prisoners of war from the Empire in the second half of the sixth century, and 
they probably never managed to do so. Had the Great King, either Ḵosrow I or his 
son, faced a problem with the lack of manpower in the Persian Empire, they would 
have surely tried to search for available labour. Morony’s thesis should thus be 
reconsidered. Instead, below I will further argue that apart from economic 
considerations,147 the capture and deportation of the Romans from the Empire could 
have had significant strategic and propagandistic appeal for the Great King. 
 
Strategic considerations 
In the sixth century the Sasanids adopted various strategies during their invasion to 
pursue military and political goals. While in most cases Roman civilians’ fates would 
not have been the Sasanids’ main concern under such circumstances, it can be shown 
that the Persian treatment of Romans related to these military- and political- oriented 
decisions. 
        Particular strategies were used by the Sasanids to facilitate the progress of their 
invasion and conquest.   The   contents   of   a   lost   Persian   text   called  Ayin-nameh,   ‘The  
Book  of  Regulations’,  which  was  preserved   in   fragments   in   the  anthology  Uyūn  al-
Akhbār,  ‘The  Book  of  Choice  Narratives’,  give  us  some  clues  regarding  the  creation  
and  use  of  fear  in  siege  warfare.  If  the  soldiers  intended  to  besiege  a  stronghold  of  a  
city   successfully,   they   should   ‘intimidate   and   frighten   them   through   themselves’.  148  
The  bloodbath  of  a  conquered  city  was  intimidating  both  for  the  surviving  defenders  
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Epiph.  5,  Whitby  1988:  260.   
147  See  above,  pp.  217-21. 
148  Inostrancev  1926:  16. 
 224 
in   the   city   and   for   those   in   neighbouring   areas,   and   it   would   have   crushed   the  
Romans’   remaining   morale.   Contemporary authors indicated that spreading   fear  
among   the   enemies   was   important   for   the   invaders.   After   that,   it   would   be   much  
easier  for  the  victors  to  maintain  order  and  then  to  have  their  own  way,  such  as  looting  
the   city   and   deporting   Roman   civilians.   Moreover,   such   activities   might   have  
curtailed  the  possibility  of  resistance  from  nearby  cities  or  villages  in  the  future.149 
What Kawād did after the sack of Amida is an excellent example of how the 
victorious Sasanids used terror as an effective weapon. Having conquered this frontier 
city, the shah sent Rufinos, the Roman ambassador, back to Anastasios in order to 
notify him about what had happened in the war zone. The ambassador, who possibly 
used the cursus publicus, the imperial post system, to travel back to the capital,150 
revealed the sufferings of the Amidenes to the inhabitants of every place he visited. 
Such reports spread fear among the inhabitants living east of the river Euphrates, and 
many of them began to flee westwards. 
The horror of the Romans is understandable. Already in 502, some Persian 
soldiers were sent to harass Roman Mesopotamia and neighbouring areas, and they 
even reached Konstantia, ‘plundering, robbing, and devastating the whole region’.151 
In addition, the king of the Tayyaye, i.e. the Arabs, also led his army to attack the 
territory of Carrhae and the villages near Edessa, ‘ravaging, plundering, and taking 
captives’.152 We know much less about the devastation caused by these invaders, but 
their arrival and presence could also have resulted in horror among the Romans. In 
order to address this issue, Jacob of Serug, the periodeutes153 at that time, admonished 
people to ‘trust in divine salvation and not to flee’.154 In one of his letters, the citizens 
of Edessa cited Jeremiah 18:7-10 to support their activities. In order to rally them, 
Jacob reminded them of Christ’s message to Abgar - ruler of the kingdom of 
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Osrhoene based at Edessa- in which Christ promised that this city would never be 
conquered. 155  Upon knowing what happened at the frontier, Anastasios soon 
dispatched his army to garrison frontier cities, possibly to strengthen people’s morale 
and, possibly, as the commentators of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle have pointed out, to 
prevent them from migrating altogether.156 
In Late Antiquity envoys were sometimes detained by the hosts for strategical 
and diplomatic reasons,157and such methods were practiced by the Sasanids in the 
sixth-century Persian wars as well. When Justinian observed Ḵosrow I’s intention of 
waging war against his Empire, an envoy Anastasios was sent to the shah.158 Like 
what Kawād had done previously, Ḵosrow I detained Anastasios,159 and the envoy 
went together with the shah’s forces to the Empire. Only after the sack of Sura was 
the envoy dismissed, ‘to announce to the Emperor Justinian where in the world he had 
left Ḵosrow, son of Kawād’.160 Later, having been sent by the Antiochenes to the 
Sasanids for ransoming their city,161 Megas, the bishop of Beroea, was detained by 
Ḵosrow I again.162 While the shah did not sack Hierapolis, he threatened to destroy all 
the Syrians and Kilikians after Megas’ entreaty.163 The scenario of these three events 
was almost the same: the Persians first detained these envoys, and, after the 
demonstration of cruelty (the sack of Amida in 503, the sack of Sura and the threat of 
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destruction in 540), dismissed them. While Prokopios kept silent on Justinian’s 
reaction to Anastasios’ report, and we cannot know whether Megas ever mentioned 
the shah’s wild threat to the Antiochenes,164 these envoys could have been regarded as 
messengers by the Persians through which the news would have been transmitted not 
only to the ruling class in Constantinople but also to local populations.165 
The treatment of other ‘counterexamples’,   that   is,   Romans who either 
surrendered their city promptly or agreed with the terms with the Sasanids without 
constituting resistance, was different. In fact, if the Sasanids could obtain what they 
wanted, the Romans probably received more lenient treatment. In 503 a sortie in 
Carrhae defeated the Persians and captured the leader of the Hephthalites,   but   a  
confrontation   or   even   a   siege   was   clearly   not   what   the   Romans   wanted,   and   the  
Hunnic  chieftain  was  soon  sent  back,  together  with  1,500  rams  and  other  gifts.  Kawād  
kept  his  promise  and  left  this  city  intact.166  The  situation  remained  similar  in  Ḵosrow 
I’s  campaigns.   In   the  540s   the  Persians  never  attacked  those  who  paid   tribute  to   the  
shah’s  forces,  while  the  farmers  in  Kallinikos  were  captured  and  removed  rather  than  
experiencing  more   cruel   treatment   like  massacre.   Finally,   in   573   the   inhabitants   of  
Apamea  were  merely   deported,   and   nothing   related   to   slaughter  was  mentioned   by  
contemporaries. 
In the sixth century clearly the Sasanids seem to have understood the possible 
repercussions on the Romans caused by their invasions, and the prospect of a sacked 
city was used with the aims of demoralising and compelling the Romans to submit. 
Strategically speaking, what they had done in a sacked Roman city thus became a 
technique of psychological warfare to facilitate the progress of invasion. In 503 a 
contingent of Persians was defeated by Timostratos, the dux Osrhoenae at Kallinikos, 
and a marzbān was captured. When Kawād arrived, he began to besiege this city, 
‘threatening to destroy it and slaughter or take captive all its inhabitants if they did not 
hand over (the marzbān) to him’.167 Having been terrified by such a blunt threat, the 
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Romans decided to hand over the general in exchange for their safety.168 Although it 
is unlikely that Ḵosrow I sacked Antioch in 540 simply in order to intimidate the 
Romans, the fate of the defeated Romans in this metropolis would have terrified 
people living in the Empire’s frontier regions: only those living in Dara, together with 
their general Martinos, tried to drum up resistance against Ḵosrow I in the same year, 
and the inhabitants of other places chose to ransom their cities by paying a tribute. 
Several years later, the experience of the Antiochenes was used by Ḵosrow I as an 
effective means to intimidate the Roman envoys of Edessa. Having summoned them 
to negotiate the terms of armistice, the shah ‘recounted how many Roman towns he 
had previously enslaved and in what manner he had accomplished it ... (he) threatened 
that the inhabitants of Edessa would receive more direful treatment at the hands of the 
Persians’.169 In 575, Adarmahan threatened the inhabitants of Konstantia, saying that 
‘Deliver to us your city, lest the same fate happen to you as to the people of Dara, and 
you perish’.170 Dara fell into the hands of the Persians at the end of 573, hence the 
memory of the atrocities in the sack of this frontier city would have been quite vivid 
among local people. What Adarmahan intended to do, therefore, was to evoke these 
horrors to terrify the Romans. 
Although it is not always easy to access the Romans’ perceptions of what the 
Persians had done or what they would do in the above cases, things happened in the 
sack of Amida that clearly cast a shadow upon the Empire’s local society even during 
peacetime. In the middle of the sixth century, those living in the nearby areas of 
Amida were struck by mass hysteria, which, according to Susan Harvey, was the 
result of a variety of human and natural-induced disasters, such as religious 
persecution, plague and famine.171 Interestingly enough, while this region was free of 
the Great King’s invasion for more than 10 years, and the atrocities committed by 
Kawād’s   soldiers   against   the   Amidenes had happened more than two generations 
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earlier, the terror of war clearly played a significant role in such phenomena. In 
Pseudo-Dionysios of Tel-Mahre’s Chronicle, the most detailed account we currently 
have, certain unusual behaviours among not only the Amidenes but also those living 
in the surrounding areas were reported.172 At the beginning, it was rumoured among 
the Amidenes that the shah’s army was ready to enter their city and slaughter the 
inhabitants. Such news definitely created havoc among local populations, and many 
civilians fled to other places in great confusion to avoid possible misfortunes. As 
more details about the Amidenes’ calamities spread further, confusion, destruction 
and people’s unusual behaviours followed across the whole region, including Edessa 
and Konstantia, and lasted for one year.173  
For the invading Persians to secure what they had seized or obtained must have 
been important, and their strategic   considerations   seem   to   have   influenced   the  
treatment   of   a   conquered   city’s   buildings   and   inhabitants.   While   some   cities   like  
Antioch,   Apamea   and   Sura   were   reported   to   have   been   razed   or   burned,174  if   not  
thoroughly,   the  buildings   in  other  places  such  as  Amida  and  Dara  were  spared. The 
analysis of Kawād’s motivation for invasion at the beginning of the sixth century and 
the experiences of those living in other cities he attacked shows that to destroy the 
conquered cities comprehensively was not his primary or universal aim.175 At the 
beginning of his Roman campaign, his forces subdued the resistance of 
Theodosiopolis in Armenia successfully and left a garrison there.176 The accounts in 
Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, according to which this city was razed by the Persians, 
should thus be doubted.177 Later on, the Persians passed Martyropolis, a relatively 
weakly-fortified city in Sophanene, where the inhabitants chose to ransom their own 
city rather than defend it. Thus Kawād, who seemed to be pleased by it, ‘withheld his 
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hand from the city and from the whole district’.178 While it is difficult to know 
whether the Great King intended to annex these frontier zones into his empire at this 
stage, he surely wanted to seize valuable goods from these conquered cities and 
regarded them as either parts of Persian territory, 179  or, more significantly, as 
beachheads or stepping stones for further military activities. 
The situation remained the same in the case of Amida. A temporary ruling group, 
composed of both Sasanids and local elites, was established in the post-siege period. 
This was an unprecedented strategy in Kawād’s campaign at that time, for in other 
places, as shown above, he only garrisoned the conquered places with soldiers, and 
nothing pertaining to any ruling group was mentioned at Theodosiopolis and 
Martyropolis. After his forces left Amida with prisoners of war and booty, Kawād left 
a garrison with around 3000 soldiers,180 two marzbāns and a certain Glones who was 
in charge of defending this newly-conquered city from any future attacks by the 
Romans. Apart from these Persians, John bar Hablâhâ, who came from the rich elite, 
Sergios bar Zabduni and others were appointed to govern the surviving Amidenes.181 
Since these aristocrats must have been more familiar with the situation of Amida than 
the conquerors, the shah would thus have kept a firm grip on this newly captured 
Roman city by appointing these Romans to rule their fellow citizens. Whether they 
would have served as tax collectors,182 however, remains unknown. 
The fate of these Roman aristocrats, however, changed when the Persian garrison 
faced the problem of famine. Contemporary authors reported that they were detained 
in the amphitheater together with other male citizens.183 Whereas the Persians might 
have controlled the consumption of food as far as they could, this decision must have 
resulted from their consideration that these Romans would, through treachery or any 
                                            
178  Prok.  Aed.  3.2.7.  On  the  ruinous  state  of  Martyropolis’  fortifications,  see  Mal.  
18.5. 
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other possible methods, deliver their hometown back to the besiegers outside the city 
walls.184  When Patrikios’ soldiers dug tunnels secretly, an Amidene woman saw 
them and shouted ‘Look, the Romans are coming into the city!’.185 Even the Persians’ 
counteroffensive actions proved to be successful later and these Romans failed to 
recapture Amida immediately; they must have been aware of the possibility of revolts 
or uprisings among local people.  
Being an important city of northern Mesopotamia, Amida must have served as 
temporary headquarters for the Persians after its fall in 503. In the same year the 
Persians, under the leadership of Kawād himself, again tried to seize other cities in 
Roman Mesopotamia, such as Edessa and Konstantia.186 While at the beginning the 
Romans seem to have been unprepared for the sudden attack launched by Kawād, 
clearly Anastasios noticed the siege of Amida, and reacted by employing both 
diplomatic187 and military strategies. Prokopios reported that upon learning this news, 
the emperor ‘dispatched with all speed an army of sufficient strength’.188 The Roman 
forces must have arrived at the frontier zone of the Empire at the beginning of 503 to 
‘spend the winter in these cities and guard them (i.e. local people)’. 189  For the 
Persians, the presence of such a mighty armed force in the nearby area must have 
been quite threatening. Considering all these issues, it would have been unwise to raze 
the remaining fortifications of Amida and other Roman cities for the newly-arrived 
Persians needed them to protect themselves from any counteroffensive attacks 
undertaken by the Romans. A similar strategy seems to have been adopted by Ḵosrow 
I 70 years later at Dara, and his decision must have resulted from his shrewd 
                                            
184  Cf.  Prok.  Wars  4.23.18-25,  in  which  Hadrametum,  a  city  which  was  recently  taken  
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considerations of military and political circumstances in northern Mesopotamia at that 
moment. Having conquered one of the Empire’s most important frontier cities, a 
garrison manned by substantial armed forces inside the existing fortifications to cope 
with the possible attacks from the Romans would have been a better choice for the 
Persians than the thorough destruction of all these defence works. 
The treatment of the Empire’s inland cities which the Sasanids seem not have 
intended to occupy permanently was different, and both Antioch and Apamea were 
reported to have been burned in 540 and 573 respectively. Sometimes there is 
evidence that the shah threatened to destroy the cities he targeted even before the 
campaign. When   Ḵosrow   I   was   about   to   invade   the   Empire   in   543,   he   threatened,  
while  still  staying  in  his  palace,  that  ‘he  would  make  slaves  of  all   the  inhabitants  of  
Edessa  and  bring  them  to  the  land  of  Persia,  and  would  turn  the  city  into  a  pasture  for  
sheep’  (Ἐδεσσηνοὺς  μὲν  ἀνδραποδιεῖν  ἠπείλησεν  ἅπαντας  ἐς  τὰ  Περσῶν  ἤθη,  τὴν  δὲ  
πόλιν  μηλόβοτον  καταστήσεσθαι),190  but  we  do  not  know  whether  Ḵosrow   I  and  his  
general  wanted  to  raze  both  Antioch  and  Apamea  to  the  ground  at  the  beginning  of  his  
military  activities. 
As  a  contemporary  historian,  Prokopios’  statement  probably  offered  a  plausible  
explanation:  although  ‘he  [Ḵosrow I]  should  be  able  to  gain  some  other  Roman  city,  
he  would   still   never   be   able   to   establish   himself   in   the  midst   of   the  Romans  while  
many   strongholds  were   left   behind   in   the   hands   off   his   enemy’.191  Therefore,  while  
we  may  never  know   the  extent  of  destruction  caused  by   the  Sasanids   in  540,192  the  
shah  might  have  ordered  the  destruction  of  some  buildings  of  Antioch  and  then  have  
his  soldiers  depart  from  Roman  Syria  because  it  was  difficult  for  the  Persians  to  keep  
their  grip  on  the  cities  they  conquered  in  Syria  Prima.193  More  than  30  years  later,  the  
forces   led   by   Adarmahan   again   destroyed   Apamea   rather   than   occupying   this  
metropolis  or  any  other  places  in  Roman  Syria  as  temporary  headquarters  for  further  
military  operations. 
                                            
190  Prok.  Wars  2.26.4. 
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193  Prok.  Wars  8.7.11. 
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Even though Adarmahan’s forces arrived in the vicinity of Antioch in 573 and 
were reported to have destroyed certain buildings,194 perhaps including the house of 
Mar Julian and other estates, he did not manage to enter this metropolis and sack it. 
The possible situation inside this city in the reign of Justin II deserves further 
examination in order to establish why the Persians chose to attack its vicinity rather 
than besieging it and attempting to destroy it for the second time. First, Antioch might 
have not recovered from the natural disasters and Ḵosrow I’s first invasion in the past 
three decades. Therefore strategically speaking, it would be fruitless for the forces of 
Adarmahan to conduct a siege in order to plunder valuable goods from it. Second, the 
enemies might have observed that it was not easy to subdue the resistance of the 
Antiochenes this time. While many Antiochenes escaped and deserted their 
hometown,195 it seems that those living there would have taken advantage of such 
chaos and revolted in the city, and the bishop’s flight resulted from either the 
weakness of the city’s fortifications or the situation of anarchy inside Antioch.196   
Finally,   possible   strategic   considerations   for   the   ransoming   of   prisoners   in  
Ḵosrow I’s  campaign   in  540  should  be  addressed.   It   is  understandable   that   the  shah  
wanted  to  sell  the  captives  from  Sura  because  to  carry  off  so  many  Romans  at  the  very  
beginning  of  his  campaign  would  have   impeded  the  invaders   from  looting   the  cities  
and   villages   in   the   subsequent   months.   The   timing   of   his   decision   to   sell   the  
Antiochenes   several  months   later   is   noteworthy.   Leif   Petersen   argued   that  what   the  
Persians  did  was  a  kind  of  delaying  tactics:  while  the  Romans  were  occupied  with  the  
details   of   ransoming   their   fellow   citizens,   they   Great   King   could   transport   these  
captives   to   Persia   as   soon   as   possible   without   being   hindered   by   the   Romans. 197  
However,  according  to  Prokopios,  it  was  not  until  the  shah’s  proposal  was  ultimately  
rejected  by  the  Romans  that  Ḵosrow  I  began  to  move  forward  (διὸ δὴ ὁ Χοσρόης τοὺς 
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αἰχμαλώτους ἅπαντας ἐπαγόμενος πρόσω ἐχώρει).198  Here  an  alternative  explanation  
can  be  provided.   If  we   take   the  routes  of   the  Persian   troops   into  consideration,   it   is  
clear   that   after   leaving   Edessa   Ḵosrow   I   and   his   soldiers   would   have   possibly  
expected  to  encounter  possible  counterattacks  from  Konstantia,  the  garrisoned  base  of  
the   dux   of   Mesopotamia, 199   and   Dara,   a   well-fortified   citadel   near   the   frontier.  
Considering  the  possible  threats  from  these  fortresses,  it  would  have  been  prudent  for  
the  Great  King  to  leave  these  Romans  behind. 
The removal of surviving Romans from the frontier cities could have been an 
important and practical strategy for the Persians. In 503, the victorious Kawād 
removed some, if not all, civic leaders from Amida. According to Prokopios, there 
were no soldiers when the Persians arrived, ‘seeing that it was a time of peace and 
prosperity, and in other respects were utterly unprepared’.200 However, as Geoffrey 
Greatrex stated, being an important city in the eastern frontier, the lack of any armed 
force seems beyond belief.201 A certain John, who has been a soldier in Amida, was 
tonsured later and became a master of a xenodocheion of the newly-established 
Dara.202  However, since no further information was provided, it remains unclear 
whether he stayed in Amida in 502-3 or not. 
While it is difficult to say whether substantial armed forces had ever been 
stationed inside Amida on the eve of its siege, and we will never know how the 
civilian populations managed to use professional siege engines which could ‘hurl 
enormous stones’203 against the invaders effectively,204 such a stubborn resistance 
must have astonished both Kawād himself and his forces. Since certain social elites 
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must have stayed in Amida and subsequently become the subjects of the newcomers, 
the deportation of their peers could have been adopted to frighten and intimidate these 
remaining Romans to maintain their loyalty to the newcomers. In addition, as shown 
above, as Amida was meant to become a temporary military base for the Persians in 
the near future, it was necessary for the Persians to grasp the fruit of victory as firmly 
as they could. To remove potential leaders, therefore, was a possible way to quash the 
possibility of revolts and uprisings in the following periods. 
The importance of adopting such policies by the Sasanids can be explained by 
what Ḵosrow I did in the middle of the sixth century. In 541 he had invaded Lazica, 
where the dissatisfaction with Roman rule was considerable at that point, and the king 
of the Lazi, Goubazes, ‘did obeisance to Ḵosrow…putting himself together with his 
palace and all Lazica into his hand’.205 Nevertheless, the conflicts between zealous 
Christians in this area and Zoroastrianism perplexed both the Persians and their 
subjects since ‘all the Persian views regarding religion are the exact opposite of 
theirs’.206 Ḵosrow I’s measures can be divided into three different stages: first, the 
assassination of Goubazes in order to crush his rule, second, the deportation of all the 
Lazi out of their country, and finally, the colonisation of this area with Persian settlers 
and other groups of people.207 While his project ultimately failed,208 it is clear that 
sometimes the Great King managed to force the inhabitants of certain areas to leave in 
order to ensure that his grip on these regions would be secure enough. In other words, 
such a policy could have eradicated both potential threats from the local population 
and conflicts between the rulers and the ruled. 
The Sasanids’ attitudes towards the control of frontier communities can be 
further illustrated by their treatment of the Christian inhabitants of Nisibis, a city 
which was ceded to the Persians after the treaty of 363. When Marcian invaded the 
Persian Empire in 573, the marzbān of Nisibis began to take some measures to 
withstand the coming siege, and, presumably for security reasons, expelled the 
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Christian population from this city. 209  His concern was justified by what had 
happened at this frontier city throughout the sixth century. When the Romans 
launched a counteroffensive and attacked Nisibis, the citizens, according to the 
continuator of Zachariah, ‘favoured the Romans and showed themselves lazy in 
battle’.210 At the very end of the sixth century, a certain Gregory was appointed as the 
metropolitan of Nisibis by Ḵosrow II because the shah wanted to have someone 
trustworthy at this frontier city between Rome and Persia.211 Therefore, clearly it was 
crucial for the Persians to exert control over the frontier cities of both the newly 
annexed regions and their empire. Having conquered Dara, it would have been 
conceivable for the Sasanids to secure control over this citadel by removing its 
population. 
The slaughter and removal of Roman civilians at Dara in 573, together with the 
fierce opposition and state of anarchy within this frontier city, illustrate first the 
possible situation inside a newly conquered city and second, the Persians’ strategies in 
coping with these problems. At the beginning Ḵosrow I’s soldiers were frightened by 
what happened inside this city for many of them had been killed. 212  Since the 
suppression of the desire to revolt by the survivors and the maintenance of order was 
extremely important, the Persians might have used such a bloody suppression to 
terrify the remaining inhabitants in order to secure their control of this Roman frontier 
citadel. The reason is two-fold. While the strategic role played by Dara was not 
unique,213 the Romans did try to recapture it through either military or diplomatic 
means several times.214 In addition, the Roman troops who were stationed in the 
surrounding areas must have been a threat for the Persians. After their unsuccessful 
siege of Nisibis, some of them retreated into a fortress at Mardin which was not far 
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away from Dara.215 Therefore the more quickly the conquerors took control over both 
the territories they conquered and their population, the more safely they could keep 
the fruit of victory. The slaughter of the Romans could thus have been considered as a 
way of terrifying the survivors so that the Persians could ‘get possession of the city 
and take its spoil’.216 
As John Lydus commented that ‘unless God by the former’s hand had heavily 
fortified it…long ago the Persians would have seized the domains of the Romans 
inasmuch as these are adjacent to them’,217 Dara was arguably one of the Empire’s 
most important citadels at the eastern front. While it was impossible to remove all the 
citizens from Dara, as stated above, it was highly likely that the shah did try to empty 
this frontier city as far as he could by transporting local Romans to his empire. As we 
have learned from different sources, he left a strong garrison, possibly together with 
some Persians in Dara.218 He might have wanted to establish either a sort of ‘armed 
colony’ or a headquarters in this newly conquered frontier city.    In 575, having 
ravaged Roman territory successfully, the Sasanids retreated to Dara.219 Moreover, 
when Hormozd IV was preparing for war several years later, the Persians could even 
have regarded this city as a stepping stone for launching attacks against the Romans 
because supplies were stockpiled at that time.220 
Geoffrey Greatrex argued that the Amidenes were sent by Kawād to the 
Caucasus in order to help the Persians guard their northern frontier, presumably the 
Transcaucasus, and to ward off the Caucasian Huns.221 At first glance, this argument 
seems to be quite plausible. The examination of Greek and Syriac texts shows that the 
situation of the north-western frontier was always of serious concern to the shahs in 
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the fifth and the sixth centuries.222 Moreover, resettling defeated groups of people to 
strategically important places and then recruiting them into the Persian army was not 
uncommon in the sixth century. In fact, some examples were preserved in al-Ṭabari’s 
text. For instance, having been defeated by the shah, the people of the Jabal Bariz, the 
southeastern part of the Kermen province, served in the infantry of Ḵosrow I’s troops. 
When he defeated the Sul and other nomads, the Persian king selected the greatest 
soldiers and settled them to the frontier as ‘he could call upon them for his military 
campaigns’.223 
However, this argument should be reconsidered for the following reasons. First, 
while to garrison their frontier with Roman captives might lessen the burden of 
Sasanian troops,224 it could have been highly risky for Kawād, at least in the case of 
Amida, to recruit these newly-conquered Romans, who had just defended their 
country assiduously several months ago, into the defence system of his empire.225 
Second, while we will never know the mortality rate of the Roman deportees by the 
Persians in the sixth century, many of them must have perished during their 
captivity.226 If Kawād ever intended to deploy these captives at the frontier of his 
territory, his soldiers had to capture as many ‘able-bodied men’ as possible from the 
places they conquered, but only Pseudo-Joshua pointed out that Kawād had ever 
managed to search for all those ‘potential armed forces’ in Amida, 227  and both 
Pseudo-Zachariah and Prokopios remain silent about it. The existence of numerous 
survivors, both men and women, inside Amida after the departure of Kawād was 
attested by the narratives of all three of these texts. In short, since the shah seems not 
to have captured many people from Amida, and, more significantly, most captives 
would have perished before reaching their destinations, it is almost impossible for the 
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Persians to have deployed the surviving Romans effectively in their existing defence 
line in the Transcaucasus. 
 
Propaganda 
Military victory was a good way to legitimise the Persian kings’ sovereignty.228 While 
similar information regarding Kawād and Hormozd IV is meagre, Ḵosrow I’s attitude 
towards both the Roman Empire and his military success can be mined from 
contemporary texts. The ideology of constant international competition between the 
‘two  eyes  of  the  earth’  in  Late  Antiquity229 must have been decisive; being a young, 
energetic and ambitious Great King, the shah must have intended to conquer those 
‘slaves of Caesar’ (νικήσας μὲν αὺτὸς τὸν Καίσαρος νικήσει δοῦλον).230 Belisarios’ 
success in the 530s, particularly the submission of the Vandals, 231  might have 
annoyed the Sasanids:232 Ḵosrow I sent envoys to Justinian ‘to receive his share of the 
spoils…on the ground that the emperor would never have been able to conquer…if 
the Persians had not been at peace with him’.233 The Great King may have done 
something to establish Persian superiority over the Romans after observing the 
victories of Justinian, his greatest rival. 
Clearly Ḵosrow I must   have   appropriated   the   propagandistic   value   of   his  
military  victory.  In  the  Šāh-nāma  of  Ferdowsī,  the  Great  King  visited  the  fire  temple  
dedicated   to   Ādur Gušnasp   at   Takht-e Soleymān   in   Azerbaijan234  and   prayed   for  
victory   before   embarking   on   his   Roman   campaign.235  Although   nothing   similar   has  
been  preserved  by  al-Ṭabari  and  other  important  Arab  writers,  Prokopios  reported  that  
in   543   the  Great  King   proceeded   to  Adarbiganon   (’Αδαρβιγάνων),   a   place  where   a  
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great   fire   temple   was   established,   from   Assyria   before   his   invasion. 236   The   war  
between  Rome  and  Persia   in  the  540s,  therefore,  could  have  become  a  war  between  
the  Christians  and  the  Zoroastrians. 
Such   ideas,   more   importantly,   would   possibly   have   affected   the   Persians’  
strategy  in  treating  the  surrendered  Romans.  Although  we  do  not  know  to  what  extent  
the   Great   King   understood   the   polytheistic   tradition   within   the   Empire,   he  
occasionally   showed   goodwill   to   the   polytheists,   the   enemies   of  Christianity,   in   his  
Roman  campaign  in  540.  After  leaving  Antioch,  Ḵosrow I  ‘bathed  himself  alone’  in  
the  Mediterranean  Sea,237  and  offered  sacrifices  to  the  pagan  divinities,  including  the  
sun  god,  at   the  neighboring  area  of  Antioch.238  Later,   the  shah  refused   to  accept   the  
ransom  from  the  inhabitants  of  Carrhae,  saying  that  as  most  of  the  Romans  there  were  
non-Christians,  the  money  did  not  belong  to  him.239 
Henning  Börm  claimed  that  the  decision  to  bathe  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea  was  
reminiscent  of  what  the  rulers  of  ancient  Near  East  had  done  after  their  conquests.240  
However,  since  nothing  is  known  about  the  spread  and  preservation  of  these  traditions  
by  either  the  Achaemenids  or  the  Sasanids,  it  is  better  to  reserve  judgment  about  this  
interpretation.  Another  tempting,  but  still  conjectural,  explanation  would  be  that  since  
the  Romans  considered  the  Mediterranean  Sea  as  the  Mare  Nostrum,  Ḵosrow I  might  
have   demonstrated   his   victory   and   authority   by   bathing   in   the   inner   lake   of   the  
Empire.   In   adition,   both   the   Great   King’s   worship   of   the   pagan   deities   and   his  
leniency   towards   the   Empire’s   polytheists   could   have   been   regarded   as   a   way   to  
challenge  Justinian’s  authority.   
Through the examination of Ḵosrow I’s strategies and decisions, I will further 
argue that he seems to have exploited the capture of booty and prisoners of war from 
the Empire for their propaganda and ideological value. Recently, the possible 
propagandistic issues in the armed conflicts have been raised. Henning Börm argued 
that the Romans’ payments to the Sasanids in Late Antiquity would actually have 
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played a minor role in the economy of Persia.241 Instead, the Great King pursued 
political and propagandistic connotations, by which his superiority over the Empire 
was established.242 
The focus of the following discussion, however, will be limited to what the Great 
King’s soldiers snatched from the Roman cities during the conflicts. While the 
Sasanids must have obtained economic profits in the Romano-Persian wars,243 the 
acquisition of booty must have had considerable social, economic and political appeal 
in the Persian Empire.244 The shah had the ultimate authority over what his soldiers 
plundered from the Romans: according to Pseudo-Zachariah, the victorious Persians 
entered Amida prior to Kawād himself, probably in order to maintain order inside the 
city and, more importantly, to guard valuable goods for the shah because the 
acquisitions were ‘given to the treasurers of the king’.245 Additionally, the Persian 
forces, both foot soldiers and cavalry, might have had the chance to share the booty 
and make profits from it.246 Therefore, while we do not know how the booty was 
divided among the hierarchy of the Persian army, clearly both the shah and his 
soldiers would have benefited from waging a successful war against the Romans. We 
know little about where and how the Sasanids deposited the booty transported from 
the Empire, but some of them could possibly have been presented in Ctesiphon. If 
Theophylaktos is right, a decorated cross that was snatched by Ḵosrow I from 
Sergiopolis in 542 was eventually deposited in the Great King’s palace,247 presumably 
in order to commemorate the Sasanids’ victory over the Romans. 
Admittedly, unlike his father Kawād, who apparently knew what he needed from 
the sack of Amida in 503, neither Prokopios nor other contemporary writers have 
mentioned Ḵosrow I’s motivation for capturing the defeated Roman civilians. In the 
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previous sections, I have demonstrated that economic profit and strategic 
considerations could have motivated Ḵosrow I to transport the Romans from the 
Empire’s cities and to remove the inhabitants from Dara, respectively. 248  These 
arguments, however, cannot fully explain the deportations made by Ḵosrow I and his 
commanders. In the last years of Justinian, Yesdegusnaph, the shah’s chamberlain, 
came to Dara to negotiate peace with the Romans. According to Menander the 
Guardsman, the ambassador insisted that ‘Ḵosrow…does not use the capture of 
Antioch for his own self-advertisement or glorification…the reduction of yet another 
Roman city does not make us haughty’.249 While we can glimpse the stance of a high-
ranking Persian diplomat from this piece of information, such statements should be 
considered as diplomatic parlance. Below, I will further argue that the capture, 
transportation and resettlement of Roman prisoners of war during the reign of Ḵosrow 
I could have had significant propagandistic value for the Sasanids. 
The difficulties and risks the Sasanids faced in capturing and transporting the 
Roman prisoners of war should be summarised. The high mortality rate of these 
Roman prisoners has been previously discussed.250 Therefore, even if the Great King 
managed to capture as many Romans as possible from the conquered cities, many of 
them would have perished before reaching their destinations. In addition, these 
captives would have been a burden for the shah’s army because carrying them would 
surely have slowed down the Persians’ movement. Given the Persians invaded the 
Empire’s heartland in 540 and 573, respectively, the slower they moved, the higher 
the risk of being attacked by the Romans. Therefore, practically speaking, it would 
have not been a cost-effective expertise for the Persians to transport numerous 
Romans back to their territory. 
In spite of these possible difficulties and risks, the Great King kept deporting the 
survivors from the Empire: having failed to sell the captured Antiochenes in 540, the 
shah transported them back to Persia, and Adarmahan took numerous civilians from 
Apamea and other places more than 30 years later. We know much less about the 
route taken by Adarmahan, and it remains unclear whether the Persians, having 
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sacked Apamea, passed or assaulted as many Roman cities as possible and collected 
ransom from the Romans. What we know for sure, however, is that in 540 Ḵosrow I 
passed many other Roman cities across the Roman Near East, and he repeatedly asked 
for money. If Malalas is to be believed, the Great King entered other Roman cities 
aside from Apamea in 540 (Ὁ  δὲ  βασιλεὺς  Περσῶν  εἰσῆλθε  καὶ   ἐν  Ἀπαμείᾳ   καὶ   ἐν  
ἑτέραις   πόλεσι   τῆς   ἀνατολῆς).251 Therefore, apart from the surviving Romans who 
stayed in Antioch, the inhabitants of these places would possibly have noticed the 
presence of numerous prisoners of war who had recently been captured from the 
Empire’s metropolis and other cities. For Ḵosrow I, the transportation of Roman 
prisoners of war, particularly from the Empire’s inland metropoleis, could possibly 
have been served both to demonstrate his soldiers’ capability of capturing numerous 
Romans and a vivid display of his own victory.  
Ḵosrow I seems to have seized any available opportunity to proclaim his victory. 
Having arrived in Mesopotamia, the captives now became the leading cast of his 
propaganda scheme. Obviously it is impossible to know why he chose to locate these 
Romans near Ctesiphon, the political nucleus of his empire, but the shah must have 
chosen this site shrewdly, for he was probably the first King of Kings who resettled 
Romans near his royal residence. The shahs in the third and fourth centuries also 
transported their prisoners of war from the Empire to cities in Persia, but in most 
cases these new places would serve as either provincial capitals or temporary political 
centres, and none of them would replace the importance of Ctesiphon and Eṣṭaḵr, a 
city which played its ceremonial role for the Sasanids in the province of Fārs.252 The 
propagandistic reason thus definitely played a considerable role in choosing the site 
where these Romans were resettled.253 While the Romans’ diplomatic protocols were 
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preserved well into later periods,254 the Sasanids must have had similar ceremonies or 
activities255 which could have been performed at the palaces at Ctesiphon. From the 
fourth clause of the peace treaty of 562, we know that ‘ambassadors and all others 
using the public post to deliver messages…shall be honoured each according to his 
status and rank and shall receive the appropriate attention’,256 but the lack of similar 
texts makes it difficult to establish the diplomatic procedures of Sasanian court. 
Even though we have no idea about the architectural styles of the Great King’s 
palace, the possible decorative style was described in one medieval Arabic source, 
and it is reported that Ḵosrow I had the victory depicted on the wall of his palace to 
commemorate his success in subduing Antioch.257 Al-Buḥturī, a ninth- century Arab 
poet, wrote down what he observed:  
When you behold the picture of Antioch, you are alarmed (as) between 
Byzantium and Persia, 
The fates there waiting, whilst Anushravan urges on the ranks under the 
royal banner. 
(Robed) in green over gold, proudly flaunting the dye of the (red) turmeric, 
And the press of men before him, all silent, lowering their voices, 
                Some cautiously reaching out the foreshaft of a lance, some fearfully     
                averting the spear-points with a shield.258 
The construction of Ḵosrow I’s ‘Better Antioch’ should be placed into this context. 
We will never know whether the shah built this Persian Antioch simply because he 
was, as suggested by Patricia Crone, a ‘Byzantiniser’, that is, a Persian who 
appropriated Byzantine culture. 259  However, propagandistically speaking, this 
portrayal in the palace and the embodiment of his victory, i.e. the construction of this 
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‘Persian Antioch’ in the capital of his empire, might have been considered either as a 
way to challenge the dominions of the Romans or to convey the greatness of their 
empire to foreign ambassadors and to his own subjects. 260  As pointed out by 
Prokopios, the captured Antiochenes were ‘subordinated to no-one of the magistrates, 
but to the king alone’ (τῶν ἀρχόντων οὐδενὶ ὑποχειρίους εἶναι ἢ βασιλεῖ μόνῳ).261 
Having been transported and, as the centre pieces of the Great King’s showcase, 
resettled near the political centre of the Sasanian Empire, these Romans would thus 
have been a precious political asset for the Great King in both consolidating his 
personal and political authority and winning power struggles with other Persian 
magnates.262  
In Late Antiquity, the military victories of the Empire were usually celebrated in 
the hippodromes through the exhibition of booty and captives, the acclamation of the 
audience and ensuing games and spectacles such as chariot races.263 In 534, a grand 
ritual was convened in the hippodrome of Constantinople to celebrate Belisarios’ 
conquest of the Vandal kingdom,264 which the Persian envoys attended.265  When 
Gelimer, the king of the Vandals, was led into the hippodrome, he saw Justinian, 
accompanied by attendants and ministers, watch all these ceremonies from his lofty 
seat. Later he was compelled to perform proskynesis (προσκύνησις) to the emperor.266 
Regardless of how the Persian king understood what happened in Constantinople,267 
such scenes must have been impressive. From 540 onwards, the triumphant Persian 
shah built a hippodrome in a Pseudo-Roman city near the political nucleus of Persia, 
Rome’s most deadly enemy. The musicians and charioteers captured from Antioch, 
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though possibly used to entertain the shah himself,268 could thus have been a shrewd 
way to recreate and re-celebrate his victory against the Romans in the Pseudo-Roman 
city near his capital.269 
The dearth of contemporary Middle Persian sources makes it impossible to 
analyze why Ḵosrow I, as reported by many late antique and medieval texts, chose to 
treat the displaced Antiochenes kindly270 in his empire. While some medieval Arabic 
or Persian authors implied that these policies came from his generosity and 
benevolence,271 such images could in fact have been an idealised portrait of the Great 
King. The ideology of competition between Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity might 
have been a crucial factor as well. If Shapur I’s motivation for constructing 
Gondēšāpur was to build a city which could ultimately outdo the original Roman 
Antioch,272 then Ḵosrow I, as a shah who, like Shapur I, named the newly-established 




As  well  as  Sasanid  economic,  military  and  political  ambitions  and  responses  to  events  
during   the   sixth-century   Persian   wars,   the   Roman   authorities’   operations   and  
decisions  would  also  have  affected  the  fate  of  urban  civilians  in  this  period.  While  the  
presence  of  a  wide  range  of  authorities  has  been  noted  before,  during  and  after  a  city’s  
siege,   the   possible   roles   played   by   the   most   frequently   mentioned   ones,   including  
bishops,  army  and  emperors,  deserves  to  be  analyzed  in  detail. 
 
Bishops 
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As   a   prominent   figure   in   a   city’s   public   life   in   Late   Antiquity, 273   a   bishop’s  
involvement   in   secular   affairs   can   be   proved   by   numerous   laws   issued   in   the   sixth  
century.274  For  example,  the  testimony  of  their  involvement  in  the  military  and  civic  
building  works  of  the  Empire’s  eastern  provinces  can  be  unearthed  from  literary  and  
documentary   sources.275  The   endeavours   and   personal   supervision   of   Thomas,   the  
bishop   of  Amida,   in   the   construction   of  Dara’s   buildings  were   reported   in   Pseudo-
Zachariah’s  Church  History,  and  more  similar  examples  can  be  noted  elsewhere.276   
More   information   regarding   the   bishops’   role   in   local   communities   during  
wartime  can  be  noted  in  contemporary  texts.  In  many  cases  they  were  the first social 
elites to face the invading Sasanids. Some of them acted as spiritual leaders for the 
defenders. Such a kind of role was illustrated well by what Bar-Hadad, the bishop of 
Konstantia, did in 503. According to Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, he ‘would go round 
visiting them, praying for them and blessing them… (he) praised their diligence, gave 
them encouragement, and sprinkled holy water on them and on the city wall’.277 In 
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Ḵosrow I’s campaign in 540, the bishop of Apamea rallied the citizens’ morale by 
presenting the True Cross.278 
In some cases the bishops negotiated with the Great King on behalf of their 
people.279 In this case the role of Bar-Hadad in persuading Kawād to retreat is again 
impressive.280 The situation was similar in the following decades. In 540 the bishop of 
Sura, bringing fowls, wine and loaves with him, supplicated Ḵosrow I to spare this 
city.281 It is worth noting that in both cases the bishops carried nothing but food and 
beverages, as a demonstration of local inhabitants’ loyalty, to the Great King.282 
Later, the Antiochenes sent Megas, the bishop of Beroea, to negotiate with the 
Persians.283 In fact, this bishop entreated not only on behalf of the Antiochenes but 
also those living in the East284 and persuaded Ḵosrow I to withhold from attacking 
Beroea’s acropolis.285 More than thirty years later, Apamea’s bishop, together with 
‘the princes of the city’, presumably the members of city council, negotiated with 
Adarmahan.286 
While many civilians must have been captured in the conflicts, few bishops had 
ever endeavoured to ransom these prisoners of war back to the Empire. Malalas 
recounted the details regarding the intervention of Ephraem, the patriarch of Antioch, 
in ransoming the Romans captured by al-Mundhir in the first years of Justinian,287 but 
the bishops of eastern cities seem to have played less prominent roles in rescuing the 
prisoners of war captured by the Sasanids in the sixth century. Some of them, as was 
the case with the bishop of Apamea in 573, could have been captured together with 
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other inhabitants, and in other cases, like with Theodosiopolis and Kallinikos the fates 
of bishops remain unknown. Kandidos, who was forced to ransom the captives from 
Sura by the Great King in 540, even refused to do so at first.288 When Ḵosrow I 
wanted to sell the captured Antiochenes, the Edessenes managed to collect their 
wealth and brought it to the sanctuary (τὸ ἱερὸν), that is the church.289 While local 
clerics would have been in charge of collecting these assets, nothing pertaining to the 
decision or the presence of Edessa’s bishop was mentioned. 
In addition, not every bishop would defend his city together with the citizens or 
managed to protect his fellow Romans. In fact, some of them chose to desert their 
post in the Persian wars. The  bishop  of  Dara  had  left  the  city  before  the  siege  began,  
and   the   patriarch   of  Antioch,  Gregory,   escaped   to   safer   places  with   sacred   vessels. 
The   most   detailed   account   is   the   escape   of Ephraem, the patriarch of Antioch, to 
Kilikia before the arrival of the Sasanids in 540.290 Both   Euagrios   and   Prokopios  
suggested   that   the   treasures   served   to   ransom   the  church  at  Antioch.  The  picture   in  
Euagrios’  Church   History   of   the   patriarch’s   actions   to   save   his   dioceses   in   540   is  
positive:  he  decided   to   leave   the  church   treasures,  hoping   that   these  precious  goods  
would   attract   the   invading   Sasanids   so   that   they   would   not   destroy   this   sacred  
building   to   search   for   further   booty.291  For   Prokopios,   the   patriarch   seems   to   have  
played  much  less  of  an  active  role,  and  he  attributed  the  decision  to  ransom  Antioch  to  
the   populace.292  Additionally,  when  Ḵosrow   I   did   find   ‘stores   of   gold   and   silver   so  
great   in   amount’293  in   the   church   of   Antioch,   it   was   the  Roman   ambassador’s   plea  
rather   than   the   ‘deliberate   decision’   of   Ephraem   to   save   this   building.294  Since   it   is  
impossible  to  know  whether  the  Romans  left  the  precious  goods  intentionally,  the  role  
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of  the  patriarch  remains  obscure.  Given  the  havoc  caused  by  the  siege,  it   is  possible  
that  the  priests  just  left  the  gold  and  silver  unattended  and  ran  away.  No  matter  what  
he   had   tried   to   do   on   the   eve   of   siege,  Ephraem  chose   to   escape,   possibly   because  
‘none  of  his  objectives  succeeded’.295 
 
Army 
In the conflicts between Rome and Persia during the sixth century we have seen that 
armed Roman forces were present in many Roman cities. Sometimes they defended 
these places with civilians, 296  while in other cases the soldiers were hidden by 
civilians.297 We are also informed that in 540 many soldiers in Hierapolis became 
deserters because of ‘their grievance that the government owed them their pay for a 
long time’.298 Later they followed Ḵosrow I and went to the Persian Empire. In any 
case, however, there is no clear link between the garrisoned soldiers’ performance or 
presence and civilians’ post-siege experiences. 
        Both Anastasios and Justinian sent an army to the Empire’s eastern front to cope 
with the pressures caused by the Sasanids’ invasions.   It should be noted, however, 
that while the Roman soldiers sent by Anastasios would not have intended to starve 
their compatriots inside Amida, their presence and operations could possibly have 
resulted in the lack of food and famine inside this frontier city. At the beginning 
clearly the Persian garrison had a sufficient supply of necessities. The expeditionary 
force led by Kawād in person carried livestock and goods with them.299 Later, when a 
garrison was established to rule the remaining Amidenes, the supply of provisions 
was sufficient as the shah left certain important generals inside in this city,300 possibly 
in the spring of 503. However, the situation seems to have deteriorated not long 
                                            
295  Euagr.  HE  4.25. 
296  Prok.  Wars  2.5.11  (Sura),  2.13.16  (Dara). 
297  Ibid.,  2.12.2  (Chalkis). 
298  Ibid.,  2.7.37,  cf.  Prok.  Anecd.  24.12-4.  This  might  result  from  the  slack  defence  of  
the  Empire’s  eastern  front,  see  Liebeschuetz  1977:  498-9,  Greatrex  1998:  219ff,  cf.  
Whitby  1995:  111-4,  2005:  361-2. 
299  Zach.  HE  7.4.  Some  commodities  were  even  snatched  by  a  certain  Roman  thief. 
300  Prok.  Wars  1.8.7. 
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afterwards. If the author of Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle is right, the forces of 
Anastasios managed to win Amida back from the Sasanids after it was captured by 
the Great King.301 A certain Roman general Farzman, who arrived at Amida together 
with 500 horsemen, spied on the enemies’ activities, slaughtered those who went to 
the villages and even carried off the Persians’ livestock. Two possibilities can be 
suggested here: the Sasanids might either have led the cattle out of the city and grazed 
them in the surrounding areas or simply plundered them from the vicinity of Amida302 
to feed themselves inside the fortifications.303 However, in any case what the Persians 
possessed had been seized by the Romans. 
Moreover, the Romans’ military activities not only halted private commercial 
activities but also resulted in the closing of local markets. Meanwhile, crops would 
have been destroyed and farmers might have been prevented from going out of the 
city and cultivating the territorium outside the fortifications. For example, in the 
summer the approaching Romans set fire to the gate of Mar Zaura304 in order to get 
access to Amida and harass the Persians.305 At that time a certain merchant entered 
Amida secretly and sold fowls, loaves of bread and other kinds of foods at high price 
to the Persians, and possibly, to Glones himself. 306  After Glones was killed at 
Thilasamon, a place which, according to Prokopios, lay in a hilly, wooded area not 
very away from Amida, because of the collaboration between Gadana, a merchant 
from Amida, and the Roman generals, the marzbān prohibited the inhabitants (i.e. the 
Amidenes) from leaving the city to buy wine, wheat and other commodities from the 
markets of the villagers.307 In Pseudo-Joshua’s Chronicle, Farzman cunningly set a 
trap for the Persians inside Amida by ‘sending a flock of sheep to pass by near 
                                            
301  Josh.  Styl.  56,  cf.  Prok.  Wars  1.8.7,  where  the  Roman  generals’  reluctance  was  
emphasised. 
302  Greatrex  1998:  98. 
303  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
304  It  was  probably  the  south  gate  of  Amida,  Greatrex  1998:  97,  cf.  Greatrex  et  al.  
2011:  243. 
305  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
306  Prok.  Wars  1.9.5,  cf.  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
307  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
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Amida’.308 The Persians, meanwhile, managed to seize such valuable livestock: 400 
Persian soldiers were selected and went out of the city to catch them. However, when 
they opened the gates and tried to seize these sheep, they were crushed by Farzman’s 
forces who were lying in ambush nearby, and the marzbān was captured and 
executed. Although it remains controversial whether they were independent events or 
not,309 both of them illustrate the negative impact on both local commercial activities 
and the Sasanids’ endeavors to obtain provisions. 
In the winter of 503-4, the Romans departed from the neighboring areas of 
Amida temporarily, and presumably returned to their headquarters at Melitene.310 
Clearly it would have been a respite for the Persians: they opened the gates, went out 
and ‘entered wherever they wished, selling brass, tin, iron, tattered clothing and 
anything they could find in (the city) to merchants, even setting up a warehouse’.311 
At that time the villagers in the markets ‘sold for whatever (price) they wanted… 
(and) received compensation in money and in goods from the city’.312 The Persian 
troops must have sold these commodities to replenish their stock of food and 
provisions to face the possible attacks from the Romans in the coming spring for it 
was impossible to cultivate anything in the wintertime. We cannot tell whether the 
Sasanids faced the lack of food or not at that time, but clearly they would have 
plentiful supply of other resources. When Patrikios noticed such commercial 
activities, a foray was made by the Romans soon afterwards, and these activities were 
again interrupted: not only the local merchants who were exchanging food and oil 
with the Persians’ goods but also the Persians who were in charge of bringing these 
necessities such as arms, grain, and animals to Amida were all killed.313 
The Sasanids thus endeavoured in vain to acquire what they needed in the 
wintertime, and their failure could have been the main reason which led to the lack of 
provisions in the following months. The situation must have been worsened by the 
                                            
308  Josh.  Styl.  56. 
309  Greatrex  1998:  99,  contra  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  68. 
310  Josh.  Styl.  66. 
311  Ibid. 
312  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
313  Josh.  Styl.  66. 
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Romans’ renewed attacks: from the winter of 504 onwards, several branches of 
Roman forces were deployed to besiege Amida. Patrikios’ detachments came first,314 
and then a larger force arrived.315 Here the changing strategies of Anastasios’ generals 
deserve to be examined. When the Romans launched the first tide of counter-
offensive in the first half of 503, Patrikios and Hypatios were dispatched in order to 
re-conquer Amida. The first thing these generals did was to construct siege engines, 
such as expensive wooden towers, to lay siege to this city rather than intercepting the 
supply of provision and water of the inhabitants, including the Persians, and of 
course, the remaining Romans, inside this city.316 Later on, the generals decided that 
‘it was not appropriate for them to fight with (the garrison at Amida), as victory 
would not be achieved by the Romans by killing them…but if Kawād was defeated, 
(the garrison at Amida) would (have to) give themselves up or die in their 
blockade’. 317  Such strategies were adopted by the Romans in the sixth-century 
battlefield. In the reign of Justinian, Dorotheos, the magister militum per Armeniam, 
managed to starve the defenders in a Persian cidatel on the top of a mountain by 
blocking the only pathway through which goods and provisions could be delivered.318 
The author of the Strategikon pointed out that it was important ‘to keep the 
necessities, such as food and water, from getting to the people within the walls’.319 
While we cannot know whether the Roman generals bore such tactics in mind in 
besieging Amida,320 what they did from then on can be corroborated by the tactics 
mentioned in the very same military manual: ‘If the besieged possess these supplies in 
abundance, then it is necessary to resort to siege engines and fighting’.321 The lack of 
provisions inside Amida might thus have been the result of the Romans’ second wave 
of siege and attack. The arrival and presence of Romans in winter and spring must 
                                            
314  Ibid. 
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Although in the sixth century the emperors never visited these war-torn zones or cities 
in person, their attitudes and decisions could have played an important role in the 
subsequent fate of the deported Romans.322 As noted earlier, the exchange and release 
of prisoners of war for both the soldiers and civilians between Rome and Persia was 
not an unusual practice during the sixth century.323 However, apart from the terms of 
the Eternal Peace,324 the details of such activites could possibly have escaped the 
attention of contemporary authors.325 Surely either the social elites or the emperors 
themselves would have expectedly noticed the deportation of Romans during the 
Persian wars. However, in most cases, the Empire’s ruling class seems to have been 
ignorant of such cases. If Probos reported what he had seen in the northern frontier of 
the Persian Empire, including the existence of these prisoners of war of the previous 
period, why did Justinian choose to ignore this information at the beginning of his 
reign? When the peace treaty was concluded in 562, nothing about the return or 
exchange of prisoners of war between Rome and Persia had been included. 326 
Although diplomatic activity between Constantinople and Ctesiphon in the last 
quarter of the sixth century was rather frequent, and the Romans raised the issue of 
Dara many times,327 nothing regarding the prisoners of war from Dara and Apamea in 
the reign of Justin II had ever been mentioned, and clearly the main concern of the 
Empire’s ruling class was merely the re-conquest of such an important frontier 
                                            
322  Cf.  Whitby  1992:  295-303  for  the  emperor’s  role  in  diplomacy. 
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stronghold. Finally, why did Tiberios II decide to ignore the request for help from 
those living in the city Better Antioch rather than sending his soldiers to rescue these 
Romans? 
Legally speaking, whenever Romans were captured legitimately by foreign 
enemies, they would immediately lose their original legal status, both political and 
private, unless they returned to Roman territory successfully.328 More importantly, as 
‘a state theoretically equated with slavery’,329 the citizens in captivity would have 
been regarded as the property of their captors,330 that is, the Persians. Therefore, there 
might have been no reason for them to rescue the Persians’ slaves. Other factors, such 
as the Empire’s strategic and military considerations and the political situation of the 
sixth-century Mediterranean world, seem to have played vital roles. For the newly-
enthroned Justinian, to send gifts to the potential ally of the Empire at the northeastern 
frontier was an important diplomatic policy, and his efforts paid off soon 
afterwards.331 Having captured two other Hunnic kings who stood with Kawād, the 
queen of the Sabir Huns Boas, together with her forces, came over to the Empire.332 
Meanwhile, it was both difficult and risky to send soldiers to the Caucasus, and such 
an action would have provoked the Persians.333 Thus it was not practical for Justinian 
to use military or diplomatic means to rescue the deported Amidenes in the 520s.  
More than half a century later, Tiberios II failed to rescue the captured Romans 
in the Sasanian Empire. Since John of Ephesos praised the emperor in other parts of 
his work, 334  John seems to not have intended to use this event to blacken the 
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emperor’s reputation.335 Again, the political circumstances between Constantinople 
and Ctesiphon may have been an important factor. Having been raised as the sole 
ruler of the Empire in 578, Tiberios II intended to show goodwill to Ḵosrow I and 
arrange a new truce,336 and it is said that he released the Persian prisoners of war, 
‘especially those of rank, of whom some were even related to the king’, as a gift.337 
Menander the Guardsman asserted that ‘the Romans and the Persians would have 
made peace had not Ḵosrow I left this life’.338 As the Avars and the Slavs ravaged the 
Balkans almost without experiencing any setbacks,339 the barbarian pressure on the 
northern frontier was noticeable. Therefore it was not a suitable time for the emperor 
to resume hostilities and prepare to march into the heartland of the Persians. 
As shown already, only Justinian managed both to negotiate with the Sasanids 
and to rescue these Roman elites back to the Empire in the mid-540s.340 We know that 
Tribunos took twenty kentenaria with him and approached the shah,341 but the details 
of the negotiation between him and the Persians remain unknown, nor can we tell 
whether it, or at least part of it, were regarded as ransom or not. While Prokopios did 
not indicate who had ordered Tribunos to make such a request for releasing the 
prisoners of war in the reign of Justinian, the imperial authority must have played a 
vital role: it was nearly impossible for a physician, as a special envoy, to act on his 
own without authorisation from Constantinople. The fact that Justinian is not 
mentioned or connected to these events by our sole source, Prokopios, is remarkable. 
One thing is clear: Prokopios might have chosen to downplay the role of the emperor 
deliberately because liberating the deported prisoners of war, i.e. those who had 
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become slaves legally, though perhaps temporarily, from the enemy by sending an 
ambassador could have been ignominious. 
For Justinian, the custody of these distinguished subjects by his opponents must 
have been quite embarrassing. It was not cost-effective for the Romans to liberate 
these captives by military means: from the end of the third century onwards, no 
Roman general had ever successfully launched an attack on Ctesiphon, a city with 
formidable walls and fortifications.342 Having been humiliated by the sack of one of 
the Empire’s greatest metropoleis in 540, it is not surprising that Justinian would 
exploit such a rare chance to win back his reputation and dignity by liberating certain 
aristocrats of the Empire from captivity. 
Second, to liberate the Romans from Persia might have been an important part of 
Justinian’s religious policies. Having experienced failures in persecuting the 
Miaphysites in the Empire, the Emperor might have adopted other milder policies in 
the hope that compromise and harmony between the Chalcedonians and Miaphysites 
could ultimately be achieved. The close examination of the royal couple’s religious 
policies showed that Justinian not only tolerated but also even encouraged Theodora’s 
pro-Miaphysite strategies, because most Miaphysites lived in regions of crucial 
importance, both militarily and economically, and it would be highly risky for the 
Emperor to alienate them altogether.343 We cannot rule out the possibility that, as 
implied in the Chronicle of Seert, Theodora took the initiative for philanthropic acts 
for Roman subjects, such as sponsoring the building of churches and saving girls from 
being sold as prostitutes,344 and then interceded on behalf of the Roman captives. 
Since there is some difficulty in establishing which sources were used in this 
section, 345  whether the compiler’s account was based on the empress’ image as 
‘believing queen’346 remains unclear. 
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While literary contexts and historical details of relevant accounts have been 
examined in previous chapters respectively, the aim of this chapter was to establish a 
taxonomy 347  of the shared features and particularities of civilians’ wartime 
experiences and, furthermore, to show whether and how various factors would have 
affected these Romans’ fates. The result indicates that while the Persians’ battle 
experience and different considerations would have affected Roman civilians’ fates, 
sometimes the decisions and reactions of the Empire’s elites proved to be equally 
important. 
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73,  van  Rompay  2005:  251,  Menze  2008:  209-27,  Wood  2010:  168-9. 
347  See  Appendix  1  for  further  information. 
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Conclusion 
My  thesis  set  out  to  study  the  wartime  experiences  of  the  Empire’s  urban  civilians  in  
the  conflicts  between  Rome  and  Persia  and  to  investigate  what  might  have  happened  
at   the   conquered   Roman   cities.   These   issues   have   been   discussed   through   the  
examination  of  available  literary  and  material  data. 
This   thesis   contributes   to   the   study  and  evaluation  of   the   sources   from  which  
our   information   and   data   were   extracted.   What   we   can   know   from   literary   and  
material  data  is  doomed  to  be  merely  a  small  part  of  the  whole  picture.  Many  writers  
adopted   characteristic   literary  motifs   or   alluded   to  well-known   passages   from   their  
predecessors   in   portraying   the   scenes   of   a   conquered   city.   As Catherine Holmes 
argued, ‘the choice of the linguistic register could have been driven by the 
expectations and pre-existing literary experiences’,1 and such ideas must have been 
shared by both the authors themselves and, more importantly, their readers.   In  
addition,  many  writers’  descriptions  of  civilians’  fates  are  highly  selective  in  terms  of  
themes,   locations   and   details.   While   they   focused   on   certain   themes   such   as   the  
Romans’  slaughter,  deportation  and  the  cities’  destruction,  the  information  about  other  
aspects   is   scarce.  Therefore, while precious information about the sacks of Roman 
cities can be mined from their works, these authoritative texts clearly affected the 
understanding of future authors and their readers. As   Cyril   Mango   stressed   in   his  
inaugural   lecture   40   years   ago,   we   are   all   doomed   to   conduct   historical   researches  
through  these  ‘distorting  mirrors’  of  literary  accounts.2 
Despite   a   series   of   archaeological   excavations   having   been   conducted   in   the  
east   Mediterranean   world,   the   evidence   is   almost   invariably   inconclusive.   The  
examination  of  buildings  in  Antioch  and  Apamea  suggests  that  these  cities  could  have  
been  either  burned  or  destroyed  by   the  Sasanids,  but   the  scale  of  destruction   is  still  
open   to   debate.   Furthermore,   data   from   other   places   has   proven   to   be   equally  
uncertain.   The   importance   of   archaeological   campaigns,   however,   should   not   be  
underestimated,  and  they  have  proven  to  be  indispensable  in  confirming  accounts  and  
in   estimating   the   destruction   caused   by   the   Great   King’s   army.   Sometimes,  
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epigraphical   texts   can   yield   relevant   information,   such   as   the   construction   of  
fortifications   in   the   frontier   region   and   the   participation   of   social   elites   in   building  
activities,   but   they   add   nothing   new   to   what   we   can   observe   from   literary   and  
archaeological  data. 
As  the  first  systematic  study  to  examine  civilians’  wartime  experiences  in  detail,  
this   thesis   generates   important   findings   in   the   research   of  Roman   social   history.  At  
first   glance,   a   straightforward   and,   of   course,   simplified   taxonomy   of   Roman  
civilians’   wartime   experiences   in   these   conflicts   can   be   established   through   the  
examination   and   analysis   of   available   sources:   first,   loss   of   life,   whether   through  
massacre   and/or   famine;;   second,   the   loss   and/or   destruction   of   personal/communal  
goods,  both  movable  and   immovable;;   third,  sexual  violence  against   female  citizens;;  
and   finally,   the   Romans’   forced   movement   in   the   form   of   hostages,   refugees   and  
deportees.  Clearly,  these  fates  in  the  Persian  wars  were  variable,  and  the  interaction  of  
multiple   factors   affected   them.   Changing   political   circumstances   in   the   Eastern  
Mediterranean  world  must  have  had  a  profound   impact  on   the  Empire’s   inhabitants,  
and,   if  Hennig  Börm   is   correct,   the   campaign  of  540  was  actually   the  watershed  of  
Romano-Persian   relations. 3   However,   there   is   no   sign   of   significant   alteration  
regarding  the  Sasanids’  treatment  of  the  defeated  Romans  in  the  sixth  century:  in  most  
cases,   the   Sasanids   seem   to   have   had   similar   incentives   and   strategies,   and   the  
acquisition  of  booty  and  captives  seems  to  have  been  consistently  important. 
The   comparison   of   the  Great  Kings’   treatment   of   the  Empire’s   frontier   cities  
with  what  their  ancestors  had  done  in  the  previous  centuries  suggests  certain  common  
features.  Indeed  many  Persian  kings  in  the  third  and  fourth  centuries  were  not  always  
keen  to  occupy  the  vast  territory  they  conquered.  Having  been  defeated  by  Kallistos  
and  others,  the  forces  of  Shapur  I  retreated  from  the  Empire.4  Also,  Shapur II  returned  
to   Persia   with   booty   and   captives   not   long   after   the   fall   of   Amida   in   359. 5  
Nevertheless,   sometimes   the   Sasanids   purposed   to   occupy   the   Empire’s   frontier  
citadels.   For   instance,   the Great King’s soldiers were garrisoned in Bezabde with 
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plenty of supplies in the middle of the fourth century. Although  the  Sasanids  seem  to  
have   seldom   intended   to   permanently   seize   the   Empire’s   strategically   important  
frontier   sites   in   the   sixth   century,   the   occupations   of   Amida,   Theodosiopolis   and  
Dara—the   first   two   only   for   a   short   period—during   the   reigns   of   Anastasios   and  
Justin  II,  respectively,  are  significant,  and  such  decisions,  as  shown  above,  must  have  
played  an  important  role  in  the  Romans’  fates. 
While   the   Persians   treated   the   defeated   Romans   in   similar   manner,   some  
particularities  can  be  noted.  Although   ransoming  captured  Romans  was  practised   in  
the   early   Empire, 6   the   sixth-century   emperors   never   managed   to   buy   back   their  
subjects  from  the  Persians,  and  we  cannot  be  sure  whether  Tribunos,  a  physician  who  
was  sent  by  Justinian  in  545  to  negotiate  peace  with  the  Persians,  ever  tried  to  use  the  
kentenaria  he  carried  to  ransom  the  captured  elites  from  Antioch.  Another  distinctive  
feature  of  the  sixth-century  Persian  wars  is  the  settlement  of  the  Empire’s  prisoners  of  
war.  In  the  third  and  fourth  centuries,  the  Sasanids  continued  transporting  the  captured  
Romans  back  to  their  empire.  In  the  sixth  century,  however,  Roman  prisoners  of  war  
were   resettled   near   the   Sasanids’   political   centre   for   the   first   time   and,   more  
importantly,  were  regarded  as  a  critical  part  of  the  captors’  propaganda  plans. 
Scholars  have  argued  that  the  sixth  and  seventh  centuries  witnessed  the  decline  
of   city   and   civic   life   in   the   eastern   Mediterranean   world.   Although   the   study   of  
possible  long-term  repercussions  of  the  Great  King’s  military  activities  is  beyond  the  
scope   of   this   research,   the   results   from   the   study   of   available   sources   definitely  
provide  new  insights  into  the  transformation  and  changes  of  the  Empire’s  society  and  
cities  in  Late  Antiquity.  For  those  living  in  the  Empire’s  eastern  provinces,  the  arrival  
of  the  invading  Sasanids  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  sixth  century  marked  the  end  of  
the  détente between Ctesiphon and Constantinople in the previous decades. As  noted  
in   the   analysis   from   chapters   3   to   5,   at   the   local   level,   the   Great   King’s   military  
activities  must  have  had  significant  effects  upon  the  Empire’s  society.  For  example,  as  
the  first  targets  of  the  Great  King,  many  strategically  important  places  at  the  Empire’s  
frontier   region   were   taken.   The   Persians—aiming   to   capture   these   sites   through  
sieges—vehemently  attacked  them  upon  their  arrival.  Kawād took Theodosiopolis in 
                                            
6  See,  for  example,  Levy  1943:  169-70  for  the  case  of  the  Marcomanian  War  in  the  
reign  of  Marcus  Aurelius  (r.  161-80). 
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502 and sacked Amida in the next year, while his son Ḵosrow I sacked Sura, 
Kallinikos and Dara in 540, 542 and 573,   respectively.   Therefore,   it   goes   without  
saying  that  the  invasion  of  the  Sasanids  must  have  had  immediate  negative  effects  for  
the   Empire;;   the   survivors’   deportation   led   to   the   loss   of   manpower,   and   the   Great  
King’s  plundering  and  looting  activities,  together  with  the  destruction  of  Roman  cities  
in   the   Persian   wars,   would   entail   not   only   the   decrease   of   revenue   but   also   the  
increase  of  expenditure.   
This,  however,  is  merely  half  the  story.  Despite  such  atrocities  that  were  reported  
to  have  been  committed  by  the  Sasanids  at  the  Empire’s  cities,  in  chapters  2  and  3,  I  
have   argued   that   given   the   limitation   of   and   the   contradiction   between   available  
sources,   such   information   should   be   treated   cautiously.   I   have   shown   that   in  many  
cases   the  scale  of  massacre,  destruction  and  deportation  caused  by   the  Great  King’s  
military   activities   could   possibly   have   been   much   less   significant   than   what   is  
recorded   in   literary   texts.   The   Empire’s   local   society   proved   to   be   resilient   in   the  
Persian   wars:   no   important   settlement   had   been   abandoned,   and   clearly   civic   life  
persisted   throughout   the   sixth   century.   However,   the   inhabitants   of   many   cities  
remained  unharmed,  as  they  surrendered  promptly  and  paid  ransom  to  the  Persians. 
This  thesis  not  only  re-examines  the  nature  of  the  armed  conflicts  between  Rome  
and   Persia   in   the   sixth   century   but   also   contributes   to   our   understanding   of   the  
Romano-Persian   relations   in   Late   Antiquity.   As   noted   earlier,   in   many   cases   the  
Sasanids   seem   to   have   been   restrained   from   committing   indiscriminate   violence  
against   the   Romans   living   in   Syria   Prima   and   Secunda.   Instead,   as   suggested   in  
chapters  3  and  6,  the  Sasanids’  thirst  for  wealth,  either  by  making  repetitive  requests  
of  payment  or  by  plundering  valuable  goods,  was  a  distinctive  feature  during  the  sixth  
century.  Apart  from  Dara,  which  was  occupied  by  the  Sasanids  for  18  years,  the  Great  
King   never   managed   to   annihilate   the   Romans   and   challenge   their   sovereign   and  
governance   in   the   eastern  Mediterranean  world.   In   addition,   despite   certain   Roman  
cities’  sackings  being  tied  to  retaliation,  the  Persians  committed  many  atrocities  in  the  
sixth  century  for  political  and  propagandistic  purposes.  As  argued  in  chapter  6,  both  
the   Persians   and   the   Romans   appropriated   the   potential   propagandistic   appeal   of  
treating   the   inhabitants   from   Antioch   and   Apamea,   the   Empire’s   two   metropoleis  
Hence,  the  prisoners  of  war  from  Antioch  were  housed  just  near  Ḵosrow I’s capital as 
demonstration of the shah’s victory.  The  Great  King’s  Roman  campaigns  in  the  sixth  
century  were  comprised  of   a   series  of  depredations/raids,   and   the  conflicts  between  
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Rome  and  Persia  should  be  regarded  as  a  war  for  looting  and  propaganda  rather  than  a  
war   for   conquest.   Such   circumstances   changed   in   the   first   decade   of   the   seventh  
century,  and  Ḵosrow II and his commanders intended to uproot the Romans’ rule in 
the eastern Mediterranean world through a war of attrition. 
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Appendix  1:  Taxonomy  of  urban  civilians’  fates  in  the  six-







Appendix 2: Figures of deportation and massacre in historical 
texts 
This   section   discusses   the   numerical   details   relating   to   the   Romans’   massacre   and  
deportation   in   the   Persian   wars.1  Of   course,   it   is   impossible   to   know   exactly   how  
many  people  were  killed  or  removed  from  any  captured  place  in  the  Persian  wars,  nor  
can  we,  as  Bryan  Ward-Perkins  has  rightly  pointed  out,  quantify  civilians’  horror  by  
examining   these   accounts.2 These   figures,   however,   deserve   further   investigation   to  
examine   how   and  why   such   information  was   preserved   in   our   texts.  This   appendix  
will   use   both   literary   and  material   data   to   gauge—though   necessarily   tentatively—
these  cities’  likely  capacities  for  accommodating  inhabitants  in  wartime. 
                The  figures  provided  by  our  authors  are  often  tantalising.  In  the  sack  of  Amida,  
both   Pseudo-Joshua   and   Pseudo-Zachariah   recorded   that  more   than   80,000   citizens  
were   killed;;3 the author of the Chronicle of Pseudo-Dionysios of Tel Mahre, who 
presumably acquired this information from the Church History of John of Ephesos,4 
wrote that 85,000 corpses were carried through the North Gate.5 In the case of Dara, 
we have information from Michael the Syrian, who recorded that approximately 
150,000 Romans had been killed in 573;6 however, the author of the Chronicle of 
1234 never wrote about the postwar massacre in Dara.7 Further numerical details 
regarding the scale of deportations can be found in both Greek and Syriac texts. In 
Prokopios’ Wars, Ḵosrow I removed 12,000 people from the frontier city Sura at the 
                                            
1  Some scholars tended to accept these figures. For the deportation of the Romans in 
573, see Trombley  1997:  176-7,  Morony  2004a:  161-179;;  for  the  inhabitants  living  in  
Persian  Antioch,  see  Kröger 1993: 447, Kettenhofen 1996, Morony 2004a, contra, for 
example, Luther 1997: 183, Lenski 2007: 224. 
2  Ward-Perkins  2005:  20. 
3  Josh.  Styl.  53,  Zach.  HE  7.4. 
4  Cf.  Greatrex  1998:  93. 
5  Ps.  Dion.  II.  5. 
6  Mich.  Syr.  10.9,  see  also  Bar  Hebraeus  Chronography  8.83. 
7  Chr.  1234  66. 
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beginning of his Roman campaign in 540,8 and thousands of Roman farmers were 
enslaved at Kallinikos two years later.9 Michael the Syrian offered the figure of 
90,000 captives from Dara in 573,10 and the author of the Chronicle of 1234 stated 
that 98,000 people were captured. The figures in John of Ephesos were even higher. 
He reported that the total number of deportees in Ḵosrow I’s campaign in 573 was 
275,000,11 and 292,000 Romans were captured from Apamea and other sites.12 Al-
Ṭabari reported that Ḵosrow I led around 90,000 soldiers against Justinian,13 while in 
the Šāh-nāma, a higher figure was provided: 300,000 Persian soldiers were dispatched 
in the shah’s campaign, and eventually they deported 30,000 Romans from the 
Empire to their king.14 In short, whereas the preservation of such details in recounting 
civilians’ experiences was not uncommon for Syriac-speaking historians, those 
written in other languages seem to have been reluctant to mention similar information. 
Indeed, sometimes the demographic details of these Roman cities in Late 
Antiquity can be glimpsed from literary accounts. As an important city in the 
Empire’s eastern frontier zone,15 Amida could have accommodated many people in 
wartime. In the fourth century, Caesar Constantius conducted a series of fortifying 
works at this city, thinking that those who inhabited the nearby areas ‘might have a 
secure place of refuge’.16 When the Persians obtained certain strategically important 
frontier cities and provinces from the Romans after Julian the Apostate’s death in 363, 
the inhabitants of Nisibis were forced to move to Amida 17  and other places. In 
                                            
8  Prok.  Wars  2.5.29. 
9  Prok.  Anecd.  3.31. 
10  Mich.  Syr.  10.9.  The  same  figure  was  preserved  in  Bar  Hebraeus  Chronography  
8.83.  cf.  Chr.  846  a.885,  174. 
11  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.19. 
12  Ibid.,  6.6. 
13  al-Ṭabari  1.959. 
14  Ferdowsī  Šāh-nāma  8.47. 
15  See  Crow  2007:  443-6  for  an  estimation  of  the  size  of  Amida. 
16  Ammianus  18.9.1. 
17  Cf.  Ibid.,  25.9.1-6,  Mal.  13.27.  According  to  Zosimos,  ‘many  (of  the  Nisibenes)  
emigrated  to  Amida’,  Zos.  3.34.1. 
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addition, many people fled into Amida after noticing the Persians’ movement and 
arrival in 502-3. If John of Ephesos’ account is to be believed, approximately 300 
refugees escaped from the monastery of the house of Mar John to Amida and stayed 
in ‘the school called that of the Urtaye’, while others escaped elsewhere. 18 
Nevertheless, we have no idea how many people inhabited this important frontier city 
either in the fourth or the sixth century. The only figure we have regarding Amida’s 
population in wartime comes from Ammianus, who related that approximately 
120,000 people were staying in this city in 359: ‘within the limits of a city…there 
were shut seven legions, a promiscuous throng of strangers and citizens of both sexes, 
and a few other soldiers’,19 but this information is again of little use for deducing the 
situation in the reign of Anastasios. 
At the beginning of the first century, an equestrian officer named Quintus 
Aemilius Secundus took a census and reported that at that time, more than 100,000 
citizens lived in the civitas of Apamea. 20  Nevertheless, this number, as David 
Kennedy recently argued, ‘is the count of all but slaves, resident foreigners and 
nomads’.21 Such information did not accurately reflect this city’s total population,22 
and all we can know is that Apamea could have been a rather populous city at that 
time. In the sixth century, there was no census data for this metropolis, but certain 
events’ effects on demography could have been significant. The deadly earthquakes 
seem to have been less destructive for its inhabitants, but the pestilence in the Empire 
from 542 onwards would surely have resulted in a decrease of its population.23 
                                            
18  Joh.  Eph.  Lives,  PO  19.218-9. 
19  Ammianus  19.2.14. 
20  See  Sherk  1988:  38-39  for  the  translation  of  this  inscription.  I  owe  this  information  
to  Greatrex  and  Lieu  2002:  283.  For  the  population  of  Antioch,  another  metropolis,  
see  Downey  1958:  84-91,  Liebeschuetz  1972. 
21  D.  Kennedy  2006:  117. 
22  On  the  issue  of  slave  population  of  the  Empire,  see  Harris:  1999:  65,  MacMullen  
1987:  375,  Scheidel  1997:  158. 
23  As a schoolboy, Euagrios himself was infected by the plague, but whether he 
contracted it in Apamea or Epiphania remains unclear, Stathakopoulos  2004:  283.  
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 In addition, epigraphical evidence is of some importance in investigating certain 
demographic features of the war-torn regions around Apamea during the sixth 
century. Judging from the lack of epigraphic record of Apamea’s surrounding areas in 
the post-540 period, Frank Trombley argues that such a halt of economic activity may 
be attributed to the depopulation during Ḵosrow I’s campaign in 540.24 John Lydus 
reported that so many Romans were deported in 540 that ‘there was no farmer nor 
contributor any longer for the public treasury’.25 Some local inhabitants must have 
become refugees and escaped, while others could have been captured by the Great 
King’s army. In the second half of the sixth century, the territorium of Apamea again 
witnessed the paucity of inscriptions in the five years following Admarhan’s 
invasion.26 Therefore, although it is impossible to provide any accurate demographic 
data, the decline in the local population of this metropolis’ nearby areas in the 
aftermath of the Sasanids’ military expeditions can still be observed. 
The data related to Sura and Dara’s population is sparser. In Late Antiquity, the 
existence of Sura, as one of the Empire’s easternmost frontier citadels, has been 
attested already by Pliny the Elder in the first century, 27  but little information 
regarding its civilian settlement can be gleaned from literary sources. Having been 
established in the frontier in the early sixth century,28 Dara was never conquered by 
enemies before 573, and neither Greek nor Syriac texts ever mentioned the outbreak 
                                                                                                                           
Also  see  Morrison  and  Sodini  2002:  193-5,  Hays  2007:  36-42,  Kennedy  2007:  91,  for  
further  discussion  with  bibliography. 
24  Trombley  1997:  178,  cf.  Foss  1997:  204-6,  232-4,  2003:  159  for  the  situation  of  
Roman  Syria’s  rural  areas  in  the  seventh  century,  where  the  life  seems  to  have  
continued. 
25  Joh.  Lyd.  De  Mag.  3.54. 
26  Trombley  1997:  178. 
27  Plin. HN 5.87. 
28  See  Lauffray  1983  (Zenobia-Halebiyye,  Mesopotamia),  Poulter  1992  (Justiniana  
Prima,  northern  Illyricum),  Zanini  2003:  201-20  (discussion)  for  other  cases  of  these  
new  cities,  which  were  founded  to  serve  as  citadels  at  the  frontier  of  the  Empire  in  the  
sixth  century. 
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of plague or other natural disasters inside this frontier citadel or its nearby areas. The 
possibility of depopulation caused by severe disasters can thus be ruled out. 
In short, even though we know that some of these Roman cities could have 
accommodated many inhabitants in the postclassical era, late antique authors 
remained silent about the populations of these communities when the sieges were in 
progress in the Persian wars. Nevertheless, the results of archaeological campaigns 
prove to be helpful in measuring first the physical dimensions of these places and, if 
possible, their population sizes in the sixth century. Also, the reliability of what we 
have from late antique or medieval texts can be judged. 
The size of these eastern cities can be deduced from the results of archaeological 
excavations. As the metropolis of Syriac Secunda, Apamea sprawled approximately 
255 hectares, 29  while the fortifications of Amida enclosed approximately 180 
hectares. The size of other eastern cities would have been much smaller. For example, 
the enclosures within the old city walls of Sura, which were probably established 
before the invasion of Ḵosrow I, measured approximately 26.25 hectares (375 m × 
700 m).30  The study of the physical boundaries of Dara, 31  compared with other 
Roman cities in Late Antiquity, shows that it was clearly not a large city:32 judging 
from the sketch plan in the early twentieth century (Map 8), the walls of this frontier 
citadel stretched across three hills and enclosed approximately 50 hectares. 
While the scale of these cities can thus be roughly deduced, it should be noted 
that some areas of these places must have been occupied by public buildings such as 
cisterns, churches and public baths. Of course, some of them could have served as 
temporary shelters for the refugees in wartime, but these buildings would surely have 
reduced the living space available to civilians. As previously shown, we know that 
many grand public buildings, such as the cathedral and the colonnade street, were 
built inside Antioch and Apamea, but the results of archaeological excavations of 
                                            
29  Balty  2000:  171. 
30  Konrad  2008:  435. 
31  Preusser  1911:  44. 
32  See  Zanini  2003:  214-5  for  the  plans  of  several  important  cities  at  the  same  scale. 
 269 
other frontier cities such as Amida, Dara and Sura were frustratingly meagre,33 and it 
is impossible to know how many public buildings existed in these places.  
Therefore, it is necessary to resort to literary sources to examine the building 
schemes of these Roman cities. 34  The fortifications of Sura were rebuilt by 
Justinian, 35  and certain barracks and the bishop’s residence 36  would have been 
established, but neither Prokopios nor other contemporary authors mentioned relevant 
details in their texts. We are better informed about the situation of other cities. In 
Amida there was an amphitheatre in which the remaining Romans were detained 
during famine,37 and the baths of Paul were built somewhere in this city, as well.38 
More information regarding ecclesiastical buildings 39  can be gleaned from 
contemporary or medieval texts. The Church of the Forty Martyrs was built at the end 
of the fifth century,40 and both the Church of the Virgin and the Church of Mar 
Cosmas was built in the sixth century.41  
From the early sixth century onwards, many military buildings such as camps 
and barracks were established to accommodate armed forces and military officials in 
Dara, one of the most important frontier cities of the Empire.42 Being the base of the 
dux of Mesopotamia, the residence of such an important officer might have taken up 
the walled area. Ecclesiastical buildings such as the Great Church and the Church of 
                                            
33  See  above,  pp.  128-38  for  the  situation  of  these  eastern  cities.   
34  Cf.  Mango  2000:  924-55. 
35  Prok.  Aed.  2.9.2. 
36  See,  for  example,  Miller  2000:  16-53,  Berenfeld  2002,  Ceylan  2006:  169-94.   
37  Zach.  HE  7.5. 
38  Ibid.,  7.4. 
39  For  the  list  of  these  buildings,  see  Keser-Kayaalp 2009.2: 11, 2013: 408-9. 
40  Chr.  819.  a.795/4,  cf.  Zach.  HE  7.3-4. 
41  The  exact  date  of  the church of the Virgin’s  construction,  however,  cannot  be  
ascertained.  Keser-Kayaalp 2013: 416, cf. van  Bercham  and  Strzygowski  1910:  187-
95,  Keser-Kayaalp 2009.1: 69-73. On  the  church of Mar Cosmas, see Bell and Mango 
1982: 106, Keser-Kayaalp 2009.1: 30, 46-7. 
42  Prok.  Aed.  2.3.26. 
 270 
the Apostle Bartholomew were established 43  within the fortifications, as well. 44 
Finally, a huge public bath, 45  a large storehouse 46  and ‘other things with which 
distinguished cities are adorned’, 47  such as the colonnades, 48  were erected by 
Anastasios. 
Despite the information above, our knowledge of these cities’ population sizes in 
the sixth century will inevitably be limited by several factors. First, while the 
construction of these public buildings would possibly have reduced these urban 
settlements’ living spaces, it is impossible to examine the topography of these cities in 
great detail. Given the fact that the features and natures of the Empire’s cities could 
vary greatly, the results would merely act as a basis of reference, and the figures 
should not be taken at face value. Second, as noted above,49 since many inhabitants of 
a city’s surrounding areas would have taken refuge in the city in wartime, their 
presence would surely have contributed to the total number of inhabitants inside a 
besieged city. Nevertheless, while in many cases the walled areas of a Roman city can 
be attested by the results of archaeological excavations, it is not always easy to assess 
the situation of a city’s territorium, let alone the number of refugees who stayed 
inside the fortifications in wartime.50 
                                            
43  Ibid. 
44  Keser-Kayaalp 2009.1: 31, 56-61, 129. On Dara’s topography and lists of churches, 
see Keser-Kayaalp  2009.2:  251-2,  14  respectively.  Cf.  Liebeschuetz  2001:  80-2  for  
further  similar  examples  in  other  parts  of  the  Empire. 
45  Cf.  Mal.  16.10,  in  which  two  baths  were  constructed. 
46  Zach.  7.6. 
47  Euagr.  HE  3.37. 
48  Mal.  16.10. 
49  See  above,  p.  10. 
50   See,   for   example,   Trombley   and   Watt   2000:   XLV-XLVI   for   an   estimation   of  
Amida’s  population  in  502-3. 
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The focus of my discussion, therefore, will be limited to the walled areas of these 
Roman cities, without making allowance for public space,51 and the population from 
the extramural areas will be excluded. As the extrapolation of population density 
proves to be a relatively reliable method in estimating a city’s population,52 I will use 
certain demographic multipliers to estimate the overall size of these eastern cities. 
Recently David Kennedy has provided a thorough discussion on the possible gross 
density numbers in estimating the Empire’s urban populations.53 Given that there are 
few relevant research works on Roman Mesopotamia,54 it is necessary to resort to the 
results of previous studies on the population of the Empire’s other cities to check the 
reliability of ancient accounts. Tony Wilkinson argued that a figure of 100-200 
persons per hectare may be applied to the cities in Mesopotamia in the Bronze Age.55 
The research results of the Oxford Roman Economy Project, which was based on the 
examination of certain Roman cities in North Africa and Pompeii, suggests that a 
range of 150 to 250 people per hectare would be a reasonable figure to estimate the 
population of a Roman city.56  
 
Table  1.  The  areas  and  estimated  populations  of  eastern  cities  from  which  the  figures  
of  massacres  and  deportations  during  the  Persian  wars  were  provided. 
                                            
51  Cf.  Koder  2001:  153-4  for  the methodology of Johannes Koder, in which the 
average population density was provided regardless of the distinction between 
villages and cities. 
52  Wilson  2011:  170,  Hanson  2011:  251,  cf.  Wilkinson  2003b:  39.  On  the  discussion  
of  other  approaches,  see,  for  example,  Duncan-Jones  1974:  261-2. 
53  D.  Kennedy  2006:  118-9. 
54  From  the  updated  bibliography  provided  on  the  website  of  the  Oxford  Roman  
Economy  Project  (OXREP)  (http://oxrep.classics.ox.ac.uk/bibliographies/ 
ancient_city_populations_bibliography/);;  there  is  but  very  little  research  on  the  
settlements  of  Roman  Syria  and  Mesopotamia. 
55  Wilkinson  2003b:  39-51. 
56  Hanson  2011:  252,  Wilson  2011:  176-7.  See,  for  example,  Hassan  1981:  66  on  the  
previous  scholarship  on  this  issue.  For  other  case  studies  in  the  classical  world,  see  
Packer  1967:  81-95,  1971,  Wallace-Hadrill  1994,  Storey  1997. 
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Thus, a table with the possible demographic figures of these Roman cities is 
provided. Nevertheless, David Kennedy has rightly argued that considering the space 
occupied by public buildings, the low end of the range of the possibility should be 
applied. As shown in the table, 100 people per hectare would give Apamea a 
population of 25,500, with 5,000 and 2,625 at Dara and Sura, respectively. Therefore, 
it is shown that only several thousands of people would live in Sura, and Dara was 
definitely not a large, populous city. Although the total population of these cities must 
have been temporarily increased by the arrival of refugees during wartime, it would 
have been difficult for these two frontier cities to accommodate tens of thousands of 
people. Both Greek and Syriac authors, therefore, seem to have provided exaggerated 
figures in their accounts to emphasise the scale of the Romans’ massacres and 
deportations during the Persian wars. 
The case of the Romans’ deportation by Adarmahan and Ḵosrow I in 573 
requires further discussion. The figures provided by John of Ephesos consist of the 
prisoners of war from Apamea, Dara and other Roman cities. Indeed many, if not all, 
Romans from Dara would have been deported in November 573. Also, as the 
metropolis of Syria Secunda, Apamea could surely house tens of thousands of 
inhabitants. However, the forces led by Adarmahan seem to not have conquered any 
populous cities. In fact, the deployment and allocation of the Sasanian army in 573 
must have made it difficult for the marzbān to capture numerous Apameans; he could 
possibly have never led a substantial army to strike the Empire, and the aim of his 
detachment was not to engage in any serious or prolonged siege or battle but to launch 
another unexpected attack at the heart of the Empire. If John of Epiphania’s report is 
to be believed, the Great King only sent 6,000 soldiers and other ethnic groups of 








Apamea 255 25,500 38,250 51,000 63,750 
Dara 50 5,000 7,500 10,000 12,500 
Sura 26.25 2,625 Ca.  3,938 5,250 Ca.  6,563 
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people to attack the Empire’s villages and cities.57 The Sasanids would have never 
been able to capture and transport so many Romans at once.58 
As noted, the prisoners of war were removed from the Empire and transported en 
masse to Persia or the Caucasus. However, we will probably never know the size of 
these communities in Late Antiquity. In the last quarter of the sixth century, John of 
Ephesos reported that more than 30,000 people inhabited the city Better Antioch of 
Ḵosrow.59 Because this city was never completely excavated, neither the living area 
of its inhabitants nor the feature of its buildings can be securely confirmed. The 
difficulty is further aggravated by the fact that it is impossible to know how many 
people were resettled by Ḵosrow I in the sixth century. However, several data—
though not directly related to this place—can be provided. Robert McC. Adams 
identified several hundred settlements on the Diyala plains,60 and based on the results 
of this research, an estimate of the Jewish population has been proposed by Jacob 
Neusner.61 As the network of irrigation systems could have fed a dense population in 
the sixth century, 62  Ctesiphon, together with its nearby cities, could have 
accommodated many inhabitants in Late Antiquity. Al-Ṭabari reported that more than 
30,000 families inhabited this city when it was conquered by the Arabs in the second 
half of the seventh century.63 If he is to be believed, Ctesiphon would have been a 
rather populous city. 
Although the Great King must have captured and killed the inhabitants from no 
less than five major cities or frontier citadels of the Empire in the sixth century, how 
many people were generally slaughtered or transported by the enemy was not the 
focus of classicising historians: neither John of Epiphania nor Theophylaktos 
provided his audience with any information about it. This does not, however, mean 
that these authors never mentioned such details in their works, and Prokopios did note 
                                            
57  Joh.  Epiph.  4. 
58  D.  Kennedy  2006:  115. 
59  Joh.  Eph.  HE  6.19. 
60  Adams  1965:  72. 
61  Neusner 1966: 246-50. 
62  Adams  1965:  69-70. 
63  al-Ṭabari  1.2467. 
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the Roman citizens’ casualties in the Gothic Wars.64 In addition, although numerical 
details regarding the armed forces or their casualties can be observed in Prokopios’ 
accounts of the conflicts both in the Empire’s eastern provinces and Lazica,65 it was 
only in the case of Sura where the number of civilian deportations was mentioned. 
The analysis of the Sasanids’ military operations and Prokopios’ text suggests that he 
might have intended to stress the scale of deportation. Because Sura was merely a tiny 
frontier city of the Empire, it must have accommodated fewer people than other larger 
places like Amida or Antioch. Therefore, the Sasanids would possibly have captured 
many more citizens from these Roman cities than from Sura. Prokopios’ concern 
could thus have possibly lain in the significance placed by the Romans on the sack of 
this frontier city: after the sack of Amida in 503, it the first Roman city to be sacked 
by the Sasanids, and from that point, many civilians must have become victims in the 
Persian wars. Such clearly exaggerated numbers of captives from this small city thus 
could have been mentioned to imply the Romans’ subsequent turmoil and calamities 
in the middle of the sixth century. 
The situation of Syriac historiography is different: both contemporary historians, 
such as Pseudo-Joshua, and the compilers and chroniclers of medieval times were 
inclined to preserve such figures in their works. At the very beginning of the sixth 
century, the author of the Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua could have collected 
information about the sack of Amida from the archives of important cities such as 
Edessa.66 On the other hand, whereas scholars pointed out the existence of a common 
source between Prokopios and Pseudo-Zachariah,67 only the latter mentioned that 
80,000 people perished in the post-siege massacre. Mauriel Debié suggested that a  
Greek   material   with   Persian   viewpoints   might   have   been   used   by   both   authors,68  
                                            
64  See  Whately  2007:  350-4  for  a  list  of  relevant  details,  cf.  Kaldellis  2014:  XIII-XIV. 
65  For  a  short  examination  on  the  figures  provided  in  Prokopios’  Wars,  see  Whately  
2007:  133-7. 
66  See  Trombley  and  Watt  2000:  XXXI- XXXIV  for  the  source  materials  used  in  
Pseudo-Joshua’s  text. 
67  Haury  1896:  22-3,  Greatrex  1998:  73-4.  See  Greatrex  2010:  229-43  for  the  detailed  
comparison  between  these  two  texts. 
68  Debié  2003:  615. 
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while  Geoffrey Greatrex argued that a local Amidene source written in Greek might 
have been used by Pseudo-Zachariah, Prokopios, and perhaps Eustathios of 
Epiphania, 69  another important work used by Malalas and Theophanes the 
Confessor. 70  Significantly, neither of these historians had ever mentioned the 
numerical details regarding the sack of Amida, and even Prokopios, who tended to 
preserve the most entertaining parts from this Amidene text,71 kept silent on relevant 
issues. The difference between Greek- and Syriac-speaking authors in recounting the 
Amidenes’ calamities is thus significant. 
In the middle ages, John of Ephesos’ Church History became the core text for 
subsequent historians such as Michael the Syrian and  Bar Hebraeus.72 We know much 
less about the data or sources John used in his Church History, but his correspondence 
with other clergy or churchmen73 could have been an important channel through 
which precious information was transmitted and preserved. As natives of northern 
Mesopotamia, events that happened far from their localities might have been less 
important. More importantly, because most Roman citizens who suffered in the 
frontier zone were Miaphysites, local churchmen such as the author of Pseudo-
Joshua’s Chronicle and John of Ephesos must have been shocked by the atrocities 
caused by the shahs’ soldiers. 
However, it is noteworthy that John did not provide any figure regarding the 
scale of the massacre in Dara. Therefore, whereas the compiler of the Chronicle of 
1234 could have used another source in which nothing related to the massacre of Dara 
was mentioned, other writers such as Michael the Syrian could have used another text 
in which relevant information was preserved. Such figures might have served as 
literary embellishments through which the cruelty of Ḵosrow I’s forces was stressed. 
Interestingly, whereas Syriac texts usually stressed the atrocities caused by the 
Sasanids’ invasions in Amida and Dara by providing casualty numbers, neither they 
nor the Greek-speaking writers provided the casualties in the sack of Antioch, one of 
                                            
69  Greatrex  2010:  244-5. 
70  See  also  above,  p.  32. 
71  Greatrex  2010:  246. 
72  See  the  discussion  of  van  Ginkel  1995:  80,  1998:  351-8. 
73  van  Ginkel  1995:  77. 
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the most important cities of Roman Syria. I will argue that the narratives of Amida’s 
and Dara’s casualties could have been a deliberate literary strategy. As shown above, 
the attention of these Syriac-speaking authors and their listeners/readers would have 
been focused on the Mesopotamian cities and eastern affairs. Moreover, while Amida 
was not a tiny city, clearly Dara was a small frontier citadel in Late Antiquity. 
Therefore the emphasis on high—and perhaps sometimes exaggerated—casualties in 
post-siege massacres may have been thus used to create significant dramatic effects 
among these works’ potential audiences.  
To  conclude,  owing  to  the  lack  of  any  systematic  archaeological  excavations  and  
reliable   demographic   statistics   of   these   sixth-century   cities,   we   cannot   establish  
precise  numbers  of  lost  or  deported  civilians  in  these  conquered  cities.  Nevertheless,  
it is necessary to have reservations about the figures provided by Syriac authors, 
because it would have been difficult for these two relatively small cities to 
accommodate so many people in wartime. Clearly, Sura’s physical size as a citadel 
was much smaller than Dara, and it is difficult to believe that more than 10,000 
inhabitants could stay there on the eve of Ḵosrow I’s invasion in 540. Since the forces 
led by Adarmahan might have been relatively small, it would have been impossible 
for them to capture more than 200,000 Apameans and send them back to the Persian 
Empire. Further   remarks   on   the   preservation   of   figures   regarding   massacres   and  
deportations   in   different   linguistic   milieux   can   be   made.   Among   classicising  
historians,  only  Prokopios  mentioned  figures  of  deportation  in  the  sack  of  Sura,  and  
neither  Malalas  nor  other  Greek-speaking  historians  related  how  many  civilians  were  
killed   or   captured   after   these   sieges  were   concluded.  By   contrast,   such   information  
was  reported  not  only  by  contemporary  Syriac  writers  such  as  the  author  of  Pseudo-
Joshua’s  Chronicle  and  John  of  Ephesos  but  also  in  the  works  of  medieval  historians. 
While the details in the sack of Sura, together with other types of atrocities, could 
have acted as signpost to alert Prokopios’ readers to Roman civilians’ calamities in 
Ḵosrow I’s invasion, 74  focusing on the situation of Upper Mesopotamia, Syriac 
authors’ preservation of such exaggerated figures in their texts could have resulted 
from their compassion towards their co-religionists. 
                                            
74  See  above,  pp.  67-8. 
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